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Abstract  
Inter-organisational relationships are at the heart of economic activity and the 
benefits of inter-organisational collaboration are widely reported. However, 
theoretical understanding of how inter-organisational relationships are coordinated 
and why they encounter coordination problems remains limited.  
I address these questions through a study of seven social housing projects in 
England, completed between 2008 and 2011. Drawing on the richness of data from 
over 3,900 pages of minutes from meetings and project reports, I integrate social 
network analysis techniques (SNA) used to map dynamic inter-organisational 
relationships with content analysis, through which I explore coordination-related 
aspects.  
Surprisingly, coordination proved not to be (directly) related to administrative 
mechanisms. Instead, I show that coordination stems from the interplay between 
administrative mechanisms and the structure of the inter-organisational relationships, 
as shown by two theoretical mechanisms: organising and relating. The former 
captures the finding that the use of contracting fosters hierarchy, while the latter 
shows that monitoring organisations foster density of inter-organisational 
relationships. I discover that inter-organisational relationships are coordinated 
through the juggling of these mechanisms over time. Furthermore, my analysis 
demonstrates that coordination problems stem from: contractual bottlenecks and 
organisational expertise-driven homophily. Interestingly, this exposes a tension 
between mechanisms intended to aid coordination and the manifestation of 
coordination problems. 
Theorising on this tension, I am led to a framework of coordination voids – 
discontinuities in the fabric of inter-organisational relationships resulting from 
mechanisms intended to aid coordination, but in fact hampering coordination under 
certain conditions. I discuss a set of theoretical contributions to the strategic 
management and organisational and management theory, alongside a methodological 
contribution. I conclude my discussion of the contributions of this thesis by drawing 
practical implications for managers and policy-makers.  
I hope that my study will stimulate a research agenda on the coordination of 
inter-organisational relationships, preferably one that also engages with societal 
challenges. 
 
 
Keywords: Coordination; inter-organisational relationships; longitudinal SNA; 
meeting minutes; coordination voids; building industry.
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Introduction 
  
The coordination of inter-organisational relationships – purposefully aligning 
resources and actions among interdependent organisations – is fundamental for 
organisations (Coase, 1937; Ring & van de Ven, 1994). Inter-organisational 
relationships are important since organisations are becoming increasingly dependent 
on external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Research reports numerous positive 
consequences of inter-organisational relationships (e.g. innovation outcomes) but it 
also alludes to numerous ‘negative’ consequences (e.g. extra costs) (Gulati & 
Gargiulo, 1999; Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000). The enduring problem is that we 
know little about the theoretical mechanisms that underpin the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships. Therefore, I investigate the following two questions: (1) 
How are dynamic inter-organisational relationships coordinated? (2) Why do 
coordination problems occur in dynamic inter-organisational relationships?  
A coordination perspective is important in addressing such an empirical puzzle 
(Gulati, Wohlgezogen, & Zhelyazkov, 2012b; Podolny & Page, 1998; van de Ven & 
Gordon, 1984). This persists despite an extensive repertoire of research on (1) 
coordination and (2) inter-organisational relationships (not always studied together). 
Coordination has attracted the interest of scholars across numerous fields of research. 
The acknowledgement that coordination is a central mechanism in social relations 
explains the significant interest from researchers across economics (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1979), organisational and management theory (Grandori, 1997b; van de 
Ven & Gordon, 1984) and sociology (Podolny & Page, 1998; Powell, 1990).  
Coordination occupies a pivotal place within many of the theories developed to 
analyse inter-organisational relationships, such as the Transaction Cost Approach 
(TCA), Resource Dependence Theory and the Social Network Approach. 
Notwithstanding this, researchers and practitioners are yet to understand the 
theoretical mechanisms that explain how the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships unfolds. Here lies a spectacular shortcoming in the current research on 
inter-organisational relationships.  
I expose this shortcoming through three interwoven observations about current 
theorising: (1) the divide between formal and informal mechanisms of coordination, 
(2) the focus on dyads and (3) the failure to address the dynamics of inter-
organisational relationships (over time). The scope of my study can best be conveyed 
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in reference to three observations as they encapsulate my theory-driven motivation 
for this study on the coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relationships.  
 
(1) The divide between formal and informal mechanisms of coordination can 
be seen in the ongoing debate on whether contracts are substitutes for or 
complements to trust in inter-organisational relationships (Ariño & Torre, 1998; 
Gulati, 1995a). This divide can best be explained by tracing the evolution of thought 
on inter-organisational relationships. In earlier works on the TCA (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1979), contracts were discussed as playing a central role in the 
governance of transactions between organisations. Contracts are bidding agreements 
that set out obligations and expectations among the parties to the transaction. 
Contracting is located at the epicentre of the alignment of actions and resources in 
inter-organisational relationships (Hart, 1995; Macaulay, 1963; Stinchcombe, 
1985a). Contracts are generally understood as safeguards against organisations’ 
opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1979). Sanctions will apply to those parties 
that fail to fulfil their obligations. Alliances are an example of contractual 
arrangements being used to ensure control among the parties involved (Gulati, 
1995b). However, the formal nature of the contract overlooks informal aspects of 
inter-organisational relationships. 
Informal aspects are important lubricants of inter-organisational relationships 
(Barney & Hansen, 1994; Macaulay, 1963; Moran & Ghoshal, 1999). These include 
trust: one organisation’s willingness to accept its vulnerability to other organisations, 
and its belief that other organisations will cooperate (Gulati, 1995a; Ring & van de 
Ven, 1992; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). Trust-based ties entail a set of 
expectations and norms regarding social behaviour. Furthermore, research shows that 
trust prompts organisations’ competitive advantage (Barney & Hansen, 1994). Trust-
based relationships are found to be less costly, and therefore more effective, than 
formal contractual arrangements. Dyer and Chu (2000) show that trust among Toyota 
suppliers sustains their competitive advantage over General Motors.  
The divide between formal and informal aspects is no narrower in the fast-
growing social network approach, which stresses the structure of ties among 
organisations. Formal aspects of inter-organisational relationships – such as structure 
and position – have received a great deal of attention (Burt, 1992; Burt & Knez, 
1995; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Uzzi, 1997; van 
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de Ven & Gordon, 1984; Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997). The structure of inter-
organisational relationships is proven to shape coordination-related aspects, such as 
information flow and social norms (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988; Uzzi, 1997). 
Information is less novel in configurations of inter-organisational relationships that 
are organised around just a few organisations (Burt, 1992). However, cohesiveness – 
multiple ties among organisations – enhances coordination due to stability of norms 
and values (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; van de Ven & Gordon, 1984). In 
contrast, configurations that are rich in brokerage positions provide opportunities for 
organisations to access novel information by connecting to other, previously 
unconnected, parties (Burt, 1992; Burt & Knez, 1995). Thus, organisations’ positions 
in the network shape their possibilities for coordination with other parties. For 
instance, organisations in central positions access large amounts of information from 
other parties (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Walker et al., 1997).  
Although the study of formal and informal mechanisms of coordination is 
instructive, this divide limits our understanding of the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships, I argue. Recent research attempts to bridge this divide 
by looking at formal and informal aspects of coordination simultaneously (Davis & 
Eisenhardt, 2011; Doz, 1996; Faems, Janssens, Madhok, & Van Looy, 2008; Uzzi, 
1997). For instance, Doz (1996) reports that the usefulness of contracts in strategic 
alliances differs according to the stage the alliance has reached. Davis and Eisenhardt 
(2011) have found that rotating leadership among partnering organisations prompts 
innovation outcomes for inter-organisational collaborative arrangements.  
 
(2) The current theorising focuses on dyads, as opposed to groups. In 
economics, this line of reasoning is at the epicentre of the TCA initiated by Coase 
(1937) and developed in the work of Williamson (1979, 1981, 1996). The alignment 
of actions between two organisations occurs through prices. The seller and the buyer 
come together in the marketplace, where the former seeks agreement from the latter 
on the price for a given transaction (either a product or a service).  
The dyad level of analysis is also present in some of the foundational work of the 
resource dependence theory (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
The importance of dyads to the resource dependence theory is observable in the 
conceptualisation of power (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). One organisation’s power is 
positively related to other organisations’ dependence on its resources. Recent 
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theoretical developments also build on a dyadic perspective, as shown in a recent 
conceptualisation of power in inter-organisational relationships (Casciaro & 
Piskorski, 2005). Overall, a dyadic perspective is widely adopted in prior research. 
It is in the social network approach that researchers move away from dyads to 
investigate whole configurations of inter-organisational relationships, that is sets of 
ties among more than two organisations (Galaskiewicz, 1985; Powell, 1990). 
Organisations are embedded in sets of ties with many organisations, forming a wider 
configuration of inter-organisational relationships (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; 
Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Podolny & Page, 1998; Sydow & Windeler, 1998). 
Coordination unfolds, therefore, at the level of the configuration of inter-
organisational ties. For instance, Walker et al. (1997) find that the structural 
properties of inter-organisational ties affect the frequency with which biotechnology 
firms establish new relationships. Moreover, the existing structure of inter-
organisational relationships changes over time.  
 
(3) Inter-organisational relationships are dynamic; however, little is known 
about how ties among organisations change over time. Recent reviews have 
consistently pointed out the scarcity of empirical research on the dynamics of inter-
organisational relationships (Ahuja, Soda, & Zaheer, 2012; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; 
Kilduff & Brass, 2010; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007). Certainly, the difficulty of 
collecting longitudinal data about inter-organisational relationships is a plausible 
explanation for this (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Provan et al., 2007). Still, one can 
hardly deny that inter-organisational relationships are, by their very nature, dynamic 
and this must impact on coordination. 
The requirement for coordination among organisations fluctuates over time as 
well. In the same way that organisations are dependent on their counterparts for 
resources, the inputs required from each organisation change throughout the different 
stages of the collaboration. Consider the development of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner. 
Inter-organisational relationships changed constantly in order to meet the 
requirements at each stage of the project. Such dynamics of inter-organisational 
relationships were critical in addressing several problems faced by the organisations 
before the first Boeing 787 Dreamliner was able to take off (Gulati, Wohlgezogen, & 
Zhelyazkov, 2011b). Another example is experienced by the thousands of 
households who every year engage others to carry out building work for them. The 
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owner of the project may appoint an architect to design his/her home, and from there 
the project will progressively require the alignment of operations with engineers, the 
local council and building contractors. Once the drawings are completed, a main 
contractor will be appointed and will bring sub-contractors, such as bricklayers and 
plumbers, on board, employed according to the workload at each stage of the project.  
It is also hard to deny that further understanding of the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships is needed. The everyday lives of organisations are filled 
with constant change in their inter-organisational ties, stemming from production-
related requirements, or just the organisations’ search for new partners. The core idea 
here is that it is in a context of dynamic inter-organisational relationships that we 
most need to understand coordination, and yet that is where we know the least.  
 
Besides my theory-driven motivations, I have also aimed to engage my research 
on the coordination of inter-organisational relationships with industrial and societal 
issues. I thus consider the UK’s building industry, known for its adversarial practices 
of collaboration and lack of innovation, in the context of the country’s enduring 
shortage of social housing. Limited collaboration among organisations has been 
consistently reported to undermine the performance of the sector, while 
simultaneously sustaining an increase in building costs (Gann, 1996; Latham, 1994). 
The managerial and policy-making implications cover two key challenges: the social 
housing shortage and the adaptations needed for the delivery of environmentally 
sustainable buildings. Over 1.84 million people in England and almost 5 million in 
the UK are currently waiting for social housing1 and the increasing building costs are 
limiting the supply. This situation is unfolding alongside the current call for ‘greener’ 
buildings, as shown in the UK Government’s report on low carbon construction2. 
 
Considering all of the above, I aim to further our understanding on how dynamic 
inter-organisational relationships are coordinated. Coordination problems have 
scarcely been studied to date, despite the high failures rates of inter-organisational 
arrangements (Kale & Singh, 2009). At best, coordination problems are only alluded 
to or discussed based on anecdotal examples (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000). I will 
now introduce the seven chapters that constitute this thesis.  
                                                 
1
 U.K. Pushes 'Social' Housing REIT Plan by Anita Likus. Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2012. 
2
 Low Carbon Construction: Innovation & Growth Team, London: HM Government (2010). 
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In Chapter I, I will review the literature on three relevant theories used to study 
inter-organisational relationships: the TCA, the Resource Dependence Theory and 
the social network approach. The assumptions and mechanisms of the coordination 
of inter-organisational relationships will be discussed and contrasted across these 
three theories. I will conclude by discussing emerging theoretical perspectives.  
 
Chapter II will present my theoretical framework, developed to examine the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships. Using a process-based approach, 
my framework entails antecedents, mechanisms and consequences of the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships. I will structure this chapter around 
these three components of the process of coordination. 
Sociologists, economists and organisational theorists have developed a valuable 
set of insights, gathered across several industries, including the building industry, 
biotechnology and fashion textiles. However, the limited breadth and depth of the 
current research on the coordination of inter-organisational relationships will prove 
surprising. My assessment of the current research suggests that any extrapolation 
regarding the coordination of inter-organisational relationships would be, as things 
currently stand in the literature, a ‘leap of faith’. I thus identify a research 
opportunity to integrate research on coordination and inter-organisational 
relationships (e.g. the TCA and the social network approach). Furthermore, I will 
argue that a spectacular limitation in the current literature is exposed by the limited 
theoretical insight on (1) how dynamic inter-organisational relationships are 
coordinated, and (2) why coordination problems occur in dynamic inter-
organisational relationships. 
 
Chapter III will draw on my theoretical framework and introduce the 
methodology deployed in this study. I will argue that the UK’s building industry is 
appropriate for studying the coordination of inter-organisational relationships. Due to 
limited research on this topic, I will show that a multiple case study of seven social 
housing projects is appropriate for studying questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Leonard-Barton, 1990). The housing projects selected were 
completed between 2008 and 2011 in England; they had an average cost of 
£1,849,481 and involved an average of around 40 organisations.  
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I will draw on extensive and rich data sources including over 3,900 pages of 
meeting minutes and project reports to investigate the coordination of the inter-
organisational relationships in question throughout the design and build life-cycle of 
each project (on a monthly basis). Furthermore, I will explain the need for, and 
development of, an in-depth approach to social networks that includes the traditions 
of inductive research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) while using the social network 
analysis (SNA) to map the inter-organisational relationships (Galaskiewicz, 1985). 
This results in a unique longitudinal study of the development of coordination and 
coordination problems in these studied inter-organisational relationships. 
 
Chapter IV is the first chapter in which I present my findings and, in line with 
inductive research, my first step of analysis is to assess the consequences of the 
phenomenon on which I will be theorising, namely coordination. I show that the 
consequences of the coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relationships vary 
widely across cases. I based my assessment on an empirically derived model, which 
led me to develop a multidimensional indicator of the consequences that entails four 
dimensions: ‘on time and on budget’, building certification, environmental 
sustainability and faults in the building. The cross-case differences across these 
dimensions will provide additional traction for my study on the coordination of 
dynamic inter-organisational relationships.  
 
In Chapter V, I will challenge some assumptions that are usually taken for 
granted, and my findings show no (direct) association between the use of contracting 
and the hiring of management consultants, and the consequences of coordination.  
Through the combination of the SNA and a qualitative analysis of the project 
documentation, I progressively uncover that mechanisms intended to promote 
coordination and the structure of inter-organisational relationships are intertwined. I 
will show that dynamic inter-organisational relationships are coordinated based on 
two theoretical mechanisms: organising and relating. The use of contracting fosters 
hierarchy (i.e. organising), while monitoring organisations foster a density of inter-
organisational relationships (i.e. relating). The visualisation of this mechanism is 
enhanced by multimedia files of the inter-organisational relationships over time.  
Based on my longitudinal study, I will show that juggling these coordination 
mechanisms over time entails three distinctive stages: mobilisation, shape-up and 
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sustainability. Furthermore, this sequence of coordination mechanisms will be shown 
to explain the cross-case differences in the consequences of coordination. 
 
Chapter VI will show why coordination problems occur in dynamic inter-
organisational relationships. Due to the scarcity of prior research, and to avoid 
context-strapping, I will start by conceptualising coordination problems in the 
context of my study in building projects. I will show that they entail omissions and 
incompatibilities in activities, and untimely interactions among organisations. 
Of the various explanations considered, coordination problems surprisingly stem 
from mechanisms intended to promote coordination. I will show that coordination 
problems occur due to two theoretical mechanisms: contractual bottlenecks and 
organisational expertise-driven homophily. It will be argued that these mechanisms 
cause discontinuities in the social fabric of inter-organisational relationships. This 
will appear counter-intuitive as they expose a point of tension between mechanisms 
intended to promote coordination and the ‘causes’ of coordination problems. 
 
In Chapter VII, I will theorise on the mechanisms of coordination, that 
nevertheless hamper coordination through discontinuities in the fabric of inter-
organisational relationships, which I term coordination voids. This observation will 
lead me to a theory of coordination voids (ToCV) insofar as I will articulate a 
vocabulary, theoretical underpinnings and consequences of coordination voids. This 
will extend the overarching argument that the administrative mechanisms of 
coordination and the structure of inter-organisational relationships are interwoven. I 
will demonstrate specific theoretical contributions that this research makes to the 
strategic management and organisational and management theory, as well as a 
methodological contribution to the organisational research methods literature. I will 
close my discussion of contributions by highlighting practical implications for 
managers and policy-makers. Last but not least, I will draw on the limitations of this 
study in order to suggest directions for further research. 
 
All being considered, I shall argue that my foremost aim for this study is to 
motivate an inclusive research agenda on the coordination of inter-organisational 
networks and management scholarship that engages with enduring societal 
challenges.   
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Chapter I: Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview 
In this chapter, I review the relevant theories on the study of inter-organisational 
relations: the Transaction Costs Approach; Resource Dependence Theory, and the 
Social Network Approach. Towards the end, I explore the relevance of emerging 
perspectives in the study of inter-organisational relations. Every theory is examined 
as a step towards developing a theoretical framework through which to study the 
coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relations 
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All the evidence we have indicates that the growth of firms is connected with the 
attempts of a particular group of human beings to do something  
Penrose, 1959 (in: Penrose & Pitelis, 2009)  
 
Organising relations of interdependence is unequivocally part of what humans do. 
It should be no surprise that coordination is therefore at the core of what individuals 
and organisations can achieve. I am interested in how organisations attain common 
goals through inter-organisational relations.  
 
1. Theories of Inter-Organisational Relations 
Research on economics and sociology presents compelling evidence about the 
antecedents, mechanisms and consequences of relations among organisations. 
Organisations themselves are ‘designates for each person in the organisation of what 
decisions that person makes, and influences to which he is subject in making each of 
these decisions’ (Simon, 1976, p. 37). I shall start the review of the existing 
knowledge on inter-organisational relations, which is the focus of this thesis, by 
introducing three fundamental ways of organising economic and social life: markets, 
hierarchy and networks.  
Markets are places where goods or services are exchanged between one party who 
sells – i.e. the seller – and another party who buys – i.e. the buyer – at a bargained 
price. A market transaction is as follows: Organisation A (i) has a good for which 
Organisation B (j)3 is willing to pay up to a certain value (Figure 1). The leading 
mechanism for organising actions among organisations, and indeed of coordination, 
is price. This brings together in the marketplace organisations (i and j) with different 
goods or services. According to neo-classic economics, the price induces 
coordination in the marketplace whereby organisations seek to maximise their profits 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981). Consider the example of bids for contracts within 
the building industry. The client (e.g. the government) tenders in the marketplace for 
the lowest bid from the main contractors for a given job (e.g. to build a new 
hospital). Client and main contractor coordinate on the basis of the price – the main 
contractor with the lowest bid seeks to maximise profit while remaining competitive.  
                                                 
3
 I shall use this notation throughout the thesis, whereby i and j denote two organisations. 
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Hierarchies are archetypical of the systematic administration of inter-
organisational relations with an imprint of bureaucratisation. Bureaucratic aspects 
define lines of authority and units of control (Williamson, 1975). In contrast to the 
linearity attached to market-induced coordination, hierarchies are purposefully 
organised forms of coordination (Powell, 1990). They provide authority to 
organisations4. One important procedure entailed by hierarchies is the breaking-down 
of tasks into sequential sub-tasks. These are further integrated among organisations. 
For this purpose, administrative apparatuses are put in place so that sub-tasks, 
performed across at least two organisations (i and j), are assembled in a harmonious 
manner (Figure 1). Managerial mandates – organisations that are contracted to 
manage inter-organisational relations – exemplify administrative-based aspects of 
implementing hierarchies. Managerial mandates with regards to coordination among 
organisations and tasks legitimise organisational authority. Notwithstanding, a break-
down of tasks among organisations is not always possible or anticipated.  
 
Figure 1 Organising Mechanisms: Markets, hierarchies and networks 
 
 
Networks are arrangements of connected organisations (i and j) – i.e. through 
inter-organisational ties – organised in a purposeful fashion (Gulati & Gargiulo, 
1999). The vital motivation for organisations to collaborate is explained by the 
possibility of pooling resources unavailable within individual organisations (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978) (Figure 1). Consider the mobile telecommunications industry 
(Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011). A telecommunications operator (i) with market 
experience develops new technology through collaboration with another (j) that has 
                                                 
4
 Unlike the markets of transactions occurring between organisations, hierarchies can take place 
within and between organisations (Coase, 1937). I shall concentrate on hierarchical aspects of inter-
organisational relations (as opposed to hierarchies within organisations).  
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the required technical skills. While the former organisation contributes market 
experience, the latter contributes technical skills to this venture. Coordination is 
sustained by relational mechanisms, such as trust among organisations (Thorelli, 
1986). Trust produces ‘standards of expected behaviour, reliable information, and 
monitoring procedures that are at least equal to those of internal hierarchical relations 
in discouraging malfeasance’ (Ring & van de Ven, 1992, p. 492). 
Certainly, the notion of markets, hierarchies and networks makes a crude 
distinction (Bradach & Eccles, 1989). However, this distinction has an advantage, in 
terms of the traceability of relevant theories developed to study inter-organisational 
relations. Organising mechanisms entail elements of markets, hierarchies, and 
networks (Figure 1). These foundational ideas are further developed within three 
theories on inter-organisational relations: (1) the transaction costs approach (TCA), 
(2) the resource dependence theory and (3) the social network approach.  
1.1. The Transaction Cost Approach 
Market transactions involve costs that are necessary to make the exchanges 
possible in the marketplace (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981). According to the TCA, 
inter-organisational relations are restricted to those governed by contractual 
arrangements – i.e. arm’s-length ties.  
The main quest of TCA focuses on which transactions are more efficient in the 
marketplace than in hierarchies – i.e. organisations (Coase, 1937). In his seminal 
work, Coase (1937) argues that firms exist because they are able to produce some 
goods internally at a lower cost than they would have to pay for them in the 
marketplace. Further, TCA posits that the decision to transact in the marketplace or 
in a hierarchy rests with a rational analysis between costs and benefits (Williamson, 
1993). The price is therefore the ultimate mechanism of coordination among 
organisations. Contracts are safeguards against opportunism and behavioural 
unpredictability, according to the proponents of TCA (Williamson, 1975).  
In a typical transaction between two organisations – e.g. seller (i) and buyer (j) of 
a product or service – efficiency is the relation between the costs of transacting and 
the value appropriated by each organisation (i and j). Accordingly, the efficiency of a 
transaction is inversely related to three transaction costs: search, bargaining and 
enforcement (Coase, 1937). First, organisations have to search for an interested 
counterpart in the marketplace. Second, once an interested counterpart has been 
  
23
found, it is unlikely that both parties to the transaction will immediately agree upon 
the contractual details of the deal. Rather, both parties will have to spend resources – 
e.g. time – on what can be termed bargaining costs. Finally, the parties draw up 
contractual terms that have been mutually agreed upon. 
At the foundations of TCA theorising are two behavioural assumptions: bounded 
rationality and opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1981). Bounded rationality 
refers to individuals’ limitations in terms of having an accurate and complete 
understanding of the market conditions, at least ex ante of the market transaction. 
Rationality is ‘bounded’ because individuals are not endowed with powerful 
analytical and data-processing apparatus (Williamson, 1981, p. 553). Individuals are 
neither certain of what is the ‘best’ transaction nor in a position to predict the 
behaviour of other parties. Additionally, contracts cannot completely cover all 
aspects of transactions (Hart, 1995). This incompleteness of contracts allows for the 
foremost assumption about human behaviour made in TCA: opportunistic behaviour. 
The counterpart is claimed to behave opportunistically – to act in its own at the 
expense of the counterpart’s interests – in the absence of contractual jurisdiction. 
Opportunism is ‘self-interest seeking with guile’ (Williamson, 1991). Altogether, 
bounded rationality and the risk of opportunism lead to uncertainty in transactions.  
The notion of uncertainty defines most of the TCA reasoning insofar as it exposes 
the limits of contracting and the concern about opportunistic behaviour. Contracts 
face two main limitations, vividly espoused by high uncertainty: (1) complex 
transactions lead to expensive enforcement and maintenance, and (2) transaction 
parameters and specificities are rather unpredictable. While the former limitation 
suggests that contracts increase the cost of any transaction, the latter creates leeway 
for parties to behave opportunistically. Against this backdrop, the choice of 
contractual arrangements requires an analysis of the characteristics of transactions. 
Transaction characteristics include asset specificity, small numbers bargaining 
and frequency (Williamson, 1979; Williamson, 1981). Asset-specificity refers to the 
uniqueness of transactions, whereby specialised goods or services present more 
hazards to the transaction. Thus, asset-specificity increases the transaction costs. 
Asset specificity may be the transaction characteristic with the strongest impact as 
far as theoretical and practical implications are concerned (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999; 
Zajac & Olsen, 1993). Small numbers bargaining occurs whenever no alternative 
goods or services are available in the market. Therefore, the number of substitutes 
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inversely predicts the costs of transacting. The frequency of transactions also shapes 
their costs: low frequency leads to higher transaction costs and vice versa. Goods or 
services that are only occasionally transacted have higher costs of transaction 
because organisations have fewer opportunities to gather information. 
Overall, the TCA represents a control-minded perspective on inter-organisational 
relations. It has been widely referenced across the fields of economics, sociology and 
strategy, often in the form of critiques rather than acceptance (Ghoshal & Moran, 
1996; Ouchi, 1980; Powell, 1990). The TCA has been portrayed as a ‘cynical 
caricature’ of human beings. Assumptions about people’s opportunistic behaviour, 
and the focus on dyads, are the two main criticisms. Critics argue that the TCA 
builds on faulty – or at least incomplete – assumptions about human motivation. 
Others claim that the motivation to transact is not exclusively financial, and the 
interdependence of resources aligns organisations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The 
notion of interdependence is dealt with in the resource dependence theory. 
 
1.2. The Resource Dependence Theory 
One of the leading propositions of the resource dependence theory is that 
organisations are dependent on resources and endowments that are available 
elsewhere in the environment. External resources – e.g. information – shape the 
possibilities for inter-organisational relations. This occurs because of mutual 
dependence (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). A further 
understanding of organisations from a resource dependence perspective calls for 
three concepts: resources, interdependence and power. 
Resources are assets that are essential for organisational operations. This is true 
for organisations that are privately owned – i.e. firms – and those that are publically 
owned – i.e. universities and governmental agencies. Resources may be broadly 
categorised into physical, financial and information (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Machinery is an example of a physical resource. For instance, carmakers (i) depend 
on the specialist production facilities of certain suppliers such as the manufacturers 
of windscreens (j). Financial investments are often essential in order for organisations 
to run their operations. Today’s organisations depend on private investors – e.g. 
venture capitalists (Hallen, 2008) – and public funding programmes – e.g. 
governmental agencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Information is also an important 
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resource. Information relevant to the operations of organisations is often available 
elsewhere in the environment (Cyert & March, 1963). Thus, organisations constantly 
rely on resources that are owned by other organisations, which fosters inter-
organisational relations characterised by a mutual dependence on resources.   
Interdependence among organisations takes shape because the possibility of 
action by one organisation is mutually dependent on other organisations and their 
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). With the notion of interdependence in mind, 
scholars refer to the notion of environment constraints. That is, the resources 
available in the environment determine each organisation’s individual possibilities 
for action. Interdependence is maximised if resources are critical and the availability 
of substitute resources is scarce. For example, Katila, Rosenberger and Eisenhardt 
(2008) report that the willingness of entrepreneurs to collaborate with larger 
organisations depends on their resource needs as well as the existence of alternative 
partners (other organisations that can offer the same resources).   
Recently, Casciario and Piskorski (2005) refined the notion of interdependence, 
distinguishing between two separate concepts: that of power imbalance and that of 
mutual dependence. Power captures the degree of dependence among organisations 
such that organisation A’s power (i) over its counterpart, organisation B (j), varies 
inversely to the dependence of organisation B (j) on organisation A (i). Thus, power 
is a product of the relationship rather than an attribute of the actor. Power imbalance 
captures the asymmetry of power between two organisations (i and j), that is, the 
degree to which the power of one organisation is substantially different from that of 
its counterpart (dependence of organisation A on organisation B ≠ dependence of 
organisation B on organisation A). Mutual dependence explains the possibility that 
both organisations (i and j) share a reliance on the resources made available in the 
exchange. Furthermore, power imbalance and mutual dependence are related to one 
another: different levels of mutual dependence can change the power imbalance 
(Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005).  
One important consequence of interdependence and power imbalance is 
uncertainty. Opportunistic behaviour can emerge through the combination of 
uncertainty and interdependence among organisations. Uncertainty also develops 
from the broad environment because organisations and the availability of resources 
change constantly (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However, organisations have limited 
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opportunities for managing environment-related sources of uncertainty, which 
explains why organisations tend to ally themselves with partner organisations. 
Organisations can reduce the uncertainty associated with resource dependence by 
engaging in long-term arrangements of inter-organisational relations (Thompson, 
1967). Joint ventures (Katila et al., 2008; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976; Zajac & Olsen, 
1993) and alliances (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Gulati, 1998) are 
examples. The resource dependence literature suggests that interdependence predicts 
inter-organisational relations. For example, organisations seek financial resources 
from partners (Baum et al., 2000). In a critique of the TCA, Zajac and Olsen (1993) 
suggest that organisations engage in inter-organisational relations to create value 
(without it necessarily leading to opportunistic behaviour). Arguably, a preference 
for less formal arrangements creates value since it lowers transaction costs.  
Protection mechanisms are sought so as to minimise opportunism and abuses of 
power. As shown by Katila et al. (2008), organisations are reluctant to seek resources 
from other organisations if there are no ‘defence mechanisms’ against the potential 
misappropriation of their resources – e.g. trade secrets. Besides contracts, protection 
mechanisms are embedded in relations among organisations. Gulati and Gargiulo 
(1999) suggest that, alongside considerations of resource independence, 
organisations are more likely to engage with partners they trust. 
Concerns over reputational damage prevent opportunistic behaviour – i.e. the 
misappropriation of resources. Organisations are able to establish contract-relaxed 
ties, where trust and reputation concerns govern the inter-organisational relations. In 
this vein, authors intentionally employ the term ‘inter-organisational relationships’ to 
denote ‘social’ aspects5 (Levine & White, 1961; Ring & van de Ven, 1994). 
Hereafter, I shall use the term ‘inter-organisational relationships’ to reflect the social 
aspect of inter-organisational interactions. 
In summary, the concepts of resources, interdependence and power demonstrate 
how the resource dependence theory is relevant for understanding inter-
organisational relationships (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Katila et al., 2008; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978). The resource dependence theory builds on the realm of 
relationships and networks. Inter-organisational relationships have just started to be 
                                                 
5
 The resource dependence theory borrows the notion of power from the social exchange theory 
(SET), in which the term ‘inter-organisational relationships’ represent the sociological and 
anthropological foundations of the SET. Still, I assert that, in this thesis, the SET is not of central use, 
even if allusions to it may occur. 
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fully explored, with the development of sociometric techniques for mapping ties 
systematically among organisations. Recently, the social network approach has been 
used to develop a detailed analysis of and theorising on inter-organisational 
relationships (Ahuja et al., 2012; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). 
 
1.3. The Social Network Approach 
The social network approach to inter-organisational relationships builds on the 
sociological perspective of embeddedness, which views economic action as 
embedded in patterns of social relations (Coleman, 1994; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 
1997). The network perspective views inter-organisational relationships as a set of 
ties among organisations, that is, a configuration of inter-organisational relationships 
(Galaskiewicz, 1985). Most recent literature reviews show that the social network 
approach has indeed produced unique insights on inter-organisational relationships. 
Network forms of organisation are ‘any collection of actors (N ≥ 2) that pursue 
repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a 
legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve any disputes that might 
arise during exchange’6 (Podolny & Page, 1998, p. 59). This quotation shows that 
network forms of organisation are predominantly characterised by repeated 
interactions – as opposed to spontaneous ones – made in pursuit of an exchange. 
Unlike in the transaction economics literature, inter-organisational relationships 
might unfold without a fully formal, authoritative structure of contractually regulated 
transactions and hierarchies. Examples of network forms of organisation include 
alliances (Baum et al., 2000; Gulati, 1998), joint ventures (Barkema, Shenkar, 
Vermeulen, & Bell, 1997; Polidoro, Ahuja, & Mitchell, 2011) and research 
consortiums between privately-held companies and universities (George, Zahra, & 
Wood, 2002; Mitev & Venters, 2009).  
The term ‘inter-organisational relationships’ is often used interchangeably with 
‘inter-organisational networks’. The former term tends to be used in sociology while 
the latter has been popularised by the advent of the SNA techniques7. (Hereafter, I 
                                                 
6
 Italicised as in the original version.  
7
 The methodological aspects of SNA will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter III – Methodology. I 
deliberately draw a distinction between social networks as a ‘methodology’ and as a ‘theoretical 
approach’. Prior research often uses the label ‘network theory’ to refer to the method and theoretical 
aspects of the social network approach. This distinction is necessary and pertinent to prevent 
confusion (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Kilduff & Brass, 2010). 
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shall also use both terms interchangeably.) To ensure an essential understanding of 
the social network approach, before I deal with the theoretical underpinnings, I shall 
now introduce the fundamental methodological notions of the approach. An inter-
organisational relationship is represented as a tie between at least two organisations. 
Each organisation is treated as a node. Consider the following example: organisation 
A (i) connects to organisation B (j); that interaction is represented as the tie xij. An 
inter-organisational tie ‘serve as a bond that aligns and coordinates action, enabling 
groups of nodes to act as a single node, often with greater capabilities’ (Borgatti & 
Halgin, 2011, p. 7). Ties are identified in relation to a function – i.e. the content of 
the tie (Galaskiewicz, 1985; Tichy, Tushman, & Fombrun, 1979). The research and 
development (R&D) leading up to a new product and driving the formation of 
various alliances represents an example of a set of ties among organisations working 
together. A configuration of inter-organisational relationships is a graphic 
representation of a set of nodes connected by ties (∑{xij}), either at a given point in 
time – known as a ‘snapshot’ – or over a period of time, which is known as 
longitudinal (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The SNA have served as a ‘sharper 
analytical tool’ (Granovetter, 1973, p. 1373) for studying patterned relationships 
among entities, whether individuals or organisations. Prior research uses SNA to map 
inter-organisational relationships in a variety of industry settings, such as 
biotechnology (Walker et al., 1997) and building (Smyth & Pryke, 2008).  
The foremost idea in the social network approach is that the structure of inter-
organisational relationships constrains organisations’ actions. Some unique insights 
are worth exploring here because of their relevance to the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships:  
(i) organisations develop and operate in patterned inter-organisational 
relationships;  
(ii) a governance structure combines both economic and social aspects;  
(iii) the structure of the inter-organisational relationships shapes potential actions 
by other organisations; 
(iv) patterned inter-organisational relationships explain behaviours and 
consequences within organisations (i.e. collaboration outcomes).   
 
Organisations are embedded in patterned inter-organisational relationships whose 
‘structure might facilitate or block organisation’ (Granovetter, 1973, p. 1373). The 
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notion of embeddedness specifically captures the constraints of the relations on the 
actors, e.g. organisations (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1985; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; 
Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1996). The embeddedness can be structural or relational. The 
former refers to opportunities and constraints set by the structural properties of 
configurations of inter-organisational relationships. Some of the relevant structural 
attributes are given by measures of the density and centrality of actors within the 
configuration of inter-organisational relationships. Density measures the frequency 
of ties among organisations, thus dense configurations are densely connected. 
Centrality is broadly the number of ties for a given organisation, thus central 
organisations have the highest number of ties with other parties (Freeman, 1979). 
Relational embeddedness refers to the impact of relationships on values and norms. 
The number of direct ties is often used as a measure of relational embeddedness (see 
Polidoro et al., 2011, for a recent example). Although, the distinction between the 
types of embeddedness allows for analytical clarity, the two are empirically 
intertwined (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Uzzi, 1996, 1997). 
The proposition of embeddedness is well-illustrated by the long-lasting debate 
about the impact of strong ‘versus’ weak ties (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988; 
Granovetter, 1973), one of the liveliest, and most inconclusive, debates in the social 
network literature. Strong ties are emotionally intense and involve a greater amount 
of time and constant interaction between the parties. By contrast, weak ties involve 
less time and less intensity while benefiting from new information (it avoids 
duplication of information). Strong ties are essential to the cohesion of the social 
structure (Coleman, 1988). Trust and mechanisms of social control are typical in 
settings where all the members know each other. Cohesion reduces the likelihood of 
‘free-riding’ behaviours while increasing the benefits for all participants (Coleman, 
1988). When studying an Italian community in Boston’s West End (USA), 
Granovetter (1973) found that weak ties were indispensable for individuals, enabling 
them to obtain useful information and integrate into the community. In disagreement 
with most of the literature at the time, Granovetter (1973) reports that strong ties 
breed local cohesion (i.e. within the group) and avoid global fragmentation (i.e. 
across the entire network). In a specific reference to inter-organisational 
relationships, Granovetter (1985b) argues that organisations in densely connected 
networks simply do better.  
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Others suggest that the effects of either type of tie, strong or weak, may co-exist, 
with distinctive outcomes. This insight was initiated by the work of Uzzi (1996, 
1997) on the ‘paradox of embeddedness’, based on the New York apparel industry. 
In another attempt to resolve this dichotomy between strong or weak ties, Mariotti 
and Delbridge (2012) go further by arguing that the dichotomy between ‘strong’ and 
‘weak’ ties is rather narrow in its explanation. The authors subtly relax the 
dichotomy by arguing that organisations also rely on potential ties (essential 
knowledge about a possibly relevant tie) and reactivate latent ties (past ties that can 
readily be reactivated) (Mariotti & Delbridge, 2012, p. 14). Overall, the effect of 
embeddedness operates simultaneously under four tie types: strong, weak, potential, 
and latent. The debate about ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ties illustrates the importance of ties 
among organisations to the explanation of collaboration. 
Organisations operate in and develop patterned inter-organisational relationships 
(Dyer & Chu, 2000; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny & Page, 1998; Rosenkopf & 
Tushman, 1998; Tichy et al., 1979). For example, they are often path-dependent, due 
to two main factors: resources and previous experience of working together. 
Research informed by the resource dependence theory reports that organisations 
develop ties with organisations that own complementary resources (Gulati & 
Gargiulo, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) conclude that 
resource interdependence is a strong predictor of alliance formation patterns among 
organisations, explaining ‘where inter-organisational networks come from’. An 
extensive body of research reports that relationships among organisations are a 
primary way of organising economic activity. This is reported across several 
industries, in areas such as flight simulation (Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1998) and 
automobile manufacturing (Dyer & Chu, 2000).  
Previous experience of working together is another factor that contributes to the 
path-dependence of inter-organisational relationships (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati & Sytch, 
2008). Organisations tend to form ties with partners with which they have previous 
experience of working, due to the familiarity mechanism (Gulati, 1995a). Familiarity 
breeds trust among organisations, providing a unique relational mechanism of 
governance in network forms of organisation.  
In contrast to prices in markets and administrative coordination in hierarchies, the 
governance structure in inter-organisational relationships combines both economic 
and social logics (Dyer & Chu, 2000; Gulati, 1995a; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; 
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Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven, 1997; Ring & van de Ven, 1992; Uzzi, 1996; 
Zajac & Olsen, 1993). Although goals of economic attainment might be enforced 
through binding agreements, trust among organisations is essential to enhance the 
coordination between them (Ring & van de Ven, 1992). Therefore, organisations, 
personified by boundary spanners, – that is, individuals working across 
organisational boundaries – foster trust-based relationships (Perrone, Zaheer, & 
McEvily, 2003). Trust is ‘the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other 
party’ (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995, p. 712). The assertion that individuals 
display a predisposition to trust is underpinned by the early works of psychologists 
who regard trust as that predisposition (Kramer, 1999; Rotter, 1971). Trust lubricates 
inter-organisational relationships by calibrating expectations and providing norms of 
behaviour (Gambetta, 1988). Recent literature reviews by Rousseau et al. (1998), 
Colquitt, Scott and LePine (2007) and McEvily (2011) establish that a consensus 
exists around Mayer et al.’s (1995) definition. Still, research on inter-organisational 
relationships frequently adopts a broader definition of trust: the goodwill of another 
party in a situation involving risk or vulnerability (Bigley & Pearce, 1998; Gulati, 
1995a; Ring & van de Ven, 1992). 
Risk and trust are related, yet distinguishable, concepts (McEvily, 2011; Uzzi, 
1997). Some confusion arises as both concepts hold an element of calculativeness 
(Stinchcombe, 1990). The distinction hinges upon two aspects. First, the difference 
between risk and calculated risk depends on the theoretical perspective. Calculated 
risk has been defined in the TCA as a rational analysis of costs and benefits 
(Williamson, 1993). Thus, calculativeness is a characteristic of contract-governed, 
that is arm’s-length, ties, as opposed to embedded ties that incorporate trust (Uzzi, 
1997). Second, risk is defined as part of a subjective judgment that one organisation 
will perform a task in a particular situation (Ring & van de Ven, 1992).  
Instead of the dichotomy of collaboration ‘versus’ non-collaboration typical of 
TCA reasoning, the risk of non-collaboration is situational. That is, organisations’ 
engagement in collaboration varies across situations. Although collaboration is 
important because of interdependence among organisations, not all non-collaboration 
episodes accrue negative consequences. The decision to collaborate is a subjective 
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judgment, as found by Stinchcombe (1990) when studying decisions to collaborate 
made by contractors and sub-contractors working on Norwegian oil platforms.  
Prior research advocates that organisations benefit from being perceived as 
trustworthy (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Dyer & Chu, 2000). Barney and Hansen 
(1994) argue that an organisation’s trustworthiness – that is, being perceived as a 
trustworthy organisation – is a valuable source of competitive advantage because (1) 
it reduces the costs of transactions and (2) it helps to attract potential business 
partners. Furthermore, Dyer and Chu (2000) report that the trust-based relationship 
between Toyota and its suppliers helped it to sustain a competitive advantage over its 
leading rival, General Motors (GM). This relies on the premise that trust lowers 
transaction costs, namely, search, monitoring and enforcing. Thus, Toyota developed 
trustworthiness among its suppliers, resulting in lower costs of contracting and 
higher supplier performance, such as fewer delays.   
 
1.4. Emerging Theoretical Perspectives 
Emerging perspectives in the literature seek insights into inter-organisational 
relationships, either by introducing ideas from other research fields or through 
original research aimed at building theory. Either way, the new insights build on 
widely-used theories, such as those mentioned above, but incorporate a degree of 
critique. Some contributions highlight agency (over structure), while others pursue 
an understanding based on the micro-foundations of inter-organisational 
relationships (over macro aspects). 
1.4.1. Strategic Action 
Research on strategic action resonates with the debate on the relation between 
action and structure in social relations8. The leading proposition is that organisations 
– formed by individuals and groups – may intentionally manage social ties. This 
tension between structure and agency is thoroughly analysed within structuration 
theory under the notion of ‘duality of structure’ (Giddens, 1984). Duality of structure 
encapsulates a recursive mechanism within social structures, where structures – e.g. 
norms and rules – facilitate social actions, which in turn create the social structure. 
                                                 
8
 Although agency approaches are an established body of literature, I focus here on the key insights of 
agency theory that have been used within the context of inter-organisational relationships. 
  
33
Agency is therefore regarded as the actions by individuals who process information 
about social structures triggering this recursive process. However, individuals can 
still deviate from the norms and rules embedded in the social structure9.  
From two quite different empirical settings, a common theme emerges: agency 
matters to inter-organisational networks. In the biotechnology industry, as reported 
by Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996), organisations in central positions in the 
network have rapidly implemented strategies aimed at creating new ties (i.e. 
alliances) with organisations that can provide R&D. This provides them with 
superior growth compared to their competitors. In another empirical setting, that of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) providing international aid in the Gaza 
Strip, research shows that the embeddedness of organisations relates to the objectives 
they pursue (Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003). The organisations involved 
sporadically in the aid programme are those associated with strategic effects 
(accessing resources), while the highly embedded organisations are those associated 
with political effects (influence over other partners) (Hardy et al., 2003, p. 342).  
Recent research sheds light upon the interplay between social structure and action 
in the context of inter-organisational relationships (Obstfeld, 2005; Ozcan & 
Eisenhardt, 2009; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). In a study of entrepreneurs in the US 
wireless gaming industry, Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009) report that individuals 
actively shape network formation. This takes place through three strategies: the 
architectural approach, critical industry uncertainties, and the prospect of ties. Given 
an absence of accurate information on the inter-organisational relationships in the 
marketplace (i.e. interdependence and roles within the industry), entrepreneurs in the 
study based their action upon cognitively perceived configurations of inter-
organisational relationships. In a second strategy, critical industry uncertainties lead 
organisations to form new ties. Entrepreneurs form new ties with organisations they 
perceive will help them to overcome industry uncertainties. Finally, organisations 
actively prospect for new ties among existing partners. Following similar reasoning, 
Santos and Eisenhardt (2009) report that successful entrepreneurs intentionally build 
                                                 
9
 Here, I aim to secure an essential understanding of structuration theory, nothing more. Further 
reading on structuration theory will lead to the concept of ‘resources’ – defined as patterns of action 
followed over time. I do not develop this theoretical nuance any further for two reasons: (1) it falls 
outside the scope of this discussion (and of this thesis); (2) it would lead to confusion with the concept 
of ‘resources’ that is defined in the resource dependence theory. Thus, the concept of ‘resources’ that 
appears elsewhere in this thesis adheres to the resource dependence theory only. 
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ties with established firms as part of a strategy to prevent the entry of the latter (who 
would use their advantageous position to take on the market). 
In a study of innovation implementation within an engineering department, 
Obstfeld (2005) observes that the interplay between structure and action is an ‘action 
problem’. On the one hand, dense networks promote coordination – i.e. cohesion that 
is sustained through norms and rules among parties (Coleman, 1994). On the other 
hand, novel ideas develop in sparse networks (Burt, 1992). Network structure is 
relevant. However, innovation in the engineering department was still found to be 
significantly due to individuals’ orientation to act across groups – i.e. orientation 
towards brokerage – and to diverse social knowledge – i.e. familiarity with role-
related specifications, accumulated knowledge in the firm (assessed via tenure), and 
education (Obstfeld, 2005, p. 100). Therefore, individual agency lies at the 
crossroads of accessing novel ideas (i.e. the potential to innovate) and the 
implementation of those ideas (i.e. innovation outcomes).  
1.4.2. Micro-Foundations of Inter-Organisational Relationships 
The micro-foundations of inter-organisational relationships explore behaviour 
among parties and its effects on the outcomes of the relationships. This approach has 
emerged as a counterpoint to the macro-level explanations.   
The departure point is Simmel’s work on third parties, or tertius iungens (Simmel, 
1950, 1971). The key idea is that ties between two parties, that is dyads, acquire new 
properties whenever connected to a third party. The mechanism is that of transitivity: 
organisation A (i) connects to organisation B (j) (xij), organisation B (j) connects to 
organisation C (l) (xjl) and organisation A (i) is thus connected to organisation C (l) 
(xil). Transitive triads develop norms and social mechanisms of control at the micro-
level, that is, among all three parties. Accordingly, transitivity in triads prevents the 
pursuit of self-interest as well as social disintegration (Krackhardt, 1998).  
Triads are associated with an individual’s ability to generate innovations through 
cross-boundary knowledge (Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010). A typical example of 
transitivity occurs when partners involved in one alliance initiate collaborations 
among their alliance partners (Gulati, 1995). Reciprocally connected ties promote 
trust and social monitoring within the alliance. Triads promote cohesion; however, 
triads led to group withdrawals from alliances in what is also a manifestation of 
cohesion (Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi, & Rowley, 2010).  
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The impetus for a deeper understanding of micro-foundations stems from the 
study of the structural properties of inter-organisational relations in management. 
The concept of capability provides a good illustration10 (Abell, Felin, & Foss, 2008). 
Initially understood at the organisational level, and widely adopted in the literature, 
capabilities represent an organisation’s ability to integrate competencies (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982) in a routine manner. Explanations of how organisations change their 
capabilities, that is, dynamic capabilities, also remains primarily at the organisational 
level (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Further research into the integration of 
competencies highlights the role of micro-level mechanisms. Davis and Eisenhardt 
(2011) find that rotating the leadership of a project among organisations has a 
positive impact on technological innovation in the context of inter-organisational 
collaboration. That is, inter-organisational ties are of critical importance to the 
innovation process, but not without micro-level leadership processes.  
To sum up, the TCA, the resource dependence theory and the social network 
approach provide an essential understanding of the relevant theories used to study 
inter-organisational relationships. Table 1 summarises this literature review. It shows 
the theoretical perspectives I used in my directed investigation of prior research on 
inter-organisational relationships.  
                                                 
10
 I call on the notion of capabilities to illustrate the relevance of research on micro-foundations (e.g. 
Abell et al., 2008). Capabilities provide a good example because they are often portrayed as a micro-
level construction in (strategic) management, despite remaining conceptualised at a higher level. 
Having served to illustrate my point, at this stage no further discussion will be pursued.   
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Table 1 Summary of the Literature Review 
Theories 
Inter-
organisational 
relationships 
Length of the 
tie Governance Critiques  Purpose  
Transaction 
Costs 
Approach 
Transactions ‘Arm's-length ties’ Contracts 
Opportunistic 
behaviour 
Profit (leading to 
profitability) 
Resource 
Dependence 
Theory 
Relations  
 
‘Arm's-length 
ties’ and 
embedded ties 
Contracts, 
power, and 
legitimacy 
Interdependenc
e (abuse of 
power) 
Resources (leading 
to competitiveness) 
Social 
Network 
Approach 
Relationships/ 
Networks 
Embedded 
ties (and 
configuration 
of ties) 
Contracts and 
relational 
mechanisms 
(e.g. trust and 
reputation) 
Structural 
constraints (e.g. 
disconnected 
parties) 
Resources and 
opportunities 
(leading to 
competitiveness) 
Emerging  Perspectives 
Strategic 
Action Relationships 
Open (global 
structures) 
‘Structural 
duality’ (e.g. 
agency and 
rules) 
Agency (if 
instability 
arises) 
Manoeuvring to 
attain goals 
Micro-
foundations Relationships 
Embedded 
(triads and 
global 
structures) 
Relational 
(e.g. 
transitivity) 
Overlooking of 
the global 
structure 
To induce action at 
the micro-level 
 
 
The aforementioned theories capture an evolution of the concepts used in this 
research, but more importantly they lay the theoretical foundations for the 
development of a theoretical framework that I will use to study the coordination of 
inter-organisational relationships, a journey that I will begin in the next chapter. 
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Chapter II: Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
Overview 
My goal in this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework through which to 
study the coordination of inter-organisational relationships, that is, the process of 
purposefully aligning resources and actions among interdependent organisations. I 
develop a theoretical framework that builds on the TCA, resource dependence theory 
and the social network approach so as to unpack the theoretical underpinnings across 
the coordination process: antecedents, mechanisms and consequences.  
One important insight – initially surprising to me – is the breadth and depth of 
current research that relates to the coordination of inter-organisational relationships 
in one way or another. Sociologists, economists and organisational theorists have 
developed valuable insights that unveil the multidimensionality of coordination and 
inter-organisational relationships (not always studied together). This provided me 
with the opportunity to develop a framework that integrates an eclectic body of 
literature (e.g. the TCA and the social network approach) that captures this 
multidimensionality (e.g. contractual and relational aspects), and multiple levels of 
analysis (e.g. the organisation, network configurations of organisations and the 
industry context) for each stage of the coordination process.  
Having developed a theoretical framework, my assessment of the current research 
suggests, however, that any extrapolation regarding the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships as it currently stands in the literature would be a ‘leap of 
faith’. This is exposed by the lack of systematic research on the theoretical 
underpinnings of the following questions: (1) How are dynamic inter-organisational 
relationships coordinated? (2) Why do coordination problems occur in dynamic 
inter-organisational relationships? 
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Coordination is pivotal in the theorising on inter-organisational relationships. 
However, the current research lacks an integrated perspective that would articulate 
the extensive research based on a wide array of theoretical perspectives and 
conducted across industry contexts. Against this backdrop, my goal in this chapter is 
to build a theoretical framework for the study of the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships. By the end of this chapter, I will have critically 
evaluated the current research, as well as identified research opportunities. These two 
accomplishments will guide my research aimed at advancing the current theorising 
on the coordination of inter-organisational relationships.  
 
2. Coordination Process of Inter-Organisational Relationships 
First of all, it is crucial to underpin the notion of ‘coordination’ by referring to 
surrounding concepts often used interchangeably in prior literature: collaboration and 
cooperation (Ahuja, 2000a; Hardy et al., 2003). Ahuja posits that ‘collaboration 
facilitates bringing together complementary skills [e.g. R&D capabilities] from 
different firms’ (2000a, p. 429). Studying relationships among organisations 
providing international aid in the Gaza Strip, Hardy et al. (2003, p. 323) define 
‘collaboration as a cooperative, interorganizational relationship that is negotiated in 
an ongoing communicative process, and which relies on neither market nor 
hierarchical mechanisms of control’. The notion of collaboration is often used 
alongside cooperation, as shown in the above definition. However, I shall distinguish 
between collaboration and cooperation for the sake of conceptual clarity.  
Cooperation in inter-organisational relationships11 entails a behavioural intention 
to collaborate towards a common goal, given a trade-off between contributions and 
payoffs (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Provan & Milward, 1995). Provan and Milward 
(1995) use the concept of cooperation alongside coordination (mentioned implicitly) 
in their claim that cooperation and integration of activities across multiple 
organisations, are fundamental to deliver health and human services. Cooperation 
occurs if all parties in the inter-organisational arrangement perceive it as being fair 
and beneficial. Ring and van de Ven (1994, p. 94) suggest that cooperative 
                                                 
11
 The concept of cooperation is widely known due to the popularity of game theory. The discussion 
of cooperation in the light of game theory is not relevant to this thesis or my research aims. Therefore, 
I intentionally confine the definition of cooperation to the scope of my literature review (Chapter I). 
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relationships are ‘socially contrived mechanisms for collective action, which are 
continually shaped and restructured by actions and symbolic interpretations of the 
parties involved’. For this discussion, I shall refer to cooperation as entailing 
behavioural intentionality, and collaboration as the willingness to jointly perform 
activities12. 
The fundamental components of the definition of coordination are found 
elsewhere in the broad literature on inter-organisational relationships (Coase, 1937; 
Granovetter, 1973; Gulati & Singh, 1998; Gulati et al., 2012b; Simon, 1976; 
Thompson, 1967; van de Ven & Gordon, 1984; Williamson, 1975). In his seminal 
work, Simon (1976, p. 72) defines coordination as the ‘process of informing each as 
to the planned behaviour of the others’. Furthermore, Simon (1976) distinguishes 
between procedural and substantial coordination. The former delineates coordination 
spheres for the activities of each organisation as well as respective lines of authority. 
The latter provides the organisations with a specification of the tasks to be performed 
by each. Consider building a public school. The allocation of responsibilities (e.g. the 
main contractor for all building works) and leadership (e.g. client pursuing on-time 
completion) refers to procedural coordination. Detailed allocation of the tasks among 
the organisations in the project documentation show substantial coordination. 
The variety of definitions of coordination echoes elements of the market, 
hierarchies and network forms of organisation (Chapter I). The variety reflects the 
breadth and depth of prior research on coordination and inter-organisational 
relationships (not always studied together). For transaction costs researchers, 
coordination is a conscious direction taken in organising physical, financial and 
human capital and workloads in order to deliver goods or services (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1979). Williamson (1991) argues that coordination refers to actions 
intended to foster the adaptation of organisations to unanticipated disturbances while 
protecting them from misappropriation by other parties to the transaction. The 
ultimate purpose of organisations is profit, achieved by selling products and services. 
Consequently, organisations actively endeavour to integrate their tasks and goals 
harmoniously and internally in order to compete in the marketplace. Because 
                                                 
12
 Although I find this distinction helpful, a consensual distinction between cooperation and 
collaboration is yet to emerge (and that is a topic of research on its own). Prior research often uses the 
two concepts interchangeably but I have observed a pattern based on the theoretical frameworks used. 
Coordination is consistently used in game theory research and collaboration in multi-party research 
(e.g. inter-agency collaboration).   
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individual goals are interdependent but not necessarily aligned, they need to be 
managed in order to avoid conflict between the organisations (i.e. parties) involved 
in the transaction (Langlois & Robertson, 1993).  
An often-debated feature of coordination is the notion of coordination costs. 
These encompass ‘activities to be completed jointly or individually across 
organisational boundaries and the related extent of communication and decisions that 
would be necessary’13 to do so (Gulati & Singh, 1998, p. 782). Coordination costs 
have implications for organisations’ profit goals insofar as the rents from economic 
activity decrease as the costs of organising increase (Coase, 1937). Communication 
and governance structures therefore become essential in attaining coordination. 
Contracts are the primary mechanisms used to promote coordination; however, they 
are costly. Less costly options are therefore appealing to organisations.  
With a focus on the intra- and inter-organisational scope of action, Thompson 
(1967) suggests that coordination refers to the effective and efficient regulation of 
the interdependence between units or organisations. As for the intersection between 
the hierarchical and network forms, Argote (1982, p. 423) states that ‘coordination 
involves fitting together the activities of organization members, and the need for it 
arises from the interdependent nature of the activities that organization members 
perform’. Organising within organisations is well-documented in some of the 
foundational work on the theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1962).  
In a literature review of inter-organisational relationships, Smith, Carroll and 
Ashford (1995, p. 11) specifically note that ‘coordination concerns the combination 
of parts to achieve the most effective or harmonious results’. Coordinated action 
requires that organisations work together to attain a common goal since the actions of 
one organisation shape another’s possibilities for action. Recalling the example of 
building a school, the main contractors are required to coordinate with the architects 
and engineering firms in order to finalise the drawings14. Similar observations about 
the integration of tasks performed by different organisations can be made in other 
settings, such as hospitals (Gittell & Weiss, 2004), software production (Camerer & 
                                                 
13
 Although I am interested in the coordination of inter-organisational relations, it is not the purpose of 
this thesis to study coordination costs in the strict sense as conceptualised within the TCA. That would 
have required an exclusive focus on the agency problems that occur throughout transactions. My 
approach is rather aligned with the management literature that adopts a broader view. This is thought 
to be more relevant to studying the alignment of inter-organisational relationships from a network 
perspective (this was first noted by Gulati and Singh [1998, p. 782]). 
14
 I acknowledge that collaboration between the architect and main contractors varies based on the 
tendering arrangement and, of course, across projects.   
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Knez, 1996) and R&D (Teece, 1986). In the same vein, the integration of parties has 
been the focus of studies on the mobilisation of local communities (Granovetter, 
1973), health care organisations (van de Ven & Gordon, 1984) and mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) (Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006).  
In a study of M&A processes, Puranam et al. (2006, p. 264) suggest that acquirers 
exploit the innovation potential of acquired firms in a ‘coordinated manner by 
linking them [innovation streams of the acquired firm] to their own complementary 
assets in manufacturing, and distribution’. This definition makes it clear that several 
parties are involved. However, the notion of interdependence acquires a pivotal place 
when one searches for other definitions of coordination. Others posit that 
‘coordination is the extent to which organizations attempt to ensure that their 
activities take into account those of other organizations’ (Hall, Clark, Giordano, 
Johnson, & Roekel, 1977). These two conceptualisations of coordination show that 
coordination entails a joint effort among organisations to attain a purpose. 
It is important to note that coordination among organisations is not specific to 
privately owned organisations, as shown by research on governmental agencies 
(Provan & Milward, 1995; van de Ven & Gordon, 1984) and NGOs (Hardy et al., 
2003). Van de Ven and Gordon (1984, p. 598) suggest that the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships is the pursuit of ‘a particular objective for which it [the 
organisation] must gain support, cooperation, or resources from a number of other 
organizations’. This definition sheds light on the role of legitimacy in explaining 
coordination among organisations; furthermore, this view conveys a sociologically 
grounded approach that complements the TCA (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; 
Ring & van de Ven, 1994). Organisations might decide to coordinate with 
government agencies to legitimise their projects (e.g. charity fundraising). 
Government agencies have a legally-endorsed legitimate right to demand action from 
other organisations (e.g. the issuing of planning permissions by local councils). 
Moving towards an inclusive definition – unrelated to the type of organisation – 
coordination ‘involves a select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous firms (as 
well as non-profit organisations) engaging in creating products or services based on 
implicit and open-ended contracts’ (Jones et al., 1997, p. 914). These authors 
explicitly integrate non-profit and for-profit organisations while contrasting 
organisational autonomy with task interdependence.  
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Some aspects emerge from previous definitions that could help us to create an 
inclusive definition of the coordination of inter-organisational relationships, namely, 
task and resource interdependence, structure, legitimacy, parties (i.e. at least two 
organisations; N>2) and purpose. Coordination of inter-organisational relationships 
can be understood as a social action system: (1) ‘behaviour among members is aimed 
at attaining collective and self-interest goals’; (2) ‘interdependent processes emerge 
through the division of tasks and functions among members’; (3) ‘an IR [inter-
organisational relation] can act as a unit and has a unique identity separate from its 
members’ (van de Ven, 1976, p. 25). The convergence of elements for a working 
definition of coordination of inter-organisational relations is perhaps better captured 
by Mark Granovetter. While doing ethnographic work with the Italian community in 
Boston’s West End, he was intrigued by ‘why some communities organize for 
common goals easily and effectively whereas others seem unable to mobilize 
resources, even against dire threats’ (Granovetter, 1973, p. 1373).  
In this thesis, I define coordination of inter-organisational relationships as a 
process of purposefully aligning resources and actions among interdependent 
organisations15. This definition is inclusive enough to encompass the richness of 
theoretical perspectives and yet provides the conceptual elements for a theoretical 
framework that reflects the multiple facets of coordination. Following a process view 
(van de Ven & Gordon, 1984), I shall organise the development of my theoretical 
frameworks around antecedents, mechanisms and consequences (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 Stylised Representation of the Coordination Process 
 
A. 
Antecedents 
B. 
Mechanisms 
C. 
Consequences 
 
I have shown the importance of establishing an inclusive definition of 
coordination before developing a theoretical framework. The study of coordination 
                                                 
15
 A recent theoretical conceptualisation of coordination – ‘joint pursuit of agreed-on goals in a 
manner corresponding to a shared understanding about contributions and payoffs’ (Gulati et al., 2012, 
p. 533) – supports the definition adopted here. 
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benefits from various research strands and I have formulated a definition of the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships that captures the diversity of 
perspectives. 
 
Before I proceed to develop a theoretical framework for my study, it is important 
to outline the underlying methodology used in this exercise. First, and following a 
process view, I argue that the study of the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships should be understood in terms of antecedents, mechanisms and 
consequences. For each of these stages, I unpack the multifaceted aspects of the 
coordination process (e.g. formalised and relational aspects) across multiple levels of 
analysis (e.g. organisations [i and j], ties [xij], network configuration [∑{xij}] of 
organisations and the industry context). I start by analysing the antecedents.  
2.1. Antecedents 
Antecedents16 are the motivations and inducements that initiate coordination 
among organisations. Often, strategy literature uses the term ‘initial conditions’ to 
refer to the objectives of the partners, adeptness at learning and industry context 
(Doz, 1998; Gulati, 1998). Still, inter-organisational arrangements extend beyond 
business-like relations and include coordination among, for example, governmental 
agencies (van de Ven et al., 1984). I shall adopt a definition of antecedents that 
includes ‘initial conditions’ and other relevant aspects that trigger the coordination of 
inter-organisational relationships. The current literature leads me to the following: 
strategic motivations, relational aspects, network structure, the nature of the tasks, 
and institutions (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 Summary of Antecedents 
 
A. 
Antecedents 
(1) Strategic motivations  
(2) Relational aspects  
(3) Network structure  
(4) Tasks  
(5) Institutions   
 
                                                 
16
 The antecedents of phenomena within social networks are often confusing because causes and 
outcomes (i.e. endogeneity) are difficult to distinguish. I shall argue, at this stage, that my aim is to 
review aspects that have been reported in the prior literature to be the antecedents of coordination of 
inter-organisational relations. 
  
44
 
(1) Strategic motivations explain why individual organisations establish ties with 
other organisations; they are set at the organisational level (every organisation has 
different strategic motivations). The resource dependence theory advocates that 
organisations deliberately seek resources across inter-organisational boundaries.  
Scholars have proposed17 two views in the search for resources: complementarity 
and similarity. One organisation’s search for resources aims to complement its own 
resources with new ones available from other organisations. Ozcan and Eisenhardt 
(2009) find that complementarity of resources drives tie formations in the wireless 
gaming industry, where complementarity is argued to lead to high performance. An 
alternative logic suggests that organisations initiate coordination with organisations 
with similar resources (i.e. similarity encourages coordination) (Saxton, 1997). 
Gulati (1998) shows that organisations form alliances (i.e. a particular case of inter-
organisational coordination) with partners with similar resources. These similar 
resources can take several different types, such as financial’ R&D capabilities’ 
information’ knowledge’ entry into new markets and legitimacy and status (Table 2).  
Financial resources activate coordination across organisational boundaries (e.g. 
venture capitalists). The main thesis is that organisations form ties with 
counterparties to access financial resources (DiMaggio, 1992; Galaskiewicz, 
Bielefeld, & Dowell, 2006). In an example about the foundation of the Museum of 
Modern Art in New York City, DiMaggio (1992) argues that the founders of the 
museum formed several ties among their already-existing network to collect financial 
endowments. Furthermore, Galaskiewicz et al. (2006) find that non-profit 
organisations that draw heavily on contributions and volunteers grow at a faster rate 
if they have more ties to urban elites; however, non-profits that depend on fees 
and/or sales grow faster if they have few ties.  
R&D capabilities are also among the antecedents of the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships, as illustrated by technology-driven ventures. In a study 
of entrepreneurial firms, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) show that the 
formation of alliances among organisations is guided by the goal of accessing novel 
                                                 
17
 Over three decades on from the initial work by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), scholars are still 
debating the implications of diversity, which echoes the debate on complementarity versus similarity. 
(In 2011, The Academy of Management Journal organised a call for papers on ‘Relational Pluralism 
of Individuals, Teams, and Organizations’, with Ranjay Gulati, Martin Kilduff, Stan Li, Andrew 
Shipilov and Wenpin Tsai as guest editors. This initiative shows the interest from a large community 
of scholars in progressing the topic from its current mixed findings.) 
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technology, in successful cases leading to new products. Prior research provides 
compelling evidence on new product development as a trigger of coordination across 
organisational boundaries. Building upon this argument, other scholars emphasise 
that organisations seek a broader array of R&D capabilities ‒ a pattern that is well-
documented among biotechnology firms (Baum et al., 2000; Cox, Mowatt, & 
Prevezer, 2002b; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). The argument is that 
organisations with robust R&D capabilities quickly become the coordinators of 
multiple ties with other organisations (Powell et al., 1996; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 
1998). R&D capabilities are the ‘admission ticket’ for inter-organisational ties based 
on information shared among organisations (Powell et al., 1996, p. 138). This is 
illustrated by the UK’s frozen food industry, in which retailers rely on coordination 
with their suppliers to integrate large departments of new product development 
(owned by UK retailers) with manufacturing facilities (owned by suppliers) (Cox et 
al., 2002b). Coordination among retailers and suppliers allows for swift responses to 
market trends due to information sharing among the parties (Table 2).  
Information is essential for coordinating actions across organisational boundaries 
(Burt, 1992; Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Stinchcombe, 1990; van de Ven, 1976; 
Walker et al., 1997). One important type of information is referrals. Information 
referrals are recommendations about organisations to work with, on the basis of 
either previous experience of working together or their reputation in the marketplace 
(Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Individuals also experience substantial benefits through 
referrals. Burt (1992) suggests that financial analysts who get frequent referrals 
experience higher financial returns because being referred in multiple settings creates 
opportunities (e.g. to work with other organisations). The source of information is 
important, though. Levinthal and Fichman (1988) find that organisations may change 
auditors based on the reputation and influence of the auditor. Other researchers have 
explored the role of information about an organisation’s background in the decision 
to form a venture with it (Stinchcombe, 1990; van de Ven, 1976; Walker et al., 
1997). Organisations seek information about the capabilities and behaviour of 
potential partners (Walker et al., 1997). Information on the behaviour of potential 
partners is essential in deciding upon the governance structure whenever there are 
concerns regarding the misappropriation of resources. 
Information conveys knowledge that helps organisations to operate in the market, 
and is especially important in dynamic environments (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 
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1988). Knowledge access and processing is a crucial part of organisations’ activity as 
it influences their ability to observe and exploit information (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; Cyert & March, 1963). Developing the necessary knowledge is a time-
consuming and expensive strategy for organisations (Kogut & Zander, 1992). 
Therefore, they develop coordinated action outside firm boundaries in a quest for 
knowledge that is readily available within their counterparts (Hitt, Hoskisson, 
Johnson, & Moesel, 1996; Sapienza, Autio, George, & Zahra, 2006).  
Entry into new markets often requires legitimacy in the marketplace, that is, 
appearing aligned with the prevailing norms and rules (DiMaggio, 1992; Nohria, 
1992; Schermerhorn & Shirland, 1981). Although the possibility of accessing new 
markets is strategically appealing to organisations, new entrants cannot succeed 
without access to relevant information about the markets. Legitimacy is crucial to 
success (even more so, if organisations have no history of market operations) (Table 
2). Organisations’ legitimacy in the marketplace is often understood as a strategic 
motivation to create inter-organisational ties. Studying cooperation among hospitals, 
Schermerhorn and Shirland (1981) posit that coordination among the directors of 
hospitals increases as they become concerned about hospital autonomy and image in 
their inter-organisational relationships. 
Status also embodies a strategic motivation to form and coordinate inter-
organisational ties (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2003; Benjamin & Podolny, 
1999; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Hallen, 2008; Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Podolny, 
1993b). Building on the example of the auditing firms, Levinthal and Fichman 
(1988) show that organisations seek status (i.e. an unqualified opinion rather than a 
qualified opinion) when choosing to start a collaboration (or switch collaboration 
ties). Researchers often operationalise status into two dimensions: an organisation’s 
past performance and its institutional affiliations (Podolny, 1993). The premise is 
that an organisation’s status is also related to that of their affiliates. Thus, the lower 
the status of an organisation’s affiliates, the lower is its own status (and vice versa). 
As a result, organisations tend to form ties with other organisations of a similar status 
– which is known as status symmetry (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2003; 
Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Providing another perspective, research has also 
conceptualised status in terms of inter-organisational network position18 (Gulati & 
                                                 
18
 Network centrality is used by Gulati et al. (1999, p. 1448) as a measure of status. This is 
complementary to other research that focused on an organisation’s past performance.  
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Gargiulo, 1999; Hallen, 2008). Organisations in central positions tend to choose 
collaboration partners that are equally central (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999  
In sum, strategic motivations refer to organisations’ search for resources that 
initiate coordination. Relational aspects also lead to coordination, as I explain next. 
(2) Relational aspects refer to interactions that occur prior to the start of 
coordination among organisations. I argue that relational aspects include the 
following: previous experience of working together (familiarity), success of previous 
ventures, personal relationships and common third parties (Table 2). 
Organisations with previous experience of working together (familiarity) develop 
stronger inter-organisational ties. Gulati (1995a) reports that repeated ties are a 
strong predictor of future alliance formation because organisations develop trust-
enhanced coordination mechanisms. The familiarity proposition posits that 
behavioural predictability based on previous experience predicts the organisation’s 
willingness to perform interdependent activities across organisational boundaries. 
Familiarity fosters ties because it reduces the risk of resource misappropriation and 
uncertainty: partners’ behavioural predictability is informed by past experiences. 
Familiarity might refer to both past and ongoing collaboration (in the case of 
multiple projects; this is the case in project-based industries). Organisations with a 
track record of alliances form more alliances. Reputation and visibility in the 
marketplace, developed through alliances, trigger new opportunities for future 
alliances (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Powell et al., 1996). Furthermore, past ties are 
important under market uncertainty. Knowing about the partner, and the success of 
prior ventures, create an appealing proposition for an organisation by reducing the 
costs of searching for new partners. Podolny (1994) shows that investment bankers 
tend to interact with those with whom they have interacted in the past. In the 
biotechnology industry, with a constant demand for novel knowledge, embeddedness 
is a critical predictor of future ties (Walker et al., 1997). 
The success of previous business ventures offers a complementary – or often 
competing – explanation for coordination among organisations (Table 2). The 
proponents of familiarity (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati & Sytch, 2008) have lately advised 
caution on the role of previous experience, on the grounds that organisations mostly 
form ties with organisations with whom they have jointly achieved successful 
ventures. Organisations choose to form ties with previous partners – from past or 
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ongoing partnerships – for reasons of behavioural predictability but no less 
importantly because of the success of prior ventures (Gulati et al., 2011b).  
Nevertheless, organisations must also initiate coordinated actions with new 
partners, with whom they have no past or ongoing partnering experience. 
Collaborations can also start because of common third parties (Greve et al., 2010; 
Gulati, 1995a; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000). 
Current partners provide referrals regarding potential partners, increasing the 
partners’ behavioural predictability (Rowley et al., 2000). 
Personal relationships can also be responsible for new inter-organisational 
collaborations (Table 2). Research on interlocks19 suggests that ties among firms’ 
directors predict future alliances (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; Davis, 
1991; Rosenkopf & Schleicher, 2008). Interlocks of directors influence the diffusion 
of information about both organisations and industry practices (Davis, 1991). As for  
alliance formation, directors sitting on the boards of several organisations become 
influential at the start of collaborations among organisations that were previously 
disconnected. Rosenkopf and Schleicher (2008) find that interlocks facilitate alliance 
formation if the common director serves as an officer in one of the firms.  
The background of the boundary spanners also influences the initiation of 
coordination among organisations. Attributes such as nationality, ethnic group and 
personal affinity complement the strategic motivations discussed above. Recent 
research that applies matching theory to entrepreneurship studies highlights the 
importance of ethnic groups in matching potential partners in starting up a business 
venture (Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009; Vissa, 2011). Vissa (2011) reports that social 
similarity – notably, social caste – explains tie formation among Indian 
entrepreneurs.  In his study of the Museum of Modern Art, DiMaggio (1992) shows 
that personal affinity becomes more of a determinant in ‘upper class’ social settings. 
In sum, relational aspects deal with the prior ties among organisations, referrals 
and personal ties among managers (i.e. boundary spanners) and their backgrounds. 
These relational aspects lead us to explore further the premise that the structure of 
ties among organisations matters for coordination. 
                                                 
19
 Corporate directors who simultaneously sit on the boards of more than one corporation. 
49 
 
Table 2  Antecedents of Inter-Organisational Relationships Coordination 
Antecedents 
Relationship 
with 
coordination 
Theoretical reasoning 
on antecedents 
Empirical and theoretical evidence on 
antecedents Examples 
1. Strategic 
motivations  
- Resource 
complementarity/ 
similarity  
- Financial resources 
- R&D capabilities 
- Information 
- Knowledge access 
- Entry to new 
markets (new clients) 
- Status 
- Legitimacy  
Nodes 
(i and j) 
● 
 
Organisations engage in 
coordination across 
organisational boundaries to 
access complementary (or 
because of) similar 
resources. Financial 
resources, R&D capabilities, 
information, knowledge, 
entry to new markets, 
legitimacy and status are 
antecedents of the 
coordination of inter-
organisational relationships 
(Baum et al., 2000; Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; 
Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Burt, 1992; Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990; Cox et al., 2002b; Cyert & 
March, 1963; DiMaggio, 1992; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Galaskiewicz et al., 2006; 
Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Hallen, 2008; Katila et 
al., 2008; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nohria, 1992; 
Podolny, 1993a; Podolny, 1993b; Powell et al., 
1996; Ring & van de Ven, 1992; Rosenkopf & 
Tushman, 1998; Sapienza et al., 2006; 
Schermerhorn & Shirland, 1981; van de Ven & 
Gordon, 1984; Walker et al., 1997) 
* Entrepreneurs who seek financial 
resources from established organisations; 
* Biotechnology firms that form alliances 
with other organisations with R&D 
capabilities; 
*Relationships between retailers and 
suppliers in the UK’s frozen food industry; 
* Entry into new markets via joint ventures; 
* ‘De novo’ organisations that seek in 
‘incumbent’ organisations a source of 
legitimacy and status for their operations.  
2. Relational aspects  
- Previous experience 
of working together 
(familiarity) 
- Success of previous 
collaborations 
- Common third 
parties 
- Personal 
relationships 
- Background of 
boundary spanners 
Ties 
(xij) 
●-● 
Previous experience of 
working together 
(specifically in successful 
ventures) promotes 
coordination among 
organisations; embedded 
personal relations and 
background elements are 
also essential.  
(Barkema et al., 1997; Beckman et al., 2004; Davis, 
1991; DiMaggio, 1992; Doz, 1996; Greve et al., 
2010; Gulati, 1995a; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; 
Gulati & Sytch, 2008; Gulati et al., 2011b; 
Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009; Podolny, 1994; Powell 
et al., 1996; Rosenkopf & Schleicher, 2008; 
Rowley et al., 2000; Vissa, 2011; Walker et al., 
1997) 
 
* Biotechnology organisations that have 
worked together tend to form future 
alliances; 
* Organisations in an alliance are likely to 
initiate coordination in the presence of 
common third parties; 
* Formation of ties among Indian 
entrepreneurs from the same social caste; 
* Founders of the Museum of Modern Art in 
New York, who created ties based on 
personal affinity in order to collect 
donations. 
(Table continues on next page) 
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3. Network 
structure  
- Structure (dense 
versus sparse) 
- Organisation’s 
initial position 
(central versus 
peripheral) 
Configuration 
(∑{xij}) 
 
The whole structure (dense 
versus sparse) and 
organisations’ structural 
position in the various 
configurations of inter-
organisational relationships 
affect the start of 
coordination.   
(Ahuja, 2000a; Burt, 1992; Chung, Singh, & Lee, 
2000; Doz, 1996; Gulati, 1995b; Gulati & 
Gargiulo, 1999; Hallen, 2008; Podolny, 1994; 
Powell et al., 1996; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1998; 
Walker et al., 1997) 
 
* Organisations in densely connected 
configurations have a better likelihood of 
coordinating;  
* Firms in central positions receive more 
requests for coordination across 
organisational boundaries; 
* Entrepreneurs trigger coordination with 
peripheral organisations (in search of novel 
resources). 
4. Tasks  
- Anticipated task 
interdependence 
- Uncertainty and 
complexity of the 
task 
 
Purpose 
(∑{xij})Y 
where Y
 a 
refers to goal a 
 
Task type encompasses 
anticipated interdependence 
and task-related uncertainty 
(e.g. task complexity), 
which leads organisations to 
coordinate.    
(Beckman et al., 2004; Bensaou & Anderson, 1999; 
Casciaro, 2003; Durkheim, 1984; Gulati & Singh, 
1998; Kogut & Zander, 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1998; Teece, 1986; 
Thompson, 1967) 
 
* Organisations seek other organisations to 
collaborate with based on anticipated 
interdependence; 
* When supplier-buyers perceive high task-
related uncertainty they develop new ties 
aimed at coordination. 
5. Institutions 
- ‘Macro-culture’ 
- Industry-targeted 
policies  
- Legal and 
regulatory mandates 
Context 
Industry structures have 
values and norms, policies, 
and legal and regulatory 
mandates embedded in 
them. These shape an 
organisation’s likelihood to 
begin coordinating with 
other organisations. 
(Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994; Baum & Oliver, 
1991; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Eisenhardt & 
Bourgeois, 1988; Galbraight 1977; Grandori & 
Soda, 1995; Hall et al., 1977; Oliver, 1990; Osborn 
& Hagedoorn, 1997; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Provan & Milward, 1995; Simon, 1962; Thompson, 
1967; van de Ven & Gordon, 1984; van de Ven, 
Walker, & Liston, 1979) 
 
* Setting up a new enterprise requires new 
coordination ties with industry regulators;  
* ‘Green economy’ regulation is leading 
organisations to coordinate with other 
parties to source new products and 
techniques;  
* Legal and regulatory mandates prescribe 
necessary coordination concerning planning 
and delivery of childcare programmes; 
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(3) Network structure20 relates to the structure of ties; an organisation’s position 
shapes its possibilities for coordination. Configurations might consist of densely or 
sparsely connected organisations. While ‘strategic motivations’ are endogenous 
(inherent to individual organisations), network structures are exogenous (inherent in the 
structural properties). The relevance of network structure as an antecedent of 
coordination occurs at two levels: the whole structure (dense versus sparse) and the 
organisation’s structural position (central versus peripheral).  
Network structures influence how organisations come to know about each other (i.e. 
about each other’s capabilities) (Walker et al., 1997). Dense configurations – multiple 
ties among organisations – lead to the coordination of inter-organisational relationships 
through the richness and fluidity of information available. Organisations progressively 
stockpile a repertoire of information and knowledge about other organisations that can 
be consulted at any time (Gulati, 1995b; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Closeness breeds 
trust and social control mechanisms that foster behavioural predictability in new 
coordination ventures. Because, in dense structures, organisations are highly 
interconnected, they entail lower costs of searching for new partners (compared to the 
marketplace). Alternatively, brokerage behaviour creates opportunities to initiate 
coordination across inter-organisational boundaries (Burt, 1992). Sparse networks 
provide greater opportunities for brokers because the organisations are connected 
around subsets rather than the whole network. This pattern is common among ventures 
aiming to pursue innovation, for example technology alliances (Ahuja, 2000a) and 
entrepreneurs (Hallen, 2008).  
An organisation’s initial position in the network configuration affects its likelihood 
of starting a new coordination with other organisations (Hallen, 2008; Walker et al., 
1997). Centrality is perceived as a form of network status relating to reliability and the 
capability to coordinate inter-organisational relationships (Powell et al., 1996). Central 
organisations choose to form ties with other organisations that are equally centrally 
located. This strategy is driven by concerns over reputation and the misappropriation of 
resources (Chung et al., 2000; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny, 1994). Because 
centrality embodies reputation, it operates as a social monitoring mechanism insofar as 
central organisations attempt to prevent potential reputation damage disseminating 
across the inter-organisational network (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Furthermore, the 
                                                 
20
 I use the term ‘network structure’ interchangeably with ‘network configuration’.  
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proponents of this idea argue that organisations in central positions also receive more 
requests to start collaborating than do organisations at the structural periphery (Ahuja, 
2000b; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Powell et al., 1996). Organisations located at the 
periphery experience less substantial informational benefits in terms of frequency and 
accuracy of information flow. Information is pivotal for organisations to learn about 
potential collaborators and their reputations regarding partnering behaviour (Ahuja, 
2000b). It is also important in updating organisations on technological directions, which 
is a proxy for foreseeing demands for interdependence (Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1998).  
In sum, the network structure is a relevant antecedent of coordination insofar as the 
configuration of ties affects how organisations get to know about each other. Centrality 
is also a signal of quality for potential partners, and the position in the network affects 
an organisation’s access to information. Notwithstanding this, task-related 
interdependence among organisations also matters; after all, coordination requires the 
integration of tasks toward a common goal (Table 2). 
(4) Tasks are a key antecedent of the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships. The main driver of task interdependence is the ‘division of labour’ among 
organisations (Durkheim, 1984; [1893]). Similarly to societies, which are organised 
around roles and professions (Durkheim, 1984), organisations split their work into 
several tasks, controlled by autonomous organisations. Yet, the breakdown of tasks into 
sub-tasks brings substantial uncertainty, as organisations become progressively 
dependent on other organisations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967). 
Anticipated task interdependence21 and task uncertainty are fundamental elements of 
the coordination of inter-organisational relationships. The integration of tasks 
performed among autonomous organisations is often planned (i.e. anticipated) through a 
form of ‘template’. Thompson (1967, pp. 54-64) suggests three types of 
interdependence: pooled, sequential and reciprocal. Interdependence is pooled if each 
party contributes and each party is supported by the whole. Sequential interdependence 
refers to situations in which the actions of organisations are arrayed serially, such that 
the action of one organisation leads to the possibility of action by another organisation 
                                                 
21
 Regarding the antecedents of coordinated inter-organisational ties, organisations form ties based upon 
assumptions about anticipated interdependence. A similar argument is proposed in Gulati et al. (1998) 
and van de Ven and Gordon (1984). Nonetheless, I fully acknowledge the theoretical proposition that 
most, as some authors would argue, of the tasks performed across inter-organisational boundaries cannot 
be entirely anticipated. 
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(like a chained process). Finally, reciprocal interdependence is an intense process that 
entails the exchange of outputs among the parties.  
Task-related uncertainty – the unpredictability of the elements that compose the task 
– shapes the willingness (or requirement) to coordinate inter-organisational 
relationships (Table 2). Each task encompasses a specific degree of uncertainty (e.g. 
risks to the harmonious integration of tasks across autonomous organisations22) based 
on endogenous and exogenous causes. Endogenous task uncertainty is intrinsically 
related to the nature of the tasks, as shown by technology collaborations and alliances. 
When an alliance is pursuing an invention (e.g. a new pharmaceutical product), the 
tasks entail a certain degree of uncertainty due to their novelty. One way to overcome 
such uncertainty is to coordinate with other organisations with experience of dealing 
with various aspects of the task. Additionally, tasks vary in complexity: the more 
components, the more complex is the task. The various elements of task uncertainty 
affect the initiation of inter-organisational coordination. In the buyer-supplier 
relationship among US and Japanese car makers, Bensaou and Anderson (1999) report 
that perceived task-related uncertainty led to the development of new ties and the 
implementation of mechanisms aimed at coordination. Casciaro (2003) too suggests that 
task-related uncertainty predicts coordination among organisations.   
Exogenous sources of uncertainty include, for example, technological change or even 
shocks (Teece, 1986). Under these conditions, organisations seek to coordinate their 
actions with other organisations in order to reduce task uncertainty. Some authors 
conclude that technology and inter-organisational networks are mutual influences. As an 
initial condition, technology shapes how organisations coordinate and react in the 
marketplace (Ansari & Phillips, 2011; Maurer & Ebers, 2006; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 
1998). A trade-off emerges between task uncertainty and inter-organisational ties: to 
reduce task uncertainty, organisations split tasks outside boundaries; however, this 
increases the external dependence of organisations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Thus, the 
integration of tasks becomes more difficult as organisations’ activities spread across 
autonomous organisations (Beckman et al., 2004) (Table 2). 
Overall, tasks are antecedents of coordination insofar as organisations are 
increasingly task-dependent on other organisations in a process that stems from the 
                                                 
22
 Task interdependence and task uncertainty are intertwined concepts. Highly interdependent tasks 
encompass a high degree of task uncertainty. However, task uncertainty is inherent to the ‘task’ itself 
(performed by a single organisation), while task interdependence is fundamentally a relational attribute 
between at least two parties performing a task.  
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‘division of labour’ in the marketplace. Thus far, I have discussed nodes (i and j), ties 
(xij) and network configuration (∑{xij}). However, the antecedents of coordination are 
also often related to institutional aspects. 
(5) Institutions are the legal, economic and social environment in which 
organisations operate. The industry environment can be seen in the foundational 
research on inter-organisational relationships (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Research has looked at the culture of the industry (‘macroculture’), 
industry policies, and organisations with legal and regulatory mandates. 
In a review of the research on inter-organisational relationships, Oliver (1990, p. 
243) classifies legal and regulatory requirements as drivers of necessity. These are the 
cases whereby inter-organisational relationships are mandated by government (Baum & 
Oliver, 1991; Grandori & Soda, 1995; Provan & Milward, 1995; van de Ven & Gordon, 
1984). Legal and regulatory requirements set rules and norms that foster (or constrain23) 
the inception of ties across organisations (Table 2). 
Industries have idiosyncratic beliefs known as ‘macrocultures’ (Abrahamson & 
Fombrun, 1994; Ansari & Phillips, 2011; DiMaggio, 1992; Lawrence, Hardy, & 
Phillips, 2002). ‘Macrocultures’ are important for understanding the antecedents of 
coordination because they induce expectations for task-related collaboration 
(Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994, p. 728). Furthermore, the roles of different 
organisations are defined within ‘macrocultures’ (Bechky, 2006; Hardy, Lawrence, & 
Grant, 2005). A further insight is given by the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) on 
institutional change (at a macro-level). The authors craft the notion of the 
‘organisational field’, which specifically encapsulates suppliers, regulatory bodies, and 
most significantly, the set of expectations, norms, values and socially constructed 
realities. As an antecedent of coordination, ‘macrocultures’ provide strong guidance on 
the ties that must be formed in order to accomplish a given task. However, non-
organised and dispersed groups in the industry can also trigger change that forces 
organisations coordinate with one another in order to address it, for example, new 
market demands. This is illustrated by the development of text messaging, which was 
                                                 
23
 A case where legal and regulatory requirements constrain inter-organisational ties is the anti-trust law, 
for example by stopping companies from forming alliances that would lead to a market monopoly, that is 
a market dominated by a single company. In 2007, the European Commission required the cessation of a 
joint venture between Bertelsmann (an international media corporation based in Germany) and 
AOL/Time Warner (two media and entertainment companies that have operated separately since late 
2009). 
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due to the diffusion of new practices by consumers rather than an initative by 
organisations (see Ansari & Phillips, 2011). 
Industry-directed policies indirectly shape the inception of inter-organisational 
coordination. Osborn and Hagedoorn (1997) suggest that the creation of alliances and 
the decision to coordinate are embedded in a larger institutional setting. Policies sustain 
and shape the possibility of inter-organisational ties. A typical case where an incoming 
policy affects (i.e. triggers or constrains) the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships is that of the widespread ‘green economy’ regulations. Organisations 
initiate a wide array of collaborations in order to source new products and techniques 
and comply with newly enforced regulations. The recently introduced UK policy aimed 
at reducing carbon emissions in new homes has caused main contractors to seek new 
partnerships in a quest for alternative materials and building techniques.  
 
Thus far, I have gathered together the current literature on the antecedents of the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships. Next, I explore the mechanisms 
underlying this coordination. 
 
2.2.  Mechanisms 
The mechanisms used to coordinate inter-organisational relationships are the engine 
of the coordination process. I consider three analytically motivated24 types of 
coordination mechanisms: administrative, relational and institutional (as shown in 
Figure 4). Administrative mechanisms resonate with the literature on contractual 
arrangements and managerial intervention in inter-organisational relationships and 
differ from relational mechanisms that stress socially embedded aspects (e.g. trust, 
power and social monitoring). Institutional refers to how the institutional environment 
acts as a coordination mechanism. Altogether, these three mechanisms encompass our 
current understanding on the coordination of inter-organisational relationships.  
 
                                                 
24
 Although empirically related, the mechanisms of inter-organisational relationship coordination are 
analytically difficult to separate. I proceed in this fashion for clarity’s sake. I do not suggest an empirical 
demarcation among the mechanisms.    
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Figure 4 Summary of Mechanisms 
 
B. 
Mechanisms 
(1) Contractual  
(2) Managerial apparatuses  
Administrative 
Relational 
(3) Network structure  
(4) Relational assets 
(5) Organisation’s characteristics  
(6) Task and Shared Vision 
 
Institutionalised  (7) ‘Macroculture’ 
 
 
2.2.1. Administrative  
Administrative mechanisms25 are implemented through formal procedures and 
intended to support the coordination of inter-organisational relationships (Larson, 1992, 
p. 78). I include contracts and managerial apparatuses as administrative mechanisms of 
coordination. Similar labels are employed elsewhere in the literature, such as 
bureaucratic forms of networks, which are ‘coordination modes formalised in 
contractual agreements’ (Grandori & Soda, 1995, p. 201). 
(1) Contracts are the foremost form of administrative mechanism used to coordinate 
inter-organisational relationships (Grandori, 1997a; Williamson, 1979). Any form of 
contractual arrangement induces coordination through relevant provisions. Macaulay 
(1963, p. 3) posits that contractual arrangements are relationships based on a device 
(i.e., contract) that includes rational planning with provisions and sanctions regarding 
performance. The relevance of contracts to the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships may be understood through the distinction between ‘structuration’ and 
‘structure’ (Giddens, 1976). ‘Structuration’ is the actual process of action and 
interaction that is contextually situated, while ‘structure’ refers to patterns of 
interactions that are recognisable by the parties. Contracts contribute to the 
‘structuration’ process, whose outcomes are a structure of interactions among 
                                                 
25
 At this point, it is important to clarify that the literature on strategy often refers to ‘structure’ as the 
formalised aspects of inter-organisational relationships (see Ring & van de Ven, 1994). I use the term 
‘administrative’ to avoid confusion with the notion of ‘structure’ that I borrow from the SNA and refer to 
the set of ties among organisations. Therefore, in this study, I shall use the terms ‘administrative aspects’ 
and ‘structure’ to ensure conceptual clarity while remaining ‘true’ to the theoretical underpinnings. 
Furthermore, the label ‘administrative’ allows me to consider the literature on both contracts and 
managerial interventions, which have rarely benefited from integration.  
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organisations. Alliances (Gulati, 1998; Jarillo, 1995), joint ventures (Barkema et al., 
1997; Zajac & Olsen, 1993), and federations of organisations (Provan & Milward, 1995; 
van de Ven & Gordon, 1984) are all examples of contractual arrangements aimed at 
coordination among organisations. 
Contracting lies at the heart of economics (Coase, 1937), occupying a pivotal place 
in the transaction costs literature (Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1979). Primarily, 
contractual arrangements are enforced in order to develop a ‘congruence of goals’ 
among the parties (Ouchi, 1980). Congruence is important given that one organisation’s 
goals do not necessarily coincide with those of partner organisations. A typical case is 
seen in technology alliances, where logics of ‘competition’ and ‘cooperation’ might 
coexist. Gomes-Casseres (1996, p. 6) emphasises that alliances are ‘loose collections of 
firms with disparate interests and capabilities’.   
Since organisations might have divergent motivations and objectives, contracts aim 
to secure a consensus on the specific means and ends of coordination (van de Ven, 
1976). The content of the contract fosters the alignment of the organisations’ interests 
while creating safeguards against appropriation concerns and behavioural uncertainty 
(Gulati & Singh, 1998; Macaulay, 1963; Ring & van de Ven, 1992). Two defining 
aspects of the contents of contracts are incentive systems and authority (Ariño & Torre, 
1998). An incentive system refers to a set of rewards and sanctions intended to promote 
compliance with the contractual terms (i.e. obligations and expectations) (Grandori, 
1997b). The incentive system is set up according to the loss (or risk of loss) that would 
be caused should the parties fail to coordinate (Gulati, 1995a). A reward that is often 
used in strategic alliances is share equity; organisations share the returns according to 
the resources they have contributed (Table 3).  
Lines of authority specify the leadership in the coordination process (Camerer & 
Knez, 1996). Authority confers organisations with a mutually agreed scope to deliberate 
over the actions of other organisations (and the enforcement of the incentive system). 
Disputes are disruptive and their resolution is as critical to the sustainability of inter-
organisational relationships as it is complex to address (Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). 
Overall, contracts are binding agreements that are enforced so as to develop 
coordination. Another type of administrative aspects is managerial apparatuses.  
(2) Managerial apparatuses are mundane coordination mechanisms aimed at 
coordination, such as managerial mandates, plans and schedules. Managerial mandates 
refer to the introduction of third parties whose role is to coordinate the inter-
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organisational relationship. The underlying reasoning draws on triads (Simmel, 1950), 
by using separate coordinators and integrators (i.e. tertius gaedens) of tasks developed 
elsewhere by autonomous organisations. Establishing bridges26 among organisations 
that are otherwise disconnected is the immediate motivation behind bringing in third 
parties that act as coordinators. Third parties matter as a mechanism of coordination of 
inter-organisational relationships because they provide the following benefits: they act 
as bridging organisations, they provide bargaining power in the relationship, they build 
trust and they aid information flow. These parties may be contracted in (e.g. consulting 
firms) or take part voluntarily (e.g. local agencies). A typical case of third-party 
coordination is that of consultant firms’ projects (Levinthal & Fichman, 1988). 
Alternatively, some organisations may voluntarily engage in bridging behaviours. 
Human and Provan (1997) highlight the role of agencies acting as brokers in the 
development of coordination among manufacturing enterprises in the US wood products 
industry. Moreover, organisations are driven to develop coordination amongst 
themselves. Van de Ven et al. (1979, p. 31) note that some agencies – in a regional 
network of agencies in the US – constantly assumed a ‘common mandate of planning 
and coordination’. The underlying motivations are diverse; however, leadership through 
brokerage behaviour often is a source of power (Table 3).  
That is, bargaining power is acquired through the intermediary position. In a classic 
example, third parties are in a position of power simply due to the ‘divide and rule’ 
aphorism, as they can access information on both sides, and may bargain one against 
another. For example, a client acting as an intermediary may be able to bargain with two 
suppliers of the same product (i.e. substitutes)27. Although there is an underlying 
assumption of ‘tension’ in the role of the third party, they are often employed to prevent 
(or resolve) conflicts of interests that, once raised, could disrupt coordination among 
organisations. Brokerage mediates tension under conditions of uncertainty and control, 
but no organisation has absolute authority over the whole network configuration. 
                                                 
26
 Establishing bridges fits with Burt’s Theory of Structural Holes (1992) on brokerage behaviour. 
However, a distinction needs to be made. In Burt’s work (1992), brokerage is primarily conceptualised as 
an individual’s intentional behaviour (e.g. entrepreneurs) charged with agency and free of any 
institutionalised incentive other than perceptions of access to information and opportunities. Here, I 
review prior research that deals with third parties that are intentionally – and voluntarily – brought in. 
Brokerage might be affected by an individual’s own will. Although the consequences of brokerage by 
third-party organisations as a mechanism of inter-organisational relationships coordination may be 
similar, the inducement process is different. 
27
 Negotiating power is greater if two parties are supplying the same (or substitute) products because the 
suppliers enter into direct competition, which benefits the buyer (lower prices or better conditions). 
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Third parties are often regarded as ‘neutral intermediaries’ whose function is to 
lubricate the coordination of inter-organisational relationships (Shapiro, 1987; Zucker, 
1986). The perception of ‘neutrality’ attached to intermediaries in inter-organisational 
relationships leverages aspects of trust. A reputation for being trustworthy is important 
for the effectiveness of ventures across organisational boundaries (Perrone et al., 2003; 
Tushman, 1977). Third parties shape the access and flow of information across these 
boundaries. Information flow is important for sustaining the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships because the actions of organisations – and the successful 
integration of tasks – depend on accurate and up-to-date information (Cyert & March, 
1963). Information becomes even more important when inter-organisational activities 
are affected by a high degree of uncertainty, whether task- or environment-related 
(Galbraight 1977). Organisations then deploy ad hoc mechanisms to enhance the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships. 
Plans and schedules, such as Gantt charts28, are institutionalised routines that operate 
as mechanisms of inter-organisational relationship coordination (Argote, 1982; Gittell 
& Weiss, 2004; Grandori, 1997b; Simon, 1976; van de Ven, 1976). Because of the 
specialisation of work (‘the division of labour’), ‘procedures must be introduced to 
secure coordination among the members of the group; and among the most powerful of 
coordination procedures is the centralization of decisions’ (Simon, 1976, p. 238). Prior 
research has devoted a great amount of effort to detailing the ‘bureaucratic’29 elements 
of inter-organisational relationship coordination. Planning and control systems are 
observable across several industries. 
In a literature review on inter-firm coordination modes, Grandori (1997b) argues that 
the building industry is a typical case of the wide use of inter-organisational planning, 
mutual control systems, and Gantt charts. Another example is found within the health 
sector, where rules and authority arrangements are also part of the managerial 
apparatuses of coordination among hospitals (Argote, 1982). A similar use of plans and 
schedules is employed to coordinate relationships within federations of organisations 
(van de Ven, 1976). Managerial apparatuses foster coordination based on assumptions 
of anticipated interdependence among organisations. 
                                                 
28
 These are graphic representations of the expected workload, with an allocation of tasks to different 
organisations. Gantt charts also establish milestones throughout the process that can be used for 
monitoring purposes.   
29
 Some authors use a broad category of ‘programmed means of achieving coordination’ to include plans, 
meetings, project-based collaboration agreements, rules and authority arrangements (Argote, 1982). I 
shall focus on plans and meetings as the key elements of coordination (Grandori, 1997). 
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Table 3 Mechanisms for Inter-Organisational Relationships Coordination 
 
Mechanisms 
Relationship 
with 
coordination 
Theoretical reasoning on 
mechanisms 
Empirical and theoretical evidence on 
mechanisms Examples 
Administrative 
1. Contractual 
- Contracts 
- Governance 
structure and content 
of the contract 
Nodes  
(i and j) 
● 
--------- 
 
Ties 
(xij) 
●-● 
 
Contracts subtly shape the 
structure of inter-
organisational relationships; 
the content of the contract 
(i.e. incentive systems and 
lines of authority) lay the 
foundations for coordination.  
 
(Barkema et al., 1997; Camerer & Knez, 1996; 
Coase, 1937; DiMaggio, 1992; Giddens, 1976; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Grandori, 1997a; 
Grandori, 1997b; Gulati, 1995a; Gulati, 1998; 
Gulati & Singh, 1998; Jarillo, 1995; Larson, 
1992; Lazerson, 1988; Macaulay, 1963; 
Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Ouchi, 1980; Ring 
& van de Ven, 1992; van de Ven, 1976; van De 
Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976; Williamson, 
1979; Zajac & Olsen, 1993) 
* Alliances and joint ventures 
develop from specific 
contractual arrangements; 
* Coordination is driven by 
incentives (e.g. shared equity or 
a share of sales in the case of 
new product development). 
2. Managerial 
apparatuses 
- Management 
mandates (third-party) 
- Plans and schedules 
Nodes  
(i and j) 
● 
--------- 
 
Ties 
(xij) 
●-● 
Management apparatuses 
develop the coordination of 
inter-organisational 
relationships by setting shared 
expectations and obligations, 
progressively harmonised 
through intermediaries and 
ordinary plans and schedules.  
(Argote, 1982; Cyert & March, 1963; 
Galaskiewicz, 1985; Galbraight 1977; Gittell & 
Weiss, 2004; Grandori, 1997b; Gulati, 1998; 
Human & Provan, 1997; Levinthal & Fichman, 
1988; Perrone et al., 2003; Shapiro, 1987; 
Simmel, 1950; Simon, 1976; Tushman, 1977; 
van de Ven, 1976; van de Ven et al., 1979; 
Zucker, 1986) 
* Management consultants 
working on projects (e.g. 
building projects); 
* Plans and scheduled 
interactions among 
organisations over time; 
* Gantt charts with task 
allocation and milestones 
agreed among organisations. 
Relational 3. Network structure  
- Dense versus sparse 
- Position 
- Arm’s-length versus 
embedded ties 
- Activity 
- Sanctions 
(reputation) 
 
 
 
Configuration  
(∑{xij}) 
 
Dense configurations and 
organisations that are 
centrally located are essential 
mechanisms of inter-
organisational relationships. 
(Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988; DiMaggio, 1992; 
Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Granovetter, 1985; 
Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Hansen, 1999; 
Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Krackhardt, 1990; 
Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Ozcan & 
Eisenhardt, 2009; Powell, 1990; Reagans & 
McEvily, 2003; Rowley et al., 2000; van de 
Ven, 1976; Walker et al., 1997) 
* Entrepreneurs in central 
positions develop more accurate 
cognitive structures of the 
whole configuration, which 
leads to the effective 
coordination of resources; 
* In the creation of the Museum 
of Modern Art in New York, 
the founders’ centrality was 
critical to their developing an 
‘awareness’ of resources. 
(Table continues on next page) 
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Relational 
(cont.) 
4. Relational assets  
- Trust 
- Reputation 
- Sanctions (further 
business)  
 
Ties 
(xij) 
●-● 
Trust is a coordination 
mechanism that is 
independent of, yet 
complementary to, contracts. 
It is less costly and enforced 
by the social mechanisms of 
trustworthiness, reputation 
and relational-based 
sanctions.   
(Barney & Hansen, 1994; Das & Teng, 1998; 
Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gambetta, 1988; Gulati, 
1995a; Gulati, 1998; Macaulay, 1963; 
MacDuffie, 2011; Madhok, 1995; Malhotra & 
Lumineau, 2011; McEvily, 2011; McEvily, 
Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003; Perrone et al., 2003; 
Simon, 1976; Williamson, 1996; Zaheer & 
Venkatraman, 1995; Zajac & Olsen, 1993) 
(Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002; Barney & 
Hansen, 1994; Burt, 1992; Burt & Knez, 1995; 
Granovetter, 1985; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; 
Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000; Larson, 1992; 
Powell et al., 1996; Ring & van de Ven, 1992) 
* Organisations often rely on 
informal means to address 
problems rather than a 
comprehensive reading of 
contractual clauses; 
* Biotechnology firms rely on 
trust-based coordination to 
achieve responsiveness (i.e. a 
high innovation rate) in a highly 
dynamic industry. 
5. Organisations’ 
characteristics 
- Learning 
capabilities 
- Similarity of 
organisations  Nodes 
(i and j) 
● 
Organisations have different 
coordination capabilities 
based on learning capabilities 
– via routines and inter-
organisational interaction – 
and similarity (primarily 
capability-based) to other 
organisations that are part of 
the same configuration of 
inter-organisational 
relationships.   
(Barkema et al., 1997; Baum et al., 2000; 
Bingham & Davis, 2012; Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Doz, 1996; 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Gomes-Casseres, 
1996; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Gulati et al., 
2000; Hallen, 2008; Hansen, 1999; Kogut & 
Zander, 1996; Larson, 1992; Levinthal & 
Fichman, 1988; McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 
1987; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Penrose, 1959; Sytch & Gulati, 
2012; van de Ven, 1976; van de Ven & Gordon, 
1984; Zollo & Winter, 2002) 
* Strategic alliances that 
develop learning capabilities in 
each organisation are more 
successful at coordinating 
operations over time; 
* Organisations that are similar 
rely on a common 
understanding of the industry in 
order to coordinate with one 
another; 
* Differences in capabilities 
between organisations promote 
coordination.  
(Table continues in next page) 
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6. Tasks and shared 
vision 
- Task uncertainty and 
novelty  
- Shared strategy and 
mission (about the 
purpose of the inter-
organisational 
arrangement) 
 
Purpose  
(∑{xij})Y 
whereas Y
 a 
refers to goal a 
Low task-related uncertainty 
and shared vision – consensus 
creation – facilitate the 
coordination of inter-
organisational relationships. 
(Argote, 1982; Bensaou & Anderson, 1999; 
Casciaro, 2003; Provan & Milward, 1995; Ring 
& van de Ven, 1992; Santos & Eisenhardt, 
2009; Thompson, 1967; van de Ven, 1976; van 
de Ven & Gordon, 1984) 
 
* New ventures involve a high 
degree of task uncertainty; 
* Multi-agency arrangements 
and entrepreneurs are typical 
cases of coordination relying on 
a shared vision among the 
parties (contracts might not be 
in place). 
Institutional 
 7. ‘Macroculture’ 
- Practices (industry 
standards) 
- Norms and rules 
- Roles 
 Context 
 
Industries are characterised 
by specific practices, norms, 
rules and roles that affect 
inter-organisational 
coordination, such as 
preferences for the use of 
administrative mechanisms, 
shaping the interactions 
among organisations and role-
driven relationships.  
(Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994; Baum et al., 
2000; DiMaggio, 1992; Durkheim, 1984; 
Eccles, 1981; Grandori & Soda, 1995; Holm, 
1995; Jones et al., 1997; Kogut & Zander, 1996; 
Olsen, 1978; Powell et al., 1996; Puranam et al., 
2006; Ring & van de Ven, 1992; Stinchcombe, 
1985a)  
* By contrast to the building 
industry’s contractual 
complexity, biotechnology 
organisations tend to engage in 
contract-relaxed inter-
organisational relationships; 
* In the Norwegian fisheries, 
inter-organisational 
relationships comprise socially 
defined norms of collaboration 
practices (e.g. patterns of 
information). 
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Here, I have shown that administrative mechanisms of coordination entail 
contractual arrangements and managerial apparatuses. These aspects form a well-
established strand of research that builds primarily on the TCA. Researchers have 
highlighted that coordination mechanisms are also underpinned by relational 
mechanisms, such as goodwill, trust among organisations and organisational 
characteristics. These two views still fuel some of the most enduring debates in the 
literature.  
2.2.2. Relational 
Relational mechanisms encapsulate coordination-enhancing aspects that are 
broadly defined in prior research as ‘informal agreements sustained by the value of 
future relationships and prevalent within and between organisations’ (Baker et al., 
2002, p. 39). Unlike administrative mechanisms, relational aspects relate to, for 
instance, the network structure and trust-based ties. Relational mechanisms are 
related to the embeddedness perspective within social network theory (Barney & 
Hansen, 1994; Gulati, 1995a; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Uzzi, 1997) (Table 3). 
(3) Network structure relates to coordination mechanisms in several ways, 
namely fluidity of information, structural position, and the awareness of resources. 
The main proposition in this regard posits that the possibilities for coordination are 
constrained by the structural features of inter-organisational relationships because 
structure affects resources (e.g. information) essential for coordination. 
Dense networks mean that the organisations (i and j) in the network (∑{xij}) are 
highly connected. In sparse networks, organisations (i and j) form groups or subsets – 
also known as ‘cliques’ – that are relatively disconnected. Prior research posits that 
coordination is primarily a feature of cohesive networks30. The structure of inter-
organisational relationships operates by constraining or enhancing coordination. 
Cohesive ties constitute ‘channels through which partners can learn about the 
competencies and the reliability of the other’ (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999, p. 1446). 
Information flows between organisations and thus affects the coordination process.  
                                                 
30
 Originally, insights on the implications of sparse versus dense networks were developed at the 
individual level, as in the Italian community in Boston’s West End (Granovetter, 1973) and among 
stock traders (Burt, 1992). Recently, this reasoning has been more widely implemented in 
organisational-level research (e.g. alliances among firms) (Burt et al., 1995; Gulati et al., 1999; Powell 
et al., 1996; Walker et al., 1997).  
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A cohesive network reduces uncertainty because organisations develop more 
accurate behavioural expectations about their partners (Burt & Knez, 1995). Shared 
norms and values allow organisations to develop coordination mechanisms (Powell, 
1990; Walker et al., 1997). However, the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships often requires information from parties that are sparsely connected. A 
typical example is given by technology collaborations in which organisations need to 
find and combine resources from parties that were previously disconnected (Owen-
Smith & Powell, 2004; Prevezer, 2001). The importance of accessing information 
that is lodged in disconnected – or indirect – parties is thoroughly discussed in Burt’s 
theory of structural holes (1992).  
From a coordination perspective, the main advantage of participating in networks 
stems from accessing novel information that would otherwise be inaccessible. In 
contrast to the argument concerning cohesiveness (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 
1985), sparse networks become pivotal in strengthening inter-organisational 
coordination by linking parties that were previously disconnected. Moreover, sparse 
networks are more efficient because they have fewer redundant ties – that is, ties 
conducting similar information (Rowley et al., 2000). The absence of redundant ties 
means that a specific role is ascribed to each tie and organisation (Table 3). 
Recent research comparing strong ties (abundant in dense configurations) and 
weak ties (abundant in sparse configurations) points out implications for information 
processing (Hansen, 1999; Reagans & McEvily, 2003). Hansen (1999) finds that the 
transfer of complex and tacit knowledge is a function of strong ties enhanced by 
shared norms and trust. Weak ties depict superior information fluidity across 
organisations. However, it tends to be fairly practical information and knowledge, 
that is, codified or explicit knowledge (Hansen, 1999). Furthermore, Reagans and 
McEvily (2003) untangle the effect of tie strength and network configurations: the 
structure and range of configurations of relationships ease knowledge transfer ‘over 
and above the effect for the strength of the tie’. Strong ties facilitate the transfer of 
tacit knowledge, as organisations tap into different expertise across the network.   
An organisation’s centrality in the configuration of inter-organisational 
relationships is an important factor in achieving coordination. Firstly, centrality 
positively affects the quality of information an organisation obtains31. Accurate 
                                                 
31
 For clarity’ sake, I must stress a distinction between the impacts of ‘network structure’ and 
‘network position’ regarding information. ‘Network structure’ – that is whether the ties are dense or 
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information flows through central network positions while ‘second-hand information 
is often fuzzy and inaccurate’ for organisations in the periphery (Burt, 1992, p. 14). 
Because structurally central organisations access information from several 
organisations, they benefit from information that is relevant to their coordination of 
other organisations located in the periphery.  
However, organisations in the periphery may establish bridges to other 
organisations. This allows organisations to reorganise information and resources that 
are available elsewhere in the configuration of inter-organisational relationships 
(Hargadon & Sutton, 1997). In an Italian subsidiary of an international computer 
firm, Gargiulo and Benassi (2000) found that if managers’ networks were dense, it 
hindered their possibility of responding to requests caused by changes in task-related 
interdependence. The authors conclude that managers in highly dense networks are 
‘trapped in their own net’; in other words, the failure to coordinate was greater 
because of a lack of ability to adjust (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000, p. 192). 
Organisations that are centrally located are greatly exposed to reputation damage 
because they are densely connected to many organisations (Gulati & Singh, 1998).  
Second, the position in the inter-organisational network not only grants access to 
accurate information, it also makes the organisation’s perception of the whole 
structure of inter-organisational relationships more accurate. The linkage between 
centrality and the accuracy of the perceived network structure has been shown to be 
decisive in the coordination of actions among parties (Krackhardt, 1990; Ozcan & 
Eisenhardt, 2009). In studying entrepreneurs in the US wireless gaming industry, 
Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009) found that they relied heavily on mental representations 
of the whole structure of inter-organisational relationships. Entrepreneurs’ strategies 
for gathering resources reflected the structure of inter-organisational ties as they 
perceived it. Greater accuracy in these perceptions led to more effective actions 
being taken. In another study, of a small entrepreneurial firm based in the Silicon 
                                                                                                                                          
sparse – affects the information flow among organisations, while ‘network position’ primarily affects 
the quality of that information (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1985; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Hansen, 
1999; Krackhardt, 1990; Walker et al., 1997). For example, consider the development of a novel 
technology by a research consortium of several companies and a specific episode of 
miscommunication regarding the integration of a component. Now, this might occur because of a 
disrupted information flow among the organisations regarding the technical specificities (i.e. 
compatibility requirements), which is typically the case with sparse network structures. Alternatively, 
it might occur because of misinformation being passed between the project leaders (i.e. the central 
organisation) and a third-party developer (i.e. a peripheral organisation). Although both cases are 
intrinsically related, there is one difference: ‘network structure’ and ‘network position’ impact 
differently on the information. 
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Valley, Krackhardt (1990) claims that accuracy in the perception of the inter-
organisational network mobilises power itself. Here, the argument is that power is 
induced through access to information flows in the informal network (Krackhardt, 
1990). These two studies suggest that the accuracy of the perception of the 
configuration – which is shaped by one’s position in it – positively affects the 
possibility of coordination (Table 3). 
Finally, central organisations develop ‘awareness’ about the resources that can be 
obtained, as well as those needed by counterparts (van de Ven, 1976). ‘Awareness’ 
suggests how organisations learn about the reliability, status and power of other 
parties (DiMaggio, 1992, p. 125). In the example of the Museum of Modern Art, the 
founders’ awareness of the resources within their personal network was critical to 
making the museum possible (against predictions by outsiders) (DiMaggio, 1992). 
The study of network configuration offers a preliminary insight into the relational 
mechanisms of coordination. However, structural features are insufficient to secure 
an understanding of the unfolding process of coordination, which leads me now to 
explore the intersection between network structure and relational assets.     
(4) Relational assets are lubricators of the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships – such as trust – that induce lower costs of coordination (Table 3). 
Similarly to the debates on strong versus weak ties, and dense and sparse 
configurations, the debate on the role of relational forms of governance is ongoing 
(MacDuffie, 2011; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; McEvily, 2011). The debate about 
the role of trust, which has engaged many scholars across fields of research, has led 
to various insights into the coordination among organisations.  
Contractual arrangements and trust-based ties are often regarded as two polar 
opposite forms of coordinating inter-organisational relationships. One perspective, 
led by transaction costs economics, is that trust is, at best, a sub-category of risk 
(Williamson, 1996). Any argument made in favour of trust can be regarded as yet 
another reason to enforce contractual arrangements. Flexibility and incompleteness 
of contracts harms the alignment and congruence of goals among organisations 
The counter-argument is suggested by scholars who support a ‘relational’ view of 
inter-organisational relationships (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Das & Teng, 1998; Dyer 
& Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995a; Madhok, 1995; McEvily et al., 2003; Zaheer & 
Venkatraman, 1995). They argue that organisations pursue their own ‘strategic 
motivations’, but not necessarily in an opportunistic way because they are aware of 
  
67
the value creation that occurs through relationships (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Zajac & 
Olsen, 1993). Trust in inter-organisational ties enhances the development of common 
understandings, which in turn lead to behavioural predictability. This can occur 
despite the absence of formal governance mechanisms – or at least when they are 
reduced” (Das & Teng, 1998; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). The role trust plays in 
coordination across organisational boundaries is asserted by Gulati (1998, p. 304): 
‘interfirm trust is an extraordinary lubricant for alliances that involve considerable 
interdependence and task coordination between partners’. A similar proposition is 
argued by Madhok (1995), who advocates for joint ventures to shift from ownership 
to trust-based governance structures. 
However, the claim that trust lubricates inter-organisational relationships has 
evolved into another rather vibrant debate: is trust a substitute or a complement for 
contracts? Some authors suggest that trust can substitute for formal agreements 
(Gambetta, 1988; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Trust-based ties themselves are 
mechanisms that align organisations in the pursuit of common goals. Citing a 
manager of a Wisconsin-based manufacture, Macaulay (1963, p. 61) offers an 
account of the relationship between contracts and trust: ‘If something comes up, you 
get the other man on the telephone and deal with the problem. You don't read 
legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want to do business again.’ This 
remark shows the prevalence of relational aspects over contractual ones (Table 3). 
A substantial amount of research suggests the presence of a continuum between 
contracts and trust in a recursive fashion – whereby trust influences contractual 
arrangements and vice versa. For instance, Herbert Simon asserted that ‘authority 
[contractual aspects], unless buttressed by other forms of influence, is relatively 
impotent to control decisions in any but a negative way’32 (Simon, 1976, p. 227). The 
complementarity between contractual arrangements and trust in inter-organisational 
ties is shown in Perrone et al. (2003). The authors conclude that organisational 
environments with a lower degree of control over their actions (discretion) foster to 
higher levels of trust among boundary spanners.  
                                                 
32
 A sociology-grounded stream of research pointed out the role of the social structure (Coleman, 
1988a; DiMaggio et al., 1983; Granovetter, 1973), at the same time that another group of researchers 
was actively pushing forward a theory of transaction costs (Eccles, 1981; Williamson, 1979; 1981; 
1993) in which contracts were given a central function to prevent misappropriation and misalignment 
in inter-organisational relations. To some extent, this section inherits this debate that is still widely 
embedded in today’s research efforts, as is shown elsewhere in this thesis. 
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The complementarity between trust- and contract-based mechanisms of 
coordination can be demonstrated by looking at the underlying social triggers of 
coordination. Unlike contract-based mechanisms, in which authority and sanctions 
are enforced, trust-based coordination operates primarily on the basis of 
trustworthiness, reputation and relational-driven sanctions. Being perceived as 
trustworthy by the other parties is important not only for organisations’ 
competitiveness (Barney & Hansen, 1994), but also as a mechanism to coordinate 
inter-organisational relationships. Perceived reliability and competence affect other 
organisations’ willingness to be in a situation of interdependence with (i.e. transfer 
power to) the focal organisation. Trustworthiness accelerates the formation of ties – 
because trustworthiness conveys information about organisational capabilities – 
while reducing coordination costs (e.g. search and contracting costs). Thus, the 
concern for coordination is ‘not if you trust, but who do you trust?’ (Burt, 1992).  
Reputation refers, for example, to an organisation’s compliance with norms and 
rules (Ring & van de Ven, 1992). Reputational concerns drive the coordination of 
inter-organisational relationships (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati et al., 2000) by 
promoting ‘enforceable’ or ‘deterrent-based’ trust (Burt & Knez, 1995). Deterrent-
based trust facilitates coordination because organisations align their interests to 
prevent the malfeasance of inter-organisational relationships. In an extreme case, 
organisations may apply relational-based sanctions to other organisations if a 
transgression has occurred. Restrictions on future business are often used to inflict 
sanctions on other organisations (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Larson, 1992). 
In summary, the sustainability of inter-organisational relationships relies heavily 
on trust regardless of the presence of administrative controls. The biotechnology 
industry provides a relevant example, where trust alongside contracts forms the basis 
of inter-organisational coordination, which is critical to innovation in highly dynamic 
industries. Not only does trust enhance coordination; it also promotes learning. As 
Powell et al. (1996, p. 117) note, ‘a lack of trust between the parties, difficulties in 
relinquishing control, the complexity of a joint project, and differential ability to 
learn new skills are all barriers to effective collaboration’.  
(5) Organisations’ characteristics are attributes intrinsic to individual 
organisations that shape the possibility of coordination across boundaries. In a study 
of entrepreneurs, Larson (1992, p. 99) notes that ‘not all firms seek or are capable of 
engaging in such in-depth coordination and collaborative activities’. This is the 
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premise for this section. In it, I identify the relevance of the following characteristics 
of organisations: learning capabilities and the similarity of organisations (Table 3). 
Organisational ties are not sufficient to develop inter-organisational coordination; 
the capabilities (e.g. technical expertise) of the organisations are fundamental in 
underpinning coordination across organisational boundaries (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Fuchs & Garicano, 2011; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Penrose, 1959). Recall the 
example of the biotechnology industry. Powell et al. (1996) show that ties among 
organisations are important but learning capabilities play a defining role in 
coordinating inter-organisational relationships. Furthermore, ‘learning is developed 
socially through the formation of values and convergent expectations’, which 
facilitate coordinated action over time (Kogut & Zander, 1996, p. 506). Like trust, 
learning unfolds as a process in which organisations engage in feedback cycles 
(Ariño & Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996). An organisation’s learning capability enhances 
coordination at the inter-organisational network level because organisations 
progressively develop adaptive flexibility and the willingness to make commitments. 
Doz (1996) argues that organisational learning capabilities are decisive in ensuring 
that strategic alliances experience success, that is, achieve the purpose of the alliance.  
Similarity33 among organisations is defined in reference to characteristics such as 
expertise and capabilities (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999), status (Hallen, 2008), markets 
(Baum et al., 2000) and country (Barkema et al., 1997). Expertise and capabilities are 
the most relevant aspects of similarity, as far as the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships is concerned. Similarity of organisational expertise 
influences the dynamics of coordination insofar as it defines how much one 
organisation knows about another (Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009).  
Organisations that have little in common are less likely to initiate communication. 
Van de Ven and Gordon (1984, p. 601) state that ‘organisations with moderately 
similar professional skills, clients, and services represent a common culture of shared 
meanings, which facilitates communication’. Organisations operating in similar 
organisational fields develop, for example, common heuristics in information 
(Hansen, 1999) and knowledge-sharing practices (Kogut & Zander, 1996). 
                                                 
33
 In the sub-section on ‘Strategic Motivations’ (Section 2 – ‘Antecedents of Inter-Organisational 
Relationship Coordination’), I argued that similarity contributed to the ignition of coordination. Here, 
I return to the discussion on similarity versus complementarity to assess the implications for the 
mechanisms used to coordinate inter-organisational relationships, that is, to what extent similarity and 
complementarity affect the unfolding of coordination. 
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Nonetheless, expertise-specific heuristics constrain information-sharing processes 
among other members located in distant parts of the network.  
 (6) Task uncertainty and a shared vision are fundamental to the process of 
coordination (Table 3). Task uncertainty increases organisations’ propensity to use 
rules and programmes aimed at developing coordination. 
A high level of task-related uncertainty brings greater challenges for task 
integration, regardless of the coordination-enhancing mechanisms (e.g. managerial 
apparatuses) that organisations may introduce. This is particularly critical as 
organisations rely more and more on an inter-organisational ‘division of labour’ 
(Kogut & Zander, 1996). Where task-related uncertainty is low, organisations 
develop ‘pattern maintenance activities’ that ease inter-organisational coordination 
(van de Ven & Gordon, 1984). However, if tasks lead to high levels of uncertainty, 
coordination across organisations becomes more important. Joint actions among 
organisations are particularly necessary if the uncertainty is linked to the novelty of 
the venture (Ring & van de Ven, 1992). In this case, the organisations must share a 
vision in order to achieve their purpose.  
A shared vision provides the basis for a ‘consensus’ among the organisations 
within the inter-organisational network configuration. Consensus refers to ‘the 
degree to which an organization’s specific goals and services are agreed upon by the 
parties’ (van de Ven, 1976, p. 31). Interaction among organisations enhances the 
development of shared goals and knowledge, which in turn help to consolidate the 
other mechanisms of coordination. Specifically, communication channels ensure that 
all parties get feedback on the suitability of their actions within the project. 
Communication, referrals and personal acquaintances solidify consensus around the 
purpose of coordination (van de Ven, 1976). 
Once organisations reach a consensus, coordination among the parties is 
facilitated by the development of congruence of goals. The notion of goal 
congruence stresses the possibility of organisations having individually different 
goals that are, nevertheless, compatible with a common purpose, leading to the ‘goal-
congruence mode of coordination’ (van de Ven & Gordon, 1984). Essentially, this 
suggests that organisations may pursue their individual goals without compromising 
the attainment of the purpose of the inter-organisational network. Oliver (1990, p. 
250) argues that ‘the greater the degree of domain consensus among or between 
public sector or social service organisations, the higher the probability that these 
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organisations will establish relations’. The lack of a shared vision and a common 
understanding of the contributions by and payoffs to each organisation lead to 
dialectic tensions about key aspects – e.g. trust and vigilance, and control and 
autonomy – that underpin the collaboration process (de Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004). 
Two examples of entrepreneurship and multi-party collaborations illustrate the 
importance of a shared vision to developing inter-organisational coordination. 
Entrepreneurs have to assemble resources from other organisations (e.g. venture 
capitalists), which may not take part if they do not share the vision (i.e. regarding the 
potential success of the project). A particular case of this occurs in nascent markets 
where organisations’ operations incur risks due to the emerging nature of the market 
(Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). Another example is multi-agency arrangements, that is 
long-term commitments to deliver programmes. Here, a shared vision is important as 
some parties might be tempted to defend their own interests (Provan & Milward, 
1995). In both examples, a shared vision ensures a sense of ‘sameness’ where 
administrative coordination mechanisms may not exist (or may not be implicit). 
In summary, relational mechanisms of coordination are concerned with relational 
assets (e.g. goodwill trust), the organisations’ characteristics, and task uncertainty 
and a shared vision among organisations. Relational mechanisms shed light on the 
sociological and organisational theories that underpin the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships. The last dimension of coordination mechanisms I 
explore concerns institutional aspects.  
2.2.3. Institutional  
These are macro-level aspects institutionalised and embedded at the industry 
level. I shall draw on the notion of macroculture (Table 3). 
(7) ‘Macroculture’ encapsulates industry-related aspects that are likely to shape 
the mechanisms of coordination of inter-organisational relationships (Abrahamson & 
Fombrun, 1994; DiMaggio, 1992; Grandori & Soda, 1995). First, research 
consistently stresses that industry’s preferences for contractual arrangements are 
uneven, as the contrast between the building (Eccles, 1981; Stinchcombe, 1985a) and 
biotechnology (Baum et al., 2000; Powell et al., 1996) industries shows. For 
instance, the building industry relies heavily on sub-contracting practices – the main 
contractors form contracts directly with several specialist contractors (Eccles, 1981). 
Sub-contracting is a form of contract; yet it has distinctive coordination-related 
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implications compared to traditional contracts. While traditional contracts are made 
between two parties and clearly state the obligations and expectations, in sub-
contracting there is a mix of formal aspects and flexibility regarding the 
interdependences across the inter-organisational network in different phases, for 
example regarding the duration of the building project (Stinchcombe, 1985a). Sub-
contracting arrangements are also used for the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships in the fashion clothing and content (e.g. film) industries (Jones et al., 
1997). There is little use of contracts in dynamic industries whose need for inter-
organisational coordination fluctuates constantly. 
Norms and rules embedded at the institutional level affect how organisations 
operate (Ansari & Phillips, 2011; Kogut & Zander, 1996; Lawrence et al., 2002; 
Ring & van de Ven, 1992). Institutions define roles and norms that shape how 
organisations relate to one another. From a sociological perspective, the work of 
Durkheim (1984; [1893]) laid the foundations for our understanding of societal 
relationships as being organised around roles. In his notion of ‘organic solidarity’, 
(Durkheim, 1984; [1893]) argues that individuals relate to society based upon their 
roles. From a narrower perspective, scholars discuss the implications of role on 
coordination-related aspects. DiMaggio (1992) argues that an important element of 
institutional aspects is that they ascribe roles to organisations, that is, institutions 
entail a ‘classification criteria’. Furthermore, these roles attach expectations and 
obligations to organisations in terms of coordination among parties, for example 
through role-based coordination (Bechky, 2006). 
Institutionalised roles present specific implications for the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships because knowledge and information become codified 
according to those roles (Holm, 1995; Olsen, 1978). Kogut and Zander (1996) claim 
that knowledge is encoded in the structuring of the work. One way in which roles 
shape coordination is by developing conventions and a common language, known as 
cross-understanding (Puranam et al., 2006), where conventions and rules define how 
individuals coordinate their behaviour (Kogut & Zander, 1996, p. 506). It is 
reasonable to say that ‘common definitions of situations produce similar actions’ 
(Olsen, 1978, p. 106). For instance, Holm (1995) reports that relationships among 
Norwegian fisheries comprise an element of social construction regarding how to 
collaborate, resolve technical problems and patterns of information (Table 3).  
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Having reviewed and discussed the antecedents and mechanisms, I shall complete 
the process view on the coordination of inter-organisational relationships by 
examining their consequences. These relate to the attainment of a common goal – as 
suggested in the definition of coordination that underlies this theoretical framework. 
 
2.3. Consequences 
Organisations do not coordinate for coordination’s sake; rather, organisations 
coordinate to pursue an end or purpose. Consequences reflect the extent to which 
organisations attain what they set out to attain at the start of the coordination process 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Provan & Sydow, 2008). To understand the consequences 
of the coordination of inter-organisational relationships is of critical theoretical 
importance as organisations increasingly depend on coordination across 
organisational boundaries. The enthusiasm about inter-organisational relationships is 
spreading among scholars and practitioners. However, we seem to know little about 
the consequences of coordination among organisations. Looking at alliance success, 
Kale and Singh (2009) find that alliances have a very low success rate, with up to 
70% of them failing. 
Surprisingly, scholars have focused on explaining the ‘positive’ consequences 
(Baum et al., 2003; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Nickerson & Silverman, 2003). The 
lack of interest in the negative consequences of relationships is expressed by Katila 
et al. (2008, p. 296): ‘scholars studying relationships between new and established 
firms strongly emphasize the positive outcomes … but neglect the negative ones’. 
The call for studies on negative outcomes has been expressed in numerous literature 
reviews on inter-organisational relationships (Borgatti et al., 2011; Kilduff et al., 
2010; Nohria, 1992; Oliver et al., 1998; Provan & Sydow, 2008).  
The dysfunctionalities in internal organisational relationships have received little 
attention, despite spectacular coordination problems being ‘showcased’ in the media 
on a regular basis (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000). According to Podolny and Page 
(1998, p. 71), ‘this enthusiasm for network forms of organization seems difficult to 
reconcile with an important fact: An extremely large fraction of network forms of 
organization do not perform the function for which they were designed’.   
I argue, therefore, that a balanced view is required of the consequences of the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships: there is an over-emphasis on the 
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positive outcomes at present (Figure 5). Thus, I shall review the positive, but also 
the negative, consequences of inter-organisational relationships, in a quest for 
completeness. At first glance, the positive-negative dichotomy is exposed to 
subjectivity issues. A consequence might be regarded as negative by one 
organisation and positive by another. From an epistemological standpoint, such a 
dichotomy also involves judgment, which varies among parties. Following prior 
research (Katila et al., 2008; Podolny & Page, 1998), I use positive here to refer to 
generalised positive consequences (intended) and negative to mean generalised 
negative consequences (unintended)34. 
 
Figure 5 Summary of Consequences 
 
C. 
Consequences 
(1) Resources  
(2) Effectiveness  Positive 
Negative 
(3) Operational  
(4) Behavioural (and relational) 
   
2.3.1. Positive Consequences 
Most prior research identifies ‘access to resources’ and ‘effectiveness’ as positive 
consequences that stem from coordination of inter-organisational relationships. 
Positive consequences relate directly to the extent to which organisations achieve the 
goals that drove the formation of the ties (i.e. accessing resources)  
(1) Resources underlie the strategic motivations that lead organisations to initiate 
coordination (Table 4). Through coordination, organisations access resources, such 
as technology, R&D capabilities, financial resources and new markets.   
Accessing the resources available within other organisations is important as 
organisations are increasingly interdependent on counterparties for production 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Wernerfelt, 1984). For instance, firms in Italy’s districts 
form ties to access specialised technology and facilities that are available locally 
                                                 
34
 Of course, positive consequences might be unintended in the first place and vice versa. A discussion 
of the idiosyncrasies of these labels falls outside the scope of this thesis. I use the notions of positive 
and negative as generalised categories (as used in prior research). However, I shall detail these 
epistemological aspects further as required in this thesis. 
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(Lazerson, 1988). Access to technology and R&D capabilities is another positive 
consequence, as is shown by technology alliances. In the biotechnology industry, 
research consistently reports that inter-organisational relationships provide 
organisations with critical R&D capabilities (Baum et al., 2000; Owen-Smith & 
Powell, 2004; Prevezer, 2001). For instance, Baum et al. (2000) find that establishing 
inter-organisational ties brings positive consequences for organisations in terms of 
the ratio between revenue and R&D spending. The importance of inter-organisational 
ties in terms of providing access to R&D increases in highly dynamic markets such 
as biotechnology (Powell et al., 1996).  
Prior research consistently highlights access to new markets as a generalised 
positive consequence for organisations (Baum et al., 2000; Doz, 1996; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati, Lavie, & Madhavan, 2011a; Stuart, 2000). An 
organisation’s access to new markets occurs through ties between established and 
new firms. Doz (1996) reports that small pharmaceutical firms gain access to new 
markets through alliances with large firms. Baum et al. (2000) suggest that Canada’s 
biotechnology start-ups that have ties with established firms acquire more financial 
endowments than other start-ups. In a study of agencies working with United Way35, 
Provan, Beyer and Kruytbosch (1980) find that agencies that coordinate with 
important community elements receive more financial support for their activities. 
(2) Effectiveness captures a performance-grounded perspective that has a long 
tradition in the literature (Table 4). Before I attempt to come up with a definition, I 
will first note that performance and effectiveness are often used interchangeably. I 
have observed, however, that performance refers mostly to consequences for 
individual organisations (e.g. profits), while effectiveness tends to be used in studies 
taking an extended view of the consequences of a general output from a group of 
organisations. In line with my motivation to investigate the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships, I adopt the view of effectiveness. Following prior 
research (Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011; Provan & Milward, 1995; Sydow & Windeler, 
1998), I take effectiveness in inter-organisational relationships to be the extent to 
which organisations attain a common goal. Furthermore, I distinguish between direct 
and indirect measures of effectiveness.  
                                                 
35
 United Way is an US-based organisation that works with the local communities on welfare issues 
relating to education and health (further information is available at http://liveunited.org/).  
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Direct measures of effectiveness have received wide attention in research based 
on sales growth (Stuart, 2000) and venture survival (Sapienza et al., 2006). In 
innovation-motivated collaborations, the number of patented products is widely used 
to gauge effectiveness. Ahuja (2000a) reports that (direct) inter-organisational ties 
lead to a larger number of patents among firms in the international chemicals 
industry. The mechanism reported is ties that give organisations access to 
knowledge, which in turn leads to a superior capacity to innovate. George et al. 
(2002) also find that inter-organisational coordination between privately-held 
organisations and universities has positive consequences for organisations. For 
instance, privately-held organisations with links to universities have substantially 
superior financial performance – measured as ‘net sales to total assets’ – to firms 
without these linkages (George et al., 2002, p. 599).  Lee (2010) reports that, over the 
period 1976–1995, US biotechnology inventors with track records of collaboration 
took bridging positions in configurations of inter-organisational relationships 
(providing the organisations in question with a larger number of patents). In both 
studies, coordinating inter-organisational ties led to effectiveness. 
Indirect measures attempt to capture consequences that span organisational 
boundaries. For instance, a direct measure such as sales growth relates to an 
individual organisation; however, an indirect measure such as innovation output is 
often shared by all parties involved in the project. Here, the reasoning is as follows: 
‘the performance of each firm comes to depend not only on its own capabilities and 
strategies but also on those of its allies and on its relationships to these allies’ 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1996, p. 3). This observation has led scholars to include indirect 
measures of effectiveness, such as the number of new products, perceived measures 
of effectiveness and new opportunities gained by the partners. The work of George et 
al. (2002) on links between privately-held organisations and universities provides a 
good example of the integration of direct and indirect measures. 
Inter-organisational ties lead to more innovations, but also to generalised 
perceptions of success and effectiveness. Recent research uses perception-oriented 
indicators. Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009) use a set of several effectiveness indicators 
in their study of alliance portfolios in the wireless gaming industry. The indicators 
include the number of hit games, the total number of games, the number of handsets 
per game and a subjective assessment of effectiveness. In another study, Davis and 
Eisenhardt (2011) report the outcomes of inter-organisational ties according to the 
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following dimensions: new technologies generated, market acceptance and product 
performance, and the perceived evaluation of success among participants. The 
authors find that the mechanism that leads to higher effectiveness is that of rotating 
the leadership among the organisations involved in the project. Measures of 
perceived effectiveness are also used among organisations that provide services to 
the community, in the form of customer satisfaction. Provan and Milward (1995) 
argue that network integration among health care providers promotes higher 
perceived effectiveness as reported by the clients, in terms of quality of life, client 
satisfaction, psychopathology, and level of functioning. 
However, effectiveness is not always a direct consequence of inter-organisational 
relationships. Rather, several non-discrete actions and phenomena occur within inter-
organisational relationships, such as the governance structures and prior experience 
of organisations. A study of 145 biotechnology alliances suggests that, once 
governance mechanisms and experience in the industry have been accounted for, the 
routines of inter-organisational coordination enhance the effectiveness of 
collaborative agreements (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002). Accumulated knowledge 
enhances organisations’ operations through a long-term effect. Inter-organisational 
ties help to transfer new knowledge but they also allow for the reintegration of 
knowledge (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Powell et al., 1996; 
Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). In their study of the Mère et Enfant in the Gaza 
Strip, Hardy et al. (2003) emphasise the role of knowledge creation through inter-
organisational ties (Table 4). Knowledge enhances organisations’ effectiveness, for 
example through the learning of new skills and capabilities. 
Learning is a key outcome of inter-organisational relationships (Ariño & Torre, 
1998; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Doz, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1996; Zollo & Winter, 
2002). Organisations that are able to engage in a constant learning process over time 
and to integrate new information show a higher likelihood of alliance success (Doz, 
1996). Repeated learning cycles are related to higher task effectiveness (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). Organisations learn operations-related skills and capabilities that 
contribute towards positive outcomes; this has been argued extensively in the 
literature. Recent research suggests that organisations also learn about the use of 
administrative mechanisms of inter-organisational coordination. Lumineau, Fréchet 
and Puthod (2011) find that the contracting process engenders rich learning for the 
organisations themselves and their partners.  
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 Table 4 Outcomes of Inter-Organisational Relationships Coordination 
Outcomes 
Relationship 
with 
coordination 
Theoretical reasoning on 
outcomes Research evidence on outcomes Examples 
 
Positive Consequences 
 
1. Resources  
- Technology and 
facilities 
- R&D capabilities 
- New markets 
- Financial resources 
 
Nodes  
(i and j) 
● 
Coordination of inter-
organisational relationships leads 
to positive consequences for 
organisations, i.e. technology and 
facilities, R&D capabilities, new 
markets and financial resources. 
(Baum et al., 2000; Doz, 1996; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati et al., 2011a; Hallen, 
2008; Lazerson, 1988; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Powell et al., 1996; Provan et al., 1980; Sorenson & 
Stuart, 2001; Stuart, 2000; Wernerfelt, 1984) 
* Firms in Italy’s districts coordinate 
their ties to access specialised 
technology and facilities available 
locally; 
* Canada’s biotechnology start-ups that 
have ties with established firms acquire 
more financial resources. 
2. Effectiveness  
- Sales growth  
- Venture survival 
- Patented products 
- Financial performance  
- Perceived measures of 
effectiveness 
- Knowledge 
- Learning 
 
Configuration  
(∑{xij}) 
 
Coordination of inter-
organisational relationships 
generates higher effectiveness, 
either directly (e.g. sales growth, 
patented products and financial 
performance) or indirectly (e.g. 
knowledge and learning). 
(Ahuja, 2000a; Ariño & Torre, 1998; Baum & 
Oliver, 1991; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Davis & 
Eisenhardt, 2011; Doz, 1996; Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; George et al., 2002; Gomes-Casseres, 1996; 
Gulati, 1995a; Gulati et al., 2011a; Hardy et al., 
2003; Human & Provan, 2000; Kogut & Zander, 
1992; Kogut & Zander, 1996; Lee, 2010; Lumineau 
et al., 2011; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009; Powell et 
al., 1996; Provan & Milward, 1995; Sapienza et al., 
2006; Stuart, 2000; Teece et al., 1997; Zollo et al., 
2002; Zollo & Winter, 2002) 
* Privately held organisations with more 
university links have substantially 
superior financial performance than 
firms without these links; 
* Routines lead to higher effectiveness 
among biotechnology firms; 
* Mère et Enfant, providing international 
aid in the Gaza Strip, relied on involved 
and embedded inter-organisational ties 
for knowledge creation.  
 (Table continues in next page) 
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Negative Consequences 
 
3. Operational 
- Miscommunication 
- Responsiveness 
- Delays  
- Additional costs of 
operations 
 
Ties 
(xij) 
●-● 
Through the effort to coordinate 
inter-organisational relationships, 
negative consequences emerge for 
organisations such as 
miscommunication, lack of 
responsiveness, delays and 
additional costs of operations 
(Ariño & Torre, 1998; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; 
Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011; Eccles, 1981; 
Eisenhardt, Furr, & Bingham, 2010; Grandori, 
1997a; Granovetter, 1985; Heath & Staudenmayer, 
2000; Kogut & Zander, 1996; Mitev, 1996; Simon, 
1976; Srikanth & Puranam, 2010; van de Ven, 
1976; Williamson, 1991) 
* Miscommunication among building 
companies results in misleading 
decisions about on-site work 
arrangements; 
* American car makers struggle to 
communicate across areas of expertise 
compared to their Japanese competitors. 
4. Behavioural (and 
relational)  
- Misalignment 
- Misappropriation 
- ‘Double-sword’ 
mechanisms 
- (Over)embeddedness 
Ties 
(xij) 
●-● 
Configuration  
(∑{xij}) 
 
Organisations might engage in 
misalignment and 
misappropriation behaviours since 
administrative mechanisms might 
also harm coordination. A high 
degree of embeddedness 
nonetheless promotes negative 
consequences regarding 
coordination.     
(Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Coase, 1937; Eccles, 
1981; Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Gomes-Casseres, 
1996; Graebner, 2009; Granovetter, 1973; Greve et 
al., 2010; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Simmel, 1956; 
Uzzi, 1997; van de Ven & Gordon, 1984; 
Williamson, 1996; Zaheer & Zaheer, 1997) 
* In acquisitions of entrepreneurial 
firms, some might develop erroneous 
trust perceptions; 
* A high degree of embeddedness 
among alliance members drives joint 
withdrawals (alongside task-related 
causes). 
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2.3.2. Negative Consequences 
Negative consequences of inter-organisational relationships are implicit in most of 
the theorising on inter-organisational relationships. For instance, concerns about 
opportunistic behaviour and the misalignment of organisations are at the epicentre of 
transaction cost theory (as I noted in Chapter I). Consider everyday life examples of 
miscommunication (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000) or a lack of trust among parties 
(Graebner, 2009). As an extreme case, one might consider an unsuccessful alliance 
(Kale & Singh, 2009) or the failure of a project (Ariño & Torre, 1998; Mitev, 1996). In 
one way or another, these are problems in which one party is unable to anticipate the 
other’s actions and adjust its own accordingly (Schelling, 1960). 
However, previous research seems not to have conceptualised the notion of negative 
consequences. Some authors refer to ‘failures of coordination’ (Williamson, 1991), 
‘coordination neglect’ (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000) or just mention ‘coordination 
problems’ (Grandori, 1997a; Srikanth & Puranam, 2010). One obstacle is the lack of 
prior conceptualisations of negative consequences of coordination of inter-
organisational relationships – despite allusions in the literature (Katila et al., 2008). 
Following the work of Polodny and Page (1998, p. 71), I argue that negative 
consequences can be understood as ‘dysfunctionalities that arise through the operation 
of the network’ of organisations. Accordingly, I single out two types of coordination 
problems: operational and behavioural/relational (Table 4). 
(3) Operational coordination problems refer to mundane coordination problems that 
may compromise purpose and represent a diversion from the anticipated course of 
action. This includes daily episodes of miscommunication and organisations’ slow 
responsiveness. The manifestation of operational coordination problems might 
encompass delays and additional costs for operations. To this extent, operational 
coordination problems call to mind the notion of effectiveness.  
Miscommunication is one of the principal impediments to effective collaboration and 
is particularly severe when the judgments to be made are subjective (Granovetter, 
1985). In a study of the Massachusetts-based building industry, Eccles (1981) reports 
that organisations are constantly producing subjective assessments, with direct effects 
on coordination-related actions. For instance, quantity-surveying firms regularly update 
organisations on the cost of the building works. These updates require organisations to 
implement practical solutions (e.g. to work extra hours) to tackle concerns over delays 
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and budget. This example illustrates the role of information flows among organisations 
but also the importance of information accuracy for the coordination process. Poor-
quality information has repercussions for coordination. 
The sources of operational-type coordination problems relate primarily to the 
‘definiteness’ of the tasks (Simon, 1976). An organisation’s individual scope of 
responsibility may become blurred when work is spread across several organisations. A 
broader scope of responsibility provides organisations with flexibility, which is 
necessary if they are to address changing task demands (e.g. task-related uncertainty) 
and demands from other organisations (e.g. demands for synchronisation with other 
organisations) (Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011; Eisenhardt et al., 2010). Miscommunication 
often stems from a lack of cross-understanding among organisations, particularly if they 
have different industrial backgrounds (Kogut & Zander, 1996).  
Modes of specialisation among organisations affect inter-organisational 
communication whenever the latter challenges the assumptions of common 
understanding (Simon, 1976). These assumptions are embodied in the language, 
practices and conventions that are often specific to, for instance, an industry or a 
profession (Table 4). Heath and Staudenmayer (2000) propose the thesis that 
individuals develop lay theories of coordination – common-sense ways of organising 
and coordinating with others. These theories create a substantial obstacle to effective 
coordination across organisational boundaries. The authors rely on a large – and 
anecdotal – repertoire of coordination problems experienced by organisations. In a 
comparison between Japanese and American car manufacturers, they find that 
communication efficiency across different areas of expertise (e.g. design and 
production) gives the Japanese car maker, Toyota, sustained and superior efficiency 
over their American competitors, GM. Similar insights are reported across several 
industries (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998). Efficient and accurate information flows 
prevent organisations from experiencing ‘blind spots’, that is, episodes where 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships is needed but the organisations cannot 
anticipate or assess this need.  
Heath and Staudenmayer (2000) coin the notion of ‘coordination neglect’. The 
message is that, however engaged organisations and individuals are in solving a 
problem, even when it is related to their competence, the parties fail to coordinate. First, 
there is a focus on the process rather than the integration of the parties. This is worsened 
by an increasing ‘division of labour’. Organisations constantly outsource their activities 
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in search of efficiency but, even above a reasonable threshold, organisations continue to 
divide tasks rather than coordinate to achieve integration. Second, organisations fail to 
communicate effectively with specialist suppliers.  
Operational coordination problems accrue negative consequences for organisations, 
such as delays and additional costs of operations. Constant episodes of 
miscommunication are associated with delays (Srikanth & Puranam, 2010). Although 
delays are costly for organisations, however, the use of tighter administrative 
mechanisms of coordination also entails additional costs. Organisations may agree to 
hold meetings (i.e. managerial apparatuses) to prevent coordination problems. However, 
these are costly. In a study on early childcare agencies, van de Ven (1976, p. 33) found 
that ‘personal contact and committee meetings absorb much time and effort and are 
inefficient mechanisms of coordination activities that can be standardised’.  
In summary, the operational types of negative consequences are miscommunication, 
delays and additional costs for organisations. Although prior research has not 
conceptualised these consequences in a systematic way, some researchers suggest that 
individuals develop lay theories of coordination that (1) focus more on the process than 
the integration of the parties, and (2) prevent effective communication with specialist 
suppliers. This leads me to explore the behavioural aspects that underlie the negative 
consequences of coordination of inter-organisational relationships. 
(4) Behavioural (and relational) coordination problems entail misalignment and 
misappropriation. These are key concerns in the prior research on transaction costs 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1996). Organisations may misappropriate resources. For 
instance, in technology alliances innovations often require the sharing of trade secrets 
and novel information (Gomes-Casseres, 1996) (Table 4).  
Although the origins of a lack of trust are diverse, trust often constrains 
organisations’ behaviour and relations with other parties. In a study of acquisitions of 
entrepreneurial firms, Graebner (2009) finds that trust persists and shapes how firms 
interact through the acquisition process. Although trust perceptions concerning 
counterparties may be erroneous, they shape entrepreneurs’ intentions to compromise 
and reach a consensus. Reaching consensus is often driven by power relations 
originating in the logic of task interdependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Sanctions aim to incentivise organisations to follow a given course of action. 
However, and according to Williamson (1991, p. 278), ‘failures of coordination may 
arise because autonomous parties read and react to signals differently, even though their 
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purpose is to achieve a timely and compatible combined response’. Alongside 
organisations reacting differently to signals, incentive systems may also suffer from 
contradictions that lead to a misalignment of organisations This is described as 
‘incentives conflict’ at the contract and inter-organisational levels (Coase, 1937). For 
example, the main contractors are often incentivised to bid low in the marketplace (to 
meet the client’s desire for a low price); however, building firms themselves seek to 
maximise profit (Eccles, 1981). Thus the client’s desire to spend the minimum may 
conflict with the quality standards that the main contractor wishes to deliver. These 
organisations face a trade-off between competitiveness and profits.  
This tension is typically addressed through coordination mechanisms (e.g. 
administrative mechanisms). However, ‘increasing formalization and monitoring in an 
IR [inter-organisational relationship] leads to conflict and dissensus among participants’ 
(van de Ven & Gordon, 1984, p. 605). The ‘division of labour’ among organisations 
itself creates differences in interests and in perceptions about those interests, and these 
are both sources of conflict (Simmel, 1956). Similarly to Coase with his concept of 
incentives conflict (1937), Simmel (1956) offers the notion of ‘antagonistic 
cooperation’ to capture situations where organisations establish coordination despite 
antagonistic interests. This is the case with technology alliances that involve exchanging 
trade secrets (Gomes-Casseres, 1996).  
A final source of negative consequences of the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships is a high level of embeddedness. My argument about embeddedness so far 
has been that it enhances coordination. However, a high degree of embeddedness also 
hinders the process of coordination by introducing rigidities into the ability of 
organisations to pursue instrumental goals (Granovetter, 1973; Uzzi, 1997). Alertness 
and responsiveness affect an organisation’s effectiveness (e.g. profitability). 
Interdependence may also necessitate coordination with distant organisations, for 
example by mobilising new suppliers (Uzzi, 1997) or inducing task-driven change into 
densely connected configurations (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000).  
Following the same line of argumentation, recent research suggests that 
embeddedness also creates friction in inter-organisational relationships. For instance, 
joint withdrawals from alliances may be explained by task-related causes but can also, it 
is argued, be a consequence of the closeness in inter-organisational relationships, such 
as the presence of triads, which is typical of dense configurations (Greve et al., 2010).  
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In summary, negative consequences such as miscommunications, misappropriation 
of resources (and rents) and unintended outcomes that result from mechanisms aimed at 
coordination (e.g. contractual arrangements) are widely mentioned in the literature. Yet, 
they have not benefited from systematic research to date.  
 
2.4. Assessment of the Literature and ‘Burning Issues’ 
The first insight that emerges from this literature review is the extensiveness of prior 
research on coordination and inter-organisational relationships. I have built on this 
extensiveness to develop a theoretical framework of the process of coordination of 
inter-organisational relationships. The result is a deep theoretical understanding of 
several theoretical mechanisms that, although previously studied without a 
coordination-based focus, provide several ‘clues’ about the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships.  
Although extensive, I argue that the literature on inter-organisational relationships 
contains various ‘burning issues’ from a theoretical perspective. First, and perhaps 
foremost, ‘scholars have paid less attention to the critical role of coordination’ (Gulati et 
al., 2012b). Specifically, the phenomena of coordination have not benefited from 
systematic research, unlike other areas such as the role of contracts, goodwill, trust and 
the structure of ties among organisations. Drawing on recent reviews (Gulati et al., 
2011a; Kilduff & Brass, 2010; Provan et al., 2007) and my own research interests, I 
have identified three burning issues in the pursuit of a theoretical insight into the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships: the heterogeneity of organisations, the 
mixture of contractual arrangements and the dynamics of inter-organisational 
relationships.  
 
(1) Heterogeneity of organisations captures the diversity of organisational expertise 
among different organisations (Lee, 2010; McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). It relates to 
fluctuations in the demand for organisation-specific (i) inputs depending on the stage of 
the project and the tasks that need to be accomplished (i.e. the purpose). In an example 
based on the Boeing 787 Dreamliner alliance programme, Gulati et al. (2011b) show 
that within-alliance demands for inputs may change over time, posing substantial 
challenges for inter-organisational relationship coordination. In that case, successive 
delays and miscommunications among various suppliers regarding, for instance, the 
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fitting of components, negatively affected the programme (Gulati et al., 2011b). 
Contrary to Cyert and March’s claim (1963) that the external environment of the firm 
consists, in part, of other firms with comparable (i.e. similar) characteristics, inter-
organisational relationships are becoming increasingly heterogeneous. Heterogeneity 
refers to the spectrum of organisations, based on their characteristics (e.g. industry and 
size). The alliance programme for the Boeing 787 Dreamliner project is highly 
heterogeneous, combining organisations drawn from a variety of industries, such as 
manufacturing (e.g. engine manufacturers/ Rolls Royce), plastics (e.g. fittings suppliers) 
and electronics (e.g. control panel suppliers).  
Alongside task-related demand shifts, increasing specialisation – that is, the ‘division 
of labour’ (Durkheim, 1984; [1893] – also requires the coordination of a greater 
heterogeneity of organisations. Any purpose relies on the integration of components and 
skills that exist across different organisations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Each 
organisation brings along a ‘socio-economic luggage’ of practices and strategic 
motivations (Bechky, 2006; Hardy et al., 2005). These aspects are idiosyncratic to 
‘organisational fields’, in other words, groups of suppliers and regulators (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983) (Table 5). 
Coordination among organisations thus engages with heterogeneous organisations. 
However, the impact of heterogeneity for coordination is currently insufficiently 
studied. Scholars widely acknowledge that heterogeneity affects inter-organisational 
relationships but shortcomings remain due to mixed findings. In the late 1970s, van de 
Ven (1976, p. 32) noted that ‘the evidence is conflicting on whether domain similarity 
helps or hinders the establishment of an IR [inter-organisational relation]’. Thirty-five 
years later, the puzzle of the effect of heterogeneity still motivates research (Goerzen & 
Beamish, 2005; Harrison & Klein, 2007; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001). 
On the one hand, heterogeneity of organisations widens the ‘pool of resources’, 
including information (Burt, 1992), knowledge (George, Kotha, & Zhang, 2008) and 
technology (Srivastava & Gnyawali, 2011). McEvily and Zaheer (1999) find that 
manufacturers that establish ties with regional institutions in the US Midwest are well-
positioned to access new information, ideas and opportunities. On the other hand, 
heterogeneous inter-organisational networks are costly to coordinate (Ring & van de 
Ven, 1992) and maintain (Gulati & Singh, 1998). If the argument on ‘homophily’ 
suggests that similarity promotes coordination and common heuristics (Kogut & 
Zander, 1996), it also implies that differences among organisations hinder coordination 
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due to a few common heuristics. Moreover, heterogeneity of organisations also affects 
the potential for the alignment of organisations’ interests. Thus, there is a requirement 
for contractual safeguards with incentive systems and sanctions to ensure inter-
organisational relationship coordination. 
In summary, inter-organisational relationships engage numerous organisations with 
different organisational expertise; this is driven by the demand for specific expertise 
that is increasingly spread outside organisational boundaries. Nonetheless, the 
heterogeneity of organisations remains under-studied in relation to mechanisms of 
coordination.  
 
(2) A mixture of contractual arrangements is increasingly becoming part of most 
inter-organisational ties (xij). This is a ‘burning issue’ for research because the latter has 
so far neglected the implications – if any – of the co-existence of various forms of 
contracting in configurations of inter-organisational relationships. Bradach and Eccles 
(1989, p. 98) warn about a ‘plurality of independent forms of coordinative exchange 
rather than the continued mutually exclusive existence of models on combination’. By 
models, they are referring to contractual arrangements among organisations36. Recently, 
Gulati, Puranam and Tushman (2012a, p. 572) have argued that ‘prominent forms of 
economic organization increasingly involve multiple firms as well as communities of 
noncontractually linked individuals’. This calls for an understanding of inter-
organisational relationships as a ‘patchwork’ of contractual arrangements, from which 
idea several insights emerge (Table 5). 
First, the mixture of contractual arrangements is linked to the aforementioned 
challenge of the heterogeneity of organisations (across the whole configuration of inter-
organisational relationships). The relevance of a ‘wider pool of resources’ raises 
concerns over alignment among organisations that are highly interdependent. As a 
result, Barney and Hansen (1994, p. 183) posit that ‘heterogeneity in governance skills 
and abilities is an important explanation of variance in a wide range of different 
economic exchanges’. Further, Burt (1992, p. 33) posits: ‘There is no long-term contract 
that keeps a relationships strong, nor legal binding that can secure the trust necessary to 
                                                 
36
 This is mentioned further in the article. The authors also use the notion of plurality to capture the case 
where a diversity of ‘control mechanisms in the same organizational structure are operated 
simultaneously by a company to perform the same function’ (Bradach & Eccles, 1989, p. 99). 
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a productive relationship. Your network is a pulsing swirl of mixed, conflicting 
demands’. This remark suggests that the usefulness of contracts changes over time.  
Second, the pertinence of contracts varies according to the stage of the inter-
organisational relationship. In the early stages, concerns about misappropriation and 
misalignment are more salient among organisations because of the lack of information 
available to support evaluations of future behaviour predictability (Doz, 1996; Faems, 
Janssens, Madhok, & Van Looy, 2008). Van de Ven et al. (1976) suggest that the 
importance of contractual safeguards decreases over time. Similarly, Gulati (1995) 
suggests that previous experience of working together substitutes – through familiarity – 
for tight governance structures in alliances. 
Third, inter-organisational relationships combine administrative and relational 
mechanisms of inter-organisational relationship coordination. For instance, according to 
Doz (1996), organisations engaged in alliances progressively start to monitor for 
efficiency and adaptability as part of a learning cycle. As a result, the usefulness of 
contracts changes over time because of emerging relational mechanisms of 
coordination. Yet, the mixture of contractual arrangements also occurs because not all 
organisations in the configuration of inter-organisational relationships have prior 
experiences of working together. Organisational theory shows the importance of 
informal ties; recalling the example of the New York Museum of Modern Art, informal 
relationships mattered and co-existed with contractual ties with other parties such as 
sponsors (DiMaggio, 1992). Thus, entrepreneurs use their informal ties to leverage 
inter-organisational network activity. Examples of factors that appear recurrently in the 
literature as governing the informality of ties include ethnic similarity (Vissa, 2011) and 
expertise (Fuchs & Garicano, 2011) (Table 5).  
Finally, non-contractual ties complement administrative mechanisms of inter-
organisational relationship coordination (Macaulay, 1963; Ring & van de Ven, 1994). 
Research has found that a mixture of contractual arrangements promotes higher 
effectiveness for organisations (Mariotti & Delbridge, 2012; Uzzi, 1997). For instance, 
it can prevent organisations from evolving towards centralisation and rigidity 
(Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003).  
The mixture of contractual arrangements forms a ‘burning issue’ as organisations 
operate across several contractual arrangements and participate in the multiples projects 
governed by diverse incentive systems and mechanisms of coordination. 
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Table 5 Emerging Insights on the Coordination of Dynamic Inter-Organisational Relationships  
Enduring challenges Relation with 
coordination Emerging theoretical insights Research evidence Examples 
1. Heterogeneity of 
organisations 
- Fluctuations of task-
related demands 
- Task specialisation 
- New resources versus 
costly coordination 
mechanisms 
 
 
Nodes  
(i and j) 
● 
Fluctuations of task-related demands 
and increasing specialisation increase 
the heterogeneity of organisations, 
which allows them to access 
information and technology but also 
reduces cross-understanding. This 
must be compensated for using costly 
administrative coordination 
mechanisms.  
(Burt, 1992; Cyert & March, 1963; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Durkheim, 1984; 
George et al., 2008; Gulati & Singh, 1998; 
Gulati et al., 2011b; Kogut & Zander, 1996; 
McEvily & Zaheer, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Ring & van de Ven, 1992; Srivastava 
& Gnyawali, 2011; van de Ven, 1976) 
* The Boeing 787 Dreamliner alliance 
programme required many specialised 
organisations but coordination problems 
among the parties led to delays; 
* US Midwest manufacturers who 
establish ties with regional institutions 
are found to be well-positioned to access 
new information, ideas and 
opportunities. 
2. Mixture of contractual 
arrangements  
- Contractual needs 
change over time 
- Co-existence of 
contractual and non-
contractual arrangements 
 
 
Ties 
(xij) 
●-● 
The need to use contractual 
arrangements changes over time with 
the outcomes of fluctuations of task-
related demands (and consequently 
turnover of organisations) and the 
accumulation of experience of 
working together. Organisations also 
benefit from combining contractual 
and non-contractual arrangements. 
(Barney & Hansen, 1994; Bradach & Eccles, 
1989; Burt, 1992; DiMaggio, 1992; Doz, 
1996; Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Fuchs & 
Garicano, 2011; Gulati, 1995a; Macaulay, 
1963; Mariotti & Delbridge, 2012; Ozcan & 
Eisenhardt, 2009; Ring & van de Ven, 1994; 
Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009; Siggelkow & 
Levinthal, 2003; Uzzi, 1997; van De Ven et 
al., 1976; Vissa, 2011) 
* Alliances progressively start to 
monitor efficiency and adaptability as 
part of the learning cycle; 
* Entrepreneurs combine contractual ties 
and, more importantly, non-contractual 
ties to achieve efficiency. 
3. Dynamic inter-
organisational 
relationships 
- Methodology 
- (Poor) Predictability of 
evolution of ties  
 
 
 
Configuration  
(∑{xij}) 
 
Inter-organisational relationships are 
evidently dynamic. However, current 
methodology and theorising are still 
dominated by static approaches. 
(Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Coase, 1937; 
Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011; Galaskiewicz, 
1985; Granovetter, 1992; Gulati & Gargiulo, 
1999; Kilduff & Brass, 2010; Maurer & 
Ebers, 2006; Oliver, 1990; Podolny & Page, 
1998; Uzzi, 1997; van de Ven & Gordon, 
1984; Williamson, 1981) 
* Most recent literature on social 
network studies reviews the scarcity of 
longitudinal approaches; 
* Technology collaborations reach a 
high level of effectiveness through 
rotating the leadership among 
organisations. 
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(3) The dynamics of inter-organisational relationships are an irrefutable aspect 
of configurations of inter-organisational relationships (∑{xij}) and must be taken into 
account. Despite the numerous calls for research on the topic, current research is 
scarce (Table 5). This is shown in recent literature reviews (Ahuja et al., 2012; 
Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Kilduff & Brass, 2010; Provan et al., 2007; Zaheer, 
Gözübüyük, & Milanov, 2010). The main finding is that inter-organisational 
relationships constantly change over time; however, there is little understanding of 
the underlying mechanisms of how inter-organisational relationships change. 
Constant changes occur at two levels: structural (who has ties with whom) and 
relational (who trusts whom). 
It is commonly agreed that ‘an understanding of this process [social construction 
of economic institutions] requires that both theory and empirical research pay 
attention to the dynamics’ (Granovetter, 1992). I use this quotation because it draws 
a distinction between method and theory (something I have been arguing for in this 
thesis). This distinction offers the first challenge, one that is methodology-based. 
Recent literature reviews attest to the difficulties that scholars face in collecting 
longitudinal data (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Kilduff & Brass, 2010).  
The second challenge – and perhaps a more pressing one – relates to theory. The 
most significant shortcomings are in theorising the dynamics of inter-organisational 
relationships. Dyads – pairs of organisations – have been the focus of most relevant 
theorising on the coordination of inter-organisational relationships, as I have 
demonstrated in my review in this chapter. Research informed by transaction costs 
focuses exclusively on the transactions between two organisations (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1981). Some of the thinking has been imported into the social network 
approach to examine configurations formed by an assortment of dyads 
(Galaskiewicz, 1985; Podolny & Page, 1998). However, inter-organisational 
networks are formed of embedded inter-organisational ties that connect organisations 
that were previously distant and disconnected (Uzzi, 1997). Researchers call, 
therefore, for research that examines the whole network (Provan et al., 2007). 
Inter-organisational relationships are formed with a purpose, and coordination is 
the mechanism used to achieve that purpose (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Maurer & 
Ebers, 2006). Thus, ‘if one is to understand the dynamics of IRs [inter-organisational 
relationships] over time, it is necessary to begin with ad hoc coordination efforts 
between organizations and to track how they are created, grow, and dissolve over 
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time’ (van de Ven & Gordon, 1984, p. 598). A fruitful strand of research is the one 
concerned with the dynamic processes of inter-organisational relationships. Yet, 
research often focuses on antecedents, mechanisms and consequences as separate 
stages, with scant possibility of recursive processes. This assessment is reflected in 
the theoretical framework of this chapter but also in recent literature reviews on 
inter-organisational relationships (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Kilduff & Brass, 2010). 
Recent empirically informed research has started to explore the underlying 
mechanisms within inter-organisational relationships by looking at micro-
foundations. For instance, Davis and Eisenhardt (2011) find that effective technology 
collaborations among mobile technology firms achieve effectiveness (e.g. new 
product releases) through rotating leadership. 
Overall, I argue that, despite the extensiveness of research related to the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships, there are ‘burning issues’ 
outstanding. A sensible assessment is that current research provides insights into 
many aspects of coordination but an integrating perspective is yet to emerge. 
2.5. Research Opportunity 
In my view, the struggle with the current theorising is to provide compelling 
explanations of the process of coordination of inter-organisational relationships. This 
presents a research opportunity; one that requires the integration of an eclectic body 
of literature and an in-depth study of that process over time. Current research puts an 
unbalanced focus on the positive consequences, and has a static view of inter-
organisational relationships. I therefore aim to advance the current theorisations by 
examining the following two research questions: 
- How are dynamic inter-organisational relationships coordinated?  
- Why do coordination problems occur in dynamic inter-organisational 
relationships? 
A simple extrapolation of answers from prior research would be a ‘leap of faith’. I 
argue that an integrating perspective should aim to deal with issues of rationality and 
non-rationality, predictability and unpredictability, and both positive and negative 
consequences. As Simon (1976, p. xxviii; emphasis in original) urges, ‘it is precisely 
in the realm where human behavior is intendedly rational, but only limited so, that 
there is room for a genuine theory of organization and administration.’ 
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Chapter III: Methodology 
 
 
 
 
Overview 
In this chapter, I will argue that the UK’s building industry is an appropriate 
empirical setting in which to unravel the theoretical underpinnings of the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships. Furthermore, it presents an 
opportunity to engage management research with ongoing endeavours to tackle 
England’ social housing shortage and deliver ‘greener’ buildings by an industry 
marked by low innovation.  
Given the scarcity of prior research, I deployed an inductive research design 
aimed at building theory on the coordination of inter-organisational relationships. I 
started by conducting 23 semi-structured interviews with experts within the UK’s 
building industry in order to familiarise myself with the empirical setting and plan 
the next stage: a multiple case-study design of seven social housing projects in the 
East Midlands. Completed between 2008 and 2011 at an average cost of £1.8 
Million, I sampled these projects theoretically to address my research questions. I 
gathered unique and extensive data from over 3,900 pages from the minutes of 
meetings and project reports which allowed me, by drawing on the richness of the 
data, to develop an in-depth approach. I integrated SNA techniques to map dynamic 
inter-organisational relationships, and content analysis to explore coordination-
related aspects that are not measurable. Although unconventional, this option was 
most suitable, as shown by my assessment of alternative data collection procedures. 
The scope of the methodological enterprise for this study is sizeable and reported 
thoroughly. Overall, it proved to be an appropriate and beneficial choice for this 
study, as a self-assessment of validity and reliability will demonstrate in the last 
section of this chapter.  
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3. Research Methodology 
The research methodology that underlies this study draws on inductive reasoning 
to investigate how inter-organisational relationships are coordinated and where 
coordination problems come from. In this chapter, I will show that the building 
industry provides an opportunity to investigate these questions. Further, I will report 
the selection criteria used to choose seven projects completed between 2008 and 
2011 in the East Midlands, the data sources (entailing the minutes of monthly 
meetings and project reports), and the development of an in-depth approach for 
studying inter-organisational relationships. I conclude the chapter with a self-
assessment of my research methodology.  
 
 
3.1. Empirical Context: The UK’s building industry 
 
Quand les cathédrales étaient blanches, la collaboration était totale  
(Corbusier, 1948, p. 46) 
 
Tremendous amount of friction and even violence between those who built them 
and those who had to supply the resources and labor 
 (Scott, 2003, p. 95) 
 
These two quotations37 depict collaboration in the building industry as a contrast 
between a ‘tremendous amount of friction’ (Scott, 2003) and ‘total collaboration’ 
(Corbusier, 1948). One might be surprised to learn that both are accounts of the same 
event: the building of Gothic cathedrals in France. Evidently, they provide 
contradictory, yet frequently observed, accounts of collaboration among task-
interdependent organisations engaged with the building process.  
The UK building industry is often characterised by adversarial collaboration 
practices and limited coordination among organisations (Latham, 1994; Reichstein, 
Salter, & Gann, 2008). Understanding the theoretical underpinnings of the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships is critical; although ‘construction 
contributes between 5-10% of GDP, it has rarely been accorded the attention that 
                                                 
37
 I thank Jan Bröchner and Anna Kadefors for drawing my attention to these two accounts of the 
building of Gothic cathedrals, during the research workshop Bringing the Building Back In, 
Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen, 16-18 November, 2011.  
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leading manufacturing and services industries, such as biotechnology or chemicals 
have received’ (Reichstein et al., 2008, p. 601). Furthermore, the construction 
industry has, researchers argue, great economic and social value for the UK’s 
economy (Pearce, 2003). The term ‘construction industry’ is often used 
interchangeably with the ‘building industry’. For clarity’s sake, the latter can be seen 
as a sub-category of the former38. I shall use the term ‘building industry’ to refer to 
the construction of buildings only (it excludes, for example, highways).  
I argue that the building industry is an appropriate setting in which to investigate 
how inter-organisational relationships are coordinated and where coordination 
problems come from. First, building projects require coordination among 
heterogeneous organisations (e.g., architects, engineering firms and building 
contractors) whose tasks are highly interdependent (Eccles, 1981; Smyth & Pryke, 
2008). In his seminal work on building firms in the state of Massachusetts, Eccles 
(1981, p. 337) notes that ‘coordinating the work of these labor specialties [referring 
to carpenters, bricklayers, plumbers, pipefitters, electricians, painters, roofers, 
drywallers, sheet metal workers, glaziers, and laborers] over the course of a project is 
a complex task’. The importance of coordination among organisations with diverse 
organisational expertise has also been reported in the context of public infra-structure 
projects (e.g. roads and water supply) in the UK (Smyth & Pryke, 2008). Indeed, 
mechanisms of coordination are critical in this industry because ‘construction 
projects involve inter-organizational and cross-disciplinary collaboration’ 
(Reichstein et al., 2008, p. 604).   
Second, coordination problems among organisations are routinely identified in the 
academic literature (Eccles, 1981; Jones et al., 1997; Korczynski, 1996; Smyth & 
Pryke, 2008; Soda & Usai, 1999). Trade industry reports also point out the lack of 
coordination among organisations (Barlow, Cohen, Jashapara, & Simpson, 1997; 
Latham, 1994). These are thought to stem from the so-called ‘confusion of 
consultants’ (Morton, 2002) as clients – public and private alike – are increasingly 
hiring consultants to assist them during the building process. Latham (1994) also 
suggests that lines of responsibility among organisations can be characterised as 
having ‘fuzzy edges’, which contribute to the dysfunctionalities across the network 
                                                 
38
 This is supported by the UK’s System of Industrial Classifications (SIC), in which the activity of 
construction (under Section F) includes: construction of buildings (e.g. construction of residential 
buildings); civil engineering (e.g. construction of railways); and specialised construction activities 
(e.g. demolitions). A complete list of activities under Category is presented in Appendix 1.1. 
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of organisations. Latham (1994) and Morton (2002) shed light on the blurriness of 
lines of responsibilities among organisations, occurring primarily because of the 
large number of firms (e.g. main contractor and sub-contractors). 
Third, inter-organisational relationships in building projects are dynamic by their 
very nature (Mehra, Brass, Borgatti, & Labianca, 2012; Smyth & Pryke, 2008; Soda 
& Usai, 1999). Due to constant fluctuations in the demand for resources, and due to 
task interdependence, inter-organisational ties change constantly throughout the 
design and build life-cycle – covering the period of time between design and project 
completion. The requirement for aligning interdependent organisations varies greatly 
according to the type of work (e.g. residential buildings and railways) and even 
across similar projects (Smyth & Pryke, 2008). Regardless of project-type 
specificities, it is reasonable to suggest that demand for task integration varies across 
and within stages of the design and build life-cycle. This aspect of the building 
industry is clearly conveyed in the Plan of Work Stages developed by The Royal 
Institute of British Architects (RIBA). This plan defines how different stages are 
conducted, and the considerations in terms of their organisation (Appendix 1.2).   
Last but not least, the wide array of expertise that is required during building 
projects contributes to a ‘melting pot’ of professional identities and heuristics. This 
contributes to the social richness of the coordination process (Beamish & Biggart, 
2010; Bechky, 2006; Hardy et al., 2005). For instance, Beamish and Biggart (2010) 
report that, in the (commercial) construction industry, organisations develop 
‘heuristics’ – which can be defined as collectively constructed and maintained mental 
frames. These authors find that ‘heuristics’ sustain coordination but also discourage 
novel technologies and impede innovation (novel technical options). I am therefore 
interested in studying coordination in such a rich context.  
Furthermore, and in line with my theoretical framework (Chapter II), there are 
also institutional aspects that shape the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships (Eccles, 1981; Smyth & Pryke, 2008; Soda & Usai, 1999). These entail 
practices that relate to the functioning of the building industry. In the UK, Latham’s 
(1994) review of procurement and contracting arrangements highlighted the 
importance of the practices embedded in the building industry to shed light on inter-
organisational relationships. I shall examine the following relevant institutional 
aspects: procurement strategy, contracting strategy and performance incentives.  
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The procurement strategy is initiated by the client once the drawings and 
agreement on the project brief have been completed. Procurement strategies are sets 
of arrangements for ordering and managing a project, and can include tendering (i.e. 
the client tenders in the marketplace, seeking competitive bids from main 
contractors) or a non-competitive setting (i.e. the client commissions the building 
work directly from a main contractor) (Morton, 2002). According to the UK’s Guide 
on Achieving Excellence in Construction Procurement, ‘the procurement strategy 
identifies the best way of achieving the objectives of the project and value for 
money, taking account of the risks and constraints, leading to decisions about the 
funding mechanism and asset ownership for the project’39.  
Four standard procurement strategies are available to the client: public private 
partnership (e.g. PFI – Private Financing Initiative), design and build, prime 
contracting and frameworks. PFIs are public sector contracts designed to purchase 
high-quality services with defined outputs from the private sector on a long-term 
basis. For instance, a PFI for a primary school may include building (e.g. the entire 
design and build life-cycle), maintaining the infrastructure (e.g. repainting walls) and 
managing it (e.g. collecting the waste on a regular basis). In the design-build 
strategy, a main contractor is liable for the design, management and delivery of the 
building (e.g. new school) within a given time frame and forecasted budget. 
Similarly, prime contracting allocates the responsibility to manage and deliver the 
project in accordance with contractually agreed terms between main contractor and 
client. Additionally, the main contractor has to demonstrate during the initial period 
of operation that operating costs and performance parameters meet the cost model 
agreed upon. Finally, frameworks are long-term contracts for supplying products or 
services. The terms of the contract refer to the cost per unit (e.g. cost of road 
maintenance per mile or simply the price per ream of printer paper). 
A contracting strategy entails a distinctive aspect of the building industry that 
shapes the architecture of the relationships among organisations. Clients and 
contractors have to coordinate with a wide spectrum of organisations from 
manufacturing (e.g. suppliers of materials and equipment) to services (e.g. 
engineering) (Blayse & Manley, 2004). Contractual arrangements are administrative 
forms of intervention used to promote the coordination of inter-organisational 
                                                 
39
 Achieving Excellence in Construction Procurement Guide 06: Procurement and contract strategies. 
Office of Government Commerce, London, 2003 (p. 2). 
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relationships (Eccles, 1981). Prior research identifies three contracting strategies: the 
traditional approach, project management and management contracting. 
The traditional approach is characterised by separate contracts for the design and 
building stages (Figure 6). Latham (1994) asserts that a traditional approach features 
consultants working for a lead manager, designing and costing the scheme within the 
normal professional roles. Once the design has been completed, it is passed to the 
main contractor, who is paid a fee to build the project. Next, the main contractor 
mobilises a wide range of suppliers according to scheduled works and demands that 
are anticipated for the entire design and build life-cycle. I use ‘anticipated’ here 
because additional expertise and supplies are often required once work starts on site.   
 
Figure 6 Traditional Approach to Contracting 
 
Source: Ball (1988, p. 79) 
Among the advantages of the traditional approach is the control exerted by the 
client, who can intervene at various stages of the construction process. However, 
since design and building are treated as two distinct phases, the client takes a great 
risk because integrating the two stages might be hazardous. The organisations 
involved may not have previous experience of working together, which is a hurdle to 
coordination across both phases (Ball, 1988). Besides this, the total costs calculated 
at the start could be exposed to unanticipated but necessary changes – e.g. technical 
specifications – during the project.  
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Project management aims to integrate the design and construction phases (Figure 
7). Project management is carried out by consulting firms specialised in managing 
the building process. Coordination between the building professionals and the on-site 
production process is the central function of project management teams (Figure 7).  
A typical project management arrangement features a client’s agent – frequently a 
quantity surveyor – working on the client’s behalf throughout the design and build 
life-cycle. The responsibilities of the client’s agent include the enforcement of 
deadlines for work completion, cost control and the execution of all works at the 
contracted standard. 
 
Figure 7 Project Management Approach to Contracting 
 
Source: Ball (1988, p. 79) 
Project management is advantageous for complex projects or clients with little 
experience in contracting within the building industry, for example private 
households (Hillebrandt, 1984). Compared to the traditional approach, project 
management reduces the risk of misalignment across the design and build stages. 
Nonetheless, centralisation of the decision-making process is seen as an impediment 
to fast decision-making as required, such as in the case of unexpected changes to the 
project (e.g. unforeseen geological conditions). 
Finally, in management contracting both the design and building stages are carried 
out by a single organisation, for example developers (Figure 8). A growing use of 
management contracting strategies has been registered following the advent of the 
real estate market in the UK and elsewhere (Wallis, 2001). 
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Figure 8 Management Contracting Approach 
 
Source: Ball (1988, p. 79) 
For instance, large main contractors have grown by concentrating on the 
capabilities to both design and build. That is, a single contractor can carry out the 
work of designing and building (and offered as a package to the client). According to 
some scholars (Ball, 1988; Hillebrandt, 1984), developers have evolved from main 
contractors who expanded their activity by acquiring in-house design capabilities. 
Still, some drawbacks include the reproduction of standardised buildings across 
cities, and the fuelling of ‘uncontrolled’ building, as witnessed since the 1960s in the 
UK and elsewhere (France, the USA and Japan).  
Performance incentives are provided by clients to encourage the main contractors 
to fulfil their obligations as set out in procurement and contracting strategies. In other 
words, performance incentives are intended to align organisations towards a common 
goal, through generalised positive consequences. The incentives can take three 
forms: a lump sum, a fee (or percentage cost), or a target cost.  
The lump sum requires the main contractor to place a bid for the total costs of the 
building work. The main contractor takes a high risk because the price offered must 
cover all the expenses without compromising its profit margin. The bill of quantities 
– a document containing the quantities of materials required and costs estimated by 
quantity surveyors – specifies the nature of the contract and the total amount 
contracted. Any variations or changes in these quantities are treated as variation 
orders. Extra work might be newly priced or rewarded according to the unit-
calculated price stated in the bill of quantities (and submitted in the tendering process 
by the main contractor). The lump sum is widely-used in the UK’s building industry. 
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When a fee (or percentage fee) is involved, the client agrees to pay head-office 
overheads and profit to the main contractor. A fee is paid to the main contractor by 
the client, who also pays direct costs (e.g. for materials) according to prices 
previously agreed upon. Consequently, the client’s exposure to risk is high. Any rise 
in the cost of materials would increase the fee to be covered by the client. This leaves 
the client with little control over the total cost.  
The target cost method incentivises cost awareness in contractors. Clients set a 
target cost for the building works on the basis of drawings and estimates made by 
quantity surveyors. The main contractor is rewarded according to whether it exceeds 
or comes in below the estimated figure. Importantly, the clients avoid the potential 
escalation of prices (unlike under the fee strategy). 
However, performance incentives still do not prevent discrepancies between the 
client’s expectations and the work delivered. Latham (1994) uses the concept of 
‘project-belief’ to draw attention to what is seen as one of the long-lasting challenges 
in the UK’s building industry: the ineffectiveness of performance incentives to 
guarantee the interests of the clients. It is common to hear, for instance, that the 
delivery of a new hospital is over-budget and late. These are unintended 
consequences of (the lack of) coordination of inter-organisational relationships, and 
not just mistakes in estimates. Such consequences are important from a societal 
perspective; over-budget projects are costly for the taxpayer. However, the argument 
gains further traction if one considers that enhanced coordination of inter-
organisational relationships could make a difference for thousands of people on the 
waiting list for social housing 
3.1.1. Engaged Research: England’ social housing shortage and building 
greener                                 
Tackling England’ social housing shortage requires a combination of lower 
building costs and an improvement in building quality. The shortage, and current 
endeavours to build greener, offer an opportunity for engaged research (van de Ven, 
2007). This interests me for two reasons. First, there is yet to be a response to 
England’s social housing shortage that is informed by research on the coordination of 
inter-organisational relationships. Meanwhile, there are 1.84 million people in 
England and almost five million in the whole of the UK who are waiting for social 
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housing40. Second, social housing also acts as a benchmark for quality standards, 
such as environmental sustainability at low costs. This is important since building 
‘greener’ is a challenge across the UK’s building industry and calls for the 
engagement of management research with broader environmental issues (Ansari, 
Wijen, & Gray, 2011). 
Regarding the shortage of social housing41, in a recent review on the future of the 
sector in England, it was predicted that the number of social housing households 
would grow more rapidly in the 25 years following 2001 than in the previous 25 
years; currently, there are over 4 million social housing tenants in England (Hills, 
2007, p. 6). In an interview on BBC News42, Labour’s shadow housing minister, MP 
Jack Dromey, warned that ‘with millions in need of a decent home at a price they can 
afford, the country is gripped by a growing housing crisis’. Both Hills (2007) and the 
MP Jack Dromey illustrate two key aspects of tackling the shortage.  
First is the imperative to build ‘at affordable prices’. On the social housing 
providers’ side, building costs have increased in recent years. In parallel, the ratio of 
house prices to household incomes is at an historic high (Hills, 2007). The desire to 
increase the social housing provision has been challenged by the scarcity of financial 
resources (due to austerity measures that have translated into budget cuts as a result 
of the financial crisis that started in 2009 and is still affecting the economy) 
(Scanlon, Lunde, & Whitehead, 2011). Thus, reducing building costs will be critical 
to tackling the shortage of social housing, especially given that the provision of extra 
social housing occurs mainly through new buildings – among the total of 60,630 
affordable homes provided in England in 2010-11, 88.04% were new buildings43. 
Second, both Hills (2007) and MP Jack Dromey point out an imperative to build 
‘decent’ homes. Although the quality of housing in England has increased overall, 
social housing tenants enjoy less space per person than tenants in private housing, 
and also less than they did a decade ago (Hills, 2007, p. 42). Nonetheless, the overall 
quality and performance of social housing schemes is good when compared against 
private housing. The rating of ‘Good performance’ is based on the Decent Homes 
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 U.K. Pushes 'Social' Housing REIT Plan by Anita Likus, Wall Street Journal, 9 May 2012. 
41
 Housing relates to the provision of homes by private and public owners alike. As a narrower 
segment, social housing refers to rental housing that is owned either (1) by the state, (2) by a non-
profit organisation or (3) by a combination of the two (http://www.housing.org.uk/about_us.aspx; 
retrieved on 10 December 2011). 
42
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15810966 (retrieved on 20 December 2011). 
43
 Affordable Housing Supply, England, 2010-11. London: Homes and Communities Agency, 2012. 
  101
programme, which provides a comprehensive set of quality indicators (e.g. facilities, 
age of the building and heating system)44. Hence, social housing projects represent a 
benchmark for building quality to be followed across an industry with a record of 
low innovation and effectiveness (Smyth & Pryke, 2008).  
Of particular interest is environmental sustainability performance. In-built 
environmental sustainability is paramount if the 2050 target of an 80% reduction in 
housing carbon emissions is to be achieved in the UK45. Environmental sustainability 
is also a key quality indicator for social housing. For the quarter between July and 
September of 2001, the average energy efficiency rating for new homes was 79.7 
(out 100) in England. Clearly, environmental sustainability is important for social 
housing providers. In what could be used as a benchmark, Hills (2007, p. 67) argues 
that the social sector standard, when compared to the ‘decent home standard’, is a 
relatively better (or, rather, less poor) standard for the energy efficiency of buildings.  
In summary, the building industry is an appropriate setting in which to study the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships. Despite the industry’s significant 
social and economic value, its track record of low effectiveness and its limited 
innovativeness, management research is yet to engage with it. Furthermore, I argue 
that this is an opportunity to engage management research with broader societal 
issues: the social housing shortage and building sustainability 
 
3.2. Inductive Research Design 
I built on my theoretical framework and analysis of the industry context to 
develop a research design that addresses how inter-organisational relationships are 
coordinated and where coordination problems come from. Given the scarcity of prior 
research on the actual coordination of inter-organisational relationships, I have 
implemented an inductive research design whereby I aim to derive constructs and 
theoretical propositions from the in-depth analysis of cases (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000; 
Miles & Huberman, 1984; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). My research design entailed an 
exploratory stage followed by a multiple case-study of seven social housing projects 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
                                                 
44
 A Decent Home: Definition and guidance for implementation - June 2006/Update. London: 
Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006. 
45
 Low Carbon Construction Innovation & Growth Team. London: H M Government, 2010. 
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3.2.1. Exploratory Stage 
I started I started with an exploratory stage that consisted of 23 interviews with 
experts and extensive access to the trade press. My aim was to gain an ad hoc 
understanding of the UK’s building industry and the extent to which my research 
interest resonated with the industry.  
I approached potential interviewees at trade fairs (e.g. Ecobuild46) and showcases 
(e.g. Showcase of Sports Buildings at Surrey Sport Centre). This represented an 
important resource. To introduce my research project to practitioners, my strategy 
was to design a research project brief (Appendix 1.3), which I handed out to 
potential interviewees on various occasions. I received mixed reactions. Some 
potential interviewees, such as a director of a UK private real estate developer, had 
‘no time for this!’ In contrast, others were encouraging: ‘you have chosen an 
important subject for your PhD and your research could contribute to the work that is 
going on right now to improve performance in the construction industry’ (EI#10; 
CEO, main contractor). I added this endorsement to my project brief in the hope of 
engaging with other practitioners.  
Following prior research (Eccles, 1981; Provan & Milward, 1995), I used 
snowball effect techniques to identify potential interviewees. The abovementioned 
director of a main contractor (EI#10; CEO, main contractor) introduced me to one of 
their clients (EI#7; environmental sustainability manager). This interviewee was 
important to my research as he was responsible for contracting building work at his 
organisation. The snowball techniques also allowed me to build a personal network 
within the industry. The interviewees became the interlocutors of my research. 
In total, I conducted 23 semi-structured interviews with experts – researchers and 
practitioners – in the UK’s building industry between December of 2009 and June of 
2010 (Appendix 1.4). Interviewed practitioners included main contractors (EI#10, 
CEO, main contractor; EI#11, Head of Strategy and Sustainable Development), 
architects (EI#3; founder of architecture firm), policy-makers engaged in the building 
industry (EI#4; director of professional association), private clients (EI#18; a 
household) and public clients (EI#23; the elected member of a local council). Each of 
the interviewees conveyed unique perspectives within the building industry by 
emphasising specific issues. For instance, one architect (EI#3; founder of 
                                                 
46
 Ecobuild is the world's biggest trade show for sustainable design, construction and the built 
environment. (Further information can be found at http://www.ecobuild.co.uk/index.html.) 
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architecture firm) emphasised the conflict that can occur among different 
organisations working on a building project. This was in line with the account of a 
‘tremendous amount of friction’ given by Scott (2003). I also interviewed 
researchers, who drew my attention to a wide range of research interests regarding 
the building industry. One professor and lecturer on project management (EI#2; 
Senior Lecturer) emphasised the complexity of contractual arrangements among 
organisations working on building projects. Another interviewee (EI#21; Professor 
of Information Systems) was keen on the link between my interest in inter-
organisational relationships and his use of social network analysis to study 
relationships among design team members (not organisations).  
My decision to conduct exploratory interviews is consistent with the strategies of 
other researchers who have used such interviews to access information about various 
industry settings, including building (Eccles, 1981) and telecommunications (Davis 
& Eisenhardt, 2011). Acknowledging the differences and complementarities among 
the participants, I adopted different interview guides for practitioners and researchers 
(Appendixes 1.5.A and 1.5.B). By doing so, I intended to translate my research 
interest into the vocabulary used in academia and in the building industry. This was 
important for engaging the interviewees in my research and gathering rich accounts 
(Bauer & Gaskell, 2000; Miles & Huberman, 1984). I recorded the interviews 
whenever the interviewees allowed it. Recording was done using an Olympus VN 
5500PC digital voice recorder. The interviews were transcribed within 48 hours to 
reduce bias (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009). 
In sum, the exploratory stage allowed me to familiarise myself with the empirical 
setting and fine-tune my research design before implementing a multiple case study.   
3.2.2. Theory-Building Stage: Multiple case-study 
In the second stage, theory-building, my research design entailed a multiple case-
study design. Here, I justify the research design and the selection criteria for seven 
social housing projects, completed between 2008 and 2011 in England.  
Inductive reasoning is widely discussed in the methodology literature, for 
example in relation to grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), the single case 
study (Yin, 1994) and the multiple case-study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989). Although 
different, these methodological approaches within the category of inductive methods 
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are tied to a common goal: to develop novel insights in areas where the theory is still 
undeveloped, through theory-building.   
I argue that the multiple case-study approach was an appropriate research design, 
given the research aims of building theory on the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships. First, a research design using multiple cases is useful whenever the 
researcher intends to understand the applicability of process questions and boundary 
conditions to new settings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Leonard-Barton, 1990). In my study, I 
aimed to understand the applicability of insights developed elsewhere in the literature 
about the coordination of inter-organisational relationships. A similar rationale has 
been used to justify the choice of a multiple case-study design to study, for example, 
high-performance alliance portfolios (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009) and social capital 
dynamics among biotechnology start-ups (Maurer & Ebers, 2006).  
Second, my choice of methodology is aligned to dealing with under-studied 
phenomena in the context of inter-organisational relationships. Human and Provan 
(1997) conducted a multiple case study to study effectiveness within Kentucky 
(USA) wood manufacturers’ networks of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). The authors argue (1997, p. 371) that, because there is ‘so little comparative 
empirical research on SME networks and because the research on other types of 
networks has limited generalizability, the multiple-case study method is justified’. 
The multiple case-study approach hinges on a logic of ‘independent experiments’ 
typically associated with more generalisable findings (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  
Last but not least, Koza and Lewin (2004) concluded that the multiple case-study 
approach met the modus operandi of the SNA in their study of the co-evolution of 
network alliances. It captured multiple interactions occurring simultaneously in a 
single network without losing individual elements of the phenomena. In line with 
prior research (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009), I found the multiple case-study approach 
to be particularly useful for the simultaneous study of the structure (e.g. network 
centrality) and the content (e.g. goodwill) of inter-organisational relationships. 
Furthermore, using multiple case studies blended with the processual studies that 
grounded my research on how inter-organisational relationships are coordinated. 
3.2.2.1. Case Selection Criteria 
The principle of theoretical sampling, where cases are selected for theoretical 
reasons, not random ones, assisted my case selection (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In 
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this approach, ‘cases are selected because they are particularly suitable for 
illuminating and extending relationships and logic among constructs’ (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007, p. 27). In addition, selection criteria were implemented to tease out 
exogenous effects (Eisenhardt, 1989), such as project typology and the procurement 
route. These are potential sources of exogenous variability highlighted during the 
exploratory interviews and my reading of the literature. 
First, I looked at seven building projects because they allowed me to track and 
compare the dynamics of inter-organisational relationships and the unfolding of 
coordination over time. One of the advantages of this approach was to combine 
retrospective and real-time research across several cases studies (Leonard-Barton, 
1990; Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997) and to study the configuration of inter-
organisational relationships from the start to the end of each project. Theoretically, 
this was critical because it allowed me to explore the coordination process over time 
and therefore develop processual explanations of the consequences of coordination 
among organisations. These projects combined an ambition to deliver greener 
buildings while keeping the building costs low. They represented an opportunity to 
explore aspects of innovation within the limits of constrained resources.   
Second, I focused on the population of social housing projects – following my 
research interests – in the East Midlands, where the shortage of social housing is 
pronounced (Hills, 2007). By focusing on a specific geographic area, I was able to 
‘control for’ extraneous variations and specify generalisable properties of the 
findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). I selected projects of a similar size, favouring small 
construction projects, in order to aid comparability across cases. I defined small 
projects as follows: building costs under £3 Million; design and build life-cycle no 
longer than 24 months (2 years); no more than 60 organisations involved. The 
similarities in the types and sizes of the projects ensured that the building materials 
and techniques were identical across the cases (Hillebrandt, 1984; Morton, 2002).  
Finally, current research consistently shows that procurement routes (i.e. contract 
arrangements used to appoint the design team and the main contractor) shape inter-
organisational relationships (Gann, 1991; Smyth & Pryke, 2008). The importance of 
the procurement route was confirmed by a Bid Sustainability Manager at one of the 
UK’s largest main contractors (EI#12; Bid Sustainability Manager), who warned me 
that ‘[collaboration] depends on the type of contract, whether it’s single-stage or two-
stage’. A single-stage contract is one in which the client tenders for design and 
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building as a lump-sum, while a two-stage contract is one in which the client tenders 
for the design and building separately.  
3.2.2.2.Case Profiles 
The multiple case-study research design comprised seven case studies of social 
housing projects completed between 2008 and 2011 in the East Midlands (e.g. Corby 
and Leicester). I named each case study after the street addresses. 
My selection of the seven cases followed prior research on inter-organisational 
relationships that used multiple case studies. For instance, Davis and Eisenhardt 
(2011) reported on eight cases of technology collaborations, while Ozcan and 
Eisenhardt (2009) studied six cases of entrepreneurial game publishers. Although 
there is no recommendation about the number of cases to be used, a large number is 
thought to weaken the richness of the data in terms of ‘context’ and ‘process’ 
(Pettigrew, 1990; van de Ven & Huber, 1990). Furthermore, Pettigrew (1990, p. 276) 
suggests that between four and six cases is ideal for longitudinal research (over a 
three-year period).  
As shown in Table 6, the building projects ranged from the transformation of a 
former Air Cadet Force base (Case#2), a former colliery village (Case#3) and brown 
field sites47 (e.g. Cases #1 and #7). The case profiles reflected my selection criteria; 
the seven projects were of small size, with low building costs, short design and build 
life-cycles, and few organisations engaged in the life-cycle.  
The average construction cost was around £1.8 Million (mean = £1,849,481.00; 
SD = £900,627.80). On average, the design and build life-cycle lasted for around 15 
months (mean = 14.57; SD = 5.62) and involved an average of 40 organisations in 
each building project (mean = 39.43; SD = 13.46) (Table 6). 
All seven projects were procured through a design and build arrangement. When 
taken together, the selection criteria fulfilled an important goal, namely creating a 
research setting where exogenous influences (e.g. size of projects, procurement route 
and contracting strategies) were largely controlled across cases. Such a degree of 
control is often difficult to achieve in large and complex empirical settings such as in 
the building industry (Eccles, 1981; Smyth & Pryke, 2008; Soda & Usai, 1999). 
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 Brown field sites are farming land that can be built on (according to local planning laws). 
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Table 6 Case Profiles 
1. Case 2. Case background 3. Building project 4. Organisations 5. Design and build life-cycle 
Dale Lane  
Road 
(Case#1) 
The site is in a residential area that has a mix of late 1980s and 1990s 
new build houses together with a range of semis and terraced 
properties from the early 1900s. There is a mixed tenure housing 
composition in the area, ranging from local authority housing stock, 
to privately rented dwellings and owner-occupied properties. The 
development site is a former hotel, now demolished and cleared, and 
consists of a surfaced car parking area of 0.55 acres. 
Project specifications:  6 x 3-bedroom 
5-person houses; 3 x 2-bed 3-person 
apartments; 3 x 3-bed 5-person houses; 
3 x 2-bed 3-person apartments; 3 x 1-
bed 2-person apartments 
 
Building Cost: £1,449,363 
40 organisations April 2008 – May 2009  
Fulmar 
Road 
(Case#2) 
A former Air Cadet Force base, which was purchased by the main 
contractor for affordable housing development in 2008. Due to claw-
back provisions in the marketing particulars for any uplift in site 
value, it was deemed suitable for affordable housing delivery only. 
The site was offered to the client, subject to planning, on the basis 
that the main contractor would build the scheme on a Development 
Agreement basis. 
Project specifications: 2 x 4-bed 6-
person houses; 6 x 3-bed 5-person 
houses; 14 x 2-bed 4-person houses  
 
Building Cost: £2,263,532 
55 organisations June 2009 – February 2011  
North 
Wingfield 
(Case#3) 
North Wingfield is a large former colliery village in the county of 
Derbyshire, situated to the south-east of Chesterfield, and to the 
north-east of Clay Cross. 
This was a two-plot development. The first site is a former residential 
area. The second site is in the same area, on the main road into 
Chesterfield, and is in close proximity to shops, a community and 
medical centres. 
Project specifications: 30 x 2-bed 3-
person bungalows; 100% parking 
provision; 2 bungalows with car ports  
 
Building Cost: £3,087,711 
58 organisations 
January 2008 – 
December 2009 
 
Rowlett 
Road 
(Case#4) 
The site is in a large, busy residential close to a local school. Served 
by a regular bus service, the site is within walking distance of local 
amenities, including a post office, a small precinct of shops and 
churches. 
The local council team has been closely involved in establishing the 
scheme mix, which reflects the current demand for affordable 
housing and the council’s strategy of widening the range of 
properties for sale in the town by encouraging the development of 
apartments and larger three and four-bed family dwellings. 
Project specifications: 2 x 2-bed 3-
person apartments; 2 x 2-bed 4-person 
houses; 1 x 3-bed 5-person house; 4 x 4-
bed 6-person house; 4 x 2-bed 3-person 
apartments; 1 x 2-bed 4-person houses; 
1 x 3-bed 5-person houses; 3 x 4-bed 6-
person houses; 2 x 2-bed 3-person 
apartments; 1 x 3-bed 5-person house; 6 
x 4-bed 6-person houses 
 
Building Cost: £2,780,000 
23 organisations 
August 2008 – August 
2009 
 
(Table continues on next page) 
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Blyth Court 
(Case#5) 
Blyth Court was a 3-storey complex containing 35 dwellings; the 
tenants were mostly older persons. 
Refurbishment was requested to include the conversion of the bedsits 
into larger accommodation and a consequent reduction in total 
number. Consideration was also given to producing dwellings 
suitable for disabled persons. The newly renovated bungalows are 
provided with lifts, a dining room, a laundry, guest facilities, and a 
community centre 
Project specifications: 18 x 1-bed flats; 
10 x 2-bed flats 
 
Building Cost: £1,715,234 44 organisations 
April 2009 and 
November 2010 
 
Oakley 
Road 
(Case#6) 
The plot of land at Oakley Road was brought to the client by the 
local council. The Environment Agency (EA) objected to the project 
twice because of a high risk of flooding. Final approval was granted 
after the client raised the ground floor levels in the building. This 
scheme resulted from a partnership between a social housing 
provider and Northamptonshire Women’s Aid. It fills a gap in terms 
of the social response for women fleeing domestic violence caused 
by the closure of a women’s refuge in 2000. 
Project specifications: 18 x 1-bed flats; 
10 x 2-bed flats 
 
Building Cost: £1,715,234 44 organisations 
 
October 2008 – 
September 2009 
 
Washbrook 
Road 
(Case#7) 
The site is in a semi-rural location and is adjacent to a pleasant park. 
The site falls within an established residential area, with a small area 
of woodland to the immediate east of the site. The site was 
introduced to the client by a local building company, who was also 
retained as the main contractor to build the scheme. The client’s offer 
for purchase was unconditional. 
Project specifications: 24 x 2-bed 
apartments 
 
Building Cost: £725,000 36 organisations 
April 2009 – January 
2010 
 
Synthesis of the Case Profiles 
 
A. Building costs B. Length of design and build life-cycle C. Number of organisations  
Mean = £1,849,481.00 
SD = £900,627.80 
Mean = 14.57 (≈15) months 
SD = 5.62 (≈6) months 
Mean = 39.43 (≈40) organisations  
SD = 13.46 (≈13) organisations 
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Regarding environmental sustainability targets, six out of the seven building 
projects aimed at Level 3 of the Code for Sustainable Homes (CfSH) or equivalent, 
which is regarded as a benchmark compared to similar buildings that have been 
developed privately (Hills, 2007). Level 3 demands an energy efficiency of 25%, 
which is part of the energy performance assessment that leads to the issuance of an 
Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) for a building. The North Wingfield project 
aims at Level 4 of the CfSH which demands an energy efficiency of at least 44%48.  
Overall, the seven cases were sufficiently diverse to explore the theoretical 
underpinnings of the coordination of inter-organisational relationships while the 
sources of extraneous variations were ‘controlled for’ to ensure validity.  
 
3.3. Data Sources  
I gathered extensive data; this was made possible due to privileged access to over 
3,900 pages of minutes of meetings, project reports and interviews. Given that the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships is a multifaceted phenomenon, I 
combined primary data sources (data I collected) and secondary data sources (data 
available elsewhere). This approach is consistent with the canons of inductive 
research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Miles & Huberman, 1984). 
3.3.1. Primary Sources 
I used the following primary data sources: face-to-face interviews; emails and 
phone calls; and visited trade fairs and academic conferences. Uzzi (1997, p. 38) 
suggests in his study of inter-organisational relationships in the New York apparel 
industry, that field methods were ‘advantageous here because they [field methods] 
provided rich data for theorizing and conducting detailed analysis of the interfirm 
ties dynamics’.  I used primary data sources mainly to cross-validate information 
available from secondary sources and minimise the risk of ‘faulty post hoc 
attributions’ from secondary data (Miller et al., 1997, p. 189) (Table 7).  
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with several project participants. 
Because of the richness of information gathered during the exploratory stage, I had 
already gained a fairly solid understanding of the building industry by the time I 
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 The CSH measures energy/CO2, water, materials, surface water run-off, waste, pollution, health 
and well-being, management, and ecology. 
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started the data collection process for the seven case studies in the following stage. I 
conducted interviews with project participants whilst I was analysing other data 
sources (Appendix 1.6). These interviews were about aspects of the projects that 
were not clear to me from the project documentation. I travelled to organisations’ 
offices to conduct interviews. Nonetheless, the social interaction between myself, the 
researcher, and the interviewees often were an informal conversation at the local pub.   
The temporal distance49 from events was an advantage because it allowed the 
interviewees to demarcate their views from the ‘heat of the moment’. For instance, in 
Dale Lane (Case#1), the client and the main contractor were in disagreement 
following the imminent failure to achieve Secured by Design (SbD) certification for 
the building; this is certification that is issued by the local police regarding safety 
against burglary. Conducting the interviews after project completion was an 
advantage in addressing judgment bias (Fischhoff, 1975). I did notice, however, that 
the interviewees often had difficulty recalling specific episodes of the building 
projects. As Weick (1995, p. 29) notes, ‘people are mindful only of a handful of 
projects at a time’. I overcame this potential bias by preparing a summary of the 
events for the interviewees; this enhanced their information retrieval.  
Emails and phone calls were important for two reasons: the geographic 
dispersion of the organisations across the UK, and the validation of information from 
other data sources. Email exchanges and phone calls were a viable alternative to 
being there in person (Table 7).  
The building projects were all based in the East Midlands but every project (i.e. 
case) had inputs from organisations based elsewhere in the UK, as is characteristic of 
the building industry (Grandori, 1997b; Jones et al., 1997; Smyth & Pryke, 2008). 
Some individuals had moved on to other companies (or even other countries) and 
travelling across the UK was not feasible due to resource constraints.  
I also used emails and phone calls to validate data and seek additional information 
about specific episodes during the building project. For instance, for the Dale Lane 
(Case#1), a local police officer was very helpful in answering my emails regarding 
the SbD certification (which this project failed to achieve). Other questions included 
the use of certain acronyms as part of industry-standard terminology. The minutes of 
                                                 
49
 The temporal distance varied from around two years (Case#1) to zero (Case#2). Thus, I combined 
retrospective and real-time research (Leonard-Barton, 1990).  
  111
meetings often contained acronyms and abbreviations that were unclear to me (e.g. 
SHP - Social Housing Partnerships).  
Trade fairs50 and academic conferences were opportunities to combine insights 
from practitioners and researchers (see Appendix 1.7).  
Trade fairs and seminars allowed me to learn about debates relevant to 
practitioners. For instance, the NLA/CABE51 breakfast seminar ‘Simpler and Better - 
Housing design in everyone's interest’ was an important opportunity for me to 
understand the imperative – as portrayed in the event – to address the challenge of 
combining quality and price in the UK’s housing sector. An architect expressed her 
concerns about the poor collaboration with home-builders regarding efficient 
building solutions. I also benefited from attending Ecobuild (2009, 2010 and 2011). 
Academic conferences were also important venues as they allowed me to 
showcase, but more importantly, to develop my research project. I submitted 
preliminary data analysis to academic conferences and had the opportunity to 
integrate feedback across various perspectives, such as management (e.g. Annual 
Meeting of the Academy of Management – AoM), organisational studies (e.g. 
Annual Conference of the European Group of Organizational Studies – EGOS), and 
construction management and economics (e.g. a workshop at the Copenhagen 
Business School). Another important conference for my research was SUNBELT – 
the world’s largest conference on social network analysis – where I presented 
implications for theory-building in research design combining multiple case studies 
and the SNA (Oliveira, 2011). At this event, I took the opportunity to acquire 
insights on methodological techniques for social network analysis by taking part in a 
capability-building workshop and discussing my research with academics. 
                                                 
50
 Trade fairs and conferences have been used in prior research as they are venues where various 
actors from an industry convene, allowing researchers to gather information about key debates (see 
e.g. Ansari & Phillips, 2011; Human & Provan, 1997). 
51
 NLA- New London Architecture and is independent forum for debate urban architecture; CABE - 
Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment acts as government’s advisor on issues of 
architecture, urban design and public space. 
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Table 7 Data Sources  
1. Type 2. Sources 3. Description 4. How did I get access? 5. How did I use the data in this study? 6. Disadvantages  7. Advantages 
Primary 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
(47 pages) 
Project 
participants were 
interviewed. Some 
interviews were 
conducted at 
organisations’ 
offices, others at 
local pubs 
 
- I identified project participants 
based on minutes of meetings and 
project directories;  
- I also used referrals from other 
project participants. In one case, 
the manager of one organisation 
introduced me to project 
managers and quantity surveyors 
via email.  
 
 
- To confirm information about 
specific episodes in the project; 
- To avoid ‘faulty post hoc 
attributions’. 
 
- Individuals’ retrieval 
of information was 
affected by the 
temporal gap and 
participation in 
multiple projects 
simultaneously. 
- Interviews provided 
documented accounts from 
the project participants, with 
information about specific 
episodes. 
Emails and 
phone calls 
(15 pages of 
notes) 
Emails and 
phones calls 
(between 5mins 
and 20 mins) 
 
- Project directories contained the 
contact details of organisations 
and individuals. I sent an email 
introducing my research project 
and asking for their co-operation 
in answering some specific 
questions. 
- To access relevant informants, 
geographically dispersed 
throughout the UK; 
-  To validate information 
accessed through other data 
sources – i.e. triangulation of 
data sources. 
- I often felt that 
interviewees could not 
remember some 
episodes of the build 
projects. 
 
- Emails and phone calls 
were an economic means of 
communication since the 
respondents were 
geographically dispersed 
across the UK. 
 
Trade fairs 
and academic 
conferences 
(80 pages) 
Trade conferences 
and workshops  
Academic 
conferences (e.g. 
EGOS and AoM) 
 
- I signed up for major trade fairs 
(e.g. Ecobuild); 
- I submitted early versions of my 
work to academic conferences, 
specifically, doctoral workshops. 
- To identify ongoing debates 
and concerns among 
communities of  practitioners 
and researchers alike; 
- To articulate insights from 
various fields of research (e.g. 
organisation studies); 
- To benefit from methodology-
related advice. 
- Because these were 
mostly trade fairs, the 
potential interviewees 
had little time to 
engage with my 
research.  
 
- By attending trade fairs 
and workshops I learnt 
about the debates most 
relevant to the building 
industry – e.g. cost 
reduction; 
- Academic conferences 
were a venue of fruitful 
discussions with researchers 
and fellow doctoral students 
alike.  
 
(Table continues on next page) 
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Secondary 
Minutes of 
monthly 
meetings 
(1,700 pages) 
Minutes of 
monthly meetings 
containing 
detailed narratives 
of each inter-
organisational 
relationship 
 
- I collected minutes of monthly 
meetings directly from the clients 
and their consultants. They were 
sent to me electronically; 
- In some cases, the minutes of 
meetings were in electronic form 
(.doc. and .pdf formats). In other 
cases, I received digitally 
scanned versions of the actual 
minutes of meetings (paper 
versions circulated during the 
meeting with handwritten 
annotations). 
- To access detailed narratives 
of the case stories with 
chronological organisational 
accounts of the coordination 
among organisations 
throughout the design and build 
life-cycle.  
- It did not provide me 
with much detail about 
the tasks that each 
organisation 
performed 
individually. Although 
some information is 
lacking, this does not 
impact negatively on 
thehis study since the 
focus is on 
coordination at the 
inter-organisational 
level (as opposed to 
intra-organisational). 
 
- The minutes of meetings 
were a good alternative for 
gathering social network 
data compared to 
questionnaires and 
(publically available) 
databases; 
- They provided detailed 
accounts of inter-
organisational relationships. 
 
Progress 
reports and 
memos 
(1,900 pages) 
Progress reports 
and memos (from 
meetings held on-
site). 
 
- I collected this information 
from the clients and their 
consultants. All information was 
gathered in electronic format.  
-  To complement the 
information from the minutes of 
meetings, as well as from the 
primary data sources (e.g. 
interviews).  
- Required 
familiarisation with 
terms (e.g. acronyms) 
and visual 
representations (e.g. 
Gantt charts and 
drawings) used in the 
building industry. 
- Extensive information 
about the projects’ progress 
- This was used by the 
organisations to coordinate 
their work. 
Trade press 
(200 pages) 
- Online 
publications (e.g. 
BUILDING.CO.U
K and 
Construction 
News); 
- Newsletters of 
professional 
bodies (e.g. 
RIBA). 
 
- Regular access to online 
publications; 
- I signed up for newsletters 
published by professional bodies.  
- To gather initial information 
about the building industry, 
mostly in the exploratory stage; 
- Complementary perspective to 
the internal data sources (e.g. 
project reports and minutes of 
meetings). 
- Politically charged 
views within the 
building industry. This 
aspect was an 
advantage in the 
pursuit of my research. 
- Up-to-date information 
about the building industry 
and ongoing debates 
Dd Main data sources for my study  
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3.3.2. Secondary Sources 
The secondary data sources entailed over 3,900 pages of minutes of meetings, 
progress reports, memos and the trade press. These contributed to the richness and 
uniqueness of my data; reports and memoranda are important data sources about 
organisations and inter-organisational relationships.   
The minutes of monthly meetings formed one of the most important data sources 
of this study (Table 7). The minutes registered detailed narratives of the coordination 
of inter-organisational relationships, documented in over 1,700 pages (Grandori, 
1997b; Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008; van de Ven & Poole, 2005). Such detail gave an 
advantage over traditional methods of data collection and analysis about social 
networks, such as questionnaires and databases. (I shall develop this argument in 
more detail in the following section.)  
Access to the minutes of meetings was a key advantage in conducting a 
longitudinal analysis of the inter-organisational relationships. The meetings were 
held monthly between the main organisations in each project (e.g. clients, main 
contractors and architects). I gathered the minutes of meetings across the seven cases 
for the entire design and build life-cycle. The minutes of meetings provided 
information about the inter-organisational relationships such as the functions 
performed and organisations involved (Grandori, 1997b). I collected the minutes of 
meetings directly from the clients and their agents. Sometimes I obtained digitally 
scanned versions of actual hard copies of minutes circulated in the meetings, 
containing handwritten amendments related to the coordination of tasks among the 
organisations (Appendix 1.6).  
Progress reports and memos also provided rich data sources. I gathered over 
1,900 progress meeting reports that were issued monthly by the main contractors in 
the projects. The aim of these was to provide updates on the progress on-site (against 
the schedule of works) and state the role of various project participants – specifically 
sub-contractors. Memos can be more sporadic; these were generally the notes from 
unplanned meetings that occurred on-site or technical notes on equipment or design 
features. In Blyth Court (Case#5), a misspecification on the design of a structural 
steel frame required an urgent meeting on-site to prevent delays.  
I used the progress reports and memos to complement the minutes of meetings as 
they provided extensive information about the projects’ progress. This was the same 
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information that was used by the organisations to assess and direct the coordination 
of their inter-organisational relationships during the design and build life-cycle. For 
instance, every project report contained information about the progress on site 
against the scheduled works. Clients’ agents and main contractors used this 
information to draw up strategies for coordination with sub-contractors so as to 
compensate for any delays to the work on site.  
The trade press offered an up-to-date source of information about the building 
industry. For the theory-building, the trade press coverage offered a complementary 
view to that obtained from internal data sources (e.g. project reports) as some of the 
cases received media coverage (Case#3 and Case#5). Hence, tensions among 
organisations that were registered in the minutes of meetings were balanced by the 
narratives, typically told as success stories, in the trade press. Consider the North 
Wingfield (Case#3). In a trade newsletter, an organisation claimed ‘a reputation for 
building some of the greenest homes’ and described this project as ‘ground-breaking 
in terms of use of eco-technology’ (RD01-Case#3). Meanwhile, the minutes reported 
coordination problems concerning the installation of the biomass system. 
Additionally, I regularly read BUILDING.CO.UK (the UK’s leading magazine 
for construction professionals) and Construction News (which gives information 
about new projects and building technology). I also kept up-to-date by signing up for 
e-newsletters from two professional bodies and policy makers: the BRE – British 
Research Establishment (the world's leading design and assessment method for 
sustainable buildings) and Constructing Excellence (the organisation charged with 
driving the change agenda in the construction industry). These sources were 
important as they helped me to gain a sense of the concerns and discussions among 
professionals and to learn the common language used in the industry. It should be 
noted, as a point of caution, however, that some of the discussions aimed at 
triggering policy-making. This meant that often the perspective depicted among the 
different sources was politically charged. While some organisations aligned 
themselves with the government’s policy, for instance, regarding funding the 
installation of solar panels in households, other organisations were clearly against it. 
I felt that such a variety of opinions enriched my study, though.  
In brief, I relied on extensive data that entailed over 3,900 pages of primary and 
secondary data sources. My data analysis draws on the richness of the data. 
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3.3.3. Discovering How the Minutes of Meetings Could be Used to Study 
Dynamic Inter-Organisational Relationships 
I argue that the minutes of meetings provide an opportunity to develop an in-
depth approach to mapping inter-organisational relationships. My view is based on 
my own assessment of the data sources used in previous research on inter-
organisational relationships – that lacks despite an exponential growth of SNA 
research (Borgatti & Foster, 2003) – organised around my research questions.  
There are just a few exceptions, to the best of my knowledge. Oliver and Ebers 
(1998), Provan et al. (2007) and Tichy et al. (1979) all dedicate commentaries in 
their reviews of the SNA to the assessment of data sources. However, in the absence 
of a systemic assessment of data sources about inter-organisational relationships, I 
felt the need to conduct my own assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of 
the key data sources used in prior research: questionnaires, datasets and interviews52. 
The criteria for my assessment were, of course, defined by my research interests. 
Table 8 summarises this assessment across two dimensions: complete configurations 
and longitudinal observations53. 
Questionnaires feature among the most commonly used data collection methods 
in SNA research (Oliver & Ebers, 1998; Provan et al., 2007). Questionnaires involve 
asking individuals to report on their interactions with other organisations (Tichy et 
al., 1979). Individuals are presented with a list of all organisations involved in a 
given project or venture. Such lists are an advantage when studying complete 
configurations. They reduce the likelihood of respondents failing to remember all the 
organisations that took part, which is more likely to occur when a study is dealing 
with past events, due to respondents’ information retrieval limitations. Another 
advantage of the questionnaire is the possibility of gathering additional information 
on, for example, organisational expertise. However, this strategy requires the 
researchers to have ex ante knowledge of all the organisations that took part so that 
they can generate a complete list. For instance, in a study of inter-organisational 
                                                 
52
 I acknowledge that researchers often combine different data sources, such as databases and 
questionnaires (e.g. McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). In my assessment, I concentrated on the main data 
source used in each study of inter-organisational relationships. 
53
 A complete configuration refers to the entire set of ties engaged in a project. As Walker et al. (1997, 
p. 122) posit, ‘the study of interfirm cooperative agreements over time requires an analysis of the 
network as a whole’. My focus is on the complete set of inter-organisational relationships instead of 
‘how are one organisation’s dynamic inter-organisational relationships coordinated?’ As for the 
second feature, the data is required to be longitudinal to capture the ‘dynamic’ aspect in my research. 
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coordination among fourteen early childhood agencies in Texas, van de Ven & 
Gordon (1984) report having used a list of all the agencies’ directors so that each 
director could indicate their inter-organisational ties. However, in retrospective 
studies, respondents experience difficulties in recalling all of the ties that relate to the 
complete configuration, which can represent a drawback of the use of questionnaires. 
Questionnaires are suitable for generating standardised data at different points in 
time. This enhances the comparability of the data and is an advantage in longitudinal 
studies. However, data collected through questionnaires require that all respondents 
participate at all observation points. Problems arise if a respondent drops out during 
the research project. The lack of an answer might be regarded as a missing value but 
it might also indicate the cessation of a tie, knowledge of which is critical in studying 
inter-organisational relationships. Uncertainty about the reason for the 
‘disappearance’ of a tie can thus be problematic to the analysis. This problem was 
reported by van de Ven and Gordon (1984, p. 607) in their longitudinal analysis of 
inter-agency relationships: it was ‘complicated’ because some member-agency 
respondents stopped participating before the end.  
Databases are (often publicly available) sources of information such as lists of 
alliances and consortia within an industry. They are widely used in research into 
inter-organisational relationships, especially if the research has a macro-level focus, 
such as an industry (Rosenkopf & Padula, 2008; Soda & Usai, 1999) or region 
(McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). Research that relies on databases uses exhaustive lists of 
organisations and formalised inter-organisational ties. This allows the use of 
sophisticated statistical routines in the SNA. Soda and Usai (1999) use a database of 
all consortia in Italy’s building industry to map inter-organisational relationships. 
The use of large databases is supported by the claim that it reduces ‘complications’, 
to borrow the language of van de Ven and Gordon (1984, p. 607). Databases allow a 
large sample size to be used, which reduces the likelihood of bias. (Gulati, 1995b) 
uses a database containing over 2,400 alliances to study how social structure affects 
patterns of alliance formation. Nonetheless, the datasets in such studies are often 
limited to information on dyads (pairs of organisations). The focus on dyads is 
understood to be a limitation because organisations are in fact embedded in extensive 
networks comprising several organisations (Gulati, 1995b, p. 645). 
Compared to questionnaires, databases are a reliable source of information on the 
entry and exit of organisations to and from a network. This feature is central for 
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longitudinal studies concerning highly dynamic settings, for instance, the 
biotechnology industry (Powell et al., 1996) or ties among venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs (Hallen, 2008). Databases enable the retrospective study of long time-
spans. For instance, Gulati (1995b) uses a database to study patterns of alliances over 
a period of 20 years (1970-1989). A notable exception in terms of studying complete 
networks using databases is Owen-Smith and Powell’s (2004), wherein the authors 
track inter-organisational relationships in the biotechnology industry between 1988 
and 1999 in the Boston area. Otherwise, research using databases seldom studies 
complete configurations (Zaheer et al., 2010). Another limitation is that longitudinal 
research to date has used databases and the analyses have been based on only 
standard SNA measures (Provan et al., 2007). Up until now, the use of SNA 
measures – for instance, organisations’ centrality – was derived for databases and 
was rarely complemented by primary data such as interviews. Complementary 
qualitative data is important for unravelling the mechanisms underlying the dynamics 
of inter-organisational relationships. For instance, Gulati & Gargiulo (1999) integrate 
the use of databases with interviews in their research on the origins of inter-
organisational networks. In another study, Maurer & Ebers (2006) show the 
relevance of interviews in unravelling the mechanisms underlying the dynamics of 
inter-organisational relationships among German biotechnology start-ups. 
Interviews are popular. They are often guided by snowball sampling techniques 
within an empirical context (Table 8). This increases the response rate and the 
likelihood of capturing a complete configuration of inter-organisational relationships. 
The information that is gathered is enriched with narratives. Doz (1996) uses 
interviews to unravel the learning processes in four strategic alliances.  
The data on inter-organisational relationships gathered through interviews are 
often analysed using content analysis rather than SNA techniques. While SNA 
techniques ‘quantify’, data from interviews ‘qualify’, inter-organisational 
relationships. Interviews are at the heart of the research designs of some of the 
seminal works on the social network approach (Granovetter, 1973; Uzzi, 1997). 
Interviews allow the researcher to unravel the ‘qualities’ of ties – for example, trust 
in embedded ties versus arm’s-length ties. However, it is not easy to use the data 
collected from interviews to generate relational matrices, that is to index 
organisations and ties into matrices (Wasserman & Faust, 1994), upon which SNA 
research relies.  
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Table 8 Assessment of Existing Data Sources Used in Inter-Organisational Relationships Research 
1. Data sources 2. Description 3. Complete configurations 4. Longitudinal observation 5. Prior research 
Questionnaires 
Typically, 
questionnaires are 
sent out to potential 
respondents along 
with a list of 
organisations. In 
longitudinal 
research, 
questionnaires are 
distributed at 
different observation 
points in time 
Advantages 
- Since respondents are presented with a list 
of organisations, no organisation is 
(inadvertently) left out by the respondents; 
- Integration of other relevant aspects, e.g. 
measures of task complexity and degree of 
centralisation. 
- Standardisation of questions 
enhances the comparison of 
observations made at different points 
in time. 
 
(Human & Provan, 
2000; McEvily & 
Zaheer, 1999; 
Obstfeld, 2005; 
Schmidt & Kochan, 
1977; van de Ven & 
Gordon, 1984) 
Disadvantages 
- Respondents’ withdrawals from the study 
reduce the completeness of the 
configuration; 
- When the study is carried out 
retrospectively, some respondents may 
experience difficulties in recalling all ties 
relevant to the complete configuration.  
- Some respondents may drop out half-
way through the study. This creates 
methodological concerns about the 
analytical treatment of the entry and 
exit of nodes. 
Databases (often 
publicly available) 
This includes 
industry datasets, 
e.g. alliances and 
consortia. 
Advantages 
- Complete list of organisations, e.g. list of 
organisations or consortia in the building 
industry; 
- Extensiveness of the data, which reduces 
the ‘complications’ that can stem from 
missing data. 
- Reliability of information on entry 
and exit of organisations, specifically 
in highly dynamic industries, e.g. 
biotechnology; 
- It allows retrospective studies over 
long time spans. 
(Gulati, 1995b; 
Gulati & Gargiulo, 
1999; Hallen, 2008; 
Human & Provan, 
2000; Koza & 
Lewin, 2004; Owen-
Smith & Powell, 
2004; Ring & van de 
Ven, 1992; 
Rosenkopf & Padula, 
2008; Soda & Usai, 
1999; Walker et al., 
1997) 
Disadvantages 
- A focus on dyads, i.e. pairs of 
organisations (with a few exceptions). This 
is often a limitation because organisations 
are embedded in broader inter-
organisational relationships.  
- The study of the evolution of 
relationships is often restricted to the 
dynamics of dyads (or in some 
exceptions triads); 
- The reporting of dynamics relies 
mostly on descriptive measures but 
often lacks complementary data. 
(Table continues on next page) 
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Interviews 
Researchers identify 
the relevant 
respondents (e.g. 
through snowball 
sampling techniques) 
to be interviewed 
about a given 
phenomenon.  
Advantages 
- High response rates and the study of the 
complete configuration of inter-
organisational relationships; 
- Information gathered is enriched by 
detailed narratives about, for example, 
coordination-related aspects of inter-
organisational relationships. 
- In-depth knowledge of the dynamics 
of inter-organisational relationships;  
- It enhances the study of mechanisms 
(e.g. changes in the structure of a 
network over time). Interviews are 
widely used in process-driven 
longitudinal research. 
(Argote, 1982; Davis 
& Eisenhardt, 2011; 
Doz, 1996; Gulati et 
al., 2011b; Hardy et 
al., 2003; Mariotti & 
Delbridge, 2012; 
Maurer & Ebers, 
2006; Ozcan & 
Eisenhardt, 2009) 
Disadvantages 
- Despite the richness of the data, the 
implementation of SNA techniques is often 
difficult. 
- Comparability to prior research (using 
questionnaires and databases) is not 
straightforward; 
- Additional difficulty in conducting 
longitudinal analyses of the social 
structure of inter-organisational 
relationships. 
Minutes of 
meetings 
Detailed narratives of 
meetings held among 
several parties with 
regards, for example, 
a project.  
Advantages 
- Detailed information on all aspects of the 
configuration, e.g. organisations and their 
functions.  
 
- A chronologically organised record of 
inter-organisational interactions;  
- No missing data on nodes (i.e. 
organisations) or ties (i.e. inter-
organisational relationships). 
Related research:  
 
(Broniatowski, 2010; 
Diesner& Carley, 
2012; Gibson, 2005; 
Jarzabkowski & 
Seidl, 2008; Simon, 
1976; van de Ven & 
Poole, 2005)  
Disadvantages 
- Requires manual extraction of relational 
data (currently, there is no computerised 
method is available); 
- No benchmarking available; 
- Not suitable for large-scale configurations 
- Because of the enormous work 
involved, it is not suitable for studying 
long time spans. 
 
Dd It denotes the main data collection method adopted for this study.
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Still, using interview-based data in longitudinal studies provides in-depth 
accounts of the dynamics of inter-organisational relationships. Unlike questionnaire-
based data, interview-based data enhance process-driven accounts of phenomena 
embedded in dynamic inter-organisational relationships. For instance, Ozcan and 
Eisenhardt (2009, p. 247) show a process framework of how entrepreneurial firms 
initiate high-performing portfolios. In another study, Davis and Eisenhardt (2011) 
use over 72 semi-structured interviews about 8 technology-oriented inter-
organisational collaborations. 
Recently published research on inter-organisational relationships aims to address 
the gaps in prior research (mainly conducted through the analysis of data obtained 
through questionnaires and databases). Nonetheless, the comparability of the findings 
is not always straightforward. Because of the difficulty of generating relational 
matrices with interview-gathered data, analysing the structural properties of inter-
organisational relationships is difficult (Table 8). While the use of relational 
matrices allows SNA measures to be used (e.g. centrality), the use of interview-
gathered data means the researcher is ‘limited’ to content analysis.  
The minutes of meetings are, I argue, an alternative to databases, questionnaires 
and interviews as a data source regarding dynamic inter-organisational relationships, 
particularly for my study.  
One reason is that minutes of meetings fulfil the data requirements that I 
identified for my study: complete configuration and longitudinal observations (Table 
8). The minutes of meetings contain detailed information on all aspects of the 
configurations in question (e.g. organisations and their functions). Simon (1976) 
refers to minutes of meetings and internal documents as two of the most insightful 
sources of data about the ‘life of organisations’. The relevance of documentation 
such as minutes of meetings and memos is evidenced in research on inter-
organisational coordination among agencies in the state of Texas (van de Ven & 
Gordon, 1984). The minutes of meetings provide information on the dynamics 
among organisations and any concerns regarding inter-organisational arrangements. 
Moreover, minutes are a key data source in strategy research (Dittrich, Guerard, & 
Seidl, 2011; Gibson, 2005; Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008; van de Ven & Poole, 2005). 
In a rare study using meetings to study networks of individuals, Gibson54 (2005) 
                                                 
54
 I thank Martin Gargiulo for drawing my attention to the work of the sociologist David Gibson. 
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delivers a detailed analysis of the interactions (superior-subordinate, friendship and 
co-working) that take place in the meetings. His article ‘is perhaps the first to link 
statistically network-analytic and conversation-analytic levels of analysis’ (Gibson, 
2005, p. 1561). Any extension of the use of the minutes of meetings to study inter-
organisational relationships needs to be assessed thoroughly, however. 
As far as longitudinal studies are concerned, the minutes of meetings provide a 
chronologically organised record of inter-organisational relationships (Broniatowski, 
2010; Diesner, & Carley, 2012; Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008). One of the strengths of 
minutes is that they provide qualitative accounts as well as systematic information on 
the inter-organisational relationships over time. Additionally, the minutes of 
meetings are advantageous for the study of complete configurations of inter-
organisational relationships. Information about organisational expertise and changes 
over time is also documented. I observed this myself in the minutes of meetings I 
gathered from the seven building projects. I found a great amount of detail about the 
functions performed by the main contractor and, more importantly, the requirements 
for coordination with other organisations throughout the design and build life-cycle.  
Nevertheless, I acknowledge that there are a few disadvantages to the use of the 
minutes of meetings to study inter-organisational relationships. An enormous amount 
of work seems to be required if we are to study inter-organisational relationships in 
detail since there are no examples to follow in the current research. The minutes of 
meetings also have limited suitability for long time spans (e.g. over 5 years).  
Still, ‘an advantage of the network approach rests with its ability to bring together 
quantitative, qualitative, and graphical analyses’ (Ibarra, Kilduff, & Tsai, 2005, p. 
368). Following this reasoning, and given how the minutes of meetings fare in the 
comparison against other data sources, I argue that their use is worth pursuing when 
studying inter-organisational relationships.  
 
In a nutshell, I have argued here that the minutes of meetings are particularly 
suitable for studying inter-organisational relationships compared to the alternatives. 
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3.4. Data Analysis: Developing an in-depth approach for studying 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships 
In this section, I describe the development of an in-depth approach that combines 
the use of the SNA to map inter-organisational relationships and content analysis 
techniques to examine the theoretical underpinnings of coordination and coordination 
problems in inter-organisational relationships over time. I first establish the relevance 
of developing such an approach and then move on to describe my use of (1) text-
based data for the SNA and (2) content analysis.  
The trigger for me to develop an in-depth methodology was the realisation that a 
study of the coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relationships would require 
a fine-grained analysis. The pursuit of answers to my research questions called for a 
combined study of the structure of ties among organisations and an inductive 
analysis of coordination based on the extensive textual material. Furthermore, this 
approach resonated with the call for research studying the ‘network structures’ and 
‘underlying process’ in the relationships among organisations (Sydow & Windeler, 
1998). In other words, the key was to combine the SNA with theoretical explanations 
of mechanisms within inter-organisational relationships (Emirbayer & Jeff, 1994).  
Figure 9 makes the case for using an in-depth approach to examine the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships. The key point is that coordination 
is a rich mechanism that unfolds within inter-organisational ties and cannot be 
captured through SNA measures alone.  
Of course, SNA techniques can be used to unravel patterns of inter-organisational 
relationships (Galaskiewicz, 1985; Wasserman & Faust, 1994), but ties among 
organisations are rich in social mechanisms that cannot be captured through SNA 
alone. In the light of the theoretical framework of this study, there are also aspects 
such as trust (Gulati, 1995; Ring & van de Ven, 1992), social mechanisms of control 
(Hardy et al., 2005; Jones et al., 1997) and heuristics and cross-understandings 
(Beamish & Biggart, 2010; Kogut & Zander, 1996) to be considered. Figure 9 is a 
stylised representation of these components underlying the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships. The red-coloured nodes are organisations (i.e. nodes in 
SNA terms), but organisations’ attributes, such as expertise are also involved. Along 
the same line of reasoning, the red-coloured ties embed other aspects, such as trust.  
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Figure 9 Making the Case for an In-Depth Approach to the Study of Inter-
Organisational Relationships  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Zumer, Ravnik, Porenta, Alexander and Yeomans (2010) 
 
I overcame this challenge by developing a novel, in-depth, approach to inter-
organisational relationships. This approach integrates (1) the SNA (Galaskiewicz, 
1985; Wasserman & Faust, 1994) and (2) traditional inductive research (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  
 
3.4.1. SNA Using Text-Based Data 
For this study, I developed my own approach to the SNA using text-based data in 
the absence of benchmarking (see, Diesner & Carley, 2012, for early steps). In a 
procedure that lasted over eight months, I manually extracted network data from the 
minutes of meetings following a stepwise procedure: (1) data extraction, (2) data 
cleansing, (3) data storage and (4) data analysis. Below, I explain each step and 
report the reliability tests on the coding.  
There were some preparatory steps. First of all, I identified various components of 
configurations of inter-organisational relationships, such as nodes (i and j) and ties 
(xij). The initial step was to specify the boundaries for all seven configurations of 
inter-organisational relationships (or network configurations). I defined the network 
configuration in relation to each social housing building project (i.e. individual case 
study). Therefore, the ‘project’ delimited the boundary of each network configuration 
as well as each case study. In line with prior research, I regarded the ‘project’ as ‘a 
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nexus of activity that allows multiple organisations to collaborate to achieve their 
individual and collective goals’ (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008). A similar approach is 
used in prior research on the building industry. Smyth and Pryke (2008) define the 
boundaries of the network related to UK-based infrastructure projects. 
The next step concerned the definition of the conceptual underpinnings as part of 
the preparation for extracting data; this ensured theory-data adherence. One 
implication of choosing the minutes of meetings to source data about inter-
organisational networks was the absence of benchmarking (as I argued earlier). To 
overcome this hurdle, I built on current research on the extraction and treatment of 
text-based data. The conceptual framework developed by Carley and Palmquist 
(1991) as a methodology for extracting mental models from text-based data is 
particularly suited to my research. The overarching concept is one of a 
‘representation scheme’, which can be regarded as the equivalent of a network 
configuration. The representation scheme entails two objects: concepts and 
relationships. A concept refers to a single word (e.g. friend) while a relationship 
refers to ‘a tie linking concepts’ (e.g. loves and does) (Carley & Palmquist, 1991, p. 
607). Hence, the parallel to the SNA is straightforward: a concept represents one 
organisation’s name (i.e. a node); and a relationship denotes an action performed 
between at least two organisations (i.e. a tie)55. Furthermore, the object ‘relationship’ 
is broadly associated with the notion of ‘interaction’, widely implemented in current 
research on inter-organisational relationships. Interactions are defined as activities 
across organisational boundaries that include ‘enduring transactions, flows, and links 
that occur among or between organisations’ (Oliver, 1990, p. 241).  
A key aspect here was the reliability of the data coding procedures. I therefore 
conducted a pilot exercise for coding text-based data for the SNA in a different case 
study, with two independent raters coding the data. I provided the raters with the 
minutes from a meeting on the ‘Melton Road’ project56 and outlined the coding 
criteria for them. My study of the inter-rater reliability – see Appendix 1.8 for a 
detailed report – shows ‘high’ agreement between the raters: Cohen’s Kappa (k) = 
.857 (confidence interval = [.804; .910]; p-value < .001; N = 2,600) (Landis & Koch, 
                                                 
55
 In the original version, Carley and Palmquist (1991, p. 607) also included two other objects as part 
of the representation scheme: statements and maps. Because these two objects were specific to the 
drawing of mental maps, I did not integrate them into the framework for this study. 
56
 This social housing project was very similar to the seven projects used in the main study of this 
research, and detailed earlier in this chapter. The main contractor started on site in May 2008 and the 
handover of the building to the client took place 20 months later. The total cost was £2, 877,792. 
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1977). The main advantage of this pilot exercise was that it helped me to establish a 
detailed guide that later allowed me to code the data of the seven case studies. Based 
on these figures, I could expect the coding to show an inter-rater reliability of 
between .804 and .910, at the 95% confidence level. Furthermore, conducting a pilot 
exercise for the coding was the most viable option in light of the financial constraints 
on this research. The coding process required a generous amount of time, which 
would have involved the payment of high fees to the raters if they had coded all 
seven case studies. I now present my stepwise approach used to extract network data 
from text-based sources, which I improved based on the pilot study (Table 9). 
(1) Data extraction entailed the extraction of social network data originally in a 
text format. I manually extracted inter-organisational network data from over 1,700 
pages of minutes of meetings. To ensure validity and reliability, I only considered 
interactions documented in the minutes of the meetings. I followed this 
methodological procedure for all seven case studies. I used a table to store 
information as it was reported in the minutes (see Appendix 1.9 for an illustration).  
I started by identifying all inter-organisational relations that appeared in the 
minutes. That led to a list of organisations (i.e. concepts/nodes) connected through 
interactions (i.e. relationships/ties) (Table 9). For instance, ‘SF met with Service 24’ 
was registered as a relationship between two concepts. In SNA terms, Organisation 
A (i), ‘SF’, and Organisation B (j), ‘Service 24’, established a tie (xij). Besides the 
transcriptions, the table also registered the nodes (i.e. concepts) forming each tie (i.e. 
relationship); I gathered over 370 pages of tables in total. I used a stylised notation: 
SFService 24. No network configuration (∑{xij}) could be drawn at this stage 
because my data were still in raw form. I simply had an inventory of all ties. Data 
were chronologically organised by monthly observation point (i.e. waves, in SNA 
terms). The unit of analysis for time was one ‘month’.  
(2) Data cleansing was also required. I conducted several verification processes 
to prevent errors. The verification processes included consistency of names of 
organisations (i.e. concepts/nodes) and ‘double counting’ (Table 9). Organisations 
were often identified by initials or even an individual’s name (e.g. the initials of the 
manager with the main contractor). In the example above, ‘SF’ referred to ‘Sara Fitz’ 
(fictitious name), the project manager for the client.  
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Table 9 Stepwise Approach Used to Extract Social Network Data from Text-Based Sources 
 
 Dd The grey shading represents the highest workload required across ‘steps’ (i.e. data extraction; data cleansing; data storage; and data analysis).
1. Components 2. Conceptual underpinnings 3. Data extraction  4. Data cleansing 5. Data storage 6. Data analysis 
Nodes 
(i and j) 
● 
All organisations engaged in each 
social housing project. Each 
organisation represented as a 
concept (Carley & Palmquist, 
1991, p. 607) (or node in SNA 
terms).  
Minutes of meetings 
contained references to 
all organisations 
involved in the project 
(i.e. concepts). I also 
used project directories 
to gather information 
about organisations (e.g. 
contacts) 
I checked for the consistency of 
the names of organisations (i.e. 
concepts/nodes). In the minutes, 
organisations were often 
identified by initials or even 
individual’s names. I generated a 
list of all references to nodes so 
that I could standardise the 
notion.  
 When it came to the inter-
organisational network, I was 
interested in ties – 
relationships between at least 
two nodes. However, I also 
created an attributes file to 
store information on the 
organisations’ functions.  
No analysis was 
carried out at the 
node level 
Ties  
(xij) 
●-● 
‘Tie serves as a bond that aligns 
and coordinates action, enabling 
groups of nodes to act as a single 
node’ (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011, 
p. 7). Every inter-organisational 
interaction was treated as a 
relationship (Carley & 
Palmquist, 1991, p. 607) 
I manually extracted all 
instances of 
organisations (i.e. 
concepts/nodes) 
connected through 
interactions (i.e. 
relationships/ties).  
 
‘Double counting’ due to the 
documentation of the same inter-
organisational interaction in the 
minutes of two consecutive 
meetings. Once I had completed 
the data cleansing, there were 
2,600 inter-organisational ties. 
All of the ties that had 
previously been stored in a 
Word document were exported 
to a text file (.txt) for each 
month and case. 
Text files (.txt) were created 
wherein every tie was 
registered on one line. 
UCINET 4 
(Over 2,600 inter-
organisational ties) 
 
Configuration 
(∑{xij}) 
 
 
 
A network/configuration is a ‘set 
of nodes and the set of ties 
representing some relationship, 
or lack of relationship, between 
the nodes’ (Brass, Galaskiewicz, 
Greve, & Tsai, 2004) . It is 
alternatively a representation 
schema formed by concepts and 
relationships (Carley & 
Palmquist, 1991).   
At this stage, network 
configurations could not 
yet be generated. Only 
an inventory of all ties 
was produced. 
Network configurations could not 
yet be generated. 
The .txt files were converted 
into .dl - UCINET 4 
requirements/ 
Using UCINET 4, I created a 
relational matrix given by g x 
g (g rows and g columns) and 
indexed the relationships 
among organisations i and j 
(xij), where g was the total 
number of organisations. 
UCINET 4 
(seven complete, 
dynamic, network 
configurations 
formed by monthly 
observation points). 
Dynamic 
 
Time 1...Time n+1 
Longitudinal study of the 
evolution of inter-organisational 
relationships (Gulati, 1995b; 
Moody, McFarland, & Bender-
DeMoll, 2005). 
The key information in 
organising the inventory 
of all ties longitudinally 
was the date.  
All interactions remained 
organised monthly but dynamic 
representations could not yet be 
generated.  
A dynamic perspective was 
created by a sequence of 
configurations according to 
each wave (e.g. time 1; time 
n+1). 
UCINET 4 
(seven complete, 
dynamic, network 
configurations; 
monthly points). 
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On other occasions, the actual name of the client organisation was mentioned. 
These were initially noted as two different nodes (i.e. concepts) although they were 
the same organisation. Another feature that required standardisation was the 
inconsistency of terms used. To address this consistently, I generated a list of all 
nodes so that I could standardise the notation. In this list, I included all notation (e.g. 
for the client, the organisation’s name and the project manager’s name) used to refer 
to the same organisation; the final inventory of ties has a unique notation.  
The ‘double counting’ of ties referred to the documenting of the same inter-
organisational interaction in the minutes of two consecutive meetings. For instance, 
‘double counting’ occurred if the minutes for ‘month n’ stated an interaction that was 
also recorded in the minutes for ‘month n+1’ (as a confirmation that the interaction 
had taken place). These were two different references to the same interaction; 
therefore, I registered just one inter-organisational interaction (Appendix 1.9). 
Similarly to in the previous step, no network configuration (∑{xij}) could be 
drawn at this point. I kept the data organised chronologically by monthly observation 
point (i.e. waves, in SNA terms). The goal of the data-cleansing stage was to ensure 
the validity and reliability of the data analysis (mostly because it was a new method 
with no benchmarking). Over 2,600 inter-organisational ties had been registered at 
the completion of the data cleansing (Table 9). 
(3) Data storage was assisted through the use of documents created in the 
Microsoft Word text processor (see Appendix 1.9). From this point on, the nodes 
were not studied individually; instead, I was interested in ties.  
At this stage, the goal was to store the data in files that could be used to run the 
SNA. In order to achieve this, I exported all the ties (remaining after the data 
cleansing) to a text file (.txt). I created a text file for each wave (i.e. monthly 
observation point) for each of the seven network configurations. Each line of the text 
file represented one tie. For instance, to recall the previous example, the tie 
ClientService 24 occupied one line in the text file, with the two nodes separated by 
a single space. The number of lines in the text file thus equalled the total number of 
ties (in that wave).  
An additional step was still necessary: exporting the text data to the SNA software 
package. I opted for UCINET 4 (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002), which has 
been used widely in prior research on inter-organisational relationships (Ahuja, 
Polidoro, & Mitchell, 2009; Greve et al., 2010; Polidoro et al., 2011; Soda & Usai, 
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1999). However, the file extension .txt had to be converted to .dl in order for the file 
to be imported into UCINET6 as a network file. I did this by adding the following 
script at the head of the text file:  
dl n=[number of nodes] , format=nodelist1 
row labels embedded 
data:  
[lines of inter-organisational interactions – for example, “Client Service 24”] 
I repeated this procedure for all of the text files, that is, for each wave (i.e. 
monthly observation point) and each of the seven network configurations. Once this 
task was finished, I imported the .dl text files into UCINET 4 (Borgatti et al., 2002), 
which automatically generated a relational matrix. This was a g x g matrix (g rows 
and g columns) that indexed the relationships among pairs of organisations i and j 
(xij), where g was the total number of organisations in that inter-organisational 
network configuration. I computed a relational matrix for all seven inter-
organisational networks (Appendix 1.9). These inter-organisational networks were 
‘dynamic’ because they were comprised of a sequence of waves (e.g. time 1; time 
n+1). I had a separate matrix for each month. 
Additionally, I created attribute files to store information on organisational 
expertise. I did so in two steps. First, I used a list of all organisations for every wave 
of the configuration of inter-organisational relationships. Information on the 
organisational expertise of each node was sorted and stored in Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets (.xls). Second, I transferred this information into a text file (.dl). Text 
files can be imported into UCINET 4 as attribute files (.vna) but they need to have a 
script ‘*node data’ inserted in the first line (Appendix 1.9).  
(4) Data analysis was the last procedure of my stepwise approach to social 
network using text-based data. From this point on, I followed standard procedures 
for the SNA (Borgatti et al., 2002; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The data analysis 
followed the routines implemented in UCINET 4 (Borgatti et al., 2002). 
I started by representing the dynamics of inter-organisational relationships as a 
sequence of monthly-observed graphic representations of the inter-organisational 
network configuration – a set of nodes and ties (Galaskiewicz, 1985; Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994). I used the NetDraw application available with the software package 
UCINET 4 (Borgatti et al., 2002) to produce graphic representations of the inter-
organisational relationships. The specification of the algorithm used to generate the 
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graphic representation was as follows: ‘Layout / Graph–Theoretic layout / Kamada-
Kawai’. The use of this algorithm was consistent with what had been done in prior 
research on inter-organisational relationships (Polidoro et al., 2011) (for representing 
joint ventures in the global chemicals industry) and representing alliances in the 
global liner shipping industry (Greve et al., 2010). 
In total, I studied seven complete, dynamic, network configurations formed of 
monthly observation points. Through the discovery of the minutes of meetings as a 
source of social network data, as well as the ability to use the SNA with text-based 
data, I managed to access social network data that met my initial data requirements 
of complete configurations and a longitudinal study.  
In sum, in this section I have shown how I developed a methodological approach 
to extract network data from text-based sources that allowed me to map the inter-
organisational relationships in these seven cases.  
3.4.2. Qualitative Analysis  
In the final part of my in-depth approach to the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships, I followed the canons of inductive enquiry (Eisenhardt, 
1989) and qualitative data analysis (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
Essentially, I built on extensive textual data to conduct qualitative analyses that 
integrated with SNA of inter-organisational relationships. 
I started according to the principles of an inductive research design that has been 
used for multiple case-study research (Eisenhardt, 1989) and in grounded theory 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). My data analysis entailed an initial process of synthesising 
and organising data across cases (Eisenhardt, 1989) in line with the qualitative 
research tradition (Miles & Huberman, 1984). I began by synthesising and organising 
all of the information available on the seven projects from various sources. The first 
step was to stitch together the individual case stories and inter-organisational 
networks and compile the information in tables (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & 
Huberman, 1984). In order to reflect the longitudinal aspect of my data, I organised 
the data chronologically across cases. Following prior research (Adler, 1995; Davis 
& Eisenhardt, 2011), I aggregated the data according to the stage of the design and 
build life-cycle. As I was reading the minutes of meetings, I made notes on 
coordination-related aspects and identified instances of dysfunctionalities that were 
reported among the organisations, such as delays and slow progress on site.   
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I started to make a provisional coding of the data. Data coding is an analytical 
procedure that entails operations that break the data down into conceptualised aspects 
and puts it back together in new ways (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 57). I followed the 
open coding approach; this type of coding was suitable for my study because of its 
flexibility and inductive element. 
I carried out the coding manually using annotations in the documents (e.g. project 
reports and memos). I started with a provisional ‘start list’ of codes based on the 
conceptual framework (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000; Miles & Huberman, 1984) and 
developed initial codes based on the theoretical framework underlying my study. 
Figure 10 shows an example of content analysis based on open coding. The open 
coding was based on the language used in the primary data sources and secondary 
sources, as I specifically wanted to keep it as it was documented in the data sources. 
 
Figure 10 Illustration of Content Analysis 
Obstacles to 
Coordination 
- Geological and weather conditions on-site 
- New materials and building techniques 
- Unexpected technical hazards (e.g. 
‘buildability’) 
Building process and 
nature of the tasks 
- Information flow among all organisations 
- Standard information channels and routines 
- Misunderstanding about technical 
specifications  
- Design misspecifications 
Communication and 
information 
First-order concepts 
(Provisional categories) 
Second-order concepts 
(Emerging dimensions) 
Third-order concepts 
(Theoretical dimensions) 
- Allocation of risk and uncertainty among 
organisations 
- Obligations of the client to the funding 
agencies 
- Legal frameworks and requirements  
Contractual 
obligations and 
expectations 
Enhancers of 
Coordination 
- Standardisation of the building process and 
materials 
- Common language and procedures used in 
in building projects 
Routines and cross-
understandings 
Relational aspects 
among organisations 
- Relationship between contractors and sub-
contractors 
- Links among the client and local public 
organisations 
- Preference of trust-based relationships over 
contractual agreements 
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I searched for relationships among the first-order concepts so as to aggregate the 
data to a higher order. The importance of this step was to shift from a descriptive 
analysis towards an analytical insight about coordination. Further attempts to group 
the data became progressively more interrelated with the theory in a move from 
descriptive to analytical categories (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1984). 
The grouping criteria were determined based on the relevant literature and emerging 
themes (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). I made use of numerous case-pairings to identify 
overlaps of constructs across the seven cases. For instance, I was interested in 
qualitative elements of ties, such as cross-understandings.  
After conducting several rounds of the above process, I reached the second-order 
concepts. For instance, the second-order concept ‘building process and nature of the 
tasks’ entailed aspects such as ‘new materials and building techniques’ and 
‘unexpected technical hazards (e.g. ‘buildability’) (Figure 10). This process revealed 
certain obstacles, for instance the use of in-built renewable energy technology in new 
projects from the design stage. I used grouping techniques to reveal cross-case 
similarities. An interactive framework started to develop, which evolved constantly 
as I made sense of the data. In his study of inter-firm relationships in New York’s 
apparel industry, Uzzi (1997, p. 41) ‘developed a working framework based on 
extant theory and then travelled back and forth between the data and [his] working 
framework’. I did the same by making notes and looking for emerging themes.  
In the final step of the analysis, I completed the process of comparing data to 
theory by identifying third-order concepts. These resonated with the broader 
theoretical framework in my study, concerning the coordination of dynamic inter-
organisational relationships. The analysis was guided by contrasting concepts across 
cases so that I could synthetise what was different and what was the same (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). Progressively, relationships among concepts started to bring to light 
explanatory paths that I ‘tested’ systematically across cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Leonard-Barton, 1990). I also used triangulation from multiple data sources to 
strengthen emerging patterns of explanation (Jick, 1979). For instance, I made phone 
calls and sent emails to clarify specific episodes that were not clear in the minutes of 
meetings. In several instances, organisations were registered as main contractors but 
only the organisation’s design department appeared to be involved in the project. 
Thus, I contacted the relevant project managers and client to establish the 
organisation’s role.  
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My goal was to reach theoretical saturation of the explanatory patterns that were 
emerging across cases. The main advantage of my in-depth approach was the 
integration the qualitative analysis of the data sources with the mapping of inter-
organisational relationships. This allowed for a two-way interaction during the 
theory-building process whereby I looked for relationships among emerging 
constructs and compared them against the SNA. For instance, while I was developing 
the coding of ‘obstacles to coordination’, I was also making notes based on the 
analysis of the structure of inter-organisational relationships. This was a critical step 
in intertwining the SNA with emerging constructs as it avoided ‘context stripping’. 
Furthermore, it meant that the SNA and an inquiry into theoretical explanations of 
mechanisms could be developed hand-in-hand (Emirbayer & Jeff, 1994). 
In summary, I have shown here how I developed an in-depth approach through the 
combination of the SNA (to map inter-organisational relationships) and qualitative 
analysis (to explore the theoretical mechanisms of coordination). Although 
unconventional, this approach was most suitable for addressing my research 
questions.  
 
3.5. Reflexive Assessment of the Quality of the Methodology 
In this last section of the chapter, I will carry out a reflexive assessment of the 
quality of the methodology I used in this study on the coordination of dynamic inter-
organisational relationships. My assessment focuses on the criteria of external and 
internal validity and reliability. I followed ethical guidelines for conducting research.  
3.5.1. Ethical Considerations 
I followed the LSE Research Ethics Policy throughout this research study, which 
is in alignment with the broader framework of the ESRC57. I based my conduct on 
the LSE Research Ethics Checklist (Appendix 1.10). 
Any ethical issues were discussed with my supervisor. Confidentiality of data was 
important because of the use of sensitive documents, such as minutes of meetings 
and progress reports. These documents often contained confidential information, 
such as details of contractual arrangements made among the parties. Drawings that I 
                                                 
57
 The framework by The Economic and Social Research Council is available from 
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/about-esrc/information/research-ethics.aspx.  
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accessed in this research cannot be disclosed here because, for instance, details such 
as floor layouts could be misused by third parties. I also encountered several 
accounts that, if leaked, could impact negatively on the reputations of the 
organisations involved. This concern was addressed by concealing the identities of 
the key organisations (and using fictitious names for the professionals involved in the 
projects). I named the organisations after their function in the project –client, main 
contractor and architect – which also served the purpose of reliability by conferring 
meaning to the reporting. There was also some documentation that contained 
confidential corporate elements, such as the main contractors’ insurance numbers. 
I followed the benchmarks for good research practice to ensure the confidentiality 
of the participants at every stage of this study. All interviewees at the exploratory 
stage gave their consent before taking part in the research. Whenever I recorded 
interviews, this too was done with their consent. When I approached organisations 
about participating in this research, my supervisor emailed the contact person to 
confirm the research aims of the study, and that I was indeed a PhD student with the 
Department of Management (DoM), at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science.  
 
3.5.2. Validity, Reliability, Confidence and Relevance 
The criteria for validity (internal and external) and reliability are benchmark 
quality indicators used in inductive research aimed at theory building (Bauer & 
Gaskell, 2000; Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1984). 
Internal validity indicates the true co-variation between the variables under 
investigation, proving that a cause-and-effect relationship exists once alternative 
explanations have been addressed (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000; Miles & Huberman, 
1984). I pursued internal validity through a permanent interaction (or ‘recursive 
cycling’) between the original research data and the analysis (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007, p. 25). Eisenhardt (1989, p. 544) asserts that ‘an essential feature of 
theory-building is the comparison of the emergent concepts, theory, or hypotheses 
with the extant literature’. I used the extensiveness of the data to seek saturation of 
causal paths, which is when the analysis reaches a stage where the researcher arrives 
at the same explanation after multiple analyses (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The 
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emergence of paths was identified through the triangulation of multiple sources (Jick, 
1979) and summary tables synthesising the findings (Miles & Huberman, 1984).  
External validity complements internal validity insofar as it refers to the 
generalisability of the findings to other research settings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & 
Huberman, 1984). In my study, this means the validity of the findings on the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships beyond the seven cases (and indeed 
beyond social housing and the building industry). In some traditions of case-study 
research, external validity is linked to replication logic (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
1981). I sought external validity by reporting thoroughly all the procedures I 
followed. This study focuses on a particular ‘niche’ of the industry: social housing. A 
full account of the research context is given alongside the case selection criteria.  
Reliability is the coherence and transparency of the analytical procedures (e.g. 
coding procedures) (Eisenhardt, 1989). Reporting the coding criteria helps to 
demonstrate reliability. I present a systematic report of the analytical procedures 
followed – in the main text and in the appendices. Consider the extraction of social 
network data from the minutes of meetings. In Appendix 1.9, I reproduce every step 
and procedure I used to extract the data, from coding the minutes to drawing the 
actual configuration of inter-organisational relationships. Furthermore, I also report 
on the study of inter-rater reliability of the coding process (Appendix 1.8); this was 
important to compensate for the lack of benchmark.  
I aimed to make available all information about the entire research process and the 
analytical procedures followed. Reliability also relates to confidence in the research 
process. Confidence can be used to assess quality in qualitative research (Bauer & 
Gaskell, 2000). I have aimed to present a detailed report on my analytical procedures 
and data treatment so that one can ‘reconstruct’ my research journey. This should 
also assist others to assess the relevance of my study. Relevance in qualitative 
research is the extent to which the insights generated are unexpected in the light of 
current wisdom (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000).  
Altogether, quality assessment criteria help to gauge the relevance of a piece of 
research. Moreover, in this case they lay out the terms for my research journey ‒ an 
inductive enquiry into the coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relationships 
‒ that will be presented in the remainder of this thesis. 
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Chapter IV: Consequences of Coordination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview 
In this first chapter of findings, I develop a cross-case analysis of the 
consequences of coordinating inter-organisational relationships, which shows stark 
differences across the seven cases of social housing projects.  
I start by exploring an empirically derived model that led me to develop a 
multidimensional indicator of these consequences. Based on the content analysis of 
over 3,600 pages of minutes and project reports, I find that there are four dimensions 
that should be included in the indicator: ‘on time and on budget’, building 
certification, environmental sustainability and faults in the building. My findings 
show great cross-case variance regarding these consequences. 
These cross-case differences provide further impetus for an inductive study of the 
theoretical mechanisms that underlie the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships. 
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4. Drawings, Bricks and Consequences of Coordination  
Following an inductive research design (Eisenhardt, 1989), I start by assessing the 
‘consequences’ of the phenomenon under study: the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships. In other words, and to borrow Thompson’s words 
(1967), I ask whether the ‘organisations achieved the most effective and harmonious 
results’ as a consequence of the coordination of inter-organisational relationships.  
During the course of my research, I came to appreciate the importance of 
developing an indicator that allowed for a cross-case comparison of the 
consequences of coordination. Furthermore, I learnt from the data analysis and from 
talking to practitioners that such an assessment would require sensitivity to the 
building industry and the inclusion of various dimensions. The result was a two-stage 
analysis in which I developed (1) an empirically derived model followed by (2) a 
multidimensional indicator of the consequences of the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships. Surprisingly, given the similarity of the projects due to 
industry standards, my findings show stark differences in consequences across the 
seven social housing projects.  
 
4.1. Deriving an Indicator of the Consequences of Coordination  
I felt the need to derive an indicator of the consequences of coordination before I 
could address my research questions: How are dynamic inter-organisational 
relationships coordinated? and Why do coordination problems occur in dynamic 
inter-organisational relationships? Drawing on the richness and extensiveness of my 
data, I developed a multidimensional indicator that reflects the multifaceted nature of 
the construct of consequences of coordination.  
Developing an indicator was necessary for several reasons. First, inductive 
reasoning requires an assessment of the consequences of the phenomenon under 
study followed by an inductive enquiry into the theoretical mechanisms that lead to 
such consequences (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Second, assessing the consequences of 
coordination requires the researcher to be sensitive to the empirical context. As early 
as the exploratory stage of my research, interviewees warned how the specificities of 
the building industry shape the consequences of the coordination of dynamic inter-
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organisational relationships. One interviewee (EI#10; CEO, main contractor) 
asserted that ‘the building industry differs from what would seem to be comparable 
industries, such as the manufacturing industry and car makers’. Car makers – such as 
Jaguar, to use the example given by the interviewee – and builders assemble various 
components to make a product that has been designed in advance. While cars can be 
reproduced exactly (or, where there are variations, they are pre-defined), each 
building is unique, depending on the combination of materials and techniques used. 
This observation is true even when replicating building projects (e.g. the construction 
of design-standard schools across the country). Finally, I needed to develop the 
indicator of the consequences of coordination in order to overcome the absence of 
alternatives in prior research. A similar approach is followed by researchers 
interested in the effectiveness of inter-organisational networks (Davis & Eisenhardt, 
2011; Provan & Milward, 1995).  
I therefore turned to my data to develop an indicator of the consequences of 
coordination. I conducted a qualitative analysis of meeting minutes and project 
reports in order to produce a model based on ‘the process of linking abstract concepts 
to empirical indicants’ (Zeller & Carmines, 1980, p. 2).   
 
4.1.1. Abstract Concept: An empirically-derived model 
The abstract concept refers to the idea (i.e. the construct) that underlies the 
definition of the consequences of the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships. I define the consequences of coordination as outcomes –positive or 
negative – that are linked to the (mis)alignment of resources and actions among 
interdependent organisations. I mapped this concept based on the content analysis.  
I started by exploring the abstract concept based on the theoretical framework and 
the accounts given by interviewees from the industry. Similarly to prior research 
(Grandori, 1997b; Kogut & Zander, 1996; van de Ven & Gordon, 1984), I too found 
that the industry context matters, particularly in a large industry, and the project 
typologies vary widely. I have gathered this insight over the last three years while 
conducting my field work. 
I learnt more about the specificities of the building industry as I focused on 
analysing my data from the seven social housing projects. I deployed ‘open coding’ 
techniques. These were most suitable for my analysis because, in them, the ‘data are 
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broken down into discrete parts’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 102), which allowed me 
to uncover discrete aspects of the consequences of coordination. I coded minutes of 
meetings and projects reports into broad categories that related to my definition of 
the consequences of coordination. I specifically focused on the board papers, project 
reports and minutes because these documents contained detailed information about 
the consequences. Board papers, which are documents that assess financial viability 
and set goals for a project, provided relevant information, such as targets for 
environmental sustainability standards and the delivery of the projects. For instance, 
the board paper for the Oakley Road project stated that ‘the scheme will achieve an 
Eco-Homes rating of Very Good, as required on all 2006-08 schemes’ (BP01 – 
Case#6). The minutes of meetings provided fine-grained information about the 
consequences of coordination throughout the design and build life-cycle. There were 
several instances of positive consequences, such as ‘progress ahead of schedule’ and 
cost savings, as well as negative consequences associated with delays and 
miscommunication. I coded all instances of coordination consequences and 
compared the categories until saturation of categories was reached. This fostered 
validity and reliability; categories were exhaustive and mutually exclusive. 
Figure 11 shows an empirically derived model of the consequences of 
coordination. This built on my content analysis of examples (i.e. first-order 
concepts), which I aggregated into sub-dimensions (i.e. second-order concepts). 
These were aggregated into four dimensions (i.e. third-order concepts): ‘on time and 
on budget’, faults in the building, building certification and environmental 
sustainability standards.  
(1) ‘On time and on budget’ captures one of the most enduring challenges in 
the building industry: over-budgeting and delayed handover to the client. The notion 
of ‘on time and on budget’ is also language that is commonly used in the building 
industry, referring to the organisations’ ability to deliver building projects within the 
forecasted completion time and total expected building costs. In North Wingfield 
(Case#3), ‘the revised programme to completion showed delays in the works … with 
potential delays to the completion date’ (MM16-W16/19-Case#3). As this remark 
illustrates, delays may refer to both the schedule of works and the handover to the 
client; these represent two sub-dimensions of ‘on time and on budget’. 
.  
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Figure 11 Empirically Derived Model of the Consequences of Coordination 
 
Note: ‘Positive consequences’ are identified by (P) and ‘negative consequences’ are noted by (N).
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Costs are another sub-dimension of ‘on time and on budget’. Because all seven of 
the projects were publicly funded, they underwent rigid programmes to control any 
extra costs paid by the client. The importance of minimising extra costs to the client 
was asserted by the client’s representative from the Oakley Road project: ‘if there 
[were] a lot of exceptional costs to be incurred then the project would not progress 
and we would need to look at one of the sites identified within the two areas’ (BP01-
Case#6). However, the data analysis shows that extra costs were in fact paid by the 
client and the main contractors. This happened in Dale Lane (Case#1), the client was 
liable for the extra costs of the topographical and land survey, following the quantity 
surveyors’ confirmation that these were not included in their fee.  
Accordingly, the dimension of ‘on time and on budget’ resonates with elements of 
effectiveness, as conceptualised in research on inter-organisational relationships 
(Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011; Human & Provan, 1997; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009; 
Uzzi, 1997). Effectiveness is viewed as the delivery of products on time and on 
budget (Human & Provan, 1997; Uzzi, 1997). In contrast, extra costs and delays 
suggest a lack of effectiveness (Stinchcombe, 1985b; van de Ven & Gordon, 1984).  
(2) Building certification covers legal requirements spanning from the early 
stages of obtaining a planning permit to the handover stage. Specifically, building 
certification is found to integrate the sub-categories of health and safety, security and 
the building process (Figure 11).  
Health and safety and security certifications related to the mechanical and 
electrical (M&E) services of the building, such as the testing of the gas infrastructure 
and electricity installations. A key certification regarding health and safety is the 
Security by Design, which social housing developers are required to apply for. In 
Dale Lane, the client’s manager clearly set the criterion that ‘Secured by Design 
certification must be achieved’ (MM01-W1/12-Case#1). This was important so as to 
ensure that the local council issued the completion certificates. 
Certification of the building process also included the Considerate Contractors 
Scheme, as required by the funding agencies. This certification requires that the main 
contractors are registered with the scheme, and aims to ensure that contractors and 
sub-contractors purchase sustainably sourced products (e.g. timber) through regular 
audits of the site. The client and the main contractors were keen on improving their 
score in this aspect because it would have an impact on other certifications, such as 
the CfSH. At the Blyth Court project, the client’s project manager suggested that ‘a 
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Considerate Constructors score of 32 next time (ie an increase of 0.5 points) would 
mean additional Code For Sustainable Homes points. [Main contractor’s project 
manager] to review to see if any of the assessors recommendations can be easily 
incorporated’ (MM06-W6/12-Case#5). This shows how coordination among 
organisations is needed in order to obtain building certification. I argue, therefore, 
that building certification is an appropriate dimension of the consequences of the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships. 
(3) Environmental sustainability standards capture the ongoing industry 
endeavours to deliver ‘greener buildings’ (Figure 11). These are demanded by 
clients, but also by the planning authorities due to the UK Government’s targets for 
the environmental sustainability of newly built projects58.  
The findings suggest that the client and their agents can play an active role in 
encouraging the architects and the main contractors to adopt environmentally 
sustainable options. In Dale Lane (Case#1), the client’s agent ‘proposed that [the] 
development is required to achieve Level 3 status on the Code for Sustainable Homes 
assessment, thus, an element of renewable sources will be required to satisfy this 
requirement’ (MM09-W9/12-Case#1). The introduction of renewable sources 
required the organisations to coordinate so that these sources could be introduced 
without negative consequences to the project, such as delays. The pursuit of Level 4 
of the CfSH in North Wingfield (Case#3) led them to install a biomass system that 
caused several delays to the projects (due to misspecifications). 
Environmental sustainability standards were enforced in the social housing 
projects as the funding agencies set environmental sustainability targets as a 
condition of funding. The failure to attain such standards seems to have stemmed 
from a lack of coordination among the organisations involved.  
(4) Faults in the building is the last sub-dimension of the consequences of the 
coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relationships (Figure 11). In all seven 
cases, the buildings were inspected for faults and poor workmanship a couple of 
weeks ahead of the handover of the project to the client. Drawing on content 
analysis, I found that the dimension of faults in the building related to the following: 
design, functionality and maintenance. Design-related faults included 
misspecifications in the drawings and unwanted aspects of the floor layout. These 
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 Low Carbon Construction Innovation & Growth Team. H M Government, London (2010). 
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issues also sometimes resulted in poor aesthetics. Functionality entailed faulty 
equipment (e.g. faulty light switches) and ‘awkward’ spaces in the floors (originating 
in design misspecifications). Maintenance included the costs of maintaining 
equipment and landscaped areas.  
A further analysis of this dimension unveiled a linkage to the dimension ‘on time 
and on budget’. The former stresses the short-term perspective while the latter the 
long-term. Building costs (as paid by the client) are a short-term issue, while faults in 
the building – in terms of maintenance – represent high costs in the long term (to be 
paid by the client). These aspects relate to an industry-wide debate about the balance 
between short- and long-term costs in building projects (Smyth, 2010). 
In sum, I built on the content analysis to map the abstract concept of the 
consequences of the coordination of inter-organisational relationships. The result was 
an empirically derived model including four dimensions: ‘on time and on budget’, 
building certifications, environmental sustainability standards and faults in the 
building. In the following section, I develop a set of empirical indicants. 
 
4.1.2. Empirical Indicants: A multidimensional indicator 
I built on the data coding to approximate the abstract concept of the consequences 
of the coordination of inter-organisational relationships to a set of empirical 
indicants. Altogether, these led me to create a multidimensional indicator of the 
consequences of coordination.  
Empirical indicants approximate and locate the abstract concept empirically and 
should be exact and bounded to a theoretical framework (Zeller & Carmines, 1980, 
p. 3). The transition process between the abstract concept and the empirical indicants 
of the consequences of coordination was grounded in the content analysis of over 
3,600 pages of project reports and minutes of meetings. I started by focusing on the 
first-order coding to develop an approximation of the information gathered from the 
minutes that could be developed into empirical indicants for the comparison of cases. 
Next, I calibrated the empirical indicants to ensure they allowed comparability but 
were also consistent with the sub-dimensions (i.e. second-order concepts) and 
dimensions (i.e. third-order concepts) of the abstract concept of the consequences of 
the coordination of inter-organisational relationships. 
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To illustrate this procedure, I now describe the transition process for ‘on time and 
on budget’. This dimension proved to entail three sub-dimensions: handover, 
schedule of works and costs. Furthermore, I matched the first-order concepts with 
eight empirical indicants: on time handover (yes; no), delayed handover (number of 
weeks), no delays on site (yes; no), delays on site (number of days), no extra costs 
(yes; no), no extra costs for the client (yes; no), extra costs paid by contractors (yes; 
no) and extra costs paid by the client (£). These are shown in Figure 11, where the 
information in parentheses is the unit of measure for each empirical indicant. 
Measurability was critical for my cross-case analysis of the consequences of 
coordination. I also made a distinction between the positive and negative 
consequences (Figure 11) that was consistent with the theoretical framework 
developed in Chapter II and the definition of the consequences of coordination.  
In sum, I drew on my content analysis of minutes and project reports to develop a 
two-stage analysis that entailed an empirically derived model followed by a 
multidimensional indicator of the consequences of the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships. Facing the absence of such an indicator in prior 
literature, my indicator is sensitive to the industry context and includes the various 
facets of the consequences of coordination. This allowed me to carry out a systematic 
cross-case comparison of these consequences, as I show below.  
 
4.2. Similarity of Drawings Yet Contrasting Results On Site  
Now, I built on the previous analysis to carry out a cross-case analysis of the 
consequences of the coordination of inter-organisational relationships. Surprisingly, 
my findings show that the consequences differ greatly across cases.  
The story of each of the seven social housing projects was very similar at the start 
of the design and build life-cycle. Once the decision had been taken to go ahead with 
a new social housing project, the client started interacting with other organisations. 
The next step was to appoint an agent and a main contractor, which would eventually 
lead to an arrangement among various organisations with the purpose of attaining a 
common goal: tackling the social housing shortage in the community. In other words, 
this was an attempt by ‘a particular group of human beings to do something’ 
(Penrose, 1959). The consequences of coordination were different, though as I will 
show in my cross-case analysis. 
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First, and for clarity’s sake when conveying my findings, I use an overall score 
entailing three levels: high, medium and low (Table 10). A score of ‘high’ denotes 
cases where the consequences of coordination led to fully achieving the purpose for 
the building project, for instance, a project that was delivered on time and at no extra 
cost to the client. In contrast, a score of ‘low’ refers to cases where the consequences 
of coordination were only marginally achieved. This includes over-budget costs 
being transferred to the client and delays in the handover of the project. (The 
methodological procedures are thoroughly described in Appendix 2.1.) 
My analysis resulted in only three projects registering a high score: Rowlett Road 
(Case#4), Oakley Road (Case#6) and Washbrook Road (Case#7). In these projects, 
the inter-organisational relationships successfully attained ‘on time and on budget’ 
targets, building certifications and environmental sustainability standards, while only 
minor faults inin the building were registered. The Fulmar Road (Case#2) and Blyth 
Court (Case#5) projects were found to merit a ‘medium’. Dale Lane (Case#1) and 
North Wingfield (Case#3) received ‘low’ (Table 10). This was due to costs coming 
in over budget, delayed handovers and the failure to achieve building certifications, 
such as the SbD certification in the case of the Dale Lane (Case#1). 
As important aspect of the reliability59 of the indicator of the consequences of 
coordination is that it is not influenced by the size of the project. Consider a 
comparison of the building costs of two similar projects: Dale Lane (Case#1) and 
Washbrook Road (Case#7). The findings suggest very dissimilar figures for the 
consequences of coordination, as the Dale Lane project registers a ‘low’ score and 
the Washbrook Road (Case#7) a ‘high’ score. Furthermore, the overall score is not 
influenced by the weather conditions that prevailed during the work on each site. 
Prior research in construction management posits that progress on site is dependent 
on weather conditions, particularly if ground works and structure are being built 
during the winter. The impact of weather conditions on the consequences of 
coordination is little. This claim is supported by the comparison between Dale Lane 
(Case#1) and Oakley Road (Case#6). In the former project, ground works and 
structure were built mostly during the summer (works on site started in May 2008). 
In the latter they were carried out during the winter (starting in November 2008). 
                                                 
59
 In Appendix 2.1, I report a series of methodological steps taken with the aim of ensuring the 
reliability and validity of my indicator of the consequences of coordination.  
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Yet, the organisations working on the Dale Lane (Case#1) appear to have 
underperformed compared to those involved in Oakley Road (Case#6).  
Altogether, I argue that the overall score of consequences of the coordination is 
robust and allows cross-case comparability. Below, I report the findings of the fine-
grained analysis across the four dimensions of coordination consequences: (1) ‘on 
time and on budget’; (2) building certifications; (3) environmental sustainability 
standards; and (4) faults in the building (Table 10). 
(1) ‘On time and on budget’ is one of the dimension for which I observe the 
most cross-case differences. Washbrook Road (Case#7) is the only project completed 
‘on time and on budget’. Although in other housing projects (cases #1; #4; #5 and 
#7), organisations delivered the projects without additional costs, the handovers were 
delayed. These clients – publicly funded housing associations – are incentivised to 
control the building costs rigorously. This was asserted by a senior manager at one of 
the UK’s major contractors ‘the spend [building costs] is very important for local 
authorities so they have to measure it as part of their criteria’ (EI#11; Head of 
Strategy and Sustainable Development). Alongside the total building costs, the 
organisations seek ‘value for money’. In Rowlett Road (Case#4), ‘[the client’s agent] 
regarded that a tender not exceeding £2,780,000 would represent value for money in 
the current tendering market…’ (BP01-Case#4). Value for money and controlled 
building costs are targets set among all parties to a project, as my analysis of project 
reports and financial recommendations made to the client by a quantity surveyors’ 
practice showed. 
As far as on-time project delivery is concerned, several projects reported a delay 
of two to three weeks. The Dale Lane (Case#1) had a delay of three weeks, 
significant considering the total forecasted completion time of 14 months. In 
contrast, the North Wingfield (Case#3) saw a delay of only two weeks against a 24-
month expected completion time. The minutes and project reports show that delays 
were mostly due to misalignment of actions among organisations. To illustrate, in 
Fulmar Road (Case#2), delays occurred ‘due to the additional gas monitoring works. 
[Main contractor] to issue costs for overrun to [client’s agent] for review (MM12-
W12-Case#2).   
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Table 10 Cross-Case Analysis of Coordination Consequences 
Case 
study 
‘On Time and on 
Budget’ (1) Building Certifications 
(2) 
Environmental 
Sustainability 
Standard (3) 
Faults in the Building (4) Illustrative Quotations Overall* 
Over 
Time Over Budget 
Dale Lane  
Road 
(Case#1) 
3 
Weeks On budget 
Building Control, 
Considerate Contractor, 
Gas & Electric Test 
Certificates 
Failure to achieve SbD 
certification 
Level 3 of the 
CfSH 
Grass areas, and ‘spotting’ on the 
walls and ceilings 
Unfortunately with this site the 
developer failed to apply for the 
Secured by Design Award until after 
the building was almost complete, the 
roof was on at the time of my first visit 
request (PI01-Case#1) 
Low  
Fulmar 
Road 
(Case#2) 
3 
Weeks 
Over budget 
(£17,000) 
SbD, Building Control, 
Energy Performance Certs, 
Considerate Contractor, 
Gas & Electric Test 
Certificates 
Level 3 of the 
CfSH 
Access to roof and windows; 
gutter maintenance; cleaning of 
windows; maintenance and 
assistance to gas boiler; rainwater 
harvesting; access to manhole.  
There were also design 
misspecifications and poor 
compliance with planning 
permission  
Extension of [completion] time 
associated with the delay due to the 
additional gas monitoring works. 
[Main contractor] to issue costs for 
overrun to [clients’ agent] for review 
(MM10-W10-Case#2) 
Previously, 13 tanks had been 
recommended. This was an error as a 
result of incorrect Engineer 
calculations (MM13-W13-Case#2) 
Medium 
North 
Wingfield 
(Case#3) 
2 weeks Over budget (£155,000) 
Building Control, SbD, 
Considerate Contractor, 
Gas & Electric test 
Certificates 
Level 4 of the 
CfSH 
Energy supply costs and 
maintenance; toilet’s flush rate; 
heating costs; operability of 
doors; right of way; costs of the 
biomass system for the tenants 
[Main contractor] issued project 
programme indicating current 
progress and a completion date of 21st 
September 2009 (MM08-W08-Case#3) 
Low 
Rowlett 
Road 
(Case#4) On time On budget 
Building Control, SbD, 
Gas & Electric Test 
Certificates 
BRE Eco-Homes 
rating ‘Very 
Good’ 
Roof durability (and 
maintenance); maintenance of 
amenity areas; landscaped areas; 
staff members’ access to the 
communal areas of the flats  
 [Client’s agent] have confirmed that a 
tender not exceeding £2,780,000 will 
represent value for money in the 
current tendering market… (BP01-
Case#4) 
High 
(Table continues on next page) 
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Blyth 
Court 
(Case#5) 
2 weeks On budget 
SbD Building Control, 
Considerate Contractor, 
Gas & Electric Certificates 
Ecohomes Pass 
Maintenance and water supply; 
shower bases and pumped waste; 
maintenance of the boiler on the 
second floor; flush cistern; 
glazing of external windows; 
water-saving taps; injuries caused 
by the operation of the doors; 
safety of the site; external 
lighting; fire hoses; manholes 
It was also noted that after the last site 
meeting the site inspection showed that 
the proposed light fitting in the shared 
ownership kitchens did not meet the 
requirements of the Code [CfSH - 
Code of Sustainability Homes] 
(MM12-W12-Case#5) 
Medium 
Oakley 
Road 
(Case#6) 
On time Over budget (£13,000) 
SbD, Building Control, 
Considerate Contractor, 
Gas & Electric Certificates 
Ecohomes Pass No particular concerns reported 
The project is currently 10 days behind 
programme. [Yet, the project was 
completed on time because the main 
contractor intensified collaboration 
with several suppliers and sub-
contractors to integrate work shifts on 
site] (MM06-W06-Case#6) 
High 
Washbrook 
Road 
(Case#7) 
On time On budget 
Gas & Electric, EPCs, 
Considerate Contractor, 
Building Control, SbD 
Certificates 
Level 3 of the 
CfSH 
Casement and windows; walls in 
the bin storage area; floor areas 
(e.g. vinyl and carpets) 
The project was currently 3 weeks 
ahead of programme taking into 
account good internal progress and 
the roofing and external walling not 
being on the critical path. (MM06-
W06-Case#7) 
High 
           * I report the methodological details in Appendix 2.1. 
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In Oakley Road (Case#6), the contractor’s reports register a time recovery of ten 
days (CR02-Case#6) after the main contractor intensified collaboration with several 
suppliers and sub-contractors to integrate work shifts on site. This example shows the 
role of coordination among organisations so as to attain a given purpose – in this case 
on-time project delivery. Of course, geological and meteorological causes are widely 
reported reasons for delays to building projects (Smyth & Pryke, 2008). However, 
these were found to play only a sporadic role in the delays of the seven social 
housing projects. This provides further evidence of the importance of the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships in explaining the consequences 
(e.g. delays and extra costs) as opposed to technical or natural (e.g. weather or 
geological conditions) explanations. The latter factors are dominant in the narratives 
from the industry and academic literature, however (Smyth & Pryke, 2008). 
(2) Building certifications were achieved across the seven cases. However, in 
Dale Lane (Case#1) the main contractor failed to coordinate with other organisations 
so that the SbD60 was not granted to the building. This was despite the warning by 
the client’s agent that ‘Secured by Design certification must be achieved’ (MN02-
W2-Case#1). Such requirements of building certifications are enforced by planning 
authorities and clients of the projects. Some certifications, such as gas and electricity 
tests, are legally required before tenants can move in. Other certifications – for 
instance, SbD – are typically required by funding agencies.  
As shown in Dale Lane (Case#1), failure to achieve the required building 
certification can stem from poor coordination among organisations. This was further 
supported in an email exchange with one of the police officers involved in Dale Lane 
(Case#1). He asserted that ‘unfortunately with this site the [main contractor] failed to 
apply for the Secured by Design Award until after the building was almost complete, 
the roof was on at the time of my first visit request’ (EE01-Case#1). This suggests 
that coordination of inter-organisational relationships is important for achieving 
building certifications because it requires integration across domains of 
organisational expertise (Eccles, 1981). Consider the example of certifications on gas 
and electrical installations – to use an indicator for the dimension of ‘building 
certification’ that is reported across all seven case studies. This certification engages 
                                                 
60
 SbD focuses on crime prevention for homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of 
security standards for a wide range of applications and products. See 
http://www.securedbydesign.com/ (retrieved on 10/12/2011). 
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the gas and electrical sub-contractor (which might even be contracted from separate 
contractors) and also the engineers and the main contractor. It is equally important 
that the gas and electrical sub-contractors coordinate their workloads with the 
progress made on site by other contractors (e.g. plasterers61). 
(3) Environmental sustainability standards were sought across all seven social 
housing projects (Appendix 2.1). In Fulmar Road (Case#2), for example, the client 
communicated to all organisations that the ‘CfSH Assessment62 will form the target 
for the construction phase’. Furthermore, the client required that ‘any divergences 
from the current CfSH Assessment will be subject to agreement by both parties [the 
main contractor and the client] prior to implementation…’ (MM05-W5-Case#2).  
In all cases, the organisations met the targets for environmental sustainability set 
at Level 3 of the CfSH or equivalent (i.e., BRE Eco-Homes ‘Pass’) (Table 10). The 
North Wingfield (Case#3) met Level 4 of the CfSH, following the target set by the 
client at the start of the project. Environmental sustainability standards are expected 
in the current context. This is conveyed in the development of policies and 
assessment tools for the sustainability of the built environment.  
Environmental sustainability standards often demand new technologies and 
building techniques that require adjustments to the coordination practices among 
organisations. In Fulmar Road (Case#2), the installation of a new heating system was 
essential to achieving level 3 of the CfSH. However, this new technology also 
required additional coordination among the organisations working on the project. 
The data show that coordination problems were involved in the installation of this 
heating system. The main contractor ordered 13 tanks instead of 18; however, the 
number of the tanks ordered ‘was an error as a result of incorrect Engineer 
calculations’ (MM13-W13-Case#2). Incorrect orders of supplies can lead to 
unintended consequences, such as delays and additional costs to organisations. 
(4) Faults in the building can affect aesthetics, as well as functionality and 
maintenance costs. For the Oakley Road (Case#6), no faults in the building were 
reported. However, several were recorded in Fulmar Road (Case#2) and Blyth Court 
(Case#5) projects. At Fulmar Road (Case#2), the client’s project manager reported 
                                                 
61
 Plaster is a material similar to mortar or cement that is made from dry powder mixed with water to 
form a paste. It is used in the building industry for coating walls and ceilings. 
62
 The CSH is the national standard for the sustainable design and construction of new homes. The 
code aims to reduce our carbon emissions and create homes that are more sustainable. See 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/planningandbuilding/sustainability/codesustainablehomes/ 
(retrieved on 10/12/2011). 
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specific concerns about costs associated with the maintenance of the building. These 
were related to difficult (and even hazardous) access for cleaning personnel to the 
roof and windows in one section of the building that were expected to increase the 
maintenance costs for the client in the long term. Additional maintenance costs 
reduce the ‘value for money’ for the client and tenants alike. For the client, lower 
building costs are often offset by higher maintenance costs. For the tenants, the 
possibility of affordable housing is reduced (since the client has to reflect these 
additional maintenance costs in the rent charged). As an illustration, at Dale Lane 
(Case#1), the realisation of additional maintenance costs for the external communal 
landscaped areas and internal communal areas led the client’s manager to posit that 
‘a service charge [would] be required’ from the tenants (MM11-W11/12-Case#1). 
Nevertheless, the provision of affordable housing is an imperative for social housing 
providers because of the low incomes of the tenants (Hills, 2007). 
Aesthetic-type faults in buildings often result from limited coordination among 
organisations. In Blyth Court (Case#5), reduced space in the kitchen to access the 
boiler, and problems with the flush cistern, stemmed from miscommunications 
among the architect, the main contractor and specialist suppliers. In the end, the main 
contractor and the client agreed on remedial work.    
Overall, the seven case studies vary greatly across the dimensions of ‘on budget 
and on time’, building certification, environmental sustainability standards and faults 
in the building. This shows how different these projects were on site in terms of the 
consequences of coordination, contrasting with the similarity of the initial drawings. 
 
In sum, my findings show stark cross-case differences regarding the consequences 
of the coordination. My analysis benefited from an empirically derived model that 
captured the industry context and the multiple dimensions of the consequences of the 
coordination. This is substantiated in a multidimensional indicator. My findings 
show that, despite the similarity of the drawings, the consequences of coordination 
varied greatly across cases. Since the projects were similar in terms of industry 
standards, such differences shift the focus of the explanation away from technical 
aspects and on to more fundamental mechanisms of interaction among organisations. 
This provides further impetus to study the theoretical mechanisms that underlie the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships. 
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Chapter V: Coordination Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview  
This chapter will address the first research question of this study: How are 
dynamic inter-organisational relationships coordinated? My findings show that the 
use of contractual arrangements and the hiring of monitoring organisations are not 
(directly) related to the consequences of coordination.  
Through an in-depth approach using the SNA to map the inter-organisational 
relationships on a monthly basis, and qualitative analysis of project documentation, I 
uncovered that mechanisms intended to aid coordination and the structure of inter-
organisational relationships are interwoven The coordination of dynamic inter-
organisational relationships unfolds through two mechanisms: organising and 
relating. Organising occurs as the use of contracting fosters hierarchy, while relating 
stems from monitoring organisations, which foster density in inter-organisational 
relationships. 
Furthermore, the coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relationships is 
required to help those involved juggle the coordination mechanisms of organising 
and relating over time. This juggling process entails three distinctive stages: 
mobilisation, shape-up and sustainability. I found that this sequence of coordination 
mechanisms explained the stark differences in the consequences of coordination (as 
observed in the previous chapter) across the seven cases studied. 
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5. Coordination Mechanisms of Organising and Relating 
Here, I explore the theoretical mechanism of the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships. I start by studying the various case organisations in 
terms of their contributions to the projects and their architecture of dependence. My 
analysis denotes the importance of the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships. However, it also exposes the limitations of the old wisdom regarding 
mechanisms of coordination. I found no (direct) relationship between (1) the use of 
contracts and (2) the hiring of monitoring organisations, on the one hand, and the 
consequences of coordination on the other. 
The turning point in my enquiry emerged from a longitudinal analysis of the inter-
organisational relationships; variations in the use of contracts and the hiring of 
monitoring organisations uncovered an unexpected pattern. Hiring monitoring 
organisations leads to density, while contracts foster a hierarchy of inter-
organisational relationships. The former pattern entails the mechanism of relating 
and the latter the mechanism of organising, two mechanisms for coordinating 
dynamic inter-organisational relationships; furthermore, the sequence of these 
mechanisms proved to explain the cross-case differences in coordination. 
 
5.1. Organisations and Coordination 
Organisations from different backgrounds come together once the client has 
initiated the process of delivering a social housing development. In this section, I 
explore the heterogeneity of organisations involved in each of the seven projects. 
Following prior research on the administrative mechanisms of coordination (Ring & 
van de Ven, 1994), I examine the relationships between contracts and monitoring 
organisations, and the consequences of coordination. I also explore the link between 
the structural properties of the inter-organisational relationships and coordination, as 
suggested by the social network approach (Coleman, 1994). Both approaches prove 
limited in explaining the cross-case differences in the consequences of coordination. 
At the start of each project, organisations and resources were yet to be coordinated 
towards their purpose: to design and build a new social housing development. A 
preliminary analysis suggests that early inter-organisational relationships in the 
projects underwent two routes. The first route occurred when a housing association 
(i.e. the client), sought to start a relationship with other organisations in order to 
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design and build a new social housing development (Cases #1, 2, 3, 5 and 7). This 
included interaction with architects, local councils and potential main contractors. In 
the second route, developers – i.e. organisations with building and design capabilities 
– approached local housing associations (Cases #4 and 6). Developers sought to 
make contact with potential clients regarding the purchase of land with planning 
approval for social housing developments. The second route is an illustration of how 
organisations initiate coordination because of strategic interests,  that is, the prospect 
of future business (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; van de Ven, 1976). Both clients and 
developers exchanged information and regarded each other’s resources as mutually 
strategic – through complementarity – for their own activities.  
Across the seven cases, the development of the new social housing project was led 
by a local housing association regardless of the route followed to start the project. 
The process started once the local housing association (or local council) had 
identified a shortage of social housing in the local area. For instance, in the Dale 
Lane project (Case#1), the shortage of social housing was reported in a board paper 
by the client: ‘According to [the local council]’s Housing Needs Analysis, there is a 
shortfall of 641 affordable units in this area’ (BP01- Case#1). Accordingly, the 
project was aimed at tackling the shortage of social housing in the local area. 
However, this instance also shows how the response to a local need for social 
housing is incremental. Given the scarcity of financial resources available to local 
housing associations, the Dale Lane (Case#1) was to provide only 18 units (against 
the 641 required). Housing associations have to compete for funding from national-
level programmes (e.g. the Affordable Housing Programme).  
As is the case with any ‘attempt to do something’, the delivery of the social 
housing projects entailed inter-organisational relationships that were embedded in the 
social scene within the local community (e.g. the local council). The Rowlett Road 
(Case#4) was located in the surroundings of a town in the East Midlands. The site 
was an established residential area close to infant and junior schools and a large area 
of established public woodland. The building project became integrated in the local 
community through its central location in a place that was once the epicentre of the 
local community. 
The social housing projects were strongly linked to the social scene of the local 
communities. Organisations from the local community were, therefore, involved in 
the inter-organisational relationships alongside organisations with unique expertise in 
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designing and building typically associated with the delivery of building projects. 
This type of integration of an inter-organisational collaboration within the social 
scene has been reported previous for a variety of inter-organisational collaborative 
arrangements, such as technology collaborations (Ariño & Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996) 
and inter-agency collaborations (van de Ven & Gordon, 1984). The social context is 
important as the design and build of a social housing project is a joint effort by 
various individual organisations providing contributions of expertise and equipment.  
 
5.1.1. Organisations, Organisational Expertise and Interdependence 
Individual organisations from a wide spectrum came together in a structure of 
complementary resources and organisational expertise, creating interdependence 
among them. The design and build life-cycle involved great heterogeneity of 
organisations based on the variety of organisational expertise (e.g. architects, main 
contractors, the local council, consulting firms and engineering firms.  
The organisations working on the seven building projects operated across 
industries and throughout the country. Each organisation was an independent entity 
operating in the marketplace. In order to study the functions and expertise of every 
organisation involved, I examined project reports and minutes from meetings. The 
project reports are monthly documents issued by the main contractor, containing 
directories of the organisations working on the site at each point in time, as well as 
detailed descriptions of each organisation’s role in each project. Once all of this 
information was compiled and checked against other relevant sources of data – e.g. 
via phone calls to the project manager – I generated a month-by-month list of 
organisations and their key expertise.  
Organisational expertise, which often overlapped with the organisations’ role, 
refers to the set of skills provided to the project by an organisation (Bechky, 2006; 
Gann, 1991). These skills represent intangible assets; however, organisations across 
domains of expertise also contribute tangible assets, such as heavy machinery and 
equipment. The final contribution by each organisation is therefore a combination of 
tangible and intangible assets (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Smyth & Pryke, 2008). I 
searched for accounts of the roles played by the organisations in each project and 
developed categories of organisational expertise based on data coding. Information 
available from multiple sources of data provided a fine-grained account of the 
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different types of expertise required in each building project. This provided an 
advantage over simple standard industry classifications. My analysis shows six 
categories of organisational expertise: design, building, engineering, monitoring, 
planning and other (Table 11).  
Design functions were carried out by organisations such as architects and interior 
designers. Architects played a key role, mostly in the early stages of the project, in 
drawing and redrawing the building designs to meet the client’s specifications and 
the requirements for planning permits63. Solutions for the layout of the building (e.g. 
interior comfort and exterior aesthetics) were the main inputs to the building project 
provided by both architects and interior designers. 
Building organisations, which represented one of the largest categories in terms 
of the number of organisations, contributed with specialised equipment and 
expertise. Although the building capabilities were mostly the responsibility of the 
main contractor, specialist building expertise would be brought in via several other 
organisations. This included carpenters, plumbers and electricians (Table 11). Sub-
contractors providing building expertise would represent the majority of the 
organisations engaged in the project at some stages of the design and build life-cycle. 
For instance, the main contractor on the Oakley Road project reported that a total of 
sixteen sub-contractors were involved, providing services such as brickwork, glazed 
wall tiling and loft insulation (CR01-Case#6).  
Engineering expertise included a variety of specialist services (Table 11). For 
instance, structural engineering firms would do the calculations regarding the 
stability of a building’s structure (e.g. deciding whether pillars and floors should be 
made of concrete, steel or timber). These calculations would be passed on to the 
architect for the finalisation of the drawings (e.g. for allocating weight across the 
built area). M&E engineers were in charge of the design and installation of, for 
instance, communication (e.g. telephones) and heating systems in the building. This 
would include the location of water pipes, gas and electrical cables, to be matched 
with flat layouts as well as the legal requirements regarding health and safety (H&S). 
M&E engineers were also responsible for specifying the requirements for utilities 
(e.g. electricity and gas). M&E services require highly specialised expertise. Some 
                                                 
63
 Planning permits are laws and regulations regarding planning approvals, which are set at the UK 
Government’s policy level and enforced at the local level by local councils. 
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engineering firms also contributed highly specialised equipment and machinery (e.g. 
sub-contractors for ground works). 
Monitoring was carried out by organisations with management mandates, such as 
clients’ agents, and by the clients themselves (Table 11). These organisations 
contributed primarily with skills and specialist expertise rather than physical 
resources. The monitoring role of quantity surveyors was ridiculed by one of the 
interviewees; for him, quantity surveyors were ‘technical geeks that like taking 
things apart and putting them back together to analyse the cost’ (EI#14; Chief 
Executive of Professional Body). The interviewee claimed that quantity surveyors 
became the guardians of the building costs, but they often had an atomised 
perspective that failed to take into account all aspects of the project and the necessity 
of coordination among organisations. Quantity surveyors were found to be 
monitoring the design and building process, acting as the clients’ agents, in all seven 
building projects, with the aim of ensuring ‘on time and on budget’ completion. 
Planning is a domain of expertise that is mostly restricted to the Building Control 
departments of local councils although occasionally other government departments 
might be involved as well. These organisations have a legally endorsed authority, for 
example to grant planning permissions (Table 11). Planning authorities demand 
building specifications (in terms of design and materials) based on legal frameworks, 
such as low inclination ramps for access by disabled people.  
Other organisations involved in the projects included utilities companies and 
providers of community services (e.g. post offices). They were found to be 
fundamental to project completion. Utilities companies – national providers of gas, 
water and electricity (national grid) – were required to coordinate their actions with 
organisations directly engaged in the projects. Utilities were essential to the building 
process, as well as to the full functioning of the newly built social housing 
developments (Table 11). 
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Table 11 Organisations, Organisational Expertise and Interdependence 
Organisations 
(Nodes i; j) Expertise/Function 
Expertise 
Domain 
(Category) 
Interdependence (Tie xij) 
Within Expertise 
Domain 
Across Expertise 
Domain 
Architect Drawings used by the builder 
Design 
(Drawing the 
building) 
* The architect was 
required to 
coordinate with 
interior designers 
to finalise the 
drawings 
* The architect was 
required to work 
closely with the local 
council and the main 
contractor. 
 
Interior 
designer 
Details concerning the 
refurbishments – e.g. 
floor layout 
Main 
contractor 
Building (concrete and 
steel frames) 
Building 
(Building in 
concrete and 
steel, as well 
as providing a 
large array of 
services and 
equipment) 
* Main contractor 
worked closely 
with specialist 
contractors in order 
to manage the work 
progress on site. 
* The main 
contractor was 
required to sub-
contract many 
services from other 
organisations (e.g. 
plumbing). 
* Main contractors 
were often required to 
coordinate with local 
council regarding 
planning permissions. 
* As the key 
organisation on site, 
the main contractor 
was required to work 
closely with the 
client’s consultants. 
* Main contractor 
worked closely with 
engineering firms. 
Electrician 
Electrical installation, 
e.g. lighting, alarms 
and CCTV systems  
Lift supplier 
Fabrication and 
installation of 
mechanical platforms, 
e.g. ‘standard’ lifts and 
stairlifts 
Carpenter 
Fabrication and fitting 
of joinery, e.g. doors 
and cupboards 
Plumber 
Installation and testing 
of plumbing services, 
e.g. water and gas 
Structural 
engineer 
Calculation of the 
stability of the 
building, e.g. whether 
pre-cast beams were 
required 
Engineering 
(Specialist 
skills required 
to ensure 
structural 
stability and 
functionality 
of the 
building) 
* The calculation 
by the structural 
engineers had to be 
reflected in the 
assessment of the 
ground conditions 
by the geological 
engineers. 
* M&E engineers 
worked closely 
with structural 
engineers regarding 
the technical 
specificities for the 
M&E services. 
* Structural engineers 
were dependent on 
planning permissions 
for choosing technical 
solutions. 
* Architects and 
structural engineers 
had to work closely 
together. 
* Engineering firms 
often depended on 
utility companies (e.g. 
gas and water) 
regarding the technical 
specifications required 
to connect to the 
national grid.  
M&E 
engineers 
Design and 
supervision of the 
installation of 
mechanical and 
electrical services, e.g. 
water, gas and anti-fire 
systems  
Geological 
engineering 
and survey 
Equipment and 
knowledge to survey 
ground conditions in 
terms of stability and 
conditions, e.g. water 
streams 
 (Table continues on next page) 
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Client’s agent 
Building management 
working with other 
organisations on 
client’s behalf 
Monitoring 
(Skills to 
monitor the 
entire design 
and build life-
cycle) 
 
*Client’s agent 
worked according 
to the client’s 
requirements for 
the project. 
* Sustainability 
consultants had to 
work with the 
client in order to 
assess suitable 
strategies for 
environmental 
sustainability.  
 
* Client’s agent 
depended on the local 
council for planning 
permissions, as well as 
authorisations for 
carrying out work, e.g. 
on public ways. 
* Both client and its 
agents had to 
coordinate with the 
main contractor. 
* The client had to 
work closely with the 
architects and 
designers.  
 
Sustainability 
consultant 
Advisory and 
managerial skills 
regarding building’s 
performance in terms 
of environmental 
sustainability 
standards 
Client 
Supervision and 
informing other 
organisations about the 
design requirements 
for the project  
Quantity 
surveyor 
Calculation of 
quantities of materials, 
workload (bill of 
quantities) and 
estimates of building 
costs (budget). 
Local council Planning control and progress on site 
Planning 
(Legally 
binding 
supervision 
and 
enforcement 
of planning-
related 
requirements) 
* The local council 
is in charge of 
issuing planning 
permission but 
must consult 
relevant 
organisations, e.g. 
the EA.  
 
 
* Although planning 
organisations were 
legally endorsed, these 
organisations often 
depended on main 
contractors for 
working out technical 
solutions for the 
building.  
* Planning 
organisations 
depended on the post 
office to issue 
definitive postal 
addresses to the new 
buildings and tenants. 
Environment 
Agency (EA) 
Supervision and 
enforcement of 
relevant legal 
framework, e.g. 
advising on flood risk 
Highways 
Authority 
Maintenance and legal 
bidding authority over  
public roads 
Utilities (e.g. 
gas and power 
grid)  
Ownership and 
management of 
infrastructures of 
utilities that need to be 
connected  
Other 
(Random 
aspects that 
were 
nonetheless 
required) 
* Low 
interdependence  
 
* Utility companies 
depend on the local 
council to issue 
licences and 
certificates, e.g. to 
locate public sewers.  
Post Office 
To issue new postal 
addresses to new 
social housing 
developments 
 
 
     The backbone of a relationship between organisations is interdependence, where 
the actions of one organisation shape the possible actions of others (Pfeffer & 
Nowak, 1976; Ring & van de Ven, 1992). When approached to start work on the site, 
the main contractor on the North Wingfield project ‘confirmed the situation as 
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regards the commencement of on site is dependent on receipt of service diversions 
and section approvals [from the engineering firm and the local council]’ (MM03-
W3/19-Case#3). Interdependence was pivotal across all seven building projects since 
individual organisations contributed specialist resources (i.e. expertise and 
equipment). Individual organisations were not self-sufficient but interdependent in 
that their actions were shaped by the actions and resources of other organisations. 
The importance of interdependence among organisations was further noted by an 
interviewee: ‘you don’t have the in-house understanding and you are reliant on 
expertise from elsewhere’ (EI#4; Chief Executive of Professional Body).  
My analysis of the architecture of interdependence among the organisations shows 
that this occurred both within domains of organisational expertise (e.g. between two 
organisations with building expertise) and across domains (e.g. between one 
organisation with design expertise and another with building expertise). In Table 11, 
I illustrate typical examples of interdependence among the organisations involved in 
the seven projects. The building organisations tended to experience interdependence 
within their domain of expertise (i.e. with other organisations with building 
expertise) more than the other expertise domains. Actions by building organisations 
were often shaped by sub-contractors (other organisations that were also contributing 
building expertise). For instance, in Fulmar Road (Case#2), the main contractor was 
‘in contact with sub-contractors concerning these [reference to tanks] as individual 
rather than communal tanks [were] the preferred route’ (MM08-W8/18-Case#2). 
Tanks were installed to provide heating and water to the buildings. After assessing 
the ground conditions, the main contractor was asked (by the client and the architect) 
to opt for individual instead of communal tanks. Nevertheless, the main contractor 
depended on advice from the relevant sub-contractors.  
However, it was not only organisations working on site that had interdependent 
relations with others within the same domain of expertise. In Oakley Road (Case#6), 
planning permission was asked by the client to the EA was rejected several times on 
the grounds of flood risk. This example also illustrates how the country’s legal 
framework shapes interdependencies among organisations (BP01-Case#6). 
All seven social housing projects inevitably became stories of inter-organisational 
relationships due to the task-related interdependence among the organisations, across 
domains of expertise. The architects depended on information from the clients 
regarding capacity (i.e. number of tenants) so that they could proceed with their 
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drawings. Often, the clients had specific requirements, for example, regarding 
accessibility to the flats for disabled people (Case#5). Architects were also dependent 
on other organisations, such as structural engineers so that the building’s layout 
would allow for a stable structure. This was not particular to this set of case studies. 
One interviewee argued that ‘architects in the UK don’t have formal technical 
knowledge like they do in the rest of the Europe’. One important insight in this 
quotation is the notion that interdependence is created by the complementarity of 
‘formal technical knowledge’ (EE14). The importance of specialist expertise in 
shaping interdependent relations is also reported in the literature on management 
(Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Ring & van de Ven, 1992), as well as that on 
construction management and economics (Hillebrandt, 1984; Smyth & Pryke, 2008).  
As the main contractors were starting work on site to prepare for the ground 
works64, the architects and planning authorities were working together to finalise the 
drawings so that both the clients’ requirements and the planning permits would be 
accommodated. In Dale Lane (Case#1), the project manager for the main contractor 
‘… again advised that suitable storage must be provided for refuse bins… [the client 
organisation] noted that there are mandatory [requirements] concerning bin storage 
that must be met in respect of the Code for Sustainable Homes’ (MM04-W4/12-
Case#1). Interdependence extended to organisations that one would not intuitively 
associate with the progress of building projects. Utility companies were reportedly 
the source of delays on site in Rowlett Road (Case#4), according to the main 
contractor, due to slow responses. This was reported at a meeting in February 2009 at 
which the ‘contractors confirm[ed] all services and diversions ordered and awaiting 
response from service utilities’ (MM07-W7/8-Case#4).  
These examples illustrate interdependence among organisations within and across 
domains of expertise. I have intentionally presented here instances of 
interdependence that may be surprising to those less familiar with the design and 
build life-cycle. I have aimed to shed light on the complex architecture of 
interdependent inter-organisational relationships. Naturally, a large amount of 
interdependence would have been anticipated by the organisations. Plumbers and 
electricians always depend on the bricklayers before they can start work on a site. 
The main contractor will be dependent on a specialist sub-contractor for carrying out 
                                                 
64
 Ground works include foundations formed by beams and pillars made of concrete and steel, 
underground pipes (e.g. water), the lower ground floor – or sections – and pavements.  
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the demolition work (Case#6). Still, the integration of organisations, their expertise 
and their interdependence was critical.  
Thus far, my analysis shows the heterogeneity of organisational expertise required 
in building projects, ranging from building to monitoring and planning. These 
organisations are bounded to interdependent relationships within and across domains 
of expertise. Coordination among the organisations is therefore required to ensure 
their purposeful alignment.  
5.1.2. Coordination: How wise is old wisdom? 
In this section, I begin my analysis of the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships. Old wisdom is based on the prior literature on the coordination of 
inter-organisational relationships. One line of enquiry is the administrative 
mechanisms used (Lumineau & Quélin, 2012; Provan & Milward, 1995; Ring & van 
de Ven, 1994), and the second draws on the SNA to explore the link between 
coordination and the structural properties of inter-organisational relationships 
(Coleman, 1994; Granovetter, 1973; Uzzi, 1997). I follow these two leads to explain 
the cross-case differences in the consequences of coordination. 
I explore my first lead based on the literature on administrative mechanisms of 
coordination. Specifically, I focus on two relevant dimensions that proved relevant to 
my research: contractual arrangements and monitoring organisations. Contracting 
entails a framework for developing relationships between65 organisations (xij) 
(Grandori & Soda, 1995; Macaulay, 1963; Stinchcombe, 1985a). Across all seven 
cases, the architecture of coordination entailed a standard JCT Design and Build 
Contract66. The design and building works were all contracted for a lump sum price. I 
learnt more about this type of contract during my exploratory interviews with 
industry experts. One important reason for the wide use of this contractual form in 
the building industry (predominantly in small and medium-sized building projects) is 
the integration between the design and building stages. This integration is thought to 
foster collaboration between the design team (e.g. architect) and the builders (e.g. 
                                                 
65
 I use ‘between’ as prior research focuses mostly on dyadic relationships. 
66
 This is a standard contract published by the Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT), which is used in the UK 
building industry. This contract states the main contractor’s basic obligation to carry out the works 
and complete the design identified in the contract documents, and the contractor’s proposals which 
explain the detailed building methods and techniques to be adopted by the contractor to fulfil the 
employers’ requirements. More information can be found at http://www.rics.org/ (Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors; retrieved on 12/06/2012). 
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main contractor). The JCT Design and Build Contract also represents a low-risk 
option for the client in terms of over-budget building costs (since the main contractor 
is committed to a lump sum price) (Latham, 1994; Nahapiet & Nahapiet, 1985). 
This view was consistently expressed in the board papers I read 
(recommendations made to the client about the financial viability and contractual 
arrangements before the decision to start any new project) across all seven cases67. 
As an illustration, the board paper for the Rowlett Road project states that ‘The 
contractor will be signing a JCT Design & Build Contract, a fixed price contract 
[lump sum price], which will include all design and construction risks so limiting the 
group’s [client] exposure to build cost increases’ (BP01-Case#4). This instance 
illustrates that contractual aspects are enforced to safeguard risks (e.g. additional 
costs) and concerns over misappropriation by other organisations (e.g. overcharging 
for changes) (Williamson, 1996). 
Contracting arrangements were also put in place among the organisations brought 
on to the sites. Specialist traders (e.g. timber contractors and plumbers) were 
employed by the main contractor. This form of contractual arrangement is often 
called sub-contracting (Eccles, 1981; Nahapiet & Nahapiet, 1985). Sub-contracting 
establishes relations of authority and dependence between the main contractor and 
third parties (i.e. sub-contractors) working on a project. The main contractor is held 
accountable by the client and its agent; the sub-contractors are accountable to the 
main contractor. An illustrative example can be observed in Rowlett Road (Case#4), 
a site located in public woodland near to a school, where the electrical sub-contractor 
required the main contractor to circulate the drawings for the design of CCTV 
(closed circuit television) and the intruder alarm to the client and its agents. The 
electrical sub-contractors were employed by the main contractor (and not the client) 
and the main contractor remained liable for the entire building project. Nonetheless, 
there was a relation of mutual interdependence between the main contractor and 
individual sub-contractors. Facing complaints from local residents – voiced by the 
local council – the main contractor to the Washbrook Road project sought to 
coordinate with sub-contractors in order to readjust the workload on site: ‘[main 
contractor] confirmed they were co-operating with the Contractors for that site and 
sharing common facilities – i.e. road sweepers’ (MM01-W1/10-Case#7). Although 
                                                 
67
 I already mentioned this aspect of the projects in my methodology chapter (Chapter III) as part of 
the selection criteria used to obtain similar contractual frameworks across the projects. 
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such concerns were the main contractor’s responsibility, the sub-contractors had to 
coordinate with the local council.  
I will now direct my attention to contractual arrangements that formalise ties 
among organisations (xij). I first analyse the contractual framework. As stated above, 
this was the JCT Design and Build I all seven projects. The standardisation of 
contracting across cases offers an advantage when comparing cases because it limits 
the variances introduced by differences in contractual terms (Ariño & Torre, 1998; 
Lumineau et al., 2011). I therefore developed a coding system that captured where 
organisations were engaged in a contractual arrangement – defined as a relationship 
entailing a device (i.e., a contract) including rational planning with provisions and 
sanctions regarding performance (Macaulay, 1963, p.3). I established whether an 
organisation was in a contractual arrangement by consulting the project 
documentation (e.g. board papers) and, whenever required, by interviewing project 
participants (e.g. project managers). I coded each organisation as 1 if it was engaged 
in a contractual arrangement and 0 otherwise. I also computed the proportion68 of 
organisations engaged in contractual arrangements. I called this figure the ‘use of 
contracting’; it is given by the number of organisations engaged in contractual 
arrangements divided by the total number of organisations in the configuration (i.e. 
the whole building project).  
My cross-case comparison shows substantial differences in terms of the use of 
contracting and the consequences of coordinating inter-organisational relationships 
(Table 12). The highest use of contracting (72.50%) was registered for the North 
Wingfield (Case#3); this project registered ‘low’ coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships69 due to a delay of two weeks and extra costs of £155,000. By contrast, 
the Oakley Road (Case#6), where the organisations made the least use of contracting 
(27.50%), scored ‘high’ for coordination. There were no faults reported for this 
social housing project and it was delivered ‘on time and on budget’. Comparing the 
Dale Lane (Case#1) and the Washbrook Road (Case#7), I observe that, in spite of 
only marginal differences in their use of contracting (50.00% and 52.50%, 
respectively), their coordination of inter-organisational relationships ranked ‘low’ 
and ‘high’, respectively. 
                                                 
68
 The proportions were converted in to percentages (by multiplying the proportion by 100). 
69
 For the sake of clarity, I shall shorten the sentence a ‘low’ score for the consequences of 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships to ‘low’ coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships. Hereafter, I use the latter expression instead of the former.  
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Accordingly, my tentative idea of an association between the use of contracting 
and the consequences of the coordination of inter-organisational relationships was 
promptly discarded. This lead from prior research on the administrative mechanisms 
of coordination appears to provide little explanation of the cross-case variances in the 
consequences of coordination. I therefore conclude that the use of contracting is not 
directly linked to the coordination of inter-organisational relationships (Table 12). 
 
Table 12 Cross-Case Analysis of Coordination Mechanisms 
Case study 
Framework Old wisdom 
Overall* 
JCT Design & 
Build 
Use of Contracting 
(xij) 
Managing Organisations 
(i and j)   
Dale Lane 
(Case #1) 
JCT Design & 
Build is a standard 
contract used in the 
building industry 
where the design 
and build are 
contracted at a 
lump sum price. 
Across all seven 
case studies, this 
contractual 
arrangement 
involved an agent 
of the client. 
50.00% 15.00% Low 
Fulmar Road 
(Case #2) 70.00% 7.27% Medium 
North Wingfield 
(Case #3) 72.50% 17.24% Low 
Rowlett Road 
(Case #4) 32.50% 17.39% High 
Blyth Court 
(Case #5) 60.00% 9.09% Medium 
Oakley Road 
(Case #6) 27.50% 16.67% High 
Washbrook Road 
(Case #7) 52.50% 8.33% High 
 
* Based on the overall score of coordination consequences (Chapter IV). 
 
Another lead that I wanted to follow, drawn from the literature on the 
administrative mechanisms of coordination, was the hiring of a monitoring 
organisation to act as ‘network coordinator’ (Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011; Provan & 
Milward, 1995; van de Ven & Gordon, 1984). The hiring of monitoring organisations 
is also part of the old wisdom in the building industry as project management 
consultants and quantity surveyors are often contracted to coordinate projects (Gann, 
1991; Latham, 1994). It was no surprise, then, that in all seven social housing 
projects I found that monitoring organisations were employed by the clients to 
coordinate their projects (as I showed earlier). Unlike the contracting, which links 
two organisations (xij), the hiring of monitoring organisations endorses these 
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organisations to operate across the whole configuration of inter-organisational 
relationships (∑{xij}). For instance, the client’s agent is authorised to represent the 
client with the sub-contractors and the local council, even if this agent has not itself 
entered into a contractual arrangement with any of these organisations. 
Monitoring organisations are third parties, hired to prevent opportunistic 
behaviour, potentially harmful to the client’s interests, on the part of any other 
organisation engaged in the project. Signing off stages (of the project), an 
administrative procedure used to confirm the completion of all required (and 
contracted) works at every stage of the build, proved to be an important role 
performed by the client’s agents. Formal project completion required all building 
stages to have been signed off by the client’s agent, and approved by the local 
council’s Department of Building Control. Payments were made by the client to the 
main contractor based on the progress on site, which was overseen by the client’s 
agent throughout the design and build life-cycle.  
In Fulmar Road (Case#2), after several pressing requests from the main 
contractor, the ‘[client’s agent] stated that the final remediation sign off will not 
occur until the works to the imported soil are complete’ (MM16-W16/18-Case#2). 
Throughout the design and build life-cycle, the role of the client’s agent included the 
supervision of works, the enforcement of schedules, and the legal representation of 
the client with the wide array of contractors working on site. As project completion 
approached, the client’s agent played a key role in checking the final work that was 
to be handed over to the client. In Dale Lane (Case#1), at one meeting the following 
note was made: ‘Floor finishes and the like to be double checked to ensure that the 
right flooring is with the right tiles / kitchens etc – Action - client and employer’s 
agent’ (MM10-W10/12-Case#1). The client’s agents were of pivotal importance for 
the coordination of inter-organisational relationships.  
Monitoring was also carried out by specialist organisations due to the increased 
specialisation involved in building work nowadays and the requirements for new 
materials and techniques. The main example is perhaps the environmental 
sustainability consultants hired to provide specialist advice on buildings’ 
environmental sustainability credentials as required by the policies of government 
funding agencies. Consider the implementation of the biomass system in North 
Wingfield (Case#3). Environmental sustainability consultants were hired to foster 
coordination among the client, the main contractor, the architect and the local 
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council. Coordination was required because the successful installation of the biomass 
system (a new technology for most of the organisations involved) depended on fluid 
information exchange during the design and build life-cycle.  
Next, I coded all the organisations in all seven configurations of inter-
organisational relationships according to their domain of expertise. I was specifically 
interested in the proportion of organisations whose domain was monitoring, that is, 
organisations whose main input into the projects was managerial such as the client’s 
agent and the environmental sustainability consultants just mentioned. The 
proportion of monitoring organisations was computed in relation to the size of each 
configuration of inter-organisational relationships (i.e. the total number of 
organisations working on the project) and then multiplied by 100.  
My findings show no association between this proportion and the overall score for 
the consequences of coordination, as Table 12 shows. High coordination of inter-
organisational relationships was found for some cases where there was high use of 
monitoring organisations (e.g. 17.39% for Rowlett Road - Case#4), but also where 
there was little use of monitoring organisations (e.g. 8.33% for Washbrook Road - 
Case#7). Interestingly, these two case studies registered the lowest and highest 
values for their proportions of monitoring organisations and yet both achieved a high 
score for coordination.  
Thus, regarding my first lead from the literature on the administrative mechanisms 
of coordination, I show that the cross-case differences in the consequences of the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships are (directly) related to neither the 
use of contracting nor the proportion of monitoring organisations involved. My 
findings are inconclusive compared to prior research as well as the accepted wisdom 
in the building industry regarding coordination among organisations. 
I now turn to the second lead: the structure of inter-organisational relationships. 
The SNA posits that the structure of inter-organisational relationships shapes the 
possibilities and indeed the consequences of coordination (Coleman, 1994; 
Galaskiewicz, 1985; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Uzzi, 1997). Prior research identifies 
density as a key factor that can explain coordination among organisations 
(Galaskiewicz, 1985; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Hence, I explore the relationship 
between density and the consequences of coordination by building on the SNA that I 
used earlier to map the inter-organisational relationships. Following prior research 
(Zaheer & Soda, 2009), I computed the measure of density for all seven 
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configurations of inter-organisational relationships using UCINET 6. (See Appendix 
3.1 for methodological procedures and a more detailed explanation of this measure.) 
The measure of density captures the number of ties between organisations. Density is 
proven to enhance coordination because dense configurations display cohesiveness 
based on trust-based ties and shared values and norms (Coleman, 1988; Uzzi, 1997). 
My analysis shows substantial differences in terms of the structural attributes of 
inter-organisational relationships across case-studies (Figure 12). These differences 
can be observed at first glance by looking at the visualisation of the configurations of 
relationships across the seven cases. The structural attributes of IORs varied greatly 
even when the cases were of remarkable similarity. For instance, the Dale Lane 
(Case#1) and Oakley Road (Case#6) projects had substantially different 
configurations despite taking the same amount of time (14 months).  
My analysis of the association between the density of inter-organisational 
relationships and the consequences of coordination shows mixed findings. 
Apparently less dense configurations of inter-organisational relationship are 
associated with a low level of coordination, as in the cases of Dale Lane (density = 
0.187; overall coordination = low) and North Wingfield Lane (density = 0.169; 
overall coordination = low). However, the association is mixed where there is 
medium or high coordination (Figure 12). Consider Rowlett Road (Case#4) and 
Blyth Court (Case#5). These two projects show similar densities of inter-
organisational relationships (Rowlett Road = 0.279; Blyth Court = 0.274); however, 
the former has high coordination and the latter medium. In other words, although 
organisations in both projects had multiple ties, their ability to coordinate differed. 
I became progressively more interested in the hierarchical properties of the 
structures of inter-organisational relationships as the research went on. This was for 
two reasons: First, I observed aspects of hierarchy in the patterns of interactions 
among organisations (Stinchcombe, 1985a). Second, highly hierarchal structures are 
reported to hamper coordination (Grandori, 1997b; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009; 
Thompson, 1967). The latter reason underlies the process of inductive research that I 
used, with prior research informing my quest for data (Eisenhardt, 1989). Yet, my 
observations about the practices of sub-contracting are part of an interactive process 
between data and theory in my search for how inter-organisational relationships are 
coordinated.  
 169 
 
Figure 12 Cross-Case Analysis of the Structures of Inter-Organisational Relationships 
Dale Lane (Case #1) Fulmar Road (Case #2) North Wingfield (Case #3) Rowlett Road (Case #4) 
 
 
 
 
Density: 0.187 
Hierarchy: 0.954 
Overall Coordination*: Low 
Density: 0.258 
Hierarchy: 0.592 
Overall Coordination*: Medium 
Density:0.169 
Hierarchy: 0.729 
Overall Coordination*: Low 
Density: 0.279 
Hierarchy: 0.753 
Overall Coordination*: High 
Blyth Court (Case #5) Oakley Road (Case #6) Washbrook Road (Case #7)  
 
 
 
Configuration of Inter-
Organisational Relationships 
(∑{xij}) 
Density: 0.274 
Hierarchy: 0.753 
Overall Coordination*: Medium 
Density: 0.469 
Hierarchy: 0.564 
Overall Coordination*: High 
Density: 0.225 
Hierarchy: 0.631 
Overall Coordination*: High 
 
* Based on the overall score of coordination consequences (Chapter IV). 
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My analysis of the patterns of inter-organisational relationships appears to show 
aspects of hierarchy. This is clearer when it comes to the sub-contracting practices 
among the organisations, and holds for all seven cases. A typical example was the 
chasing of collateral warranties70 from the sub-contractors by one client’s agents 
(Fulmar Road, Case#2), which finally required intermediation by the main 
contractor. After four months on site, the client’s agent ‘noted that warranties are still 
required from the piling subcontractor and the beam and block flooring sub-
contractor’ (MM05-W5/18-Case#2). The collateral warranties were chased by the 
main contractor who had engaged in a contractual arrangement with each of the sub-
contractors. This example suggests that interaction patterns adhere to the contractual 
arrangements among organisations. I find that such a pattern extends to other actions, 
typical in building projects. For instance, facing delays to the building of a fence at 
the North Wingfield site (Case#3) (which the client was concerned about because it 
was a hazard), the client contacted the main contractor, who ‘confirmed the fencing 
sub-contractors would be commencing shortly’ (MM06-W6/19-Case#3). 
Drawing on these accounts, I became interested in the hierarchal properties of the 
structures of inter-organisational relationships. This illustrates the advantage of using 
an in-depth approach; I could build on the qualitative analysis to explore the 
structural properties of inter-organisational relationships further. First, the pattern of 
hierarchy I identified depicted ordered patterns of interaction; these resemble the 
notion of hierarchy developed within organisational theory (Simon, 1976; 
Thompson, 1967). Second, I found that the measures of network hierarchy captured 
the patterns I started to observe in the data. 
I therefore computed the measure of network hierarchy based on a routine 
implemented in UCINET 6. (See Appendix 3.1 for the methodological procedure 
and an explanation of this measure.) This was consistent with prior research using 
this measure of hierarchy to study hierarchies of relationships among individuals ( 
Cummings & Cross, 2003), and at the level of inter-organisational relationships 
(Kenis & Knoke, 2002, pp.286-7) 
                                                 
70
 Collateral warranties are used with a third party (e.g. an architect or specialist sub-contractor) 
outside of the primary contract (e.g. with the main contractor). These third-parties need to warrant to 
the client that they will fulfil their duties under a building contract. 
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My analysis shows that the cases differ in terms of the hierarchies found in the 
structures of inter-organisational relationships. As far as the consequences of 
coordination are concerned, there appears to be a relationship between hierarchy and 
the consequences of coordination. Consistent with prior research (Kenis & Knoke, 
2002; Thompson, 1967), this relationship appears negative. The Dale Lane (Case#1) 
is the most hierarchical (0.954) and is found to have low coordination, while the 
Rowlett Road (Case#4) display the least hierarchy and high coordination. Further 
investigation of this relationship shows there is a need for caution. The Blyth Court 
(Case#5) and the Rowlett Road (Case#4) show similarly hierarchical structures of 
inter-organisational relationships (0.753 in both cases); however, the former registers 
medium coordination and the latter high. A comparison of the Blyth Court (Case#5) 
with the North Wingfield (Case#3) project shows that the first has medium 
coordination and the second low despite similar levels of hierarchy (0.753 and 0.729, 
respectively). I therefore conclude that there is no (direct) relationship between the 
hierarchy of inter-organisational relationships and the consequences of coordination. 
All considered, I found no (direct) association between the structural attributes of 
inter-organisational relationships and the consequences of coordination (Figure 12). 
Two identical configurations in terms of density and hierarchy, the Rowlett Road 
(Case#4) (density, 0.279; hierarchy, 0.753) and the Blyth Court (Case#5) (density, 
0.274; hierarchy, 0.753), performed differently in terms of coordination (high and 
medium, respectively). Moreover, the Fulmar Road (Case#2) and the Washbrook 
Road (Case#7) also have similar figures for density (0.258 and 0.225, respectively) 
and hierarchy (0.592 and 0.631, respectively) but different figures for the 
consequences of coordination (medium and high, respectively).  
Thus far, the tales from my study are intriguing: neither administrative 
mechanisms (i.e. contracting and monitoring organisations) nor the structural 
properties of inter-organisational relationships (i.e. density and hierarchy) explain the 
cross-case variances in the consequences of coordination. My findings show the 
limitations of conventional wisdom regarding such coordination. My quest has, 
however, relied on a static perspective. Prior research focused on ‘static’ 
configurations of inter-organisational relationships therefore conventional wisdom 
(from prior research) about their coordination is shaped by this perspective.  
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5.2. Coordination of Dynamic Inter-Organisational Relationships 
In what follows, I present the turning point in my enquiry, which emerged from a 
longitudinal analysis of the inter-organisational relationships and the variations in the 
use of contracts and monitoring organisations. In order to investigate how dynamic 
inter-organisational relationships are coordinated, I took a longitudinal approach 
that entailed a month-by-month study of the dynamics of inter-organisational 
relationships, made possible through the use of over 1,700 pages of minutes from 
monthly meetings. This unravelled a fundamental interplay between action and 
structure: the use of contracting and monitoring organisations shapes hierarchy and 
density in dynamic inter-organisational relationships. Grounded in this interplay, I 
find, the coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relationships unfolds from two 
distinctive mechanisms: organising and relating. Organising emerges from the 
association between contracting and hierarchy, while relating stems from the 
association between hiring monitoring organisations and density. 
Furthermore, my analysis unravels that the coordination of dynamic inter-
organisational relationships over time hinges on the juggling of these organising and 
relating mechanisms. Indeed, the sequences in which these mechanisms were used 
over time proved to explain the cross-case differences in coordination consequences. 
 
5.2.1. The Coordination Mechanisms of Organising and Relating 
My findings suggest that, as organisations manage their coordination through 
contracts and monitoring organisations, they are simultaneously shaping the structure 
of their inter-organisational relationships. Unknown to the organisations, this 
interplay proved fundamental in explaining the success of their coordination 
attempts. Next, I will show how the organising and relating mechanisms unfold.   
In building projects, perhaps like in any inter-organisational collaborative 
endeavour, the challenge is to coordinate inter-organisational relationships that are 
constantly changing (i.e. dynamic). As an architect advised me, ‘in construction 
projects, those networks [referring to networks of organisations] change quite 
dramatically from the beginning of the project through the main period of 
construction to the end’ (EI#3; founder of architect’s practice). The challenge is 
therefore to manage inter-organisational relationships over. As I showed earlier, the 
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conventional wisdom regarding coordination concerns the use of contractual 
arrangements and managing organisations. 
Progressively, and building on my previous observation that sub-contracting 
appears to be related to hierarchical patterns of interaction among organisations, my 
data analysis led me to uncover how contractual arrangements and monitoring 
organisations shape the structures of inter-organisational relationships. I found that 
contractual arrangements induced hierarchy and the hiring of monitoring 
organisations triggered density. I argue that such an interplay entails two 
coordination mechanisms: organising and relating. 
Organising is a coordination mechanism that I developed from an observed 
association between the use of contracting and hierarchy in inter-organisational 
relationships. Furthermore, my analysis shows that such a mechanism unfolds as a 
process whereby contracting induces control so as to attain goal-congruence among 
organisations and, in turn, leads to information control among organisations.  
(1) Control among organisations occurs through contractual obligations and the 
setting of performance targets (Ring & van de Ven, 1994). Further exploration of the 
contractual relationship using the example of collateral warranties shows that 
contractual relationships play a key role in shaping the patterns of interaction among 
organisations. Contractual relationships give the main contractor influence over the 
sub-contractors. In Fulmar Road (Case#2), the main contractor warned that design 
changes introduced by the engineers concerning rainwater harvesting were 
impossible to accommodate. Notwithstanding this, the main contractor also clarified 
that ‘[the main contractor’s engineering department] is in contact with sub 
contractors concerning these [issues] as individual rather than communal tanks is the 
preferred route’ (MM08-W8/18-Case#2). This quotation shows how the practice of 
coordination acknowledged contractual aspects of the relationship. Furthermore, the 
use of the term ‘sub contractors’, instead of their actual names, shows the importance 
of contractual aspects (Table 13).  
(2) Goal congruence stems from control insofar as targets are set for the 
completion of tasks at various stages of the design and build life-cycle. An important 
aspect of goal congruence found in this research was shown by the contents of 
contracting arrangements setting out obligations and expectations aimed at aligning 
the organisations involved. In April 2008, as the organisations were reaching the 
handover stage in Dale Lane (Case#1), the client became concerned about issues 
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regarding carbon land gas and retaining walls, which had to be resolved before the 
final drawings could be sent for consideration by the local council (i.e. Building 
Control) (MM02-W2/12-Case#1). In the light of this, the architect decided to amend 
the drawings, even though they had no contractual obligations to do so (this would 
have been the responsibility of the engineers). Later on, the client’s agent advised, 
the ‘architect has picked these up and allowances have been made in their costings’. 
One important aspect of this example is the role of contractual obligations and 
expectations as enforced through incentives and sanctions (Table 13).  
Payments yielded a performance incentive in the sense that financial transfers to 
the main contractor were made according to on-site valuations. Monthly payments 
were made by the client to the main contractor, rewarding the progress on site. These 
were assessments of the value of the work carried out by the main contractor 
(financial transactions to the sub-contractors were then made through the main 
contractor, as further evidence of the contractual dependence). An account of this 
procedure was communicated to the main contractor in Rowlett Road (Case#4): 
‘schedule of valuation dates requested, targeted at mid-month dates for payment 
early the following months and co-ordinated with progress meeting dates’ (MM01-
W1/8-Case#4). Valuations were checked against cash flow maps and a progress 
timetable handed in by the main contractor. These documents were used as part of 
the contractual arrangement in order to evaluate the main contractor’s performance.  
(3) Information control describes practices of communication that resemble the 
dimension of control (as discussed above). In Oakley Road (Case#6), a ‘contract 
instruction for the headwall to be issued following confirmation by the subcontractor 
that the quotation will stand’ (MM06-W6/8-Case#6). This shows that the information 
passed between organisations resembles contractual arrangements among them 
(Stinchcombe, 1985). Furthermore, I found that the information flow reflected the 
contractual arrangements, such as those for the sub-contracting. This pattern in the 
data is illustrated by multiple instances of Collateral Warranties being chased. This is 
described by one of the project managers: ‘[the main contractor] circulated revised 
Warranties to [the client’s agent], which will be required by [the client]. [The main 
contractor] to progress with consultants and sub contractors. [The client] to urgently 
return signed warranties from the beam and block contractor to [the main 
contractor]’ (MM13-W13/19-Case#3). This illustrates a case of information flow 
adhering to ordered relationships based on contractual arrangements.    
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Table 13 Mechanisms of Organising and Relating 
 
Unfolding of Coordination in Dynamic Inter-Organisational Relationships 
Mechanisms 
(1) Control (2) Goal Congruence (3) Information Control 
Use of 
Contracting 
Control occurs through 
contractual obligations and 
performance targets. Sanctions 
for missing performance targets 
are included in the contracts.  
Goal congruence stems from 
control aimed to align 
organisations. Payments rewarding 
progress on site (based on 
valuations) exemplify a control 
approach to goal congruence. 
Communication among organisations 
resembles the dimension of control. 
Contractual obligations and 
performance targets define ties among 
organisations. 
Organising - association between the use 
of contracts and hierarchy. Contracting is 
viewed as external to organisations. 
 
Monitoring 
Organisations 
(1) Monitoring (2) Liaising (3) Communication  
Monitoring is performed by 
organisations contracted to do 
so, such as project management 
consultancies. They monitor the 
activities of organisations based 
on anticipated task 
interdependence. 
Liaising aims to reconcile 
differences among the parties and 
follows monitoring endeavours in 
order to attain a common goal. 
Communication spreads across the 
configuration of inter-organisational 
relationships; this is driven by liaison 
roles. The driving force is from within 
the configuration through monitoring 
organisations. 
Relating - association between monitoring 
organisations and density.  
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Relating was found to be another mechanism of coordination; this stems from the 
association between the proportion of monitoring organisations used and the density 
of inter-organisational relationships. Unlike contracting, which is understood as an 
external force, monitoring organisations work within configurations of inter-
organisational relationships and develop ties among organisations. They do so by 
monitoring and liaising, which explains the wide communication that typically takes 
place among organisations in dense configurations (Table 13).  
(1) Monitoring is performed by third-party organisations mandated to link 
organisations together based on anticipated task interdependence throughout the 
design and build life-cycle. As one project manager told me, ‘you are designing, 
planning…You know the project in the first place and you need to identify all of the 
relevant parties as early as possible, get them on board right at the beginning; you 
know any potential problems as early as possible’ (EE03-Case#3). This captures the 
role of monitoring organisations. Because they are third parties to the project, they 
can foster ties between organisations that would otherwise be disconnected. They 
enjoy legitimacy when operating as intermediaries, as prior research shows 
(Krackhardt, 1998; Simmel, 1950). In North Wingfield (Case#3), the client 
confirmed with other organisations that ‘…[the building consultancy firm] will be 
undertaking the CDM-Coordinator71 role… [Consultant’s name] to commence H&S 
(Health & Safety) Plan as necessary’ (MM02-W2/19-Case#3). The client thus gave 
the third party the go-ahead to influence other organisations’ courses of action.  
Monitoring was found to be especially important when new technologies, often 
related to green issues, were brought into the building process. In North Wingfield 
(Case#3), where a new biomass system was installed as part of the goal to achieve 
‘level 4’ of the CfSH, the specialist consultant firm had a key role (BP01-Case#3). 
According to the data, the specialist consultants required the ‘designs to be 
completed by [the biomass systems supplier] / [engineering firm] / [main 
contractor]’. Furthermore, the client’s agent informed the parties that: “The 
completion is also determined by the works commencing to fit out the biomass house 
from the 22 October 2009 and being completed by the 17 November 2009. It was 
noted that the Boilers have still to be delivered to [engineering contractors], which 
need to be monitored by [client’s agent and environment sustainability consultants] 
                                                 
71
 [Footnote added] CDM coordinators are project advisors, providing guidance to the client regarding 
matters of construction health and safety and risk management.  
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as this will determine the completion date for the project” (MM18-W18/19-Case#3). 
The specialist consultants thus enhanced the creation of ties among organisations – 
specifically, the main contractor, the biomass system manufacturer and the structural 
engineers. The specialist consultants then monitored the actions of the organisations, 
for instance, by checking that the works were completed within the time scales and 
liaising between them.  
(2) Liaising refers to communication between parties to reconcile differences so 
as to proceed towards a common goal. Procedures used for liaising include ad hoc 
information processing and problem solving (Grandori, 1997, p. 903). Although it is 
a different activity, liaising stems from monitoring procedures. Following doubts 
about the feasibility of installing a biomass system in North Wingfield (Case#3) as 
part of the strategy for achieving level 4 of the CfSH (BP01-Case#3), the client and 
their agents liaised between the various organisations involved. The project reports 
and minutes of meetings show that the client’s agent played an important role in 
ensuring that (a) the biomass system was installed and (b) communication among 
suppliers was improved to prevent further delays on site. Furthermore, my analysis 
shows that organisations with monitoring responsibilities delimitate spheres of 
activity for organisations, which is termed sequential coordination (Simon, 1976). 
This aspect is shown in the instruction from the client in Fulmar Road (Case#2) ‘to 
speak to [environmental sustainability consultants] with regards to a Pre-assessment 
under the Code for Sustainable Homes being undertaken’ (MM18-W18/19-Case#3). 
Liaising helped to develop ties among the organisations in this case (Table 13). 
(3) Communication results from monitoring organisations’ liaising role. The 
minutes of one meeting for the North Wingfield project recorded that ‘[environment 
consultants] met with [the main contractor] with regards to the ECO homes rating, 
[the main contractor’s manager] is currently putting together the corresponding 
documents which will be sent to [environment consultants] for review prior to 
issuing to [specialist suppliers] for final assessment’ (MM07-W7/19-Case#3). This 
provides a detailed account of the communication that went on among these 
organisations and shows the sequence of interaction among them and the tasks to be 
performed. In Dale Lane (Case#1), ‘[the client agents] advised [environmental 
sustainability consultants] have commented on the information provided to date in 
connection with the Code for Sustainable Homes. [Client’s agent] to provide further 
info to [the environmental sustainability consultants] by the end of next week. 
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Design stage submission will be made to the BRE by the end of March 2009’ 
(MM10-W10/12-Case#1). This confirms wide spread communication among 
organisations based on the intervention of monitoring organisations. 
Having unpacked the mechanisms of organising and relating, I next conducted a 
longitudinal study of these mechanisms over time. I studied the relationship between 
the use of contracting and hierarchy (which I termed ‘organising’), and I considered 
the relationship between the proportion of monitoring organisations and the density 
of inter-organisational relationships (which I termed ‘relating’).  
Because such proportions are calculated in relation to the total number of 
organisations involved, comparing them across cases and over time can lead to bias. I 
addressed this issue by converting each proportion into a z-score to standardise them 
(See Appendix 3.2 for methodology of z-score values.) A z-score gauges the 
variation in a given variable at any point in time against the average value of that 
variable such that negative values suggest a variation below the average while 
positive values denote a variation above the average. I computed the z-score values 
based on monthly calculations of the densities and levels of hierarchy in the 
configurations of inter-organisational relationships (see Appendix 3.3 for monthly 
graphical representations). I present the monthly values of the relevant variables for 
the mechanisms of organising and relating across cases in Appendix 3.4. The 
visualisation of the inter-organisational relationships over time is enhanced by a 
multimedia file.  
************************** 
Multimedia File 1 Mechanisms of Coordination 
************************** 
The results of my wave-by-wave study of the standardised values show that the 
interplay between managing organisations to achieve coordination and shaping the 
structures of inter-organisational relationships occurs across the seven cases (Table 
14). As the monitoring organisations intervened to coordinate the relationships 
among the other organisations, they were unknowingly shaping the properties of the 
configuration of inter-organisational relationships. On the one hand, variations in 
contracting were associated with a hierarchy of inter-organisational relationships. On 
other hand, variations in the number of monitoring organisations used were 
associated with the density of inter-organisational relationships.  
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Table 14 Longitudinal Study of Organising and Relating Mechanisms 
Cases (n=7) Mechanism W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 W13 W14 W15 W16 W17 W18 W19 Effectiveness  
 
                    
 
Dale Lane 
(Case#1) 
Organising * *  *  *   *  *  *    *          Low 
Relating   *  *  *  *  *  *     *         
 
                    
 
Fulmar Rd 
(Case#2) 
Organising   *  *       *     *     *   Medium 
Relating *    *   *  *  *   *  *  *    *  *   *   
 
                    
 
North 
Wingfield 
(Case#3) 
Organising *  *  *  *  *   *  *   *    *       *  
Low 
Relating *   *  *   *    *  *  *  *     *   *   
 
                    
 
Rowlett Rd 
(Case#4) 
Organising      *  *  *             High 
Relating  *  *  *  *    *             
 
                    
 
Blyth Court 
(Case#5) 
Organising  *  *  *  *   *  *             Medium 
Relating *  *  *  *  *  *    *  *  *  *         
 
                    
 
Oakley Rd 
(Case#6) 
Organising  *      *  *             High 
Relating *  *  *  *   *  *  *             
 
                    
 
Washbrook 
Rd 
(Case#7) 
Organising *   *  *  *  *    *  *           
Low 
Relating *   *  *  *  *   *  *  *           
                     
 
 
W – Wave (monthly observation point); unit of analysis for the variable time. 
* Organising: variations in the use of contracting and the presence of hierarchy are in the same direction; Relating: variations in monitoring organisations and density are in the same direction. 
Sd Project phases: “Phase 1 – Design and start on site”; “Phase 2 – Structure and partitions”; and “Phase 3 – Fittings and handover”. 
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Table 14 depicts the manifestation of the two coordination mechanisms, organising 
and relating72. In a nutshell, my analysis confirms that these mechanisms occur, as 
suggested in my qualitative analysis, on a near-monthly basis. In Blyth Court (Case#5), 
every month manifestations of both mechanisms appeared; in Oakley Road (Case#6), 
the mechanisms occurred in seven months out of eight. Furthermore, my analysis 
proved to hold regardless of the length of the project. In Fulmar Road (Case#2), 
coordination mechanisms occurred in thirteen months out of eighteen; in North 
Wingfield (Case#3), the findings are even more pronounced (in sixteen out of eighteen 
months). I also observed that the manifestation of these mechanisms was unrelated to 
the stage of the project (Table 14); this provides further assurance of the reliability of 
these findings.  
 
All being considered, I have shown that, as organisations attempt to coordinate their 
operations, they are unknowingly shaping the structure of their inter-organisational 
relationships. This is important because it includes two mechanisms of coordinating 
dynamic inter-organisational relationships: organising and relating.   
 
5.3. Juggling Coordination Mechanisms over Time 
The question that remains is how, if at all, does the sequence in which coordination 
mechanisms are used explain the consequences of coordination across cases? In the 
conclusion to this chapter, I explore how the two mechanisms of organising and relating 
influence the consequences of coordination. My findings show that the sequence in 
which the mechanisms are applied explains cross-case differences in the consequences 
of coordination. In other words, I argue that the coordination of dynamic inter-
organisational relationships requires those in charge to juggle both mechanisms. 
I have developed a formalised summary of the juggling of coordination mechanisms 
in order to fully capture my findings (Table 15). Prior longitudinal research on 
coordination and inter-organisational relationships develops stages based on distinctive 
characteristics of the production process (Adler, 1995; Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011) or 
distinctive sets of theoretical mechanisms (Faems et al., 2008). I integrate both 
perspectives and define stages as distinctive sets of coordination mechanisms 
                                                 
72
 This is a stylised representation produced for the sake of clarity. In Appendix 3.5, I present a graphical 
representation of the monthly variations in the relevant variables underlying organising and relating.  
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throughout the design and build life-cycle. I end up with three stages that explain the 
cross-case variance in the consequences of coordination: mobilisation (design and 
starting on site), shaping-up (structure and partitions), and sustainability (fittings and 
handover)73. 
  
5.3.1. Mobilisation and Design of Relationships 
The mobilisation of organisations and the design of relationships – at the early stages 
of the design and build life-cycle – occur through monitoring organisations rather than 
contractual arrangements. The relating mechanisms prevailed in cases of high and 
medium coordination, those with no extra costs or delays. In contrast, where the 
organising mechanisms prevailed, projects were delayed and extra costs were 
transferred to the client.  
In the early stages, the organisations were required to create a new building. There 
was a creative element here since the organisations had to coordinate with one another 
in order to fulfil the concept-related demands of the local council. For the Oakley Road 
(Case#6), ‘the original brief from [the local council] asked for a distinctive modern 
design with a significant street presence and this is to be achieved via the use of three 
storey flats …’ (MM02-W2/8-Case#6). Similar requests were conveyed by the local 
council involved in Rowlett Road (Case#4), who sought a ‘contemporary look to the 
scheme’ (MM03-W3/8-Case#4). The organisations had to translate a concept into a 
design, which moved the coordination process across organisational boundaries, going 
beyond a mere assembling of organisational expertise. This was collective endeavour to 
perform tasks based on the interpretation of information yet to be converted into 
something concrete (e.g. drawings) 
The relating mechanisms appear to be substitutes for contracting (the number of 
contractual arrangements fell as the relating mechanisms increased). In Oakley Road 
(Case#6), there was a close collaboration between the main contractor and the client’s 
agent. This was noted by the client, who also mentioned having received referrals from 
partner organisations. This episode was noted in a board paper issued in February 2008: 
‘The [main contractor] submitted a price in line with [the client]’s budget and [they] are 
working closely with our cost consultants, [organisation’s name], to arrive at a firm 
                                                 
73
 The stages are also shown in Table  (grey shading). 
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tender price. Favourable references on [the main contractor] have been received from 
[the housing association from a neighbouring county] and [a local purchasing agent]’ 
(BP01-Case#6). Previous (positive) experience of working together – familiarity – also 
explained the mobilisation of inter-organisational relationships. One example was the 
appointment of the quantity surveyors for the Rowlett Road project that was based on 
‘prior good experience’ (BP01-Case#4). The client clearly demonstrated the role of 
familiarity when justifying the choice of these quantity surveyors to carry out the 
valuation of the plot of land and the respective building project located in Oakley Road. 
According to the relevant board paper, ‘[the quantity surveyors], who had previously 
provided professional valuation advice to [the client] at Acquisition stage, have now 
provided a report confirming the updated value of the site and units’ (BP01-Case#6). 
According to prior literature, previous ties are thought to impact positively on the 
consequences of inter-organisational coordination as ties breed trust (Gulati, 1995a; 
Ring & van de Ven, 1994).  
Trust-based relationships were found to be important in the early stages of the 
projects (Table 15). As the client was finalising the planning application for the Fulmar 
Road (Case#2), which already included drawings for the building, there was still an 
issue – the client was yet to own the land. However, the client trusted the verbal 
promise that had been made by the local council. This was communicated to the other 
organisations already working on the project (e.g. the architect, the main contractor and 
the solicitors) as follows: ‘[The local council] has verbally agreed with [the client] to 
sell the land to the Western boundary of the site at zero cost’ (MM02-W2/18-Case#2). 
The formal requirements for transferring the land ownership were yet to be finalised, as 
it was further confirmed that ‘[the client was] to speak to [the client’s agent] with 
regards to the arrangements for the land sale…and seek written confirmation from [the 
local council] with regards to the land purchase at zero cost’ (MM04-W4/18-Case#2). 
The benefits of good relationships extended outside the network itself, for instance, to 
adjoining owners (Table 15). In Oakley Road (Case#6), the adjoining owner, a 
nationwide supermarket chain, confirmed to the main contractor that ‘as a gesture of 
goodwill we [the supermarket chain] are prepared to offer you [the main contractor] part 
of the land by the culvert outside our car park area for your set up’ (letter; MM02-
W2/8-Case#6). This was important as the main contractor and the client were struggling 
to find a convenient set-up area. 
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The alignment of organisations was clearly visible in Oakley Road (Case#6), where 
the architects worked closely with engineers and the local council in order to accelerate 
planning approval. The architect explained that ‘internal flat partitions had been 
designed as robust masonry (therefore requiring foundations) to secure an agreement 
from the EA as appropriate to minimising damage to the building in the event of flood’ 
(MM01-W1/8-Case#6). Coordination enabled a joint redesign of the drawings in 
anticipation of the formal submission to the local council. Parking spaces and bicycle 
storage were relocated (Table 15). In the end, the project received planning approval 
within a short period of time, avoiding the delays that are a common hazard, as shown 
in a study of Norwegian offshore projects (Stinchcombe, 1985b).  
Following the granting of planning approval for the Oakley Road (Case#6), 
eagerness to start on site was shown by the client and the main contractor. This project 
was long overdue given the existing shortage of social housing in the local area (PA01-
Case#6; PA02-Case#6). The client’s agent led the way, liaising with the architects to 
submit the outstanding ‘third party validation of imported soils’ to the local council as a 
matter of urgency (MM03-W3/8-Cae#6). The architects promptly coordinated with the 
local council, and a consensus was reached that the main contractor could indeed start 
on site regardless of the validation, although the architect was yet to hand in the 
outstanding documentation. The relational aspects lubricated the collaboration (Das & 
Teng, 1998) among the organisations in this instance, aiding their progress in the design 
and build life-cycle. Indeed, monitoring organisations often played a pivotal 
communication role that helped to save time in these projects. In Fulmar Road 
(Case#2), the client’s agent required the architect to establish a timeline with the 
environmental sustainability consultants: ‘…[architect practice] to liaise with 
[environmental sustainability consultants] with regards to the effect, if any, that the 
proposed amendments to the internal layouts would have on the Code for Sustainable 
Homes assessment’ (MM02-W2/18-Case#2). By doing so, the client’s agent prevented 
any potential delays associated with the CfSH assessment, from the start, by ensuring 
that the relevant organisations had already made contact.  
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Table 15 Juggling of Coordination Mechanism in Dynamic Inter-Organisational Networks 
 
Mobilisation (Design and Starting On Site) Shaping Up (Construction) Sustainability (Completion and Handover) 
Overall* 
Coordination Mechanism Consequences  Coordination Mechanism Consequences Coordination Mechanism Consequences 
Rowlett 
Road 
(Case#4) 
Relating prevailed. 
Positive effect on 
monitoring 
organisations. 
Importance of 
familiarity and 
monitoring 
organisations. 
- Adaptability - 
design changes to 
meet demands by the 
local council; 
- ‘Very Good’ for 
environmental 
certification based on 
initial drawings (no 
further changes). 
Organising prevailed 
although there were 
fluctuations in this over 
time. Specialist 
consultants worked 
closely with the client to 
align other organisations. 
- Delays of five weeks on 
site (e.g. caused by slow 
progress with external 
cladding and internal 
boarding); 
- Work rearrangements on 
site with sub-contractors 
in order to recover delays.  
Relating co-existed with 
organising, with 
monitoring organisations 
consolidating their 
leadership towards the end.  
- Recovery of five 
weeks of delays; 
- Minor issues 
regarding 
landscaped areas 
and layout design. 
High  
Relating Organising Relating/ Organising 
Oakley 
Road 
(Case#6) 
Relating prevailed. 
Organisations mobilised 
at the design stage on 
the basis of referrals and 
familiarity as opposed to 
contractual mechanisms.  
- Adaptability to 
provide 
‘contemporary’ 
design required by the 
local council; 
- Search for redesign 
strategies to meet cost 
targets; 
- Goodwill 
Organising prevailed 
where there was high 
contracting and hierarchy.  
Flexible management 
practices in place. 
- Recovery of delays; 
- Specification changes; 
- ‘Constant running over 
time’; 
- Adaptability on site to 
adopt new techniques and 
redesign work 
arrangements. 
Relating prevailed, which 
led to a high density of 
inter-organisational 
relationships (organisations 
had multiple ties).  
- Responsiveness 
to unforeseen 
aspects (e.g. site 
vandalism); 
- Minor delays, 
but they were 
recovered; 
- Agreement for 
minor extra works  
High 
Relating Organising Relating 
Washbrook 
Road 
(Case#7) 
Relating prevailed, 
followed by a 
pronounced increase in 
contracting and the 
density of inter-
organisational 
relationships. 
- High-quality 
relationships among 
organisations; 
- Adaptability –
changes to design of 
foundations; 
- New layout 
solutions – e.g. 
parking spaces for 
disabled tenants. 
Organising co-existed 
with relating; an increase 
in contracting was 
coupled with dense ties in 
a blend between relational 
aspects from the early 
stages and contractual-
based operations.  
- Redesign of work 
arrangements (once time 
frame was in place); 
- Delays were recovered – 
up to three weeks ahead 
of schedule; 
- Trust among parties. 
Relating prevailed; density 
among organisations was 
sustained by contracting 
and monitoring 
organisations. Monitoring 
organisations counter-
balanced the hierarchy 
induced by contracting. 
- Delays 
recovered (three 
weeks ahead of 
programme); 
- Trust among 
parties (to 
enhance built-in 
environmental 
sustainability) 
High 
Relating Organising/ Relating Relating 
(Table continues on next page)     * Based on the overall score of coordination consequences (Chapter IV). 
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Fulmar 
Road 
(Case#2) 
Relating prevailed. 
- Relevance of previous 
experience and cross-
understandings; 
- Standardisation of work 
flow. 
- Dialogue among 
organisations (e.g. 
client, architect and 
local council); 
- Operational issues – 
incompatibility of file 
formats used by 
organisations. 
Organising prevailed 
despite an (exceptionally) 
high proportion of 
monitoring organisations 
(Wave 4) where 
contracting led to a 
hierarchy of coordination. 
- Failure to recover from 
delays that were 
consistently reported; 
- Extra costs; 
- Miscommunications and 
delays to granting of 
planning permits. 
Organising co-existed with 
relating mechanisms. 
Density was related more to 
contracting than actions by 
monitoring organisations. 
- Delay of three 
weeks to the 
handover; 
- Over budget;  
- Several design 
misspecifications. 
Medium 
Relating Organising Organising / Relating 
Blyth Court 
(Case#5) 
Relating prevailed. 
Initial ties occurred 
mostly between the main 
contractor and a pilling 
(boring techniques used 
to build building’s 
foundations) sub-
contractor 
- Prompt start on site 
and to demolition 
works; 
- Responsiveness in 
addressing emerging 
issues with existing 
infrastructure (this was 
a refurbishment 
project); 
No prevailing 
coordination 
mechanisms. Co-
existence of hierarchy of 
inter-organisational 
relationships and use of 
contracting alongside 
some trust-based ties. 
- Detailed discussion of 
specifications – after 
unexpected problems; 
- (Mis)coordination across 
two sites, and design 
issues; 
- Misinformation about 
building’s M&E services; 
- Delays on site. 
Organising prevailed, with 
reduced use of monitoring 
organisations (management 
and consulting services 
provided by the client and 
their agents only throughout 
the project). 
 
- Limited fluidity 
of information;  
- Light fittings 
missed some 
requirements; 
- One-week delay 
recovered (two 
weeks delay to 
handover). 
Medium 
Relating No prevailing coordination mechanism Organising 
North 
Wingfield 
(Case#3 
Organising prevailed 
due to increasing use of 
contracting. Involvement 
in multiple parts of the 
design stage. 
- Clear specification of 
which organisations 
should attend meetings 
and the delegation of 
responsibilities; 
- Delays on site; 
- Rigidity in dealing 
with unexpected bore-
hole on site. 
Relating prevailed; 
contracting and hierarchy 
of inter-organisational 
relationships decreased 
 
- Slow information flow; 
- Documentation missing, 
delays in planning 
approvals; 
- Redesign of sewers; 
- Poor adaptability 
involving new technology 
(biomass system) and 
building techniques. 
No prevailing coordination 
mechanisms. Several issues 
concerning built-in 
specifications to 
accommodate the needs of 
disabled tenants. 
- Scaffolding 
issues;  
- Biomass system: 
misspecification 
and misalignment 
among parties 
during design and 
installation. 
Low 
Organising Relating No prevailing coordination mechanism 
Dale Lane  
(Case#1) 
Organising prevailed, as 
shown by a large 
proportion of contracting 
arrangements. 
- Intent/commitment 
to collaborate; 
- Design 
misspecifications (e.g. 
missing elements). 
No prevailing 
coordination 
mechanisms 
Simultaneous use of 
contracting and 
monitoring organisations. 
- Uncertainty (‘mystery’) 
about the SbD 
certification; 
- Slow information flow 
and lack of responsiveness 
to requests. 
Organising prevailed; 
monitoring organisations 
did not trigger a density of 
inter-organisational 
relationships and contracts 
were breached.  
- Failure to achieve 
SbD certification; 
- Disagreements; 
- Late handover 
Low 
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5.3.2. Shape-Up through Organising 
In the following phase, the coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relationships 
relied primarily on organising mechanisms as more organisations joined the projects 
(Table 15). The use of contracting and a hierarchy of inter-organisational relationships 
characterised the cases with ‘high’ coordination. The organising mechanism delivered 
an element of control and goal congruence following the mobilisation of the 
organisations, which enabled, for example, the recovery from delays on site.  
A fundamental observation is that the use of organising mechanisms ‘shapes up’ 
inter-organisational relationships – that is, it provides a structure likely to facilitate 
coordination. The ‘shaping-up’ of the structure of relationships was revealed to be 
important for coordination in the transition from relating mechanisms as both the 
number and heterogeneity (in terms of expertise) of organisations on site increased. My 
analysis suggests that contracting and the imposition of a hierarchy were more effective 
for coordination as part of strengthening the relating aspect. This allowed a blend of 
organising and relating mechanisms of coordination to be used. 
Once the work had started on site, several new sub-contractors joined the other 
organisations already working on the project, such as the main contractor, the engineers 
and the client’s agent. Continuous alignment of these organisations was critical as the 
tasks on site became increasingly interdependent. Against this backdrop, organising 
mechanisms played a fundamental role since the combination of contracting and 
hierarchy acted as a safeguard against risk and the misalignment of organisations. Ring 
and van de Ven (1992, p. 487) similarly refer to ‘the need to make decisions in the face 
of uncertainty of accomplishing tasks that require sustained cooperation with others, 
particularly when they represent difficult or novel ventures’. Across my seven cases of 
social housing projects, there was also an element of novelty since each building project 
was unique and, therefore, resulted in ‘webs’ of inter-organisational relationships 
particular to each case study74. The uncertainty was addressed through contracting, 
leading to a hierarchy of inter-organisational relationships. 
There was a centralisation of decisions around organisations such as the main 
contractor and the client’s agent. Hierarchy was in place insofar as there was a locus of 
decision making (van de Ven, 1976, p. 26). The relevance of the organising mechanisms 
                                                 
74
 A graphical representation of the configurations of inter-organisational relationships by month across 
the seven social housing projects is shown in Appendix 3.3. 
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for coordination was the development of goal congruence among the organisations as 
the ground works gave place to the erection of the building’s structure. As the projects 
were progressing on site, contracting arrangements progressively modelled a well-
defined hierarchy of inter-organisational relationships, which provided a ‘platform’ 
from which to direct organisations.  
Anticipated interdependence resulted in assumptions about the tasks to be performed 
by the different organisations, as well as how those organisations would work together 
(through ties). Such assumptions provided an essential premise for the mandates of the 
monitoring organisations (Gulati & Singh, 1998). Organisations drew upon standard 
industry practices thought to be applicable at various points in time. In Dale Lane 
(Case#1), the main contractor ‘… again advised that suitable storage must be provided 
for refuse bins… [the client organisation] noted that there are mandatory [requirements] 
concerning bin storage that must be met in respect of the Code for Sustainable Homes 
and requested [that the architectural firm] check with their Code Assessor concerning 
this’ (MM04-W4/12-Case#1). This quotation shows how the organisations based their 
operations on notions of anticipated interdependence. 
The client’s project manager for the North Winfield (Case#3) reinforced this control-
minded perspective, suggesting that ‘the things that should [be] known should be 
properly quantified … you should have a good set of drawings, prelims, specifications, 
schedules, and that suite of documents that spells [out] your task’ (PI02-Case#3). The 
implementation of schedules contributed to a hierarchical arrangement of inter-
organisational relationships, as well as some positive consequences of coordination, 
such as the recovery of delays.  
However, intriguingly, delays on site were common even in cases where the project 
was handed over on time (e.g. Cases #4, 6 and 7). A distinctive feature of the cases of 
‘high’ coordination of inter-organisational relationships, though, was the ability to 
recover from such delays. This occurred as a result of organising mechanisms that 
became the backbone of the coordination of inter-organisational relationships. In 
contrast, weeks of delays were not recovered in cases where a mix of coordination 
mechanisms were used (Table 15). Thus, it was not a matter of whether there were 
delays; instead, it was about whether the organisations could coordinate successfully to 
recover from those delays. The recovery of time resulted from a combination of changes 
in work arrangements and the quality of the relationships among the organisations. 
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A remarkable example of the recovery of a delay occurred in Rowlett Road 
(Case#4). In December 2008, the main contractor warned the client’s agent and the 
local council that ‘5 week delays [were] anticipated’ (MM06-W6/8-Case#6). The delays 
followed several design changes and inclement weather. As organising mechanisms 
prevailed in the project, the main contractor managed to recover the time that had been 
lost and the project was delivered on time and at no additional costs. Another example 
of the recovery of delays occurred in Washbrook Road (Case#7). Here, the recovery 
was spectacular, ending in project completion three weeks ahead of the agreed date. In 
July 2009, a revised programme showed that the project was two weeks behind (verbal 
project report given by the main contractor’s project manager at a progress meeting; 
MM04-W4/12-Case#7). After this, the main contractor underwent a process of 
rearranging the work on site among the sub-contractors. A month later, the main 
contractor advised that the delay was being addressed through ‘a revised plan to build 
Plots 22 and 23 houses concurrently with the flats’ (MM05-W5/10-Case#7). In October 
2009, the main contractor reported that ‘the project was currently 3 weeks ahead of 
programme taking into account good internal progress and the roofing and external 
walling not being on the critical path’ (MM07-W7/10-Case#7).  
The ‘good internal progress’ was a consequence of the main contractor rearranging 
the organisations on site, instead of allowing the sub-contractors to coordinate among 
themselves as they had done previously. One technique used was to create sequences of 
work in different sections of the building (MM05-W5/10-Case#7). Initially, the sub-
contractors were dependent on other organisations to complete sections of the building, 
e.g. plot 22. Under the new work arrangements, the main contractor required the sub-
contractors to finish different sections of the building concurrently. By doing so, they 
were able to complete their work more quickly. However, consensus was also a 
fundamental aspect of the enhancement of coordination (Table 15).  
Work rearrangements in the Washrook Road (Case#7) were possible because the 
organisations recognised and agreed upon the need to address concerns. Perhaps the 
primary factor that induced the change was related to the contractual terms in place; the 
main contractor would have experienced sanctions if there had been delays. The main 
contractor, in turn, had contract-based authority over the sub-contractors. Certainly, 
these contractual aspects would have helped to encourage the sort of coordination 
needed to deliver the project ‘on time and on budget’.  
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Naturally, contractual arrangements are intended to align organisations (while 
preventing opportunistic behaviour and exposure to risk). However, in some of the 
cases looked at here contractual arrangements failed to align the organisations 
sufficiently that they could make up delays. In Fulmar Road (Case#2), delays in the 
early stages of the project were carried forward throughout the design and build life-
cycle. This resulted in a handover that was delayed by three weeks.. Hence, consensus 
is not solely contract-driven (van de Ven, 1976, p. 1). 
The organisations engaged in continual consensus-building in order to synchronise 
their actions. In Blyth Court (Case#5), the main contractor agreed to relocate the sockets 
only after it became evident that the installation, as it was, did not comply with planning 
regulations (MM04-W4/12-Case#5). In this case, consensus was induced by legally 
binding requirements, although it still required negotiation among the parties concerned 
regarding the correct course of action. The relationships among the parties proved to 
affect the coordination aimed at addressing unexpected hazards, such as design 
misspecifications. When the main contractor noticed a requirement for a ‘false’ door in 
order to address a design misspecification in the social housing development in 
Washbrook Road (Case#7), the client and the architect were reportedly ‘confident the 
proposal to use working doorways will be accepted [by the local council]’ (MM05-
W5/10-Case#7). Such an optimistic perspective was based partly on the fact that this 
was a self-evident solution but also, and more importantly, because the organisations 
involved, namely the main contractor and the architect, were willing to work together.  
The organisations often looked for cost-saving strategies to offset unforeseen costs. 
While the roof and external brick walls were completed in the Fulmar Road project 
(Case#2) during a sunny July75, the client ‘noted that due to possible additional costs 
that may be incurred, consideration should be given to finding any possible savings 
within the scheme’ (MM11-W11/18-Case#2). The development of cost-saving 
strategies was important because it increased the threshold of costs that the 
organisations involved in the build, mainly the main contractor, could afford before 
extra costs would have to be passed on to the client.  
Up to now, I have shown an emerging sequence of relating followed by organising 
mechanisms, associated with the cases with a high level of coordination. 
 
                                                 
75
 UK weather records by region are available at http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate/uk/stationdata/ 
(MetOffice - UK's National Weather Service). 
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5.3.3. Sustainability of Relating 
In the last section, I observed some sustainability in the relating mechanisms 
underlying the coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relationships. In the cases 
with high coordination, the organisations operated in a dense configuration that 
followed on from the use of organising mechanisms of coordination. Interestingly, a 
low level of coordination occurred when the organising mechanism prevailed. 
The relating mechanisms consisted of an array of actions that enhanced the 
coordination consequences following the process of shaping-up through organising 
(Table 15). The recovery of delays and continuous adaptability were pronounced. A 
recovery of five weeks was registered for the Rowlett Road (MM06-W6/8-Case#4). A 
recovery of delays also occurred in Washbrook Road (Case#7). I observed that 
organisations engaged in collaborative behaviour that was often based on relationships 
of trust. Because the inter-organisational relationships were densely connected, cross-
understandings and trust behaviours developed. These dense configurations were a 
characteristic of those configurations where the coordination was found to be high. 
Thus, there was a link between the relating coordination mechanisms (i.e. dense 
configurations), trusting behaviours and time-saving effects. The importance of trust 
being embedded in inter-organisational ties in terms of the effect on time-saving is also 
reported by Uzzi (1997) in his study of the New York fashion industry. 
Trusting behaviours were often exhibited as the organisations coordinated their 
endeavours when applying for certifications – the lead-up to project completion. A 
common example across the cases was the submission of documentation to the local 
council and the EA in order to obtain full discharge of the planning conditions76. This is 
necessary before a main contractor can proceed with the handover of a newly built 
social development. The time gap between project completion on site and the agreed 
handover date was often very tight (and sometimes shortened still further by delays on 
site). Thus, the organisations had a narrow time window in which to submit all of the 
required documentation. Given the time pressure, trusting behaviours and fluidity of 
information were essential components of coordination (Bechky, 2006). For instance, in 
Washbrook Road (Case#7), the main contractor anticipated that the formal BRE 
                                                 
76
 Planning permission is granted on the basis that specific conditions are met at the various stages of the 
building process (see Appendix 1.2). At each stage, specific planning conditions are discharged, that is 
the client submits the required proof that conditions have been met to the local council. These conditions 
vary widely across the country and are enforced by local council. More information can be found at 
http://www.planningportal.gov.uk 
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certificate would be unavoidably delayed, impacting upon the formal handover to the 
client. This was detailed in a meeting in December 2009: ‘If [the main contractor] don’t 
anticipate the final BRE certificates being available at handover, then the Code 
Assessor’s letter confirming his visit just prior and that the project will achieve final 
level 3 certification would be acceptable’ (MM09-W9/10-Case#7). Thus, an informal 
agreement among the organisations was critical. 
Flexibility too was important for the organisations, for example, in carrying out the 
final work on the building – e.g. footpaths and landscaped areas. Beyond the faults in 
the building identified during the snagging process, minor work was often noted as 
necessary, even if there were no contractual obligations in this respect. In these cases, a 
high quality of relationships among the organisations (typical of dense configurations) 
was crucial. As an illustration, the main contractor in Oakley Road (Case#6) agreed to 
carry out work to relocate a footpath. This was proposed by the client when the project 
was near completion. Nonetheless, the main contractor agreed to it at no extra cost. 
Relating mechanisms were also required to address concerns perceived as potential 
hazards, for example, to obtain the required certification (Table 15). In Blyth Court 
(Case#5), the relationships between the main contractor, the ‘window man’77, the client 
and their consultants were important as concerns were raised regarding the 
compatibility between the materials being used and the requirement for SbD 
certification. (This certification aims to prevent crime and requires numerous material 
specificities.) Both the main contractor and the ‘window man’ engaged in an exchange 
of information about the requirements in terms of materials and design. This was 
necessary because the windows and doors were being manufactured using a new 
technology. None of the organisations knew about the compatibility (and therefore 
compliance) of the materials with SbD certification. In the end, SbD certification was 
granted to the social housing development. In relation to the same certification, 
however, the story for the Dale Lane (Case#1) had a different ending. Although the 
client and their agent repeatedly asked the main contractor about their endeavours 
regarding the SbD certification – which was a contractual requirement – the matter 
seems to have remained shrouded in a degree of mystery. As I explained earlier in this 
chapter, SbD certification was not granted to this development because of coordination 
                                                 
77
 This was the language used in the minutes of the meeting (MM06-W6/12-Case#5). 
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problems between the main contractor and the local police. (I shall explore how 
coordination problems such as these unfolded in the next chapter.) 
 
A key finding presented here is that the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships is a journey, wherein the juggling of mechanisms is (at least) as important 
as the coordination mechanisms themselves. Together, the dynamic inter-organisational 
relationships in these cases were coordinated through a time-dependent combination of 
mechanisms. Cases with a high level of coordination shared the same sequence of 
coordination mechanisms: relating  organising relating. In cases of low 
coordination, other sequences occurred.  
 
This chapter has shown, against the conventional wisdom, that the coordination of 
dynamic inter-organisational relationships hinges on an interplay between the action of 
coordination and the structures of inter-organisational relationships. Drawing on an in-
depth longitudinal study, I have demonstrated the unfolding of two coordination 
mechanisms, that I have termed organising and relating. Furthermore, I have argued that 
the sequence in which these two coordination mechanisms were applied in the seven 
projects explains the cross-case variance in the consequences of the coordination of 
dynamic inter-organisational relationships. In the next chapter, I shall explore why there 
are coordination problems. 
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Chapter VI: Coordination Problems 
 
 
 
 
Overview 
 
Why do coordination problems occur in dynamic inter-organisational relationships? 
Given the scarcity of prior literature on this topic, I shall start by conceptualising the 
notion of coordination problems based on my extensive set of data, with which I was 
able to conduct a detailed monthly inventory of coordination problems – that is, a 
failure to align organisations or resources in a purposeful manner – across the seven 
cases. 
My analysis revealed that the coordination problems stemmed from two 
mechanisms: contractual bottlenecks and organisational expertise-driven homophily. 
These mechanisms cause discontinuities to develop in the social fabric of inter-
organisational relationships, the social fabric being defined as the structure (i.e. ties) and 
coordination-related ‘qualities’ of the structure (e.g. cross-understandings). My month-
on-month study of coordination problems showed that these discontinuities are of three 
types: contract-induced, expertise-induced and ‘break-up’. 
In what is a puzzling finding – at least for me – my study singles out a paradox: the 
mechanisms that foster coordination can also lead to coordination problems under 
certain conditions. 
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6. Coordination Problems in Dynamic Inter-Organizational 
Relationships 
 
 
Building As I showed in the last chapter, I found that dynamic inter-organisational 
relationships are not always well coordinated. I also found that coordination problems 
recurred in all of the cases at various stages of the design and build life-cycle. In this 
chapter, I shall start by conceptualising coordination problems in the context of my 
study. 
 
6.1. Coordination Problems – What are they? 
Coordination Coordination problems are recognisable by the failure to align 
organisations and resources in a purposeful manner. I say ‘recognisable’ because the 
current literature provides only anecdotal examples of coordination problems (Heath & 
Staudenmayer, 2000; Kogut & Zander, 1996). I therefore felt the need to conceptualise 
the notion of coordination problems based on accounts from the minutes of meetings 
and projects reports. This option was advantageous because it avoided ‘context-
stripping’ (Leonard-Barton, 1990) and addressed the lack of a definition in prior 
research.  
The failure to align actions and resources becomes a ‘problem’ due to 
interdependence among organisations (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000; Katila et al., 
2008; Kogut & Zander, 1996). Accordingly, coordination problems represent a 
misalignment among interdependent organisations. As shown in Figure 13, 
coordination problems occur when at least two organisations fail to coordinate their 
actions and resources in a purposeful manner. The failure to fulfil the purpose is 
represented as a mismatch between the two symbols on the right of the figure 
(representing resources, such as organisational expertise and machinery), with the 
alignment between Organisation A (i) and Organisation B (j) failing to complete the 
‘square’.  
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Figure 13 Stylised Representation of Coordination Problems  
 
Organisation A (i) 
Organisation B (j) 
Failure to align actions 
and resources 
Purpose 
Coordination 
problem  
≠ 
 
I started my conceptualisation of the notion of coordination problems by building on 
the prior research, but then I moved on to using the extensive data I had gathered from 
the minutes of meetings and project reports, and this formed the main basis for my final 
conceptualisation. In line with inductive research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glasser & Strauss, 
1967), prior research alludes to ‘coordination failures’ (Podolny & Page, 1998; 
Williamson, 1991). Although instructive, I argue that ‘coordination failures’ are 
associated with the cessation of the inter-organisational relationships (e.g. alliances) 
(Ariño & Torre, 1998; Park & Ungdon, 2001) or the failure of the project (Mitev, 1996). 
Coordination problems lend themselves more to processual studies and refer to episodes 
of misalignment that do not necessarily lead to coordination failures78. My view of 
coordination problems is therefore akin to the omission of actions and resources 
throughout the collaboration process (Bechky, 2006; Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000) and 
to incompatibilities (or dysfunctionalities) across the network of organisations (Jones et 
al., 1997; Podolny & Page, 1998). Accordingly, I use these two dimensions as a starting 
point to investigate how coordination problems manifested themselves.  
(1) Omissions of actions and resources covers ‘forgetting’ to submit documentation 
and misallocations of resources for performing required tasks (Table 16). A typical 
example was delays in planning approvals, as well as decisions on other planning-
related aspects. Delays in planning approvals were common across several of the 
projects (e.g. Cases #1 and #7). Organisations often failed to circulate information 
relevant to the actions of other parties working on the project. Consider the design and 
                                                 
78
 I developed this argument in more detail in Chapter II. 
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installation of the biomass system in North Wingfield (Case#3). After several changes 
to the design features, various organisations had to develop collaborative relationships 
to address unplanned task interdependencies. In April 2009, ‘[i]t was agreed that [the 
main contractor] would discuss with [the engineers] and [the biomass system 
manufacturer] the involvement and appointment of [an environmental consultant who 
would] assist in the procurement of designs for the boiler house, ring main and 
installation [in] the properties for the ESCO [Energy Service Company]’ (MM11-
W11/19-Case#3). This episode dates back to the start of the project. The client, the 
client’s agent and the main contractor made the assumption that the biomass system 
manufacturer would be supplying all of the necessary accessories. However, the 
biomass system manufacturer clarified later that the main contractor would have to 
manage the procurement process for the accessories.  
Omissions often related to features being missed from drawings, preventing the 
fulfilment of the client’s requirements or compliance with planning policies (Table 16). 
Such omissions often came at a cost for the organisations involved. In North Wingfield 
(Case#3), the main contractor and the architect failed to deliver a conservatory as 
requested by the client. According to the information I obtained, ‘it was also confirmed 
by [the client’s project manager] that [the client organisation] will accept the omission 
of the Conservatory; have the oven and hob provided to the wheelchair units at nil cost’ 
(MM12-W12/19-Case#3). This example shows that the costs of the oven and the hob 
for the wheelchair units were passed on to the main contractor. This is an example of 
direct costs to organisations; however, omissions also accrue indirect costs. This can 
occur in the case of misplaced orders of supplies or misleading information about 
project specifications. According to the drawings for the Fulmar Road (Case#2), ‘13 
tanks had been recommended. This was an error as a result of incorrect Engineer 
calculations. The actual required number of tanks is 18’ (MM13-W13/18-Case#2). This 
error resulted in additional costs to the organisations; for instance, the main contractor 
had made its bid on the basis of thirteen tanks. However, the costs were absorbed by the 
client from a contingency fund, which is typical in these projects (these costs do 
contribute towards the figure for the extra costs in this project, though). 
(2) Incompatibility of actions stems from poor coordination and unanticipated task 
dependencies (Table 16). This is widely reported in the literature on the building 
industry (Gann, 1996; Latham, 1994; Smyth & Pryke, 2008). My analysis finds several 
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examples of it. In Blyth Court (Case#5), ‘at the commencement of the works […] the 
report by [specialist consultant] was inadequate for the works, and [...] he had therefore 
commissioned a further report which had sited additional works and therefore the 
Asbestos Removal Costs had increased’ (MM02-W2/12-Case#5). Incompatibility of 
actions was common in the transition period between the design and building stages.  
A typical example of incompatibility of actions is provided by so-called 
‘buildability’ issues. These refer primarily to misspecifications in the design or design 
features that pose unexpected technical complexity in the building work. For example, 
the client’s agent for the Oakley Road (Case#6) confirmed that ‘changes to the roof 
design for “buildability” purposes have been made’ (CR05-Case#6). However, 
incompatibilities extended to work arrangements on the site, with some organisations 
incompatible with others. In North Wingfield (Case#3), the client’s agent ‘was 
concerned that the delays in the engrossment of the 278, 38 and 104 will start to affect 
programme. Furthermore, these delays will also affect services to site and potentially 
completion of the project based on the revised programme’. This example shows that 
the actions of various organisations must be coordinated because of extended 
interdependencies among organisations. The ultimate implication of coordination 
problems such as incompatibility of actions is potential delays to the project (Table 16).  
The incompatibility of actions is reflected in decisions that affect the project (and 
might even compromise the intended outcomes). An example of this came to light 
through the client’s agent’s description of the submission of the application for the 
Sustainable Homes Code at Dale Lane (Case#1): ‘Level 3 Sustainable homes; Gas saver 
boiler offers up to 52% more efficiency; Mid terrace have solar panels and normal 
combi[nation], which kicks in if no heated water in the 90L tank from the solar power; 
10 year product guarantee on solar panels; Low flow water taps throughout; Bin store 
for individual houses, communal for apartments; Windows/Door/Lighting are all Secure 
By Design but the site design does not comply’ (MM11-W11/12-Case#1). Although the 
organisations had managed to fulfil several requirements, environmental standards were 
jeopardised because some of the design features and materials failed to comply with 
Secure By Design (I shall discuss this example in more detail in the following section). 
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Table 16  Illustrative Evidence of Coordination Problems in Inter-organisational Relationships 
Dimensions Illustrative Evidence of Coordination Problems (Within Cases) Summary (Across Cases) 
(1)  
Omissions of 
actions and 
resources 
‘It was also confirmed by [the client’s project manager] that [the client organisation] will accept the 
omission of the Conservatory; have the oven and hob provided to the wheelchair units at nil cost’ (MM12-
W12/19-Case#3); 
‘Revised drawings changing the car parking spaces were provided by the architect’; the main contractor 
argued ‘the levels on these drawings do not work’ (MM07-W7/12-Case#5); 
‘13 tanks had been recommended. This was an error as a result of incorrect Engineer calculations. The 
actual required number of tanks is 18’ (MM13-W13/18-Case#2). 
Omissions cover technical specifications 
and coordination of tasks among 
organisations. Examples are ‘forgetting’ 
to submit documentation when it 
requires the involvement of multiple 
organisations. 
(2) 
Incompatibility of 
actions (i.e. 
inadequate 
actions) 
‘At the commencement of the works … that the report by [specialist consultant] was inadequate for the 
works, and that he had therefore commissioned a further report which had [cited] additional works’ 
(MM02-W2/12-Case#5); 
‘Changes to the roof design for “buildability” purposes have been made’ (CR05-Case#6). 
‘The original planning application had to be withdrawn as planners were not happy with trees and parking 
facility being lost’ (MM02-W2/10-Case#7); 
‘… whilst it was accepted that a sub-station on site was unavoidable, its positioning near the flats 
entrances was not acceptable’ (MM03-W3/10-Case#7); 
‘Location of soil and vent pipes were reviewed on site and alternative locations agreed’ (MM03-W3/12-
Case#5). 
Incompatibility is recorded for 
interdependent tasks performed across 
organisational boundaries, e.g. planning 
authority, main contractors and 
architects. Incompatibilities are due to 
poor coordination and unanticipated task 
dependencies.   
(3) 
Untimely 
alignment 
 
‘Biomass System designs to be completed by [specialist contractors] within timescales’ (MM18-W18/19-
Case#3); 
‘At the time of my [the local police] visit it became obvious that the site would not achieve the award due 
mainly to layout and orientation, which at this late stage could not be changed to meet the SbD criteria, so 
therefore it failed to achieve the [SbD] award’ (EE01-Case#1); 
‘Application was submitted on 21.05.2010 … technical approval is required by 9 July 2010 if their 
programme is to be achieved’ (MM05-W5/18-Case#2); 
 ‘[Main contractor] confirmed that a Robust Details application has been registered. [Client’s agent] stated 
[specialist consultants] are awaiting structural information from [structural engineers] who confirmed this 
would be issued direct by Monday 18th to [local council]’ (MM02-W2/8-Case#6).  
An emerging form of manifestation of 
coordination problems is untimely 
alignment. Across cases, agreed 
timescales define the requirements for 
coordination among organisations. 
However, organisations often have to 
wait for other organisations; this leads to 
delays on site and uncertainty about 
performance targets. 
Note: Components (1) and (2) are based on the literature and component (3) emerged from my analysis 
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(3) Untimely alignment refers to situations where, although there might not have 
been omissions or incompatibilities, the interactions among the organisations were 
either not achieved at the right time, or were not appropriate for the situation. This is 
the final dimension of coordination problems, and it emerged from my data analysis. 
A fundamental aspect of coordination among organisations during projects is the 
completions of tasks within agreed timescales. This is particularly important because 
delays in completing a given task can have repercussions for other parties, due to the 
mutual dependence of tasks and organisations. Therefore, monitoring organisations 
actively set deadlines. For example, the client’s agent on the Fulmar Road (Case#2) 
advised that the ‘application was submitted on 21.05.2010 … technical approval is 
required by 9 July 2010 if their programme is to be achieved’ (MM05-W5/18-
Case#2), illustrating the importance of timely interactions (Table 16). 
A typical example of untimely alignment among organisations is provided by the 
application for SbD certification at the Dale Lane (Case#1). The organisations 
responsible were late in submitting their application for the SbD certification, even 
though it was a contractual requirement. This also caused difficulties in the 
certification of the building’s environmental sustainability. These difficulties were 
flagged by the client’s project manager, who ‘advised that part of the code79 requires 
achievement of Secured by Design’ (MM01-W1/12-Case#1). The main contractor, 
the client and their agents, and the local police (responsible for issuing the SbD) 
failed to satisfactorily align their actions in time. I sought further information via 
email exchanges with the managers involved in this episode. According to an official 
from the local police, ‘the development failed to achieve SbD mainly because of the 
non-interaction by the developer with myself’ (EE01-Case#1). In a further email 
exchange, the official from the local police noted that the main contractor had only 
sought contact when the project was already near completion (EE01-Case#1). Thus, 
as the local police officer explained to me: ‘At the time of my visit it became obvious 
that the site would not achieve the award due mainly to layout and orientation, which 
at this late stage could not be changed to meet the SbD criteria, so therefore it failed 
to achieve the award’ (EE01-Case#1). The failure to receive SbD certification in this 
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 [Added by the author] The ‘code’ refers to the CfSH. Abridged names such as this are used 
frequently in the documentation across the case studies.  
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case occurred as it was too late to carry out the required changes in order to meet the 
certification requirements.  
In summary, my analysis showed that coordination problems entail the following 
dimensions: (1) omissions of actions and resources, (2) incompatibility of actions 
and (3) untimely alignment. The third of these emerged from my data analysis and 
adds a nuanced perspective to our understanding of coordination problems (Heath & 
Staudenmayer, 2000; Podolny & Page, 1998), showing that the timing of the 
interaction matters.  
The coordination problems mattered for two reasons: First, targets for the social 
housing developments were missed (e.g. SbD certification) and second, organisations 
spent additional resources. This was the case with the Dale Lane project regarding 
SbD certification. Speaking to the client (this was also confirmed by the local police 
officer), I learnt that the main contractor had appealed to the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO) after certification was denied. This action involved the 
resources (e.g. time) of the main contractor, as well as of the client, their agent and 
the architect. Everyone involved hoped that the decision to deny SbD would be 
overturned by ACPO (partially because it was a funding requirement). That did not 
occur, however. There were also relational costs since the relationships between the 
main contractor and both the client and the local council were jeopardised. The 
potential for the client and the main contractor to do business again in the future was 
therefore compromised (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). 
Interestingly, coordination problems occurred despite contractual arrangements 
being in place. Contracts are regarded in prior research as an intended – or even 
desired – way of coordinating (Ring & van de Ven, 1994; Williamson, 1996). 
However, as shown, coordination problems did occur. This reinforces the pertinence 
of my last research question: Why do coordination problems occur in dynamic inter-
organisational relationships? 
 
6.2. Mechanisms of Coordination Problems 
My analysis shows that coordination problems occur across the seven cases. 
Paradoxically, the underlying mechanisms of coordination problems originate in the 
very mechanisms used to coordinate the relationships. My findings show that 
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coordination problems stem from two mechanisms: contractual bottlenecks and 
organisational expertise-driven homophily. 
6.2.1. Contractual Bottlenecks 
The first mechanism refers to the control of communications on the basis of 
organisations’ contractual relationships with one another (i.e. contract versus non-
contract). Such control results from two micro-level processes: contractual 
homophily and contractual centrality. The former refers to organisations’ tendency to 
create ties with parties that have similar contractual obligations (to the project) to 
their own, while the latter captures the control of information by organisations that 
occupy central positions in the configuration of relationships (Table 17). Contractual 
homophily and contractual centrality came to light as I analysed coordination 
problems in parallel with the structures of inter-organisational relationships80. This 
insight from the data is enhanced by a multimedia representation. 
************************** 
Multimedia File 2 Mechanisms of Contractual Bottlenecks 
************************** 
Contractual homophily came from my observation that coordination problems 
often emerged among organisations with a contractual relationship, for example 
between the client and the main contractor. Contractual relationships are called 
arm’s-length ties to distinguish them from embedded ties (Uzzi, 1997). In this study, 
I want to use the notion of contractual relationships in a broad sense, namely, 
interactions involving organisations engaged in a contractual relationship that is not 
necessarily restricted to the parties belonging to the tie. Thus, a tie between the 
client’s agent and the main contractor is regarded as a contractual relationship. 
Although these two organisations are not engaged in a contractual arrangement, both 
are working under contractual relationships specific to the project. This 
operationalisation is consistent with the distinction between ‘contractual’ and ‘non-
contractual’ relationships (Macaulay, 1963). 
However, other coordination problems occurred between organisations that were 
in contractual relationships and those that were in non-contractual relationships. 
Delays in gaining planning approval from the local council due to the misalignment 
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 See Appendix 4.3 for month-by-month graphical representations of the inter-organisational 
relationships. 
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of actions by other organisations (e.g. the late submission of documentation by the 
main contractor and architect) are notable examples that involve non-contractual 
organisations. The authority of the local council is legally endorsed by the UK’s 
legal framework (regarding planning permits) rather than by any contract between 
the parties, at least according to the legal meaning of the word ‘contract’. Numerous 
coordination problems were related to changes in the layouts in order to meet 
planning requirements. The architects have contracts with their clients but not with 
the local council. Accordingly, coordination problems often involved both 
contractual and non-contractual ties.  
I learnt of this aspect of contractual arrangements in more detail while talking to 
an architect (EE03-Case#5). He explained to me that, although contracts were used 
so as to prevent coordination problems, often they were not sufficient to do. 
Opportunism was frequently observed among the organisations on site. According to 
the architect, ‘you [myself, seen as the client] have opportunism and that’s the way 
the game is played because once you [have] signed the contract little can be done’ 
(EE03-Case#5). This quotation shows the difficulty of changing either the contract or 
the terms of the contract, even if one party’s actions are regarded as opportunistic. 
The architect added, ‘if your contractor [client’s main contractor] is wanting to 
charge you large sums of money for the mistakes that I [the architect] made, it says 
it’s quite difficult to get another contractor, it’s very expensive, very disruptive to 
throw them off [main contractor] and start again’. The interviewee was referring here 
to a rather common problem in the building industry: main contractors 
opportunistically seek to profit from design misspecifications, knowing that, once 
they are on site, it will be difficult for the client to replace them with other 
organisations. This difficulty arises from two factors: (1) it requires a contractual 
relationship to be ended and (2) it imposes extra costs on the client. As a result, the 
main contractor acquires a powerful position in relation to the client and their agents.  
Once a design misspecification has been identified on site, one could expect that 
the main contractor and the architect would communicate in order to address the 
problem. Rather, the minutes of meetings provided many instances where the main 
contractor would interact with the client (these two organisations having a 
contractual arrangement) instead of the architect. If involved at all, the architect 
would coordinate with the client (as these two organisations also had a contractual 
arrangement). For instance, in Blyth Court (Case#5), the client became the 
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intermediary between the contractor and the architect to address the numerous design 
misspecifications, although the main contractor could have exchanged information 
with the architect directly. Instead of seeking alternatives, they demanded an 
extension to complete the project. This request was refused following advice from 
the client’s agent (MM07-W7/12-Case#5).  
Design misspecifications also illustrate another facet of contractual arrangements 
that helps to explain coordination problems. In the aforementioned examples, all the 
organisations were engaged in some sort of contractual arrangement. However, the 
coordination problems were more evident where coordination was required between 
organisations with a non-contractual relationship, such as the local council or the 
police. Recalling the example of the SbD certification at the Dale Lane (Case#1), an 
organisation with a contractual relationship to the project (i.e. the main contractor) 
failed to align its actions with an organisation with a non-contractual relationship to 
the project (i.e. the local police). The main contractor favoured interaction with 
organisations on site, where contractual obligations were directly enforceable. 
Perhaps it was a sign of over-confidence, but the manager working for the main 
contractor neglected a dialogue with the local police.  
Accordingly, contractual relationships breed ties among organisations, that is 
contractual homophily exists. The coordination problems in the seven cases involved 
organisations with contracts and without. Numerous delays were registered (based on 
project reports) across the case studies regarding the connection of the sites to the 
national grid (e.g. water). Utilities were critical to the work on the sites, as well as to 
full operation of the buildings after completion. However, the utility companies had 
no contractual obligation to respond promptly beyond their moral and legal 
obligation to connect the site to the national grid within a reasonable amount of time.  
In North Wingfield Road (Case#3), the main contractor and the client could not 
proceed with the preparation of documentation because of a failure ‘to gain 
resolution of Street Names and Post codes from … Building Control for Wayside 
Close. [Main contractor, client and their agent] will continue to chase Building 
Control / Post Office for confirmation’ (MM17-W17/19-Case#3). This represents a 
coordination problem insofar as the organisations (i.e. main contractor and client) 
faced a disruption to their workflow because of a lack of information required from 
one party. Indeed, there was a delay in confirming the postal addresses compared to 
the standard amount of time this usually takes across the building industry. 
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Table 17 Contractual Bottlenecks 
1. Stylised View 2. Mechanism 3. Definition 4. Measure 5. Consequences 6. Illustrative Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contractual 
homophily 
 
Organisations with 
contractual 
arrangements form ties 
with other 
organisations with 
contractual 
arrangements, while 
those without 
contractual 
arrangements form 
times with others 
without contractual 
arrangements. 
Based on E-I 
index 
(Krackhardt & 
Stern, 1988) 
Contractual relationships 
shape inter-organisational 
relationships. 
Communication and 
willingness to coordinate in 
the seven cases reflected the 
awareness of contractual 
versus non-contractual 
arrangements. 
- Design misspecifications and 
their correction (across 
projects); 
- The SbD application for 
Dale Lane; 
- Coordination with ‘other’ 
organisations, such as utility 
companies, e.g. to connect the 
site to the national grid. 
Contractual 
centrality 
Organisations in a 
contractual 
arrangement occupy 
central positions in the 
project network. 
Based on group 
centrality 
(Everett & 
Borgatti, 1999) 
Organisations with 
contractual ties to the project 
also occupied central 
positions in the 
configuration of inter-
organisational relationships. 
Centrality and contractual 
obligations contribute jointly 
to the control of information. 
This resulted in delays and 
additional costs. 
- Slow responses between 
organisations when one was 
central and the other in a 
peripheral position; 
- Poor fluidity of information 
among organisations resulted 
in the need to reverse 
decisions and actions, e.g. 
relocation of the power station 
in Washbrook Road (Case#7). 
* I use a stylised representation given the impracticality of presenting the graphical representation of the configurations of dynamic inter-organisational relationships for all 
waves and across all seven case studies. Additionally, the stylised visualisation enhances interpretation.   
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This illustration shows how organisations linked by a contractual relationship 
(main contractor, client and client’s agent) aligned their actions but coordination 
problems emerged when they had to deal with organisations with whom they had no 
contract (Multimedia File 2). Gaining further understanding of the contract-related 
antecedents of coordination problems will require an additional methodological 
apparatus beyond what I have discussed so far.  
I aimed to assess the extent to which organisations create ties to other parties that 
are contractually related to the project. To do so, I used a routine in UCINET6 to 
compute the E-I index (Krackhardt & Stern, 1988), which is a ratio of the number of 
‘external’ (E) to ‘internal’ (I) ties. In my study, ‘external’ ties refer to ties between 
organisations in the ‘contractual relationship’ group and organisations in the ‘non-
contractual relationship’ group81. ‘Internal ties’ are those between organisations 
within the ‘contractual relationship’ group. I call this my measure of contractual 
homophily. (Methodological details are reported in Appendix 4.1.)  
Contractual centrality suggests that the central organisations in the 
configurations were contractually bound to the projects while those on the periphery 
were not. From the perspective of construction management and economics this is 
expected, as contractors, clients’ agents and sub-contractors are all central to the 
project and have contractual relationships. However, my analysis sheds light on how 
one organisation’s centrality and contractual relationships can help to explain the 
coordination problems that occur (Table 17; Appendix 4.1).  
Centrality and periphery are important notions in configurations of inter-
organisational relationships82. One organisation’s position in the network is defined 
in relation to the number and diversity of ties it has with other organisations 
(Freeman, 1979). An organisation with few ties is generally situated away from the 
centre of the configuration. Those occupying central positions in the case studies 
included key organisations required to complete the seven social housing 
developments, such as the main contractor and the client’s agent. In terms of 
coordination problems, though, organisations located in the periphery nonetheless 
had the capacity to bring the projects to a standstill. These organisations include the 
local council. Non-compliance with planning regulations was one example often 
                                                 
81
 This analysis builds on the coding of ‘contractual relationships’ that was presented in Chapter V. 
82
 The notions of centrality and periphery are similar to the ideas of graph theory, which informs the 
visual representations of the configurations of inter-organisational relationships that are used in this 
study (as well as in other studies, regardless of the SNA software package used). 
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neglected by the organisations on site, for which the project was just about the 
construction process. This sometimes resulted in a partial vision of the project, which 
could challenge the integration of the workflow.  
The interesting finding here is that organisations in contractual relationships 
occupy central positions (Multimedia File 2). Thus, there is an accumulative effect 
in terms of the control of information: both centrality and contracts shape 
communication. Organisations in contractual relationships include those 
organisations key to the design and build life-cycle, and this is the case for every 
social housing development. Organisations such as the main contractor and the 
client’s agent were bound by contracts, yet these organisations were also central in 
the configurations of inter-organisational relationships because of their key roles in 
the building projects.  
Contractual centrality proved to play an explanatory role in terms of creating 
bottlenecks of information, and consequently coordination problems. Information 
among organisations was often shaped by both contractual terms and centrality 
within inter-organisational relationships. The first premise of this argument has been 
reported in the literature: centrality in inter-organisational relationships provides 
organisations with control over information (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Walker et al., 
1997). However, the central aspect in my study of coordination problems relates to 
the combination of centrality and being bound by contractual arrangements. 
Both the contracting arrangements and the centrality of the organisations shaped 
the information that was required to coordinate the inter-organisational relationships. 
A lack of timely information accounted for many of the coordination problems. In 
several instances, delays to the work on site were observed to be due to the main 
contractor holding back information regarding the progress on site or about changes 
to material specifications. In several cases, too, they routinely failed to communicate 
with the local council. The main contractor was a central organisation but the local 
council was located at the periphery of the network of inter-organisational 
relationships. In Rowlett Road (Case#4), the main contractor was late in handing 
over documentation to the local council. The planning approval was consequently 
delayed for several days. Slow responses between organisations respectively 
operating at the centre and the periphery had implications for the progress on site. 
This was reported for the North Wingfield (Case#3): ‘[the architect] will issue 
drawings to Building Control to apply pressure on Building Control. Without 
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resolution [main contractor] will be “Potentially” [quotation marks as in the original] 
delayed in procuring service connections and meters to units on plots 4 – 16…’ 
(MM15-W15/19-Case#3).  
Contractual centrality had severe implications in many cases, as the coordination 
problems proved to be costly. In the case of the (re)location of the electrical sub-
station83 for the Washbrook Road (Case#7), the main contractor had arranged with 
the utility company to locate a power sub-station to meet the power specifications for 
the full operation of the building. However, the location of the sub-station was 
promptly rejected by the client and their agent. Further to the instruction given by the 
client, the client’s agent informed the main contractor that ‘whilst it was accepted 
that a sub-station on site was unavoidable, its positioning near the flats entrances was 
not acceptable’ (MM03-W3/10-Case#7). The client justified the need for immediate 
relocation of the sub-station based on the potentially negative impact on the SbD 
certification. The main contractor had to establish further contact with the utility 
company to discuss the possibility of relocating the sub-station. Although the utility 
company agreed to this, the costs of doing so were transferred to the main contractor. 
The main contractor had to accept these costs given the lack of alternatives.  
In summary, contractual bottlenecks, based on the micro-processes of contractual 
homophily and contractual centrality, explain the role of contracts in the 
development of coordination problems. This provides a perspective whereby 
contracts are studied in relation to the structure of inter-organisational relationships.   
 
6.2.2. Organisational Expertise-Driven Homophily 
The second mechanism of coordination problems relates to organisational 
expertise. Organisations tend to form ties with other organisations with similar 
expertise. This can be termed expertise-driven homophily (Table 18). For instance, 
managers working for the main contractors tended to interact with their counterparts 
working for the sub-contractors and had limited interaction with the architects and 
engineers. An essential aspect of effective coordination in building projects is the 
alignment of actions and resources among organisations across domains of 
organisational expertise84.  
                                                 
83
 A power sub-station is a room that connects the building to the national grid. 
84
 As I identified in Chapter V, I used: design, managing, building, engineering, planning and other. 
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Task-related interdependence across the seven case studies created an imperative 
for coordination among organisations. However, organisations tended to form ties 
with other parties carrying out similar functions in the building project. Coordination 
problems emerged when it was necessary to integrate different domains of 
organisational expertise from different organisations. Moreover, while similarity 
facilitated inter-organisational coordination, lack of similarity hindered essential 
integration across domains of organisational expertise. 
Prior research suggests that organisations operating in similar organisational 
fields develop common heuristics (Grandori, 1997b; Hansen, 1999; Kogut & Zander, 
1996) and knowledge-sharing practices (Kogut & Zander, 1996). In my study, I 
found that the main contractors experienced fewer problems communicating with the 
sub-contractors than, for example, with the architects. Previous research has shown 
that this also occurs in biotechnology companies involved in collaborative ventures 
to develop new products (Powell et al., 1996; Walker et al., 1997). Similarity – of 
industry, for example – implies the upholding of conventions and an industry-
standard language that enhances communication among the parties.  
I experienced the importance of similarity to communication myself when 
conducting exploratory interviews. Initially, I often had to ask for clarification of the 
terms used by the interviewees. Although terms such as PPP [Public Private 
Partnership], Stage C [Design, according to RIBA’s plan of work stages] and M&E 
services are standard in the industry, I had difficulty in grasping this vocabulary in 
the early stages of my study. (I was used to thinking in theory-informed terms 
instead). Thus, similarity among parties enhances information transfer and 
communication, and similarity between the organisations enhanced the coordination 
of their inter-organisational relationships.  
I often found coordination problems recorded between organisations from 
different domains of organisational expertise. Although similarity enhanced 
coordination, problems often occurred when organisations from different domains of 
organisational expertise were required to align their actions and resources. On the 
one hand, similarity of organisational expertise fostered coordination. On the other 
hand, the interdependence of the production process demanded coordinated 
operations among expertise-diverse organisations. The challenge, therefore, was 
collaboration among dissimilar organisations. This has been observed in other 
project-based arrangements across industries (Bechky, 2006; Maurer & Ebers, 2006). 
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My cross-case analysis shows several instances of coordination problems 
involving organisations with different expertise. Still, the underpinnings of the 
coordination problems were often deeply embedded in the fabric of the inter-
organisational relationships. One project manager suggested to me: ‘you have got the 
technical problem of different languages and software packages that people use to 
interconnect. That was about communication language and how far you had to take 
data from its original, it’s a metadata so that everybody could understand it and then 
it was reconstituted the other side’ (PI01-Case#4). Language was entrenched in the 
terminology used in documents (Table 18). The issue of file extensions came up in 
several of my data sources. It was discussed by the client’s project manager on the 
Fulmar Road (Case#2): ‘All electronic drawing issues to be in DWF85 format. In 
order to view, a DWF viewer (available online) is required to be downloaded. [Main 
contractor] to forward sample DWF file to [client] to ensure compatibility’ (MM05-
W5/18-Case#2). DWF files were passed on to the client by the architect for analysis 
and comments before the drawings were finalised.  
Afterwards, the main contractor (through quantity surveyors and project 
managers) used these files to survey the work (e.g. square metres of floors, walls and 
quantities86 of steel and concrete) required, which was important for the preparation 
of the bid. Once on site, the DWF files were consulted regularly to direct the overall 
progress, and to manage the work of numerous sub-contractors at every stage of the 
design and build life-cycle. Incompatibility of file formats could have resulted in 
misspecifications of the measures that the main contractor used to erect the structure 
of the building. 
Communication and language played a critical role in the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships since the organisations were required to combine their 
expertise. The required expertise was held by individuals from across numerous 
organisations, which sustained the interdependence of these projects. One 
organisation’s ability to complete its tasks would be shaped by another organisation’s 
actions. 
                                                 
85
 DWF is a binary format file published by AutoDesk and AutoCAD, specialist software packages 
used for drawing (e.g. buildings, pipework and landscapes). 
86
 This is termed the ‘bill of quantities’ and is a detailed inventory of all the work and materials to be 
used to complete a project.  
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Table 18 Organisational Expertise-Driven Homophily 
1. Stylised Visualisation 2. Mechanism 3. Definition 4. Measure 5. Consequences 6. Illustrative Evidence 
 
Organisational 
expertise-driven 
interaction  
Organisations tended 
to form ties with 
organisations with a 
similar type of 
expertise (i.e. design, 
building, engineering, 
planning, 
management or other 
expertise) 
Measure of 
homophily 
(Ibarra, 1992; 
McPherson & 
Smith-Lovin, 
1987) 
Problematic 
communication among 
parties, coupled with 
different languages and file 
formats among 
professionals. 
Delayed communication 
among parties. 
Disruption across the 
design and build life-cycle. 
- Ordering the wrong amounts of 
material (e.g. tanks) due to 
misspecifications by other 
organisations; 
- ‘Buildability’ issues stemming 
from limited integration across 
domains of organisational 
expertise; 
- Poor fit or incompatibility 
between design and equipment in 
the flats. 
* I use a stylised representation given the impracticality of presenting the graphical representations of the configurations of dynamic inter-organisational relationships for all 
waves and across all seven case studies. Additionally, the stylised visualisation enhances interpretation.   
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According to one interviewee, ‘architects in the UK don’t have formal technical 
knowledge like they do in the rest of the Europe, as it should be. I must admit, I have 
an adverse reaction to architects; I can’t stand them. They draw a couple of lines and 
they expect you to see the artistic implementation of it, and it’s complete nonsense’ 
(EI#14; Chief Executive of Professional Body). Although this opinion sounded quite 
extreme to me at the time, I learnt later that it was fundamentally about ‘buildability’. 
‘Buildability’ is used in the building industry to refer to the feasibility of building 
all the features in the drawings (Table 18). Essentially, the notion of ‘buildability’ 
sheds light on the integration between ‘design’ and ‘building’. I observed that 
organisations often had to make minor changes to the layout – further to approval by 
the local council (i.e. planning control) – in order to improve ‘buildability’ on site. 
The issue of ‘buildability’ was referred to specifically in the main contractor’s 
progress report on the Oakley Road project in July 2008: ‘Changes to the roof design 
for “buildability” purposes have been made’ (CR05-Case#6). Several design changes 
were required by organisations with different domains of organisational expertise.  
Limited coordination across different domains of organisational expertise led to 
additional costs for the organisations. The North Wingfield (Case#3) is a case in 
point. The design and installation of the biomass system was marked by several 
misunderstandings and miscommunications among the various specialists involved. 
However, there were many other examples. In Dale Lane (Case#1), delays in issuing 
the soft landscape proposal resulted in the late submission of documentation to the 
local council. The relocation of a BT (British Telecommunications) cable was 
severely delayed by the utility company, as a result of which the main contractor 
encouraged the client to seek advice from their solicitors (MM11-W11/19-Case#3; 
MM12-W12/19-Case#3). Thus, half-way through the project, the main contractor 
had to reschedule and rearrange the workload on site as the cable needed to be 
removed in order to complete the roof infrastructure. The delay was a further 
problem for the main contractor as it was trying to recover progress on site after 
several other delays that had affected the ground works. At the same time, the main 
contractor and the architect were informed by the water company of several design 
changes that would be required in order to achieve connection to the water main. In 
this case, the building work by the main contractor was already underway when the 
‘back-track’ was required in order to accommodate the new design specifications.  
  
 
 
212
These two examples demonstrate more than just a coordination problem, though; 
indeed, they represent a disruption across the design and build life-cycle whereby 
building started to precede design. In other words, the form (i.e. the building) was 
followed by the concept (i.e. the design). The coordination problems resulted in 
fundamental changes to the industry-standard flow of work and arrangements on site. 
This was also the case when the boilers in several flats in Oakley Road (Case#6) had 
to be relocated in order to create space in the layout. In this case, the building work 
(i.e. the installation of the boilers) preceded the design (i.e. the redesign of the layout 
for every flat) in another example of a disruption occurring across the design and 
build life-cycle. Here, it was due to a coordination problem between the architect and 
the main contractor. Also, the architect and the supplier of the boiler had failed to 
discuss the actual dimensions of the boiler. Consequently, insuffient room was 
allocated in the drawings submitted to the local council for planning permission.  
A measure of organisational expertise-driven homophily must necessarily be built 
on prior research on homophily (Ibarra, 1992; McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1987). 
The measure of homophily is typically used to capture individuals’ tendency to seek 
interactions with other individuals of the same gender and similar ethnicity (Ibarra, 
1992). This reasoning can be extended to the organisational level: interactions among 
organisations are driven by a similarity of industry background and mission 
(McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1987). Accordingly, I computed a measure of 
organisational expertise-driven homophily that captured organisations’ tendency to 
establish interactions (i.e. ties) with other organisations of similar expertise. This 
tendency was defined as the number of ties an organisation had with other 
organisations with similar expertise. Six categories of organisational expertise were 
used: design, monitoring, building, engineering, planning and other (as defined 
earlier in this thesis). A high score for this measure would suggest that the 
organisations in these case studies tended to create more ties with other organisations 
with similar organisational expertise to their own. (See Appendix 4.2 for 
methodological details.) 
Thus far, my findings suggest that coordination problems originate from two 
theoretical mechanisms: contractual bottlenecks and organisational expertise-driven 
homophily. Paradoxically, coordination problems stem from actions intended to 
coordinate dynamic inter-organisational relationships. For example, contracts foster 
contractual homophily and contractual centrality. Similarity of organisational 
  
 
 
213
expertise often degraded the integration required across the design and build life-
cycle. Altogether, these mechanisms of coordination create discontinuities in 
coordination-driven action across configurations of inter-organisational relationships. 
 
6.3.  Discontinuities in the Inter-Organisational Fabric over Time 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will explain how the mechanisms of 
coordination problems described above foster discontinuities in the inter-
organisational fabric that in turn harm the alignment of resources and actions within 
the configurations. I conducted a month-on-month study of the coordination 
problems across the seven cases, based on the ‘measures’ of coordination problems 
developed earlier in this chapter. My aim was to map how these mechanisms unfold 
over time as the configurations of inter-organisational relationships change. Over 
time, the coordination problems proved to be explained by discontinuities in the 
inter-organisational fabric. The notion of a ‘fabric’ reaches beyond the idea of a 
structure of inter-organisational relationships, as it also includes qualities of that 
structure. 
In a preliminary study, my cross-case analysis shows a strong association between 
the coordination problems and overall coordination87. The aggregation of the data 
according to the overall score for coordination provides robustness to my analysis. 
As shown in Figure 14, contractual centrality – where organisations bound by 
contractual relationships also occupy central positions – is substantially lower (0.52) 
in configurations where a high level of coordination was attained (Cases #4, 6 and 7) 
than in cases of low (0.78) and medium (0.80) coordination.  
Contractual homophily – where organisations in contractual relationships tend to 
create ties among themselves – is also higher (0.41) when overall coordination is low 
than when it is high (0.31). However, cases of medium coordination are found to 
have the lowest contractual homophily (0.25). Finally, organisational expertise-
driven homophily is found to have limited variance (0.15 to 0.19) across the three 
levels of coordination. Overall, these findings support my analysis of the 
mechanisms of coordination problems. 
 
 
                                                 
87
 Based on the overall score of coordination consequences (Chapter IV). 
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Figure 14 Relationship between Mechanisms of Coordination Problems and 
Overall Consequences of Coordination 
 
Note: The values for the three mechanisms of coordination problems were averaged across the case 
studies in each category of overall coordination (low, medium and high). They are comparable 
because all range between 0 and 1. 
 
My next step of analysis entailed a month-by-month study of the mechanisms of 
coordination problems, across the seven configurations of dynamic inter-
organisational relationships. In order to do so, I juxtaposed the coordination 
problems with their mechanisms. The result was a fine-grained view on the 
discontinuities in the fabric of dynamic inter-organisational relationships. 
Consistently, over time and across all seven configurations of dynamic inter-
organisational relationships, the discontinuities underlying coordination problems 
were of three types: organisational expertise-induced; contract-induced and ‘break-
up’. 
6.3.1. Contractual-Induced 
Contract-induced discontinuities in the fabric of inter-organisational 
relationships were formed by contractual bottlenecks (i.e. contractual homophily and 
contractual centrality). Positive variations88 in contractual centrality and contractual 
homophily were found to be a sufficient predictor of coordination problems 
throughout the design and build life-cycle (Table 19). Contract-induced 
                                                 
88
 Consistently with prior analyses in this study, I measured this variation using Z-Scores. These 
assess the variation of a variable at a given point in time against the average of that variable over the 
entire period of observation. 
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discontinuities relate to the role of contracts in the development of coordination 
problems. Based on an in-depth longitudinal analysis, periods of increased 
contractual bottlenecks are consistently associated with coordination problems.  
Consider the Blyth Court (Case#5). In the initial six months of the project, there 
were positive variations in contractual homophily and contractual centrality (Table 
19). This suggests that contractual bottlenecks were in place (within the 
configuration of inter-organisational relationships). The outcomes included several 
coordination problems; for instance, miscommunications among personnel working 
for key organisations (e.g. the main contractor and architect). In wave 4, the 
inventory of coordination problems ranged from confusion about the lift and firing 
system involving the client’s agents, engineers and architects to the ordering of M&E 
sub-contractors. This prevented the discharge of planning conditions due to 
outstanding information. Another example of coordination problems associated with 
contract-induced discontinuities is the timeframe between wave 3 and wave 5 in Dale 
Lane (Case#1). This was a critical period for the project: the transition from the 
design to the build stage. Nonetheless, there were substantial positive variations 
incontractual homophily (wave 3, 2.225; wave 4, 1.065; wave 5, 0.285), which 
proved to be associated with numerous coordination problems (Table 19). In wave 4, 
the project manager for the main contractor was late in handing information over to 
the client. At the same time, the manager for the client was concerned about poor 
communication between the main contractor and the architect, which is essential in 
easing the transition from the design to the building stage. Coordination problems 
were growing, with implications for the work progress on site.  
An important element of this analysis concerns the role of contractual 
relationships. All these organisations – engineers, architect and the client’s agents – 
were contractually bound to the project. However, the contractual terms did not 
always result in the alignment of contractual relationships. These organisations in 
contractual relationships demonstrated limited coordination with organisations that 
were not contractually related to the project. Where the contracted organisations did 
work together, several coordination problems nevertheless emerged regarding 
information control. For instance, the main contractor on the Blyth Court (Case#5) 
failed to provide detailed information about health and safety issues; the file 
submitted to the client failed to comply with legal requirements. It was to industry 
standards, though. Collateral warranties from the engineering firms were delayed 
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despite several requests being made by the client and their agent. This was noted in 
the minutes of a meeting in February 2010, in which the client’s agent ‘suggested 
that [the main contractor] liaise with [the client] for the required format of the H&S 
[health and safety file]’ (MM11-W11/12-Case#5). Additionally, the building costs of 
refurbishing Blyth Court were disputed by the main contractor; the costing of project 
reports and cash flows needed clarification. The main contractor claimed that there 
was unforeseen work that needed to be added to the agreed lump sum. The 
consequences of contractual bottlenecks were not just poor coordination due to 
limited contractual relationships. Surprisingly, contractual bottlenecks were also 
associated with coordination between organisations that were contractually bound to 
the project. Although ties were created among organisations, such interactions did 
not always prevent coordination problems.  
A long-term sequence with several coordination problems and contractual 
bottlenecks was observed between waves 11 and 17 for the configuration of inter-
organisational relationships in Fulmar Road (Case#2). Notably, waves 11 and 12 
registered a positive variation in contractual homophily and contractual centrality 
(Table 19). Organisations witnessed several delays involving, for example, the main 
contractor and the sub-contractors, the architect and the client. All these 
organisations were engaged in contractual relationships. For instance, the main 
contractor had signed a contract with the client. Still, there was degradation in 
coordination between these different domains of organisational expertise.   
In Fulmar Road (Case#2), there were several ongoing issues between the main 
contractor and the local council, such as delays in obtaining planning approval. The 
client and the main contractor failed to provide site layout/setup details to the local 
council. Communication between these two organisations was disrupted, which had 
implications for progress on site, for example requiring rearrangements of work and 
schedules. Then, changes to the existing design were required in order for the project 
to achieve compliance with planning requirements. This caused problems for the 
main contractor, which was concentrating on collaborating with several sub-
contractors at the time, in an attempt to recover from delays. Rescheduling the work 
affected the payments it received (from the client) because of the poor progress on 
site. These sanctions (missing payments) were part of the contractual agreement, and 
were based on monthly valuations carried out by the client’s agent. After weeks of 
discussions about the most efficient system to improve the building’s environmental 
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credentials, the biomass system was chosen. However, according to those involved, 
this impacted negatively on the progress of the work on site, due to the technical 
requirements as well as the need for several organisations (specialist sub-contractors 
and local council) to liaise with one another. 
Hence, contracts seem to have induced discontinuities in the fabric of inter-
organisational relationships on these projects. Organisations fail to align resources 
and actions, even if there were (1) contractual relationships between organisations 
and (2) ties among organisations. Thus, the presence of discontinuities goes beyond 
the mere absence of a tie. Although a tie might exist, organisations can still lack goal 
congruence and the consensus needed to coordinate. According to my analysis, the 
lack of goal congruence and consensus was associated to the contractual bottlenecks. 
The coordination problems can be explained by the contractual aspects of the 
relationships among the organisations.
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Table 19 Coordination Problems: A longitudinal cross-case analysis 
Dale Lane (Case#1) 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 
Contr. Homo. -1.084 0.334 2.225 1.065 0.285 -0.869 
Contr. Centr. 0.289 -3.175 0.289 0.289 0.289 0.289 
Org. Exp. 0.739 1.641 -0.613 -1.514 -0.803 0.944 
Coordination 
Problems 
i) Design 
misspecificatio
ns; ii) 
complaints 
from the local 
residents about 
work on site 
i) Local council 
demanded changes to 
design features (due to 
planning regulations); ii) 
ongoing discontent 
expressed by locals 
i) Remaining 
(minor) issues 
with drawings, 
but planning 
approval was 
granted 
i) Main contractor was late in handing over the 
necessary documentation to the client; ii) negative 
impact of some design features on CfSH 
certification; iii) misplacement of the gas board; iv) 
architect failed to send drawings to the main 
contractor; v) poor communication between 
architect and main contractor (as noted by client’s 
project manager) 
i) Changes required to 
material details; ii) 
client’s project 
manager felt that main 
contractor was 
neglecting the SbD 
certification 
i) Design changes due to 
misinformation on 
location of solar panel; 
water storage tank 
impacted adversely on 
the storage space  
(Continued) 
 Wave 7 Wave 8 Wave 9 Wave 10 Wave 11 Wave 12 
Contr. Homo. -0.296 -1.421 -0.611 0.334 -0.296 0.334 
Contr. Centr. 0.289 0.289 0.289 0.289 0.289 0.289 
Org. Exp. -1.514 0.417 0.289 0.289 0.739 -0.613 
Coordination 
Problems 
i) Design changes had to be 
made to the initial project in 
order to comply with planning 
regulations; ii) SbD certification 
was at risk (due to poor 
communication between main 
contractor and local council); 
iii) main contractor reports, 
'have received two differing 
responses from the police 
concerning the scheme' (MM06-
W6/12-Case#1) 
i) Main contractor awaits 
SbD officer site visit; ii) 
architect, engineer, timber 
frame sub-contractor and 
plumbing and heating 
sub-contractor failed to 
provide necessary 
documentation; iii) main 
contractor fails to meet 
the requirements 
regarding the H&S file 
format 
i) Delay to revised soft landscaping layout 
because of late agreement on the use and 
maintenance of external areas; ii) SbD was 
denied due to the lack of natural surveillance of 
the car park areas (this was both a contractual and 
a funding requirement); iii) client was unaware of 
some design changes; iv) disagreement between 
the client and the main contractor regarding the 
efforts to achieve SbD; v) client’s agent stated 
that the main contractor was falling short on 
obtaining assurance from the Building Control 
officer regarding the building's level of access 
i) 'Spotting 
was coming 
through the 
decorations to 
the walls and 
ceilings' 
(MM10-
W10/12-
Case#1) 
i) Fire brigade 
officer was against 
the provision of a 
‘mesh cage’ in 
front of the electric 
meters (MM11-
W11/12-Case#1); 
ii) minor defects 
found 
i) Minor concerns 
about 
management 
arrangements 
between the 
client and the 
local council; ii) 
locals raised 
concerns about 
safety in the area 
 (Table continues on next page) 
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Fulmar Road (Case#2) 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8 Wave 9 Wave 10 
Contr. Homo. 1.342 1.106 0.023 -1.193 -0.181 1.382 -0.499 0.417 -1.675 1.605 
Contr. Centr. -0.210 -1.347 0.699 0.699 0.699 0.699 0.699 0.699 0.699 -0.210 
Org. Exp. -0.784 -0.592 1.859 0.742 -0.592 -0.838 0.907 -0.336 2.357 -0.059 
Coordination 
Problems 
No 
coordinat
ion 
problems 
reported 
i) Changes to the 
drawings; ii) 
organisations 
could not access 
the drawings 
because of the 
file format; iii) 
HA opposed the 
use of soak ways 
underneath 
adopted 
highways (this 
had been a 
design/engineeri
ng decision) 
i) 
Uncertainty 
over whether 
commuted 
sum applied; 
ii) gas 
governor 
placement - a 
problem for 
other tenants 
living in 
close 
proximity to 
the gas 
governor 
No 
coordinat
ion 
concerns 
raised 
i) Delayed release of 
planning conditions 
leading to delays in the 
contract with the main 
contractor; ii) S.106 
Agreement needs 
further amendments; 
iii) Relocation of street 
furniture required to 
satisfy planning 
conditions; iv) late 
hand-in of documents 
to finalise the contracts 
between the client and 
the main contractor 
i) 'Parties named 
in the original 
agreement were 
incorrect' 
(MM05-W5/18-
Case#2); ii) 
'discrepancy 
between the 
Land Registry 
drawings and 
the site 
boundary on the 
proposed plans' 
(MM05-W5/18-
Case#2) 
No 
coordinat
ion 
problems 
reported 
i) 
Changes 
to 
materials; 
ii) 
location 
of the gas 
boiler 
meant 
that 
changes 
had to be 
made to 
the design 
i) Major 
changes to 
rainwater 
harvesting 
system; 
however, this 
was primarily 
due to 
unexpected 
ground 
conditions 
i) Delays on site; ii) changes to 
the materials needed; iii) gas 
remediation works; iv) local 
council requested the engineers 
to stop undertaking gas 
monitoring when atmospheric 
pressure is high; v) The client 
asked the engineers to finalise 
their proposals urgently (after 
constant delays); vi) uncertainty 
over whether BRE would accept 
design changes due to water 
table; vii) architect was late with 
the landscaping scheme and 
issuing it to the planners 
 (Continued)  
 Wave 11 Wave 12 Wave 13 Wave 14 Wave 15 Wave 16 Wave 17 Wave 18 
Contr. Homo. -0.438 -1.032 -1.101 -0.914 -0.432 0.360 0.153 1.077 
Contr. Centr. 0.699 -0.938 0.699 0.699 -0.668 -2.027 0.699 -2.027 
Org. Exp. -0.681 0.293 -0.592 -0.093 -1.478 0.404 0.480 -0.997 
Coordination 
Problems 
i) Work on site 
dependent on approval 
from HA; ii) delayed 
finalisation of the 
landscaping scheme; iii) 
design changes required 
in some plots; iv) 
documentation handed in 
by sub-contractors did 
not meet the 
requirements set by the 
client and their agent 
i) Delays caused by the 
client in obtaining 
information from the 
BRE; ii) boundary fence 
delayed because of late 
confirmation from the 
local council; iii) cost 
overrun; iv) contractual 
arrangements delayed; 
iv) late hand-in of 
documentation by 
several sub-contractors 
i) Cost overrun; ii) 
traffic management 
problems; iii) late 
hand-in of 
documentation by the 
piling sub-contractor 
and the beam and 
block flooring sub-
contractor; iii) delays 
on site compromised 
the funding from the 
HCA  
i) Main contractor 
was late in issuing 
information to BRE 
due to delays with the 
architect’s drawings; 
ii) power on site 
delayed; iii) sockets 
had to be 
removed/replaced; iv) 
sign-off between the 
engineers and the 
planners was delayed 
i) Light 
bracket 
poorly 
fitting at 
front and 
back (due to 
miscommun
ication 
among 
suppliers) 
i) Uncertainty 
regarding the 
method of tree 
protection 
(organisations 
failed to obtain a 
definitive answer); 
ii) Anglian Water 
returned agreement 
to client for 
initialling  
i) 
Additional 
building 
costs; ii) 
contractual 
issues 
between 
client and 
main 
contractor 
i) Bacterial test 
failed; ii) omissions 
in the cost 
breakdown; iii) 
additional building 
costs issued by the 
local council; iv) 
Fire Brigade officer 
demanded changes 
to the PV panel 
junction box; v) 
minor faults 
(Table continues on next page) 
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North Wingfield (Case#3) 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8 Wave 9 Wave 10 
Contr. Homo. -1.239 0.601 0.995 -1.439 1.108 -0.144 -1.312 -2.554 0.206 -0.394 
Contr. Centr. -1.616 -0.895 0.789 -1.217 0.789 1.991 -0.755 -1.857 -0.414 -0.144 
Org. Exp. 2.331 2.331 1.578 -0.779 -0.064 -0.597 -1.155 -0.806 -0.430 -0.358 
Coordination 
Problems 
No 
coordin
ation 
proble
ms 
reporte
d 
i) 
Minor 
issues 
with 
paper 
work 
i) 
Uncertain
ty about 
land 
registry; 
ii) 
Misunder
standings 
about the 
timetable  
i) Issues 
raised as 
the main 
contracto
r issued 
several 
service 
requests 
i) Board approval 
dependent upon the final 
costs estimate; ii) back-
and-forth decision about 
technical specifications 
for the boiler; iii) details 
regarding the party walls 
were missing; iv) 
amendments to the health 
and safety plan 
i) Delays 
between the 
client and the 
local council; 
ii) minor 
issues 
regarding the 
plan and 
details on the 
drawings  
i) Main contractor failed 
to provide site setup to 
the local council; ii) main 
contractor is late in 
providing the cash flow 
report to the client; minor 
amendments needed for 
planning approval; iii) 
local residents expressed 
concerns about the noise 
i) Failure 
to agree on 
the boiler 
specificitie
s within the 
time frame 
agreed  
i) BT plc stated 
that the relocation 
of a cable was 
impossible; ii) 
delays to the 
revised plan; iii) 
local authority 
raised issues about 
site boundaries 
i) Pending issues with 
EcoHomes prevent a 
Design Stage application 
to the BRE; ii) delays in 
transferring the land 
ownership from the local 
authority to the client; 
iii) pending 
documentation from sub-
contractors  
(Continued)  
 Wave 11 Wave 12 Wave 13 Wave 14 Wave 15 Wave 16 Wave 17 Wave 18 Wave 19 
Contr. Homo. 0.206 0.493 0.404 0.995 0.897 0.935 0.456 -0.144 -0.068 
Contr. Centr. 0.880 0.390 -0.414 0.188 -0.414 0.390 0.616 1.304 0.390 
Org. Exp. -0.555 -0.293 -0.179 -0.304 0.449 -0.275 0.152 -0.597 -0.451 
Coordination 
Problems 
i) Delays with soft landscaping proposals; 
ii) insufficient information regarding 
CfSH; iii) issue with the Highway 
Covenant off Chesterfield Road giving an 
Easement of 10m from the back edge of 
the path into the site; iv) client, main 
contractor and engineers ask for 
intervention of solicitors about the BT 
cable; v) design had poor ‘buildability’; 
vi) client chaseed solicitors regarding the 
BT cable; vii) water supplier demanded 
some alterations to the design;  
i) Main contractor 
failed to progress 
with the Design 
Stage Assessment 
and submission to 
the BRE; ii) 
design of a section 
of the building 
needed 
amendments; iii) 
ongoing issue 
with BT cable  
i) Derbyshire 
Police  had 
concerns 
with security 
of the 
biomass 
system; ii) 
delays in 
Design Stage 
Assessment 
submission 
i) 
Ongoing 
concerns/
delays 
over BT 
cable 
i) Information 
sharing issues were 
between client, 
engineers and main 
contractor over the 
biomass system; ii) 
local council 
demanded more 
information about 
the drawings; iii) 
wood pellets to be 
used instead of 
woodchip  
i) HA and 
NEDCC were 
slow to decide 
on the bus stop 
relocation; ii) 
Post Office was 
slow to process 
road naming; 
Post Office and 
Building 
Control had to 
be chased 
i) HA and 
NEDCC 
were slow 
to confirm 
bus stop 
relocation, 
causing 
delays; ii) 
delays with 
the 
biomass 
system 
installation 
i) Contractual 
concerns 
between the 
client and  
Severn Trent; 
ii) changes had 
to be made to 
provide level 
access shower; 
iii) minor 
communicatio
n problems 
i) Minor 
misunderst
andings 
between 
utility firm 
and client 
 
(Table continues on next page) 
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Rowlett Road (Case#4) 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8 
Contr. Homo. -0.979 1.505 -1.227 1.008 0.204 -0.837 -0.316 0.642 
Contr. Centr. 0.141 -0.561 -0.561 -0.982 1.542 -0.561 -0.561 1.542 
Org. Exp. -1.320 -1.025 -0.485 -0.534 1.600 0.364 0.776 0.624 
Coordination 
Problems 
No 
coordinat
ion 
problems 
reported 
ii) Local school contested 
the positioning of site 
boundary ii) 
documentation from the 
main contractor was late 
i) Review of 
mechanical engineering 
outstanding; ii) county 
council was late in 
finalising agreements 
i) Sub-
contractors late 
to hand in 
documentation 
i) Delays in 
finalising 
parking area 
and 
landscaping 
i) Consultants 
were slow to 
check 
sustainability 
credentials for 
the building 
No 
coordinat
ion 
problems 
reported 
i) Design changes required in order to 
meet planner's demands - 'the Local 
Council wanted ''contemporary" look to 
the scheme – use a combination of 
cladding, metal windows and mono pitch 
roofs to achieve this' (MM10-Case#4) 
 
Case#5 Blyth Court 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 
Contr. Homo. 0.300 2.151 0.379 0.455 0.345 0.775 
Contr. Centr. 1.085 0.711 -0.035 0.412 1.085 0.711 
Org. Exp. 0.845 -0.780 1.713 0.702 0.752 -1.369 
Coordination 
Problems 
i) Client’s agent noted poor 
coordination with the 
engineer; ii) misleading 
quotation from the 
contractor based on 
incorrect assumptions about 
the work; iii) uncertainty 
regarding the asbestos 
i) Engineer 
was late with 
details; ii) 
soak ways 
wrongly 
designed; iii) 
delayed 
documentation  
i) Alternatives to 
shower bases needed; 
ii) waste report failed 
to meet CfSH 
requirements; iii) 
window 
misspecification 
regarding SbD 
i) Confusion regarding the lift and firing system, 
between client, architects and engineers; ii) 
information on radiators delayed by plumber; iii) 
suggested flush cisterns not maintenance-friendly 
as requested by the client; iv) planners considered 
road cleaning to be an issue; v) mechanical and 
electrical sub-contractors prevented planning 
discharge 
i) Client and main contractor 
did not meet conditions set out 
by the local council ( Building 
Regulations application); ii) 
collateral warranties from sub-
contractors outstanding; iii) 
remedial work on windows 
insufficient 
i) 
Considerate 
Constructors 
score low; ii) 
‘buildability’ 
issues 
(Continued) 
 Wave 7 Wave 8 Wave 9 Wave 10 Wave 11 Wave 12 
Contr. Homo. 0.345 -0.641 -1.540 -1.031 -0.593 -0.945 
Contr. Centr. 0.412 -0.596 -2.277 -0.596 0.244 -1.157 
Org. Exp. -0.780 -0.011 -1.242 1.105 -0.507 -0.427 
Coordination 
Problems i) Revised drainage drawings provided, but the levels on the 
drawings did not work; ii) 
outstanding collateral warranties 
from sub-contractors; iii) changes 
needed to handrails in corridors 
 i) Drainage 
and 
electrical 
drawings 
needed 
revision 
i) BRE submission invoice 
to be paid by the main 
contractor as per contract 
and not by the client; ii) fire 
hose location posts raised 
maintenance issues 
i) BRE took longer than 
expected to review the 
application; ii) 
outstanding collateral 
warranties from engineer; 
iii) format for H&S file 
was not followed 
i) Engineer was 
late in providing 
lift pit details; ii) 
ongoing cost 
issues among 
contractor, client 
and client’s agent 
i) Roof quality was poor; ii) ongoing 
cost issues among contractors; iii) no 
safety protection in the access to the 
lift motor room; iv) light fittings in 
the bungalows had to be changed to 
low-energy light fittings, as 
requested 
(Table continues on next page) 
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Oakely Road (Case#6) 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8 
Contr. 
Homo. 1.521 -1.109 -1.109 0.471 0.097 0.572 -1.109 0.665 
Contr. Centr. -0.223 0.820 0.142 -1.683 0.142 -0.536 -0.385 1.723 
Org. Exp. -1.652 0.878 -0.820 1.081 -0.761 -0.141 0.878 0.538 
Coordination 
Problems 
No 
coordinati
on 
problems 
reported 
i) 
Ownership 
of the land 
to be 
confirmed; 
ii) drawing 
needed 
revision 
i) Planning approval with delays; 
ii) plumbing sub-contractor failed 
to inform the main contractor 
about the additional costs for the 
pipe work; iii) outstanding 
collateral warranties from sub-
contractors, and mechanical and 
electrical precast floor sub-
contractor 
i) Outstanding 
collateral 
warranties 
from sub-
contractors 
i) Site boundary 
delimitations to be 
agreed; ii) 
outstanding collateral 
warranties from 
mechanical, 
electrical, precast and 
floor sub-contractors 
i) Unable to obtain a 
response from adjoining 
owner; ii) late BRE 
certification; iii) outstanding 
collateral warranties from 
mechanical, electrical, 
precast and floor sub-
contractors 
i) Unable 
to obtain a 
response 
from 
adjoining 
owner 
i) Minor building 
quality problems; ii) 
outstanding 
documentation from the 
local council; iii) boiler 
pipe work had to be 
relocated due to poor 
functionality 
 
Washbrook Road (Case#7) 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8 Wave 9 Wave 10 
Contr. Homo. 0.123 -0.604 -1.069 0.139 -1.778 0.240 0.293 -0.172 1.165 1.663 
Contr. Centr. 0.336 0.426 -0.118 -1.824 -1.484 0.074 0.221 -0.118 1.244 1.244 
Org. Exp. -0.202 -0.553 0.591 1.417 1.390 -0.145 -0.119 0.386 -0.962 -1.804 
Coordination 
Problems 
i) Late resolution of legal 
matters prior to starting 
work on site; ii) windows 
specifications needed 
revision; iii) boiler had to 
be relocated; iv) natural 
lighting needed in 
bathrooms; v) main 
contractor failed to provide 
cost analysis 
i) Pilling queries and pilling 
logs were not passed on by 
the contractor; ii) discharge 
of pre-start condition had to 
be chased on a weekly basis 
with the local council; iii) 
unable to obtain a response 
from adjoining owner; iii) 
planners rejected a change 
from a metal front railing to 
a timber one 
i) Sub-station 
positioning was 
considered 
unacceptable 
by the 
planners; iii) 
outstanding 
collateral 
warranties 
from sub-
contractors 
i) 
‘Buildabilit
y’ issues; 
ii) 
outstanding 
collateral 
warranties 
from sub-
contractors 
i) Outstanding 
collateral 
warranties 
from sub-
contractors; ii) 
Pilling queries 
and pilling logs 
were not 
passed on by 
the contractor 
No 
coordinat
ion 
problems 
reported 
i) Pipe 
work 
contractor 
failed to 
justify 
changes to 
the initial 
project 
No 
coordinati
on 
problems 
reported 
i) 
‘Buildabi
lity’ 
issues 
i) Client and 
main contractor 
failed to provide 
necessary 
information to 
utility company 
regarding the 
sub-station on 
site 
Note: Unstandardised values are presented in Appendix 4.5. 
 
Contra. Homo. – Contractual Homophily 
Contra. Centr. – Contractual Centrality 
Org. Exp. – Organisational Expertise-Driven Homophily
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6.3.2. Organisational Expertise-Induced 
Organisational expertise-induced discontinuities were found to be mainly caused 
by an increase in organisational expertise-driven homophily. This insight was gained 
through a comparative analysis of the variation in organisational expertise-driven 
homophily and the inventory of coordination problems in every wave. Furthermore, 
coordination problems also came from interactions among organisations with similar 
organisational expertise, regardless of the existence of ties.  
In Washbrook Road (Case#7), coordination problems were observed between 
wave 3 and wave 5, during which there was substantial organisational expertise-
induced homophily (Table 19). The positioning of the sub-station on site was 
considered unacceptable by the planning control officer from the local council. 
Essentially, the coordination problem came from three organisations: the architect, 
the engineering firms and the local council, three organisations whose expertise 
spanned different domains. Due to expertise-driven homophily, these organisations 
failed to interact properly and communicate regarding the location of the sub-station 
on site. These examples were typical of the degradation in coordination that took 
place among various organisations across different domains of organisational 
expertise throughout the design and build life-cycle. 
However, interactions among organisations with similar types of organisational 
expertise were not free from coordination problems either. This was observed 
between wave 3 and wave 5 in Blyth Court (Case#5), when organisational expertise-
induced homophily increased significantly (Table 19) alongside coordination 
problems. Several design changes (e.g. shower bases and windows) were required in 
order to comply with planning permission, as these aspects had not been properly 
taken into account by the architects and other design professionals involved in the 
project. I observed several examples of coordination problems among organisations 
with similar organisational expertise. Consider the main contractor and some of their 
sub-contractors, for example. The manager of the plumbers failed to pass on 
information about the radiators, resulting in delays in carrying out the required tests 
to the pipe work installed in the building. Additionally, the flush cisterns ordered 
were not maintenance-friendly. This request had been made by the client’s manager 
to the main contractor’s project manager on the site. The M&E sub-contractors 
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prevented the discharge of planning conditions due to delays on site and a failure to 
provide required information. 
In Fulmar Road (Case#2), uncertainty was created by several episodes of 
ambiguous information being passed between the client’s project manager and their 
agents, two parties with monitoring responsibilities for the project. In wave 3, when 
organisational expertise-driven homophily increased above the average (1.859), the 
client’s agent sought to confirm the arrangements regarding the tenants with the 
client’s project manager (Table 19). This had implications for the instructions that 
the client’s agent would have to give to the organisations starting work on site (e.g. 
main contractor), as well as other professionals working on the project (e.g. 
architect). The conflicting information provided caused an issue in terms of 
coordination and the epicentre was two organisations operating within similar 
domains of organisational expertise, namely monitoring. Later in the project, the 
agreement between the client and the water supply company was returned due to 
incorrect information and procedures (letter from water supply company; MM16-
W16/18-Case#2). This took place in wave 16 when there was an increase in 
organisational expertise-driven homophily (0.404) that was sustained in the 
following wave (0.480) (Table 19). Both managers were surprised by the procedures 
adopted by the water supply company.  
These findings provide a fine-grained explanation of how organisational 
expertise-driven homophily acts as a mechanism that induces coordination problems. 
Firstly, organisational expertise-driven homophily in dynamic inter-organisational 
relationships triggers coordination problems through the absence of inter-
organisational ties that jeopardise integration across organisational expertise 
domains. The absence of ties shows discontinuity in the structure of inter-
organisational relationships. Secondly, organisational expertise-driven homophily 
creates subtle discontinuities in the way inter-organisational relationships operate 
through the development of common understandings locked in to specific domains of 
expertise. For instance, monitoring organisations follow procedures and adopt 
communication practices containing aspects that get ‘lost in translation’ during 
communication with other domains of expertise, as illustrated by the example of the 
agreement returned by the water supply company. 
Therefore, the measure of organisational expertise-driven homophily signals an 
absence of inter-organisational relationships, and indicates that organisations may be 
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using shared norms and practices that could also trigger coordination problems. The 
notion of organisational expertise-induced discontinuities captures the richness of 
homophily as a mechanism of coordination problems.  
Both organisational expertise and contractual relationships were found to underlie 
the development of coordination problems but what happens if contract-induced and 
organisational expertise-induced discontinuities occur in parallel? 
 
6.3.3.  ‘Break-Up’ 
The combination of contract- and organisational expertise-induced discontinuities 
proved to be associated with coordination problems. Furthermore, it was 
significantly associated with cases of low overall coordination of dynamic inter-
organisational relationships. Accordingly, I argue that such a combination leads to a 
degradation of the coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relationships, in 
what can be described as a ‘break-up’ situation.  
In North Wingfield (Case#3), a case of low overall coordination, the fabric of 
inter-organisational relationships experienced a ‘break-up’ as the aforementioned 
combination of discontinuities occurred at numerous stages of the design and build 
life-cycle. As early as wave 3, contractual bottlenecks (contractual homophily, 0.995; 
contractual centrality, 0.789) and organisational expertise-induced homophily 
(1.578) were found to have increased significantly above the average for this 
configuration of inter-organisational relationships (Table 19). Thus, organisations 
that were contractually bound (e.g. the main contractor) were unable to reach non-
contracted organisations (e.g. the local council) and neither were inter-organisational 
ties developed among domains of organisational expertise. I emphasise the early 
stage because of the transition from the design to the build stage. In this case, the 
drawings were being finalised by the architect as the main contractor’s project 
managers were preparing to start work on site (e.g. setting up offices, hoarding89 site 
boundaries and starting ground work).  
Another ‘break-up’ of the fabric of inter-organisational relationships was found 
half-way through the design and build life-cycle, as the building’s structure (concrete 
frame, internal and external brick walls) was completed. A turnover of organisations 
                                                 
89
 Hoarding is a temporary wooden fence around a building or structure under construction or repair. 
There are several specialist hoarding contractors operating in the UK. 
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occurred as the bricklayers gave way to numerous specialist suppliers starting work 
on site (e.g. plumbers, M&E sub-contractors and tiling contractors). This occurred 
between waves 11 and 12. Particularly in wave 11, my findings show that contractual 
bottlenecks (contractual homophily, 0.206; contractual centrality, 0.880) and 
organisational expertise-induced homophily (0.555) were substantially above the 
average (Table 19). Close to project completion (wave 17), there was another 
intensification of three mechanisms of coordination problems simultaneously: 
contractual homophily (0.456), contractual centrality (0.616) and organisational 
expertise-driven homophily (0.152). This was at the same time as organisations on 
site were trying to recover from delays in order to hand the project over to the client 
by the agreed deadline. In the end, the handover of the North Wingfield (Case#3) 
was delayed by two weeks at an extra cost of £155, 00090.  
Further supporting evidence of a ‘break-up’ of the fabric of inter-organisational 
relationships comes from the Blyth Court (Case#5). The start of the project (wave 1) 
was marked by contractual homophily (0.300), contractual centrality (1.085), and 
organisational expertise-driven homophily (0.845) (Table 19). Coordination between 
the architect and the client’s agents was unsatisfactory. Meanwhile, the main 
contactor provided misleading quotations for the work to be carried out, based on 
misunderstandings and incorrect assumptions. Soon after the internal demolitions 
(e.g. partitions) and removal of existing refurbishments (e.g. joinery and asbestos) 
were completed, my findings show sustained mechanisms of coordination problems 
in wave 5 (contractual homophily, 0.455; contractual centrality, 0.412; organisational 
expertise-driven homophily, 0.702) and wave 6 (contractual homophily, 0.345; 
contractual centrality, 1.085; organisational expertise-driven homophily, 0.752) 
(Table 19). These instances of a ‘break-up’ in the fabric of inter-organisational 
relationships occurred in the first half of the project. In the second half (waves 6-12), 
no such instances were found. This aspect was important in the context of the ‘case 
story’ of the Blyth Court (Case#5). To recap, several delays occurred at the initial 
stage coupled with numerous misunderstandings about the nature of the work to be 
carried out. Eventually, the organisations managed to recover time in the second half 
of the project. This (Case#5) was delivered ‘on time and on budget’. Although there 
                                                 
90
 Based on the overall score of coordination consequences (Chapter IV). 
  
 
 
227
were minor coordination problems regarding material specifications, these did not 
impact negatively on the progress on site. 
My analysis showed that a higher number of instances of a combination between 
contract-induced and organisational expertise-induced discontinuities were 
associated with cases of low coordination of inter-organisational relationships. 
Consider the Dale Lane (Case#1). My findings show that in six waves (out of twelve) 
there was a combination of contract-induced (either contractual homophily or 
contractual centrality) and organisational expertise-induced discontinuities (Table 
19). There are two important insights to make here. First, ‘break-up’ discontinuities 
occurred mostly in the second half of the project. Moreover, these were sustained for 
over four months (between wave 8 and wave 11). During this period, coordination 
problems ranged from delayed circulation of the drawings among the relevant 
parties, missing documentation, and project targets being missed. The handover was 
delayed by three weeks and the SbD certification was refused due to incorrect 
material specifications. Despite the organisations having prior experience of working 
together, this did not result in widespread collaboration. Rather, the organisations 
related to one another based on contractual relationships and domain of 
organisational expertise. Second, the figures for the number of combinations of 
contract-induced and organisational expertise-induced discontinuities were 
significantly high given the duration of the design and build life-cycle. Six waves 
(out of twelve) of ‘break-up’ discontinuities represents 50% of the design and build 
life-cycle.  
Moreover, the actual number of combinations of contractual bottlenecks and 
organisational expertise-driven homophily was higher when compared to other 
projects where the design and build life-cycle was substantially longer, such as those 
in Fulmar Road (18 waves; Case#2) and North Wingfield (19 waves; Case#3). In 
each of the latter cases, I found only five instances of a combination of contract-
induced and organisational expertise-induced discontinuities, which represents 
27.77% (five out of eighteen waves) for Fulmar Road and 26.32% (five out of 
nineteen waves) for North Wingfield. These figures show a stark contrast with the 
figure of 50% for Dale Lane (Case#1). 
The findings regarding ‘break-ups’ in the fabric of dynamic inter-organisational 
relationships and coordination consequences were wholly consistent with the overall 
coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relationships. Medium overall 
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coordination in Blyth Court (Case#5) was associated with four instances (waves 1, 3, 
4 and 5) of ‘break-ups’ (Table 19). In contrast, the Rowlett Road (Case#4) and 
Washbrook Road (Case#7) projects, where I found a high level of coordination, had 
fewer ‘break-ups’ (two and one, respectively). The Oakley Road (Case#6) is an 
exception as it had three such instances, despite a high level of overall coordination.   
To conclude, the theoretical mechanisms of contractual bottlenecks (i.e. 
contractual homophily and contractual centrality) and organisational expertise-driven 
homophily were found to be robust predictors of coordination problems on a monthly 
basis. Moreover, these measures signal the development of discontinuities in the 
fabric of inter-organisational relationships. These discontinuities unfold at the 
intersection of the structure and ‘content’ of inter-organisational relationships and 
can be of three types: contract-induced, organisational expertise-induced and ‘break-
up’. These discontinuities are meaningful beyond the presence/absence of ties. Ties – 
or the absence of ties – are visible in the graphical representations of configurations 
of dynamic inter-organisational relationships. However, discontinuities are not as 
they are intrinsic to the tie, being related to, for example, shared norms and 
understandings between organisations. 
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Chapter VII: A Theory of Coordination Voids (ToCV) 
 
 
 
 
Overview 
In this chapter, I will discuss the findings of my research, and in doing so I will 
propose an emerging framework based on the observation that the coordination of 
inter-organisational relationships leads to the development of coordination voids. 
These are discontinuities in the fabric of inter-organisational relationships, caused by 
the mechanisms aimed to promote coordination but in fact hampering it. Theorising 
about this paradox, I will discuss a set of theoretical contributions this research 
makes to strategic management, and organisational and management theory, as well 
as its methodological contribution to the organisational research methods literature. I 
will end my discussion of the contributions of this research by highlighting practical 
implications for managers and policy-makers. Finally, I will suggest an agenda for 
further research on the coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relationships. 
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7. Coordination, Inter-Organisational Relationships and Voids 
It is often assumed that coordination problems in inter-organisational relationships 
occur due to a lack of coordination mechanisms. I will argue that coordination and 
coordination problems in dynamic inter-organisational relationships are two sides of 
the same coin. For instance, contracting is often regarded as an aid to coordination; 
however, it appears that it also undermines coordination.  
The tension between these two effects provides me with a starting point from 
which to theorise on how the coordination of inter-organisational relationships 
unfolds. I will argue that the mechanisms of coordination and coordination problems 
need to be understood through a nuanced perspective, which I will articulate in a 
theory of coordination voids (ToCV). Voids are discontinuities in the fabric of inter-
organisational relationships resulting from mechanisms intended to aid coordination, 
but in fact hampering coordination. In this chapter I will elaborate the ToCV, which 
provides a parsimonious framework for the coordination of dynamic inter-
organisational relationships. 
Theoretical contributions to strategic management and organisational and 
management theory will be put forward alongside methodological contributions. 
Based on my empirical study, I will draw implications for managers and policy-
makers, in terms of an opportunity to deliver more for less in inter-organisational 
arrangements. Last but not least, I will set a research agenda aimed at advancing our 
understanding of ‘what is seen, but not yet visible’ regarding the coordination of 
dynamic inter-organisational relationships.  
  
7.1. Summary of the Findings 
The fundamental premise about coordination is that one organisation’s 
possibilities for action are shaped by other organisations as they become mutually 
dependent on each other’s resources (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Thompson, 1967). 
Thus, the alignment of actions and resources among organisations is critical for 
understanding the consequences of inter-organisational relationships. Interestingly, 
there is scant prior research on (1) how inter-organisational relationships are 
coordinated over time and (2) why coordination problems occur. My motivation 
behind my research was to address these two shortcomings.  
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The coordination of inter-organisational relationships is a key area of interest 
across many industries. In particular, the UK’s building industry, one of the largest in 
the UK by GDP, turned out to be an appropriate research setting to explore the 
theoretical foundations of the topic. I saw an opportunity to apply my research to an 
industry that has been wrestling with dysfunctional collaborations among 
organisations and increasing building costs. This is occurring hand-in-hand with the 
UK Government’s efforts to tackle England’s social housing shortage. As of 2012, 
there were 1.84 million people in England waiting for social housing, and almost five 
million in the UK as a whole91. Another relevant aspect is the current debate about 
climate change and how the building industry is addressing this challenge.  
Against this backdrop, and in line with my research interests, I conducted a 
multiple case study of seven dynamic inter-organisational relationships (Eisenhardt, 
1989). I examined newly built social housing projects completed between 2008 and 
2011 in the East Midlands region of England. Drawing on over 3,900 pages of data, I 
developed an in-depth approach to the study of inter-organisational relationships that 
integrates inductive research (Glasser & Strauss, 1967) and SNA techniques 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). I was able to map the inter-organisational relationships 
on a monthly basis and explore the richness of the data through content analysis to 
unlock the underlying mechanisms of their coordination.  
My first research question was the following: How are dynamic inter-
organisational relationships coordinated? Unexpectedly, I found that the traditional 
mechanisms of coordination – contracting and the use of monitoring organisations – 
proved to have no association with the consequences of coordination (van de Ven & 
Gordon, 1984; Williamson, 1996). This was shown consistently across the seven 
case studies. Instead, I discovered that coordination stems from two theoretical 
mechanisms, which I termed ‘organising’ and ‘relating’. The former describes how 
the use of contracting leads to hierarchy, while the latter denotes the association 
between the use of monitoring organisations and the density of inter-organisational 
relationships. Furthermore, the sequence in which these coordination mechanisms are 
used explains the cross-case differences in the consequences of coordination. 
Therefore, I argued that dynamic inter-organisational relationships are coordinated 
through the juggling of coordination mechanisms.  
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 U.K. Pushes 'Social' Housing REIT Plan by Anita Likus. Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, May 9, 
2012. 
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The second research question was the following: Why do coordination problems 
occur in dynamic inter-organisational relationships? My analysis showed that 
coordination problems develop unseen from traditional mechanisms of coordination 
such as contracting. Drawing on a combination of inductive research and SNA 
techniques, I showed that coordination problems arise due to two theoretical 
mechanisms: contractual bottlenecks (i.e. contractual homophily and contractual 
centrality) and organisational expertise-driven homophily. My analysis showed that 
these two mechanisms foster discontinuities in the fabric of inter-organisational 
relationships, and the discontinuities proved to be robust predictors of the 
coordination problems that occurred each month across the seven cases. 
In summary, my findings identified that coordination hinges on the relationship 
between administrative mechanisms (i.e. contracting and monitoring organisations) 
and the structure of inter-organisational relationships. A closer inspection also 
revealed a point of tension: the same mechanisms aimed at achieving coordination 
are simultaneously found to explain the manifestation of coordination problems.  
 
7.2. An Emerging Theory of Coordination Voids (ToCV) 
A view has emerged of the coordination of inter-organisational relationships that 
builds on my empirical study. I now advance my Theory of Coordination Voids 
(ToCV) to stitch together my analytical blocks and explain the paradox I found in 
terms of mechanisms that are traditionally associated with coordination proving to 
simultaneously cause coordination problems. I will begin the development of this 
ToCV by establishing a vocabulary. Then, I will present the theoretical 
underpinnings and the consequences of coordination voids.   
New vocabulary is required to better convey my findings. Naturally, my point of 
departure is prior social network research applied to the study of inter-organisational 
relationships. At this stage, I want to recap some fundamental notions that are used in 
the current research (Table 20). Organisations – for instance, Organisation A (i) and 
Organisation B (j) – are called nodes. An interaction between these two organisations 
is known as a tie (xij). For example, Organisation A (i) establishes contact with 
Organisation B (j) to design a new social housing project. Clearly, more 
organisations than this will be required to complete the project. More importantly, 
organisations establish multiple interactions throughout the design and build life-
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cycle. This forms a configuration of inter-organisational relationships (∑{xij}) which 
is dynamic insofar as inter-organisational ties are created and ended over time. The 
representation of inter-organisational relationships captures these nodes, ties and 
configurations. Ties are depicted as lines connecting dots that represent organisations 
(Table 20). This captures the conventional view in a nutshell. 
My research has unveiled a new perspective that expands the conventional one by 
complementing the SNA with qualitative aspects (Table 20). My framework is 
stitched together with the threads of an emerging vocabulary. From a coordination 
viewpoint, nodes are more than just the names of organisations plotted in a visual 
representation. There is a need for an understanding of the characteristics of these 
organisations. For instance, the primary domain of organisational expertise of each 
organisation shapes the alignment of their actions and resources. The first substantial 
difference in vocabulary is the use of (dis)continuity to refer to what is 
conventionally known as a ‘tie’. In an oversimplified view, a tie is a line linking 
organisations (i.e. nodes), while a (dis)continuity may include a tie but is not limited 
to this. Continuity and discontinuity are defined in terms of the presence or absence 
of coordination-enhancing aspects of the tie – such as trust among the parties or 
shared norms and values. Therefore, continuity implies the presence of a tie, together 
with coordination-enhancing aspects. A discontinuity is where the tie exists without 
such aspects, or of course where there is no tie.  
By the same token, a configuration of inter-organisational relationships is formed 
by organisations (and their characteristics) and ties among those organisations (and 
coordination-enhancing aspects of those ties). In other words, a configuration of 
inter-organisational relationships is formed by organisations and continuities, as well 
as discontinuities. These aspects form what I label the ‘fabric’ of inter-organisational 
relationships (Table 20). This vocabulary is critical for capturing how the 
coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relationships unfolds. Moreover, I feel 
that the notion of a social fabric leaves me better-equipped to tackle the tension 
between coordination mechanisms (e.g. contracting) and coordination problems (e.g. 
contractual bottlenecks). 
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Table 20 An Emerging Framework of the Coordination of Dynamic Inter-Organisational Relationships 
Conventional View (Prior research) Emerging View (This study) 
Notion Stylised Representations Notion Stylised Representations 
Nodes (i and j)  
  
Organisations (i and j) 
  
Ties (xij) 
 
 
 
 
Continuity (xij) 
 
 
Discontinuity (xij) 
 
 
Configuration (∑{xij}) 
 
Fabric of inter-organisational 
relationships (∑{xij}) 
(Language, cross-understandings and 
characteristics of organisations) 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Zumer et al. (2010) 
Structural Holes  
(Absence of ties) 
 
Coordination Voids  
(A tie may exist) 
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The theoretical underpinnings of my thesis hinge on a tension between 
mechanisms of coordination (e.g. contracting) and coordination problems. I argue 
that they are two sides of the same coin, that is, the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships. As Simmel (1955, p. 605) notes: ‘cooperation and 
antagonism have a common origin’. Coordination unfolds within a rich fabric of 
inter-organisational relationships formed by inter-organisational ties but also by 
relational aspects such as trust and shared norms and values. Furthermore, 
coordination is a relational phenomenon ‘that is situated not only physically in 
locality, but also mentally in an identity’ (Kogut & Zander, 1996, p. 502). These 
relational aspects are captured in my notion of (dis)continuities in the fabric of inter-
organisational relationships.  
One important insight on which my research sheds light is the role of 
(dis)continuities in ‘dictating’ whether it is coordination or coordination problems 
that unfold in dynamic inter-organisational relationships. In order to gain a deeper 
understanding of these (dis)continuities, I believe it is helpful to build on the notion 
of structural holes. As shown in Table 20, a structural hole occurs in a situation 
where Organisation A (i) interacts with Organisation B (j), and Organisation C (l) 
interacts with Organisation B (j), but Organisations A (i) and C (j) have no 
interaction. Organisation B (j) is an intermediary between Organisations A (i) and C 
(j). Coordination-enhancing aspects are not considered in the notion of structural 
holes (because it relies solely on measures of nodes and ties in the structure of inter-
organisational relationships). Although ties might exist (or be created) for 
coordination, they are not sufficient for the coordination of dynamic inter-
organisational relationships; coordination-enhancing mechanisms are also required.  
To overcome this shortcoming in the prior research, I put forward the notion of 
coordination voids, which builds on the notion of structural holes. While a structural 
hole is defined by the presence/absence of ties, a coordination void includes not only 
the absence of ties but also the presence/absence of coordination-enhancing aspects 
(Table 20). A coordination void emerges from discontinuities in the fabric of inter-
organisational relationships. I borrow the notion of a ‘void’ to capture the tension 
that underlies the coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relationships. I find 
the notion remarkably suitable for capturing this tension from a theoretical 
perspective.  
  
 
 
 
236
However, the notion of a ‘void’ might prompt different ideas for different people. 
Thus I will now offer some background to my thinking. I start by considering 
cosmology. In this, voids are empty spaces between large structures of the universe 
(i.e. filaments), which have no galaxies (see, Clifton & Ferreira, 2009; Freedman & 
Kaufmann III, 2008). Here, voids refer to the absence of material, which is 
nevertheless relevant to understanding the universe and galaxies. In the empirical 
context of my study, building engineering relies on the absence of material as a 
building technique. A typical example is the tunnel: ‘a unique type of structure, a 
significant void distinguished by the absence of material rather than a construct of 
form (Jackson, 1988, p. 604). 
In the social sciences, the notion of a void is found in the field of institutional 
theory, where ‘institutional voids’ refer to ‘missing institutions that normally 
underpin the efficient functioning of product, capital, and labor market’ (Khanna & 
Rivkin, 2001, pp. 46/7). Institutional voids are regarded as the primary explanation 
for the formation and operation of business groups – corporate agglomerates of 
several companies – in developing economies. Thus, research deploys the notion of 
institutional voids to mean ‘analytical spaces’ of contradiction and conflict (Mair, 
Marti, & Ventresca, 2012).  
In organisational everyday life, individuals might experience rational voids, which 
can be defined as the ‘existence of beliefs which can be considered as justified de 
facto, and are never discussed because they are taken for granted’ (Gomez & Jones, 
2000, p. 698). Rather than a language of absence, rational voids refer to the existence 
of beliefs about the procedures and norms of organisations. Beliefs are fundamental 
in handling uncertainty, allowing individuals to perform these tasks without question 
(Akerlof, 1970; Schelling, 1960).  
Social network research also employs the notion of the void in the background, as 
shown in the longstanding debate about closure and brokerage (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 
1988; Granovetter, 1973; Obstfeld, 2005; Uzzi, 1997). On the one hand, densely 
connected inter-organisational relationships breed trust and normative control, which 
enhances coordination activities (Coleman, 1988). On the other hand, sparse 
configurations allow individuals and organisations to benefit from access to novel 
information (Burt, 1992). Recently, Vedres and Stark (2010) addressed this debate 
with research that built upon what the authors called ‘structural voids’, that is, the 
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role of presence versus the absence of ties. In their study of inter-personal 
relationships among Hungarian firms between 1987 and 2001, the authors (2010, p. 
1183) place importance on the ‘missing spaces in the social structure’ for the 
emerging entrepreneurial activity of recombination. Two insights emerge about 
voids: 
(i) Voids are spaces, either in structure or meaning. 
(ii) The consequences of voids are relative – it depends! 
 
Drawing on these two insights, I define coordination voids as discontinuities in 
the fabric of inter-organisational relationships resulting from mechanisms 
intended to aid coordination, but in fact hampering coordination under certain 
conditions. 
The conceptual backbone of these discontinuities is the interplay between 
administrative mechanisms of coordination and the structure of inter-organisational 
relationships over time. In Figure 15, I present a stylised representation of a 
coordination void, alongside the indicators that signal discontinuities in the social 
fabric of inter-organisational relationships. Broadly, I use the term ‘coordination 
void’ in relation to analytical spaces (Mair et al., 2012). Coordination voids occur 
when discontinuities create spaces that are empty of the ties or ‘meanings’ required 
to coordinate inter-organisational relationships. Although ties might exist, relational 
aspects – such as differences in terms of expertise, incentives to coordinate and 
cross-understandings – are absent.  
Coordination voids lead directly to the manifestation of coordination problems. 
Under conditions of contractual bottlenecks, the omission and incompatibility of 
activities is expected. Although contracts are thought to align organisations, these 
devices of control foster goal congruence, which in turn results in the control of 
information among organisations based on their contractual relationships. A 
coordination void emerges when organisations, regardless of the contractual 
arrangements, fail to exchange the required information swiftly enough, even when 
ties exist between the organisations. Prior research also alludes to ‘strategic 
gambling’ and misinformation as outcomes of contractual arrangements (Grandori, 
1997b; Macaulay, 1963). Furthermore, the effects of contractual arrangements 
extend beyond the parties involved as these devices shape the structure of the entire 
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configuration of inter-organisational relationships. The consequences of coordination 
voids are also apparent in the coordination problems that stem from organisational 
expertise-driven discontinuities. Similarity of organisational expertise enhances 
coordination (Bechky, 2006; Kogut & Zander, 1996). However, although ties 
between organisations with similar organisational expertise enhance coordination, 
ties across domains of expertise are also required due to the importance of combining 
expertise from various domains. A typical case is the installation of ‘green’ building 
technology where, as well as coordination among building sub-contractors, 
interaction with engineers and architects is also crucial to developing an integrated 
approach. Layout features need to be designed appropriately and building techniques 
may need to be adjusted. Failure to do so could result in remedial work or faults. 
 
Figure 15 Coordination Voids 
Stylised Representation Indicators 
 
 
Contractual Centrality 
Contractual Homophily 
Organisational Expertise-
Driven Homophily 
 
(These three indicators signal 
the development of 
coordination problems) 
 
 
Indirect consequences of coordination voids for coordination include extra costs 
for organisations – broadly referred to as ‘coordination costs’ (Coase, 1937; Gulati & 
Singh, 1998; Williamson, 1979). Current reasoning suggests that coordination costs 
(e.g. contracts) are necessary to align organisations. Although that reasoning is 
instructive, coordination voids add a more nuanced view, according to which the use 
of contracting leads to coordination problems through contractual bottlenecks. These 
problems add extra costs or delays to the project. Additional contracting is costly and 
might not result in additional coordination. (I shall explore this further when 
discussing the practical implications later in this chapter.) 
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In sum, the ToCV provides the vocabulary and theoretical underpinnings of 
coordination voids, which is essential to the articulation of my nuanced view on the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships. 
 
7.3. Theoretical Contributions 
My study contributes with an empirically informed framework of the coordination 
of dynamic inter-organisational relationships, namely the ToCV. This framework 
hinges on my observation that administrative coordination mechanisms shape the 
structure of inter-organisational relationships. My discussion of the contributions of 
this study will centre around an integration of the SNA with the relevant aspects of 
my theoretical framework. In so doing, I address the challenge set by Emirbayer and 
Jeff (1994, p. 1421): ‘despite its growing prominence, however, network analysis has 
yet to be subjected to a theoretically informed assessment and critique…there has 
been an unfortunate lack of interest in situating network analysis within the broader 
traditions of sociological theory’92.  
I will now present my specific theoretical contributions to the literature on 
strategic management and organisational and management theory. Based on my in-
depth approach to social networks, I will also specify my methodological 
contributions to the literature on organisational and research methods.  
7.3.1. Strategic Management – Coordination 
My research contributes to the debate on the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships. Specifically, I contribute to five areas within the coordination 
literature: coordination problems; the evolution of coordination over time; contracts 
and trust; strategic motivations (Table 21).  
(i) Coordination problems emerge from discontinuities in the fabric of inter-
organisational relationships. Furthermore, I develop the notion of coordination voids, 
which captures the phenomenon by which mechanisms aimed at fostering 
coordination can in fact hamper it.  
Prior research alludes to coordination problems (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000; 
Podolny & Page, 1998; Srikanth & Puranam, 2010); however, it is limited to 
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 Nearly two decades of research later, this is still the case, as shown in recent literature reviews 
(Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Kilduff & Brass, 2010; Zaheer, Gözübüyük, & Milanov, 2010). 
  
 
 
 
240
providing anecdotal evidence (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000). I contribute to this 
debate by conceptualising coordination problems in inter-organisational 
relationships. Specifically, I identify that coordination problems entail three 
dimensions: (1) omissions of actions and resources, (2) incompatibility of actions 
and (3) untimely alignment. The final of these emerges from my longitudinal 
analysis of project reports and the minutes of meetings and provides a nuanced view 
on the debate regarding coordination problems. Prior research does allude to 
omissions and incompatibility of actions (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000). However, 
by adding untimely alignment, I demonstrate that the timing of interactions is also 
relevant for explaining coordination problems. 
My contribution extends to establishing the theoretical mechanisms of 
coordination problems: contractual bottlenecks and organisational expertise-driven 
homophily. The former mechanism entails (1) contractual homophily – 
organisations’ tendency to relate better to other parties with similar contractual ties to 
the project – and (2) contractual centrality – organisations that are contractually 
bound to the project are also located in central positions in the project’s configuration 
of inter-organisational relationships. Organisations’ similarity in terms of their 
domains of expertise also enhances coordination; however, it also appears to be 
associated with coordination problems. Therefore, this study contributes to the 
enduring call for research into ‘problems’ with inter-organisational arrangements 
(Katila et al., 2008; Podolny & Page, 1998) by unravelling the theoretical 
mechanisms of coordination problems. It is important to understand these aspects of 
inter-organisational arrangements, where the failure rates are remarkably high (Kale 
& Singh, 2009; Park & Ungdon, 2001; Podolny & Page, 1998). 
(ii) Over time, coordination develops in a non-linear trajectory (Table 21). Prior 
research on the coordination of inter-organisational relationships builds on the 
assumption that coordination follows a linear trajectory, as demonstrated by 
administrative mechanisms of coordination (Coase, 1937; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; 
Williamson, 1996). Contracts are regarded as the primary way to align organisations 
towards a common purpose, while creating safeguards against opportunistic 
behaviour (Stinchcombe, 1985a; Williamson, 1996). The contents of the contracts 
are made up of obligations and expectations aimed at fostering goal congruence 
among – but mostly between pairs of – organisations (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; 
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Stinchcombe, 1985a). However, contracts are static mechanisms of coordination 
insofar as their contents cannot be changed half-way through the inter-organisational 
venture (Grandori, 1997b; Puranam et al., 2006). This embodies the static 
perspective on coordination.  
This study expands the static view of coordination by showing that the juggling of 
the ‘organising’ and ‘relating’ mechanisms proved to explain the coordination of 
inter-organisational relationships. Against conventional wisdom, I found that the use 
of contracts and monitoring organisations was in itself unrelated to the consequences 
of coordination. Instead, my findings suggest that successful inter-organisational 
coordination is explained by a time-informed use of contracting.  
For example, heavy contracting in Dale Lane (Case#1) contrasted with a delayed 
handover and the main contractor’s failure to fulfil their obligations. Although the 
client set out in their contract with the main contractor that the new social housing 
development had to achieve SbD certification, the latter organisation failed to 
accomplish this. Communication and interaction between the client’s agent, the main 
contractor and the local police was reportedly hampered. 
(iii) Contracting is thought to operate at the local level – e.g. between 
organisations – and does not bind an entire configuration of inter-organisational 
relationships (Grandori, 1997b; Macaulay, 1963). Nonetheless, I argue that it does 
shape the structure of the entire configuration. 
A focus on dyads prevails within the contracting literature (Ariño & Torre, 1998; 
Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). For instance, the literature on alliances focuses on 
contractual aspects between pairs of organisations (Casciaro, 2003; Gulati, 1995a; 
Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Puranam et al., 2006). My research shows that 
contracting has to be analysed from the perspective of complete configurations of 
inter-organisational relationships. Contracting induces dynamics in the inter-
organisational relationships that reach beyond the organisations directly involved in 
each particular contract. Specifically, contracting shapes how organisations in 
contractual relationships relate to other organisations with whom they have non-
contractual relationships. Contractual homophily occurs because organisations tend 
to relate better to other organisations with similar contractual ties to the project. To 
this extent, contracting undermines the relational elements of coordination. Looking 
at the mechanisms of organising, the use of contracting induces a hierarchy of inter-
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organisational relationships. Taken altogether, this contributes to the emerging strand 
of research that looks at the heterogeneity of contractual arrangements in 
collaborations (Gulati et al., 2012a).  
(iv) Contracts and trust are the basis of a longstanding – and indeed unresolved 
– debate on whether trust is a complement to or a substitute for contracts in aligning 
organisations (Table 21). This is shown in recent research (MacDuffie, 2011; 
Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; McEvily, 2011; Poppo & Zenger, 2002), nearly half a 
century after the start of this debate (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Macaulay, 1963; 
Williamson, 1975). Since its inception, several threads of discussion have taken 
place. Some research suggests that contracts are essential for preventing opportunism 
and misalignment across organisations – thus contracts are a necessary cost of 
transacting across organisational boundaries (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981). 
According to this view, trust has no place because it increases the friction among the 
parties to the transaction. In contrast, others argue that contracts undermine trust 
among the parties involved (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Zajac & Olsen, 1993). 
At first glance, my study supports the view that contracts are critical for aligning 
inter-organisational relationships. Contracting is used as a strategy to allocate – or 
distribute – risk among organisations. For instance, across all seven projects of social 
housing, the client opted for a JCT Design and Build contractor in a deliberate 
attempt to allocate all risk to the main contractor. Through the use of a lump sum 
contract, any extra costs incurred during the building project (e.g. due to geological 
conditions or technical complexity) are absorbed by the main contractor. No 
substantial evidence was found in this study for a direct effect of contracts on trust. 
Notwithstanding this, contracting shapes the configuration of dynamic inter-
organisational relationships and hierarchical structures breed ties that are less based 
on trust (Kenis & Knoke, 2002). 
In a related discussion, prior research suggests that experience of working 
together, in other words familiarity, enhances trust among organisations (Gulati, 
1995a; Gulati & Sytch, 2008). In this regard, trust that stems from previous 
experience substitutes for contracts. I found that previous experience of working 
together was important in the phase of mobilising/recruiting organisations. 
Organisations tend to bring in third parties with whom they have worked before. 
Recently, familiarity was questioned as an explanation to the formation of ties on the 
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grounds that the antecedent of familiarity is the success of previous ventures (Sytch 
& Gulati, 2012). The findings of my research adhere to this perspective. For instance, 
the client’s choice of quantity surveyor to evaluate the plot of land and respective 
building project in Oakley Road (Case#6) was based on previous (positive) 
experience. This shows that previous inter-organisational ties breed trust because 
only successful ventures lead to continued ties (Sytch & Gulati, 2012).  
(v) Strategic motivations also shape the alignment of organisations (Table 21). 
Managers interact with counterparties through multiple strategic commitments. 
Multi-party arrangements operate on the basis of complementarity of resources (and 
motivations) (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Provan & Milward, 1995; van de Ven & 
Gordon, 1984). For instance, developers (main contractors with design expertise) 
seek out local housing associations, driven by the prospect of future business. 
Housing associations are interested in buying plots of land that already have planning 
permission and approved drawings. Housing associations also collaborate with 
government agencies to access financial resources for new developments.  
The delivery of a new development requires interactions among multiple parties 
with diverse strategic commitments. Local councils are important organisations in 
these collaborations as the UK’s legal framework endorses them to oversee the 
planning regulations. I observed that, often, the main contractors and the architects 
were reluctant to communicate with local councils. The architects were more 
concerned with the design, and the main contractor with completing the project ‘on 
time and on budget’. Often, different sub-groups co-exist within the same multi-party 
arrangement, for example, contractors and sub-contractors, and the client and the 
local council. Hence, multi-party arrangements are required to coordinate parties 
with diverse, as well as similar, motivations so that they can achieve their common 
goal (Provan & Milward, 1995; van de Ven & Gordon, 1984). My study shows that, 
although strategic motivations are important for aligning organisations, coordination 
is better understood as similar and divergent strategic motivations occurring within 
the same arrangement, requiring the inputs of all organisations to be aligned.  
 
Overall, my study contributes to the coordination strand within the strategic 
management literature. The specific contributions include coordination problems, 
coordination over time, contracting, contracts and trust, and strategic motivations. 
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Table 21 Theoretical Contributions 
 
1. Domain 2. Key Debates  3. Current Theoretical Reasoning  4. Contributions of this Study 
Strategic 
Management 
(i) Coordination problems 
(ii) Coordination over 
time  
(iii) Contracting 
(iv) Contracts and trust 
(v) Strategic motivations 
(i) Although widely acknowledged, research on coordination 
problems remains limited (Katila et al., 2008) 
(ii) Much of prior research suggest that coordination develops 
linearly over time (Williamson, 1996) 
(iii) Contracting is understood to occur between organisations 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1996) as there is limited research 
on coordination at the network level (Gulati, et. al., 2012b). 
(iv) Debate over whether trust is complementary to or a 
substitute for contracting (Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Ring & van de Ven, 1994) 
(v) Multi-party arrangements operate on the basis of 
complementarity (and motivations) (Casciaro & Piskorski, 
2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
(i) Coordination problems stem from two mechanisms: 
contractual bottlenecks and organisational expertise-driven 
homophily.  
(ii) Coordination unfolds in a non-linear fashion and requires 
the juggling of mechanisms (organising and relating) over 
time 
(iii) Contracts extend beyond the particular dyad concerned 
by creating bottlenecks  
(iv) Strategic motivations enhance coordination; however, 
coordination in multi-party arrangements is better understood 
as similar and divergent motivation co-existing. 
Organisational 
and 
Management 
Theory 
(i) Dynamics of inter-
organisational 
relationships  
(ii) Sparse versus cohesive 
configurations  
(iii) Heterogeneity 
(iv) Task complexity 
 
(i) Dynamic inter-organisational relationships have received 
little attention in empirical studies (Ahuja, et al. 2012; 
Borgatti & Halgin, 2011); specifically, in terms of the 
processes (Bizzi & Langley, 2012). 
(ii) While cohesive configurations enhance coordination 
(Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973), sparse configurations 
provide organisations with novel  information (Burt, 1992). 
However, this remains an inconclusive debate (Gulati, et al., 
2011). 
(iii) Heterogeneity of configurations presents hazards; yet it  
has gains for organisations (e.g. learning) (Goerzen & 
Beamish, 2005; Ring & van de Ven, 1992) 
(iv) Task complexity leads to coordination problems (Argote, 
1982; Casciaro, 2003) 
 
(i) Drawing on extensive analysis, this study shows the 
dynamics of inter-organisational relationships are interwoven 
with the use of contracting and organisational expertise.  
(ii)  I show that hierarchical (sparse) configurations stem from 
contracting and sparse configurations result from the actions 
(e.g. liaison roles) of monitoring organisations. I bring 
together dense and cohesive aspects. 
(iii) Heterogeneity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for organisations to coordinate I add monitoring organisations 
as a vehicle for resource bundling. 
(iv) Coordination problems result from relational aspects and 
less so from task complexity. 
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7.3.1. Organisation and Management Theory – Dynamic inter-
organisational networks 
I have developed an empirically-informed framework based on the notion of 
coordination voids – discontinuities in the fabric of inter-organisational relationships 
resulting from mechanisms intended to aid coordination, but in fact hampering 
coordination under certain conditions. I now present contributions that span 
dynamics of inter-organisational relationships, the sparse ‘versus’ cohesive debate, 
the heterogeneity of organisations and task complexity. 
(i) Dynamic inter-organisational relationships are pivotal for the theorising 
within the fast-growing social networks literature. The ToCV provides several 
empirical insights relevant to the current theorising (Table 21). Specifically, I found 
that the interplay between action and structure is a critical component of the micro-
foundations of dynamic inter-organisational relationships.  
Prior research suggests that ‘economic action and consequences, as any social 
action and consequences, are affected by actors’ dyadic relations and by the structure 
of the overall network of relations’ (Granovetter, 1992, p. 32). This study contributes 
towards the understanding of the micro-foundations of dynamic inter-organisational 
relationships by unravelling the tension between coordination-targeted actions and 
coordination problems, that is coordination voids.  
My study into the mechanisms of coordination problems provides several insights 
into the ‘genesis’ of dynamic inter-organisational relationships (Ahuja et al., 2012; 
Provan et al., 2007). I relied on month-by-month analysis over an average of 14 
months, which adds greater granularity to the measure of time (prior research mostly 
uses years). Drawing on the combination of inductive research and SNA techniques, 
I discovered that contractual arrangements shape the dynamics of inter-organisational 
relationships. Contractual bottlenecks concern two processes: contractual homophily 
and contractual centrality. The former shows that organisations tend to form ties 
based on contractual arrangements, while the latter conveys the observation that 
organisations centrally placed in the configuration of inter-organisational 
relationships also tend to be engaged in contractual arrangements. Altogether, the 
mechanism of contractual bottlenecks adds a nuanced view whereby contractual 
arrangements are interwoven with the structure of ties among organisations. 
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Furthermore, I provide empirical indicants that capture this mechanism empirically 
and will enable other researchers to implement it. 
Organisational expertise proved to influence the formation of ties among 
organisations. My findings show that organisations tend to form ties with parties of 
similar organisational expertise. This integrates the literatures on the role of 
organisational expertise in coordination (Bechky, 2006; Kogut & Zander, 1996; 
Srikanth & Puranam, 2010) and on the SNA (Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011; 
Galaskiewicz, 1985; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999).  
Altogether, this study highlights the role of contracting and organisational 
expertise in the dynamics of inter-organisational relationships. 
(ii) Sparse ‘versus’ cohesive is a debate that resonates with my findings on the 
two mechanisms of coordination, organising and relating (Table 21). Dense 
configurations breed trust and norms of control among the ties, which is ideal for 
coordination (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973). In contrast, a sparse configuration 
provides organisations with more novel information (Burt, 1992).  
My study shows that the type of organisations involved in configurations of inter-
organisational relationships influence how they function. Specifically, monitoring 
organisations operate as third-party intermediaries and remove discontinuities by 
incentivising the development of ties across domains of organisational expertise. 
These organisations also foster cross-understandings and mutually agreed norms 
through a liaison role, which lead to cohesive configurations of inter-organisational 
relationships. My research contributes to the debate on sparse ‘versus’ cohesive 
networks by showing that, rather than cohesiveness being shaped by monitoring 
organisations, it is instead a discrete property that unfolds naturally (Coleman, 1994; 
Mariotti & Delbridge, 2012; Uzzi, 1997). I also add the role of monitoring 
organisations as another dimension of managerial intervention in inter-organisational 
relationships (Maurer & Ebers, 2006).  
Based on the mechanism of organising, I showed that contractual arrangements 
lead to hierarchical configurations. This extends prior theorising on hierarchy in 
inter-organisational relationships by showing contractual arrangements to be an 
antecedent (Kenis & Knoke, 2002; Stinchcombe, 1985a). Hierarchical structures 
suggest that organisations are dependent on a few organisations to communicate 
across the configuration of inter-organisational relationships. Arguably, hierarchical 
properties resemble the features of sparse configurations (Krackhardt, 1994). 
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Therefore, this provides further insights into the explanatory mechanisms that 
underlie the development of sparse configurations. 
Last but not least, my study brings together evidence that both sparse and 
cohesive configurations of inter-organisational relationships are the result of an 
interplay with the administrative mechanisms of coordination (i.e. the use of 
contracts and monitoring organisations). This blends the structural with the 
sociological view of inter-organisational relationships (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1994; 
Granovetter, 1985; Podolny & Page, 1998). The juggling of coordination 
mechanisms shows that the consequences stemming from sparse or cohesive 
structures change over time instead of being a constant outcome. This is shown by 
the sequence of mechanisms of organising and relating that proved to explain the 
cross-case differences in the consequences of coordination. Organising mechanisms 
are linked with hierarchical structures, relating mechanisms with sparse 
configurations.  
(iii) Heterogeneity of organisations requires coordination across domains of 
organisational expertise (Table 21). Some researchers suggest that organisations 
with little in common are unlikely to seek interaction, which hinders communication 
(Kogut & Zander, 1996; Puranam et al., 2006; van de Ven & Gordon, 1984). 
However, heterogeneity provides gains for organisations, such as learning (Goerzen 
& Beamish, 2005; Ring & van de Ven, 1992).  
My findings suggest that the coordination of inter-organisational relationships 
mediates the benefits obtained from a large pool of expertise. I argue that the 
availability of resources is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for organisations 
to coordinate. Managerial action is required in order for resource bundling to be 
observed (Lavie, 2006; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). To this literature, I add the 
role third parties (i.e. monitoring organisations) play in the process of resource 
bundling. 
(iv) Task complexity refers to the number of components that each task entails. 
Although the projects analysed in this study are arguably of a small scale93 by 
industry standards, an average of 40 organisations took part in each design and build 
life-cycle. This number illustrates the increasing division of labour among 
organisations across many industries, with the building industry no exception. Prior 
                                                 
93
 Average cost £1,849,481; average number of organisations involved 40; average completion time 
fifteen months. 
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research posits that task complexity increases the likelihood of coordination 
problems among organisations insofar as it becomes a source of uncertainty (Argote, 
1982; Ring & van de Ven, 1992). In this study, it was reasonable to expect that 
coordination problems would occur in particular phases of the design and build life-
cycle, based on the assumption that each stage entails different levels of task 
uncertainty and degrees of uncertainty (Hillebrandt, 1984; Latham, 1994). Instead, I 
observed that coordination problems occurred across the design and build life-cycle 
in a seemingly random fashion.  
Where task complexity and uncertainty are perceived as high, organisations are 
more like to invest in the coordination of inter-organisational relationships (Bensaou 
& Anderson, 1999; Casciaro, 2003). In social housing projects, one way of investing 
in coordination is to hire monitoring organisations; this was particularly evident 
when new technologies were brought in. An illustrative case is the design and 
implementation of the biomass system in North Wingfield (Case#3). Specialist 
consultants were brought in as the client’s agent and the main contractor anticipated 
some uncertainty in this aspect of the project. The design and fitting of a biomass 
system is a complex task because it requires several sub-tasks to be performed across 
organisational boundaries. This shows that task complexity does not have to lead to 
coordination problems, even in the case of the world’s last large handcrafted product, 
buildings. 
 
In this section, I have presented the overarching contribution of this study, based 
on the ToCV, which sheds light on coordination voids, that is, discontinuities in the 
fabric of inter-organisational relationships resulting from mechanisms intended to aid 
coordination, but in fact hampering coordination. My theorising on this point of 
tension makes specific theoretical contributions to strategic management and 
organisational and management theory. 
 
7.4. Methodological Contribution 
One of the advantages of my methodology was the integration of inductive 
research with the SNA. This allowed me to draw on the extensiveness and richness 
of over 3,900 pages of data sources and to deepen our understanding of the 
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theoretical mechanisms of coordination and coordination problems in dynamic inter-
organisational relationships (Table 22).  
 
7.4.1. Organisational Research Methods – Social networks research 
My methodological contribution to organisational research methods is anchored in 
the development of an in-depth approach to studying inter-organisational 
relationships. In particular, I show that this approach contributes to social network 
research across two dimensions: method (integration of methodologies and data 
sources) and network characteristics (dynamic networks and complete networks). 
The integration of methodologies contributes to the development of an in-depth 
approach to the study of inter-organisational relationships, which blends inductive 
research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and SNA (Galaskiewicz, 1985; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The integration of inductive research and SNA 
techniques provides, I argue, a valid approach for addressing the longstanding call 
for the joint study of the mechanisms and the structure of inter-organisational 
networks (Ahuja et al., 2012; Sydow & Windeler, 1998).  
Inter-organisational relationships are formed by nodes (i and j ) that are connected 
by ties (xij), and can be represented graphically in a configuration (∑{xij}) 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Much of network research builds on large datasets 
(Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Walker et al., 1997), relying exclusively on SNA 
measures to map inter-organisational relationships. An exception is Gulati and 
Singh’s (1998) study of the mode of coordination in alliances, combining 
(predominantly) SNA and interviews with managers. Still, quantitative-based 
approaches prevail in the study of inter-organisational relationships, as documented 
in recent literature reviews (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Brass et al., 2004; Kilduff & 
Brass, 2010; Provan et al., 2007; Zaheer et al., 2010).  
The overarching insight across these reviews is the call for in-depth research on 
the mechanisms underlying inter-organisational relationships (Ahuja et al., 2012; 
Provan et al., 2007). To some extent, this is currently being addressed by an 
increasing cohort of scholars conducting qualitative research (Davis & Eisenhardt, 
2011; Hardy et al., 2003; Mariotti & Delbridge, 2012; Maurer & Ebers, 2006; Uzzi, 
1997). Their research builds on the richness of the qualitative analysis of inter-
organisational relationships. Of course, the decision to use SNA is strictly informed 
  250
by the researcher’s interests. Nevertheless, qualitative analyses often constrain the 
possibility of comparing and integrating research across strands (Table 22). 
I address the apparent dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative by building 
on the conceptual framework of Carley and Palmquist (1991) to develop a stepwise 
approach for extracting social network data from text. I manually extracted inter-
organisational network data from over 1,700 pages of meeting minutes in a very 
time-consuming process marked by numerous ‘backs’ and ‘forths’, which took me 
nearly a year to refine and complete. I report this process thoroughly here and I 
believe this could ease future implementations of this in-depth approach. Every step 
is described, including the hazards, solutions and reliability tests. This will allow 
interested scholars to implement this approach within their own domains of research.  
The data sources used in my approach enrich the spectrum of data sources 
previously used to gather data on social networks. Currently, self-reported data (e.g. 
questionnaires) and secondary data (e.g. datasets) are the dominant ones.  
Datasets are widely used in studying inter-organisational arrangements such as 
alliances (Baum et al., 2000; Polidoro et al., 2011) and consortia (McEvily & Zaheer, 
1999; Soda & Usai, 1999). In a recent review of research on (complete) inter-
organisational relationships, Provan et al. (2007, p. 511) establish that: ‘[a]lthough 
there is hardly any serious alternative to these quantitative methods [standardised 
questionnaires and SNA] for studying large-scale networks, additional insights into 
the structure and content of the relationships, their development over time, the initial 
conditions at founding, and changing contexts could be gained by the additional use 
of qualitative methodologies such as narrative interviews and participant 
observation’ (Table 22).  
One of the advantages of text-based data is the possibility of articulating the 
insights of the SNA with a fine-grained understanding of the unfolding mechanisms 
depicted in (monthly) accounts of the collaboration among the organisations. To the 
best of my knowledge, the use of the minutes of meetings to conduct SNA of inter-
organisational relationships, in a field that is already very eclectic in terms of 
research methods (Ibarra, Kilduff, & Tsai, 2005), remains a novel approach. I 
showed that there is much to gain from the ongoing research in sociology (Gibson, 
2005) and strategy practice (Dittrich et al., 2011) by using meeting minutes.  
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Table 22 Methodological Contributions 
 
1. Dimensions 
2. Current Research 
3. Contributions Made by this Study 
Aspects Current practice 
Method (SNA) 
Integration of 
Methodologies 
(i) Networks are often studied using datasets (Gulati & Gargiulo, 
1999; Walker et al., 1997), relying exclusively on SNA metrics (see 
Gulati & Singh, 1998, for an exception). 
(ii) Qualitative studies do not used SNA metrics (Davis & 
Eisenhardt, 2011; Hardy et al., 2003; Mariotti & Delbridge, 2012; 
Maurer & Ebers, 2006; Uzzi, 1997). 
(i) Integration of inductive research and SNA 
(ii) Use of text to extract SNA data (Carley & 
Palmquist, 1991). Stepwise approach to the 
combination of text-based data and the SNA. This 
approach can be replicated by researchers since all 
steps and reliability tests are reported. 
Data Sources (i) Self-reported data (e.g. questionnaires) (ii) Secondary data (e.g. datasets)  
(i) Minutes of meetings enrich the spectrum of data 
sources in an already eclectic field. Furthermore, 
they provide a fruitful data source through which to 
explore the richness of the phenomena underlying 
networks. 
Network 
Characteristics 
Dynamic 
(Longitudinal) 
Networks 
(i) Current research is still dominated by one-time observations 
(Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Kilduff & Brass, 2010; Zaheer et al., 
2010). 
(ii) Recent research on longitudinal networks is often limited in 
terms of the number of observation points. The unit of time is often 
one year. 
(i) Dynamic configurations of inter-organisational 
relationships 
(ii) Monthly-observed configurations of inter-
organisational relationships with multiple 
observation points; n = [8;19]. 
Complete 
Networks 
(i) Ego networks prevail in prior research and emphasis is given to 
dyads (Gulati, 1995a; Larson, 1992) and triads (Greve et al., 2010; 
Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010). 
(i) This study contributes with an analysis of seven 
complete configurations of inter-organisational 
relationships. 
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Longitudinal networks research has attracted an increasing number of scholars 
interested in dynamic configurations of inter-organisational relationships (Table 22). 
However, current research is still dominated by one-time observation; this is shown 
in recent specialised literature reviews by Borgatti and Halgin (2011), Kilduff and 
Brass (2010) and Zaheer et al. (2010). My study provides a longitudinal investigation 
of seven configurations of inter-organisational relationships in social housing 
projects. Recent research on longitudinal networks is often restricted to the use of 
years as the unit of time (Ahuja, 2000a). However, inter-organisational relationships 
often unfold as a process of incremental change, going back and forth (Ring & van 
de Ven, 1994). For instance, Vedres and Stark (2010) report that inter-personal 
relationships among Hungarian firms between 1987 and 2001 were marked by 
overlaps in their structures, with ties changing constantly. I contribute to this topic 
with a month-by-month analysis of the configurations of inter-organisational 
relationships in my seven cases. My study thereby adds greater granularity in terms 
of the unit of time used (a month), with the total number of observation points per 
case ranging from 8 to 19 months. This contributes to emerging approaches to study 
processes in social networks (Bizzi, & Langley, 2012) 
Complete networks are still scarce in a field of research dominated by research 
on ego networks (Table 22). Emphasis is given to dyads (Gulati, 1995a) and triads 
(Greve et al., 2010). However, understanding inter-organisational relationships often 
requires data on the ties among all organisations (i.e. the complete network). 
Collaborative arrangements targeting the development of a new technology are a 
typical example in which it is critical to have the benefit of mapping the complete 
network (Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011). However, as far as research on complete 
networks is concerned, ‘there is simply not very much of it’ (Provan et al., 2007, p. 
510). This study contributes with an analysis of seven complete configurations of 
inter-organisational relationships in the context of social housing projects.  
In sum, my development of an in-depth approach to the study of inter-
organisational relationships expands the literature on organisational and research 
methods. Specifically, my contribution spans across two dimensions: method and 
network characteristics. This adds to the current literature and, when integrated with 
the relevant theoretical frameworks, will allow researchers to explore further the 
theoretical mechanisms that underlie inter-organisational relationships.  
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7.5. Practical Implications 
In what follows, I will discuss the practical implications of my research. This 
study engaged with two main areas relevant for managers and policy-makers: 
England’ social housing shortage and tackling environmentally sustainable 
construction. Reflecting on the practical implications has been expressed as follows: 
‘the intelligent application of the experiences of the past to the expectations of the 
future’ (Stinchcombe, 1985a, p. 172). True to this, and based on my empirical study, 
in the following subsections I shall note numerous practical implications that point 
towards ways of delivering more for less in inter-organisational arrangements.  
7.5.1. Managerial 
This study has numerous managerial implications for the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships in the building industry, a collaboration-averse context. 
Specifically, I draw implications for managers addressing the long-lasting low 
effectiveness of such relationships, and reflect on some managerial innovations that 
might help to tackle this challenge. A debate on managerial change is particularly 
important given that the building industry, one of the largest in the UK by GDP, has 
a poor track record of effectiveness and innovation compared to other industries.  
Effectiveness is a fundamental concern in the context of the UK’s building 
industry, where projects are typically over-budget and delayed. My study contributes 
towards a fine-grained understanding of the issues of effectiveness. 
The dimension of ‘on time and on budget’, which is part of my multi-dimensional 
indicator of the consequences of coordination, captures the issues of effectiveness. 
Drawing on my findings, I argue that the juggling of the coordination mechanisms of 
organising and relating reduces the likelihood of additional building costs (for 
contractors and clients). Currently, lower costs are sought through the integration of 
the design and building stages. This aims to prevent design misspecifications (which 
are costly). For instance, in Blyth Court (Case#5), the lighting had to be replaced in 
order to comply with the CfSH. There was also no safety protection in the access to 
the lift motor room, despite several attempts to redesign the light features. Beyond 
the integration of stages, my analysis shows that one of the advantages of juggling 
coordination mechanisms is the development of cost-saving strategies throughout the 
design and build life-cycle (Table 23). 
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Alongside making cost savings, the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships leverages the potential for time-recovery strategies. Delays can occur in 
obtaining planning permits and getting supplies on site. This study provides insights 
on the ‘causes’ of delays. According to prior research (Hillebrandt, 1984; Smyth & 
Pryke, 2008) and trade reports (Latham, 1994), delays on site occur due to 
unforeseen factors, such as weather and geological conditions. My analysis confirms 
that delays can be caused by these factors; however, in some cases organisations 
recovered from these delays. Therefore, the core question is whether adequate 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships is in place.  
I have thus shed light on how the combination of current practices (e.g. the 
integration of building and design stages) and new approaches, such as the juggling 
of organising and relating, can enhance effectiveness.  
Social innovation, in this discussion, refers to innovative managerial processes 
aimed at fostering coordination among organisations, and delivery in collaborative 
arrangements. Below, I discuss how new ways of organising inter-organisational 
relationships can enhance, for example, the delivery of ‘greener’ buildings.  
The main focus in innovation has been on the technical aspects, and this is 
reflected in accounts that show that the building industry is low in terms of 
innovativeness (Winch, 2003). Although, this perspective is instructive, broadening 
the scope of innovation is also important. Taking a step back, my research shows that 
the underlying role of social innovation is the delivery of technical innovation, such 
as environmentally sustainable technology (Table 23).  
First, I argue for the rethinking of contracting practices among organisations. 
These practices have routinely been considered from a dyadic perspective; however, 
managers should also consider how the effects of contracts extend across the entire 
configuration of inter-organisational relationships (e.g. through contractual 
bottlenecks). The failure to do so might result in a dysfunctional approach, and this 
needs to change given the current vogue for inter-organisational collaboration 
arrangements (Sytch & Gulati, 2012; Zaheer et al., 2010).  
Second, and related to the abovementioned managerial implications, the presence 
of monitoring organisations is not a sufficient condition for delivering projects 
effectively; they must be hired at the right times. The conventional wisdom suggests 
that monitoring organisations are the key to a project running smoothly and can help 
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to shelter the client from risks. Although this study supports such a view, this should 
not overshadow the insight that the impact of monitoring organisations varies over 
the course of a project. Indeed, some have pointed out that employing too many 
monitoring organisations can result in a ‘confusion of consultants’ (Latham, 1994).  
Third, coordination among organisations enhances the delivery of the technical 
solutions required for greener buildings. This is a key challenge for managers as the 
UK Government has set environmental sustainability standards for new buildings 
that has often been addressed through in-built technology. However, my study shows 
several examples where this strategy was not a straightforward success. In North 
Wingfield (Case#3), the design and installation of a biomass system involved several 
coordination problems and additional work. This case clearly illustrates that the 
introduction of technical innovation94 may well be an important part of attaining a 
project goal, but its success will ultimately rest on the organisations’ ability to 
coordinate. My view is that managers need to calibrate the appointment of the main 
contractors (and their sub-contractors) according to their ability to deliver the project 
specifications. This will also foster ties among suppliers, which in turn will 
contribute to foster innovation in low-technology settings, of which the building 
industry is an example (Cox, Frenz, & Prevezer, 2002a). 
Last but not least, my study unveils some managerial implications in terms of the 
design of inter-organisational relationships. The relevance of design in terms of 
informing management has attracted the interest of some scholars (Estrin & 
Barzelay, 2011; van Aken, 2004). Design science ‘is not concerned with action itself, 
but with knowledge to be used in designing solutions, to be followed by design-
based action’ (van Aken, 2004, p. 226). In what has been mostly an intellectual 
debate, I argue that some interventions in the design of inter-organisational 
relationships could prevent the development of coordination voids. For instance, 
monitoring organisations (e.g. client) need to be involved in the appointment of the 
main contractor (as currently does), but their role should extend to the appointment 
of sub-contractors (move downstream in the supply chain).  
In sum, the managerial implications of my study are related to effectiveness and 
social innovation in managerial practices relationships. 
                                                 
94
 I focus on the adoption of technical innovations because many of these innovations are developed in 
other industries (e.g. steel) and then applied to the building industry. The challenge, therefore, is to 
make the necessary adjustments in terms of building techniques and managerial practices.   
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Table 23 Managerial and Policy-Making Implications 
 
1. Domain 2. Key Areas 3. Current Challenges/Proposed Directions  4.  Implications of this Study 
Managerial 
(i)  Efficiency 
(ii)  Social innovation 
 
 
(i) Building ‘on time and on budget’ 
(ii) ‘Confusion of consultants’ 
(iii) Low innovation, mostly technical (social 
has been less studied) 
(i) Contracting is not sufficient for the coordination of 
inter-organisational relationships; an analysis of the 
impacts of contracting on the extended configuration of 
inter-organisational relationships is required. 
(ii) The timing of the use of monitoring organisations 
matters. 
(iii) Technical innovation requires innovations in 
managerial practices. 
(iv) Greater integration downwards between the client’s 
agents and the sub-contractors would minimise ‘voids’. 
Policy-
Making 
 (i) Social housing shortage  
(ii) Environmental sustainability 
(iii) Infrastructure programmes 
 (i) Scarce financial resources and increasing 
building costs. 
(ii) As one the largest industries, the building 
industry is required to deliver more 
environmentally sustainable buildings. 
(iii) Delivery of infrastructure programmes to 
boost ailing economies and bring development. 
 (i) Building costs can be reduced based on 
collaboration between government-led organisations 
and contractors. 
(ii) The adoption of environmental sustainability 
policies for new buildings requires alignment with 
management at the project level. Top-down policies are 
likely to fail because of industry-rooted practices. 
(iii) Coordination between contractors and local council 
would reduce building costs  and increase the 
‘usefulness’ of the projects for communities. 
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7.5.2. Policy-Making  
My study informs policy-making in two areas: England’s social housing shortage 
and tackling environmentally sustainable construction. The former remains an issue 
despite the UK Government’s programmes of social housing (Hills, 2007). The latter 
reflects a wider consciousness about climate change and environmental sustainability 
at the corporate, governmental and societal levels (Ansari et al., 2011; Stern, 2006). 
England’s shortage of social housing remains a challenge for policy-makers, as 
shown in the medium-term strategy for housing (to 2015)95. Recent events, such as 
the 2009 financial crisis, have taken a toll, and led to a squeeze on public spending 
and families’ budgets (Scanlon et al., 2011). On the one hand, the figures for people 
on waiting lists for social housing are increasing. On the other, the UK Government’s 
allocation of financial resources is affected by cuts in public spending coupled with 
increasing building costs. I will focus on the latter factor since the former is 
inflexible at present. Policy-makers are required ‘to do more with less’ (Table 23).  
Policy-makers contract for the lowest bid (I acknowledge there are tending 
arrangements that give more weight to technical quality in the final decision) 
according to design briefs that stress the affordability of the material and building 
process. These results of my study lead me to cast some doubts about the value of 
this approach and suggest some policy implications. Quite simply, the lowest 
building costs do not necessarily come with the lowest bid. Low building costs stem 
from the coordination of inter-organisational relationships throughout the design and 
build life-cycle. Although all seven cases I studied were contracted based on 
providing the lowest bids, three out of seven went over budget (Cases #2, #3 and #6). 
Furthermore, coordination among organisations provided the basis for value-
engineering solutions that enabled them to offset extra costs if they emerged. I argue 
that public tending policies should include incentives to foster coordination among 
organisations as a strategy for reducing building costs (and preventing over-budget 
costs). One strategy would be to enhance the participation between government-led 
organisations (e.g. local councils and local police) and the project team on site. As 
things currently stand, ad hoc mechanisms of coordination mostly involve the 
contractors and the client’s agents. Indeed, if building costs are to be reduced, further 
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attention needs to be paid to coordination of among organisations. This is a fairly 
interesting proposition that could help to expand social housing supply while 
maintaining the current level of public spending.  
Another domain of policy implications relates to expanding the delivery of 
environmentally sustainable construction. Framed in the broader debate of climate 
change and environmental sustainability (Ansari et al., 2011; Stern, 2006), the UK 
Government’s strategy of low-carbon construction96, and its funding criteria, work 
primarily according to a top-down approach. Taking the specific example of social 
housing, the Government requires buildings to have environmental sustainability as a 
condition for funding (Table 23).  
Thought should to be given to the next stage, however: implementation at the 
project level. A great deal of the success of these policies lies in the coordination of 
dynamic inter-organisational relationships and the mechanisms that transform 
policies into action. My study shows that the successful adoption of environmental 
sustainability-targeted construction technology in new projects often depends on 
inter-organisational dynamics, from the pre-start phase to the completion of the 
projects. The current practice of hiring environmental sustainability consultants is the 
first step in bringing in specialised expertise. Consultants minimise the 
discontinuities among organisations (contractors, engineers and architects). The 
transition from policy-making to implementation requires, however, further 
coordination strategies to aid the organisations engaged in the projects.  
Clients demand certain environmental sustainability standards (e.g. ‘Level 4’ of 
the CfSH), which the architects meet by bringing in new technology. Tighter 
coordination among the architect, the main contractor and their suppliers, and the 
local council is critical. Coordination would lead to the development of joint 
solutions (instead of industry-rooted practices) that could deliver high environmental 
sustainability standards that are less technology-dependent. This is aligned with my 
other policy implications targeted at reducing building costs so as ‘to do more for 
less’. All considered, policy-makers need to be imaginative in their strategies so as to 
deliver greener buildings and keep costs under control. Contrary to the common 
thinking, my study shows that environmentally sustainable building has to be neither 
expensive nor complex. Mostly, it requires coordination among organisations 
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working across domains of organisational expertise. This is acknowledged among 
practitioners to some extent. The delivery of London Olympics 2012 shows that the 
building industry can deliver ‘on time and on budget’.  
My last policy-making implication cuts across both issues, developing social 
housing and promoting greener buildings. A further understanding of the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships is critical as we are referring to one 
of the largest sectors of the UK’s economy, and investment in public infrastructure is 
being sought by the Government as a strategy to support an ailing economy. 
According to the 2011 Autumn Statement, the UK Government has targeted the 
building industry with a multi-billion infrastructure investment plan aimed at 
fostering economic growth97. By the same token, the governments of developing 
countries and international funding agencies (e.g. EBRD, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development) are also targeting the building industry as a way to 
boost economic growth and development. Major investment programmes in roads 
and public buildings (e.g. hospitals), but also nationwide programmes involving 
small-scale projects (e.g. water pumps), are part of this strategy (Table 23).  
However, the success of any policy-making endeavour aimed at boosting 
development and economic growth through infrastructure is linked to the micro-
foundations of the dynamic inter-organisational relationships involved in delivering 
the projects. It should come as no surprise that neglecting the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships might harm the success of such investment strategies. It 
is therefore important to be able to deliver more infrastructure for less. This is surely 
no less important when the management of resources is needed to take people at the 
‘bottom of the pyramid’ out of poverty (Ansari, Munir, & Gregg, 2012). In this 
context, a key aspect of the success of the interventions is to identify the set of 
infrastructure needed by communities at the local level. Strategies for coordination 
among organisations and local representatives can bridge the gap.  
Overall, the managerial and policy-making implications of my study break away 
from the conventional view that coordination problems are addressed through ‘more 
coordination’. My overarching point is that it is possible ‘to do more for less’, less 
being contractual arrangements or technological innovation and more being more 
savings on building costs or greater environmental sustainability standards.  
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7.6. Argument Transferability: Public versus private projects and cost-
driven versus innovation-centric projects 
My research opens up possibilities for transferring the argument on 
coordination and coordination voids to nuanced contexts. In particular, it matters to 
discuss the transferability of my argument from public to private projects, as well as 
from cost-driven projects to innovation-centric projects.  
My study draws on a set of seven projects of social housing that have been 
publically-funded to address the shortcoming of social housing in several towns in 
East Midlands. Accountability is fundamental such that local housing associations 
need to justify the value of these investments. Although cost and time overruns in 
publically-funded projects are widely known to the public, private projects can 
equally experience such underperformance. I would argue that knowing more about 
public projects than private projects results from the exercise of accountability in 
public projects rather than a reflection of fundamental differences between public 
and private projects. A private developer or a household is also interested in attaining 
value for money in their projects. From a coordination perspective, client’s agents 
are employed to control the cost and oversee the design and build life cycle. The 
appointment of client’s agent is often the case in private clients, more so, if the client 
has little experience in contracting (e.g. households). Another aspect of similarity 
between public and private project relates to the supply-chain; many suppliers and 
contractors are engaged in both types of projects simultaneously. This is observed for 
small-scale projects, as those I base my study upon. For similar projects (in terms of 
size and technical complexity), the arguments developed in this should hold in 
understanding how coordination and coordination problems unfold among 
organizations working together in private projects.  
Innovation-centric projects posit another interesting area of transferability for 
my argument, specifically in terms of coordination problems. I have no evidence to 
suggest that coordination problems stem from tight budget. Rather, I find that 
coordination problems stem from the interplay between mechanisms aimed to aid 
coordination which lead to discontinuities in the social fabric. This is an important 
insight for innovation-centric collaborations. For instance, R&D collaborations often 
underperform in terms of innovation out despite substantial financial investment and 
commitment from the partners. As coordination among partners is critical, the 
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deployment of coordination mechanisms can be seen as an appealing solution. 
However, such a solution has two drawbacks. First, it increases the coordination 
costs without a necessary improvement of coordination (as suggested in prior 
literature). Second, the deployment of coordination mechanisms is less suitable for 
collaborations whereby partners combine resources and look for new solutions which 
require flexibility (as opposed to planned coordination).  Based on this study, I also 
argue that coordination voids can also develop in innovation-centric projects. The 
implications are coordination problems, as well as financial costs associated with 
implementation and low return on the financial investment by partners.  
Overall, I see potential for transferability of my argument to other contexts – 
such as, private projects and innovation-centric projects. This should not discourage 
a careful analysis of the context, though.  
 
7.7. Limitations and Further Research 
My research does not come without limitations. One is the limited diversity of 
contracting arrangements within each case. This study focuses on JCT Design and 
Build contracts. The strategy of categorising contractual relationship as ‘contract’ 
and ‘non-contract’ was appropriate for this study because it captured the key features 
of contracting, which are very similar across projects (due to standardisation). The 
contents of the contracts are an essential part of the collaborative dynamics of inter-
organisational relationships (Faems, et. al., 2008). Recent research has called for a 
fine-grained understanding of the contents of contracts (Lumineau & Quélin, 2012). 
This study suggests that contracts shape inter-organisational relationships. However, 
do the contents of the contracts shape the effects of inter-organisational 
relationships? Are effective contracts at the dyad level also effective at the inter-
organisational level?  
This research is also under a specific economic outlook: the financial crisis of 
2009 unfolded as I started my field work. The economic downturn hit the UK’s 
building industry severely and this needs to be taken into account when reading my 
findings. In the 1980s, when reporting on the findings of his research among builders 
in Boston, Eccles (1981, p. 347) warned of the need for ‘caution on reading the 
findings because this study was conducted in a State with a severely depressed 
housing industry at the time of these interviews’. I too conducted my research in a 
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depressed industry. According to the figures for construction output, the volume of 
new construction orders in 2011 dropped 14.1% from 201098. Nonetheless, my study 
has contributed to management research with insights from a deprived and low-
innovation sector of activity. 
From a methodological viewpoint, the use of the minutes of meeting was fruitful 
for studying the coordination of dynamic inter-organisational relationships. Still, 
meeting minutes have limitations, as do any other data source. The contents of the 
minutes were represented narratives of the projects. Prior research draws attention to 
the bias and partial information in other written data sources (e.g. transcripts) (Bauer 
& Gaskell, 2000). However, the use of multiple case studies in this research was 
advantageous in helping to reduce such biases. In extracting social network data from 
text-based data sources, I painstakingly built on the framework of Carley and 
Palmquist (1991) in order to develop an in-depth approach to social networks. I 
reported my approach and reliability tests in great detail so that other researchers will 
be able to use them in their research endeavours. 
I used an inclusive definition of coordination that was suitable for my study of 
inter-organisational relationships (Grandori, 1997b; van de Ven & Gordon, 1984). In 
further research, though, a fine-grained operationalisation of coordination will be 
desired. Through my interviews with practitioners, I learnt that coordination is a rich 
phenomenon. One suggestion for further research would be to investigate inter-
organisational relationships according to Thompson’s types of coordination (1967): 
sequential, reciprocal and pooled. How do sequential, reciprocal and pooled 
coordination unfold within dynamic inter-organisational relationships over time?  
Some of the directions for further research are part of my research agenda, which 
is grounded by this study. I am interested in the notion of ‘social fabric’ as opposed 
to ‘configurations’, as a concept that conveys the richness of the coordination of 
inter-organisational relationships. I am currently working towards a fine-grained 
theorising On the nature of coordination in dynamic inter-organisational 
relationships (Appendix 5.1).  
I am also interested in risk management and the evolution of the structure of inter-
organisational relationships. On the one hand, the structure of inter-organisational 
relationships influences the perceived risk. Dense configurations are perceived as 
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less risker, where risk is seen as the likelihood of collaboration by other 
organisational – that is, relational risk (Nooteboom, et. al., 1997). On the other hand, 
managers actively manage risk in inter-organisational collaborations and that affects 
ties among organisations. For instance, this study shows that monitoring 
organisations shape the configuration of inter-organisational relationships. Therefore, 
I am pursuing further insights at the intersection between these two elements: Trust 
and risk in dynamic inter-organisational (Appendix 5.1). The extensive research on 
the risk management has not been integrated with the social network approach. I 
think that research in this area is much needed. 
 In my view, conceptual refinement co-occurs with methodological rigour and 
sophistication. I have demonstrated the relevance of the use of text-based data for 
studying social networks (Gibson, 2005). With hindsight, I recognise that I 
underestimated the resources required for the development of an in-depth approach 
for my study of the coordination of inter-organisational relationships. I too 
underestimated the amount of personal learning I would have to do as a result of 
following a ‘trial and error’ approach. I trust that I have gone a long way towards 
shortcutting the implementation of this approach in further research. In the interest of 
replicating this approach, I shall share it with the community of researchers – An in-
depth approach to social network analysis: relevance, methods and applications 
(Appendix 5.1). There is enormous potential for the use of text-based sources of 
network data. Considering the difficulty of accessing longitudinal social network 
data, minutes published by publicly managed organisations provide a pool of data. 
For instance, UNICEF (The United Nations Children's Fund) provides public access 
to the minutes of their meetings regarding projects that entail inter-organisational 
relationships in developing economies. Moreover, an in-depth approach to social 
networks provides potential to move social network research forward in an area 
where meaningful analyses are scarce (see, Bizzi & Langley, 2012).  
As for further extensions in terms of the empirical setting, a suitable one could be 
related to the fast-growing literature on social enterprise. For instance, the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationships is relevant to aid organisations 
(Hardy et al., 2003), which rely on collaboration with a wide array of organisations 
and contractual arrangements in order to reach their target populations. Another 
extension would be to organisations that provide network relations for others, known 
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as ‘waving organisations’ (Ingram & Torfason, 2010).The mission of these 
organisations is to create ties among organisations. The Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, for example, ‘fund, monitor, and direct meta-organisations of non-profit 
agencies, connecting them with each other and with crucial political, social and 
economic actors’ (Gulati et al., 2012a, p. 575). However, the question is how are 
these organisations bound together? Are the actions of ‘waving organisations’ 
sufficient to produce the positive consequences?  
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Conclusion 
 
In this study, I have examined coordination and coordination problems in dynamic 
inter-organisational relationships. My findings shed light on the interplay between 
administrative coordination mechanisms and the structure of inter-organisational 
relationships. I have shown how the solution is also part of the problem in the 
coordination of inter-organisational relationship. On the one hand, coordination 
hinges on the mechanisms of organising (the use of contracting that leads to 
hierarchy) and relating (the use of monitoring organisations that leads to density). On 
the other hand, mechanisms intended to promote coordination undermine 
coordination by creating discontinuities in the social fabric of inter-organisational 
relationships. I have theorised on this point of tension based on the notion of 
coordination voids, leading to my development of a ToCV. My study provides 
theoretical contributions and insights for innovation of managerial practices.  
Coordination has attracted the interest of scholars across various fields of the 
social sciences, such as economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981), organisation 
studies (Grandori, 1997b) and strategy (Ring & van de Ven, 1992). The research 
domain of inter-organisational relationships is no exception; the alignment of actions 
and resources across organisations is part of an organisation’s everyday life (Gulati 
& Gargiulo, 1999). Contracts between organisations are regarded as the primary 
mechanism for aligning organisations transacting in the marketplace (Coase, 1937). 
Contractual relationships reduce the ‘frictions’ that underlie relationships among 
organisations, while creating safeguards against other parties’ opportunistic 
behaviour (Williamson, 1979).  
Meanwhile, organisations become increasingly embedded in configurations of 
inter-organisational ties so as to access resources that are available elsewhere and 
which they depend upon (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Thus, the relational aspects of 
networks expand the set of alternative coordination mechanisms that underlie inter-
organisational relationships (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Macaulay, 1963; Powell, 
1990). Furthermore, less costly mechanisms are required to access these resources 
and foster organisations’ competitiveness (Barney & Hansen, 1994). This signals a 
change towards the relational aspects of inter-organisational relationships such as 
trust-based ties and familiarity (Gulati, 1995a; Nooteboom et al., 1997), the structure 
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of inter-organisational relationships (Ahuja, 2000a) and attributes of arm’s-length 
(contractual) and embedded (trust-based) ties (Uzzi, 1997). 
Inter-organisational relationships are attractive for researchers and practitioners 
alike. Such ties trigger knowledge transfer (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004) and 
learning (Doz, 1996), which leverage innovation outcomes (Obstfeld, 2005) and 
organisations’ operations (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Surprisingly, there has been 
little research on how organisations align their resources and actions. This 
spectacular limitation is emphasised by the lack of research on coordination 
problems (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000), which leaves us with a one-sided story. 
Prior literature has been slow to address successive calls based on literature 
reviews for more longitudinal research in the area of inter-organisational 
relationships (Ahuja et al., 2012; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). At the same time, many 
researchers have turned to theory-building approaches in order to unravel the 
underlying mechanisms of aspects such as dynamic inter-organisational relationships 
(Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011; Maurer & Ebers, 2006). My study contributes to this 
expanding research strand by examining how coordination and coordination 
problems unfold in dynamic inter-organisational relationships.  
I investigated these questions based on a multiple-case study of seven social 
housing projects in England. Drawing on a unique integration of inductive research 
and SNA techniques, using over 3,900 pages of project documentation, my findings 
contribute towards a nuanced view of the coordination of inter-organisational 
relationships. My study has theoretical contributions to: coordination of inter-
organisational relationships, micro-foundations of dynamic inter-organisational 
relationships and research methods (social networks methods).  
I will start with the theoretical contributions directly related to the focus of my 
study: coordination. I addressed the long-standing call for research on coordination 
(Grandori, 1997a; van de Ven & Gordon, 1984). The need for a greater 
understanding of the coordination of inter-organisational relationships was recently 
noted by Gulati et al. (2012, p. 532): ‘scholars have paid less attention to the critical 
role of coordination’. Strategic management research on the coordination of inter-
organisational relationships suggests that contracting is critical to securing 
coordination. Although I found some support for this view, my findings highlight the 
interplay between contracting and the structure of inter-organisational networks. I 
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have provided an inter-organisational network perspective, complementing the 
dyadic (i.e. pairs of organisations) view that dominates the TCA. In this regard, my 
study expands our current understanding of the mechanisms used to trigger the 
coordination of inter-organisational networks but it also contributes towards 
untangling some of the empirical puzzles in prior research. For instance, this study 
moved the debate on whether contracts and trust are substitutes or complements for 
one another into the background. I argued that contracts and inter-organisational 
networks are intertwined.  
An alternative view is to discuss the effects of the interplay between contracting 
and inter-organisational networks – in other words to move away from the dyadic 
perspective (where the substitute versus complement debate is entrenched). This is 
directly connected to the longitudinal perspective I have taken in this study. 
Coordination of inter-organisational relationships requires a combination of 
mechanisms over time. The typical sequence is one of relating, organising and then 
relating again (i.e. the project is first driven by relational aspects, followed by 
contracting, and finally the development of relational assets among organisations). 
This longitudinal perspective contributes a new view to the current debate on the 
factors that underlie the high failure rates (up to 70%) of joint ventures and alliances 
(Kale & Singh, 2009). Prior research focused on the alignment of contractual 
incentives (Ariño & Torre, 1998) and relationships aspects, such as trust (Gulati, 
1995a). Can these high failure rates result from the use of a limited combination of 
different coordination mechanisms during the ventures?  
The second contribution this study makes is to the fast-growing body of research 
on the micro-foundations of dynamic inter-organisational networks (Davis & 
Eisenhardt, 2011; Mariotti & Delbridge, 2012). This literature has developed 
primarily within the field of organisation and management theory. One insight 
regarding the dynamics of inter-organisational networks is the importance of 
organisations’ characteristics. A critical example is the role of monitoring 
organisations, that is organisations performing managerial roles only (as opposed to 
other organisations such as the main contractors and the architect). I found a positive 
association between the proportion of monitoring organisations among those 
involved in a project, and the density of the inter-organisational networks.  
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I suggest that the dynamics of inter-organisational relationships are formed by the 
fabric of inter-organisational relationships. This notion emerges from the findings 
that suggest that inter-organisational networks are more than a set of ties and nodes. 
Furthermore, the structures of inter-organisational relationships (formed by nodes 
and ties) are insufficient to explain their dynamics. Consider coordination problems. 
These result from discontinuities in the social fabric of inter-organisational 
relationships, which in turn stem from the interplay between inter-organisational 
networks and mechanisms aimed at fostering coordination. This explains how 
mechanisms of coordination problems, such as contractual bottlenecks, emerge.  
The final set of contributions relates to organisational and research methods, 
specifically, in the domain of social networks. I conducted a fine-grained analysis of 
dynamic inter-organisational networks through the integration of inductive research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) with the SNA (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). I studied seven 
configurations of inter-organisational relationships on a monthly basis for over 15 
months (on average), using SNA metrics and content analysis hand-in-hand. I 
demonstrated the potential of using text-based data for studying inter-organisational 
relationships (e.g. minutes from meetings). Furthermore, I provided a detailed 
account of the steps (and common hazards, according to my experience) of this in-
depth approach to studying social networks. I hope that this will lead to a growing 
body of research aimed at theory building involving inter-organisational networks.  
The industrial context of this study had the merit of bringing the building industry 
back into management research. Since the seminal works of Eccles (1982) and 
Stinchcombe (1985), the building industry has received little attention (in 
comparison to biotechnology and telecommunications). I ‘bring the building industry 
back in’ by conducting this piece of engaged research (van de Ven, 2007). There are 
1.84 million people waiting for social housing in England and almost 5 million in the 
UK as a whole according to recent figures99. At the same time, there is increasing 
pressure to deliver environmentally sustainable construction. In-built environmental 
sustainability is paramount if the 2050 target of an 80% reduction in housing carbon 
emissions is to be achieved in the UK100. This will require coordination among 
organisations working throughout the design and build life-cycle, so that new 
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materials and building solutions can be identified and implemented. Recent 
developments in the global economy have redirected attention to the building 
industry. Multi-million investment packages funded by tax-payers’ money are being 
invested in infrastructure programmes in the UK. This policy aims to help an ailing 
economy to recover from the 2009 financial crisis. In the UK, every £1 spent on 
construction output generates a total of £2.84 in total economic activity101.  
Turning to managerial implications, one example is that the combination of 
contracting and monitoring organisations over time is found to be a more efficient 
way to deliver projects. Firstly, contracting costs are reduced because contracting is 
strategically concentrated in specific parts of the project. A similar reasoning can be 
applied to the appointment of management consultants. These aspects lead to savings 
in the building process. Secondly, the case projects that combined contracting and 
monitoring organisations over time were found to deliver ‘on time and on budget’. 
This constitutes another source of efficiency, which is critical for policy-makers 
needing to justify the expenditure of tax-payers’ money. I see the managerial 
implications of this study to be primarily in the domain of social innovation, that is, 
the adjustment of managerial practices. This complements the ongoing work on 
technical innovation (Cox et al., 2002a).  
As I approach the end of this study, I also want to explain how it informs further 
research. This study only represents the start. Other directions should be explored, 
some of which should tackle the limitations of this study. This study can be extended 
to other empirical settings, such as car manufacturing (Mariotti & Delbridge, 2012) 
and telecommunications industries (Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011), where inter-
organisational collaborations are widely used. Another key area for further research 
relates to social enterprises, where coordination among organisations is equally 
important to tackling social issues effectively. This could include organisations 
operating at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’, in whose success social relationships have a 
critical role to play (Ansari et al., 2012). 
Further research should explore in more detail the content of contracts as an 
essential aspect of collaborative inter-organisational relationships (Ariño & Torre, 
1998; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). It would be interesting to investigate to what 
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extent the contents of contracts shape inter-organisational networks and their 
evolution. What are the implications for the design of contracts? This study focused 
on a single form of contracting, informed by the case study selection criteria. 
Although this was merited so as to draw attention to the need for a network 
perspective on issues typically dealt with from a dyadic perspective, further research 
need to consider the diversity of contractual arrangements that might co-exist within 
a single arrangement (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Gulati et al., 2012a).  
In our everyday lives, perhaps far more than we acknowledge, we are part of a 
‘group of human beings trying to do something’ (Penrose, 1959). Ultimately, any 
chance of success is dependent on coordination among the members of the group. 
This task, well, is ‘like shooting a moving target’ (Thompson, 1967). However, I 
believe that such a task has to be meaningful for society, too. This is where 
management scholarship, I argue, can have a great impact: to develop insight and 
foresight about organisations and their contribution to the society as a whole.  
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APPENDICES 1 Methodology (Chapter III) 
Appendix 1.1 UK Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities 
2007 (SIC 2007) 
 
Section F Construction 
41 Construction of buildings 
41.1 Development of building projects 
41.10 Development of building projects 
41.2 Construction of residential and non-residential buildings 
41.20 Construction of residential and non-residential buildings 
41.20/1 Construction of commercial buildings 
41.20/2 Construction of domestic buildings 
42 Civil engineering 
42.1 Construction of roads and railways 
42.11 Construction of roads and motorways 
42.12 Construction of railways and underground railways 
42.13 Construction of bridges and tunnels 
42.2 Construction of utility projects 
42.21 Construction of utility projects for fluids 
42.22 Construction of utility projects for electricity and telecommunications 
42.9 Construction of other civil engineering projects 
42.91 Construction of water projects 
42.99 Construction of other civil engineering projects n.e.c.* 
43 Specialised construction activities 
43.1 Demolition and site preparation 
43.11 Demolition 
43.12 Site preparation 
43.13 Test drilling and boring 
43.2 Electrical, plumbing and other construction installation activities 
43.21 Electrical installation 
43.22 Plumbing, heat and air-conditioning installation 
43.29 Other construction installation 
43.3 Building completion and finishing 
43.31 Plastering 
43.32 Joinery installation 
43.33 Floor and wall covering 
43.34 Painting and glazing 
43.34/1 Painting 
43.34/2 Glazing 
43.39 Other building completion and finishing 
43.9 Other specialised construction activities 
43.91 Roofing activities 
43.99 Other specialised construction activities n.e.c.* 
43.99/1 Scaffold erection 
43.99/9 Specialised construction activities (other than scaffold erection) 
n.e.c.* 
* ‘Not elsewhere classified’ (n.e.c.) 
 
Source: UK Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities 2007 (SIC 2007, p. 39) – 
Structure and explanatory notes. London: Office for National Statistics. 
  
 
 
 
 
290
Appendix 1.2 RIBA’s Plan of Work Stages  
The RIBA Plan of Work describes the activities from appraisal (Stage A) of the 
client’s requirements to post practical completion (Stage L) of the project. This is 
summarised in outline as far as possible but the exact way in which different Stages 
are conducted within the overall project programme needs careful consideration at 
the outset. (It is worth noting that the RIBA Plan of Work was originally developed 
to reflect the needs of Traditional contract forms.)  
 
Source: The Outline Plan of Work 2007, The Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), London..
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Appendix 1.3 Research Project’s Brief 
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Appendix 1.4 Exploratory Interviews 
Ref. # Job Position Organisation’s activity Area of  expertise Role  Date (2010) Notes 
EI#1 Course Director for MSc 
Project and Enterprise 
Management 
Leading university in teaching of 
civil engineering  and construction 
management 
Inter-firm collaboration in the 
construction industry (e.g., large 
projects of infra-structures) 
Academic 
expert 
28th  
February 
Recorded  
Very enthusiastic. I was advised about 
the complexity of the contractual forms 
and inter-organisational relationships 
EI#2 
Senior Lecturer and Director 
of Postgraduate Research 
Leading university in the teaching of 
civil engineering  and construction 
management 
Inter-firm trust in the construction 
industry 
Academic 
expert 
3rd  
March 
Recorded  
Very supportive. He felt I was very 
well-versed with the relevant literature 
 
EI#3 
Founder and partner at 
architects’ practice Architects’ practice  
Design of medium projects across 
many industries. Experience of 
designing social housing 
developments 
Architect 4
th
  
March 
Recorded  
Exceptional insight into the 
relationships of conflict among 
organizations working in building 
projects 
EI#4 Director at one of  UK’s 
construction industry think-
thank 
Organisation in charge of the agenda 
for UK’s construction industry 
Construction. Particular interest in  
collaboration and procurement for 
environmental sustainable building 
Policy-maker  
20th  
April 
 
Recorded  
Politically-driven discourse (defensive 
approach) 
EI#5 
Professor of Construction 
Management and Economics  
Leading university in the teaching of 
civil engineering  and construction 
management 
Organisational management theory 
and management and economics in 
the construction industry 
Academic 
expert (editor of 
the leading 
academic 
journal) 
26th  
April 
 
Recorded  
Great guidance in identifying ‘problem 
misspecification’ in conceptualising 
inter-organizational collaboration in the 
building industry 
EI#6 
Professor of Technology and 
Innovation Management  
Leading business school in teaching 
and researching (focus on 
construction management) 
Adoption of innovation in complex 
industries; notably, in construction 
and health care 
Academic 
expert  
22nd  
April 
 
Recorded  
Insightful in terms of trade press. 
Pessimistic about the success of 
studying trust in the building industry 
EI#7 
Environmental sustainability 
manager  
Estates division of one of UK’s 
leading universities 
Environmental sustainability in new 
residential and university campus 
Environmental 
sustainability 
credentials 
15th  
April 
 
Recorded  
Emphasis on communication problems 
among organisation in building projects. 
Very enthusiastic 
EI#9 
Director of Business 
Development 
 One of the UK’s providers of social 
housing 
Development and management of 
housing projects (client’s perspective) 
Private client 
(charity status) 
22nd  
April 
Recorded  
Good understanding of the procurement 
arrangements. Tense during the 
interview 
EI#10 Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) at a main contractor 
UKs leading privately-owned 
contractor of construction 
 
Construction industry and offsite 
construction Main contractor  
12th  
April 
Recorded  
Great link between practice and critical 
thinking  
EI#11 
Head of Strategy and 
Sustainable Development  
One of the UK’s largest privately-
owned firms of capital works, 
regeneration and support services 
 
Environmental and social 
sustainability across main contractor’s 
the supply chain 
Main contractor 20
th
  
May 
Recorded  
Emphasis on monitoring of the supply 
chain 
EI#12 
Bid Sustainability Manager 
One of the world’s leading 
construction firms with expertise in 
construction, development of 
Management of portfolio of suppliers 
in PFI initiatives in the UK’ sector of 
health care 
Manager of  
public-private 
partnerships  
23rd  
June 
Recorded  
Emphasis on Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPP’s) in the health care sector 
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commercial and residential projects  
EI#13 
Director of funding agency 
This agency works with Local 
Authorities, Trusts, Educational and 
Corporate establishments wanting to 
apply for public funding 
Experience in project management, 
design and building funding. 
Specialised in sports and leisure 
facilities 
Consultant 
(funding raising 
on client’s 
behalf)  
5th  
June 
Recorded  
Business-oriented 
EI#14 Chief Executive of 
Professional Body in the 
building industry 
To promote the highest standards of 
professionalism in property industry 
More than 14 years board level 
experience in multi-disciplinary and 
international organisations  
Professional 
body 
17th  
May 
Recorded 
Personal opinion. Emphasis was on bad 
experiences within the building industry 
EI#15 
Director of Pre-fab company Portugal’s pioneering company in 
wooden pre-fab construction 
Prior experience in the UK’s building 
industry Pre-fab firm 
7th January 
and 3rd April 
Not recorded  
Solid understand of the industry at both 
national and internationally 
EI#16 
Head of Development and 
Strategy at a main contractor 
Portugal’s biggest and most 
innovative building firm with a 
strong presence in the renewable 
energy 
Strategic management of building 
firms (e.g. alliances and entry in new 
markets) 
Strategy and 
planning at a 
major 
contractor  
17th 
December 
(2009) 
Not recorded  
Insightful on strategic management 
practice 
EI#17 Professor of management 
and editor at an academic 
journal.  
An international business school with 
one of the world’s leading research 
centres on organisational theory 
applied to the building industry 
Researcher on inter-firm trust and 
theory of the firm 
Academic 
expert 
7th  
May 
Not recorded  
Acknowledged my good understanding 
of key debates on the theory of the firm, 
particularly on trust 
EI#18 
Private clients perspective 
(household) 
Owner of a HUF HAUS – one of 
Europe's leaders in post and beam 
design.  
Owner of a pre-fab home; this 
technique is acknowledge as an 
alternative to on-site construction 
Private client  21
st
  
May 
Via email 
Sharp identification of key collaboration 
issues among professionals private 
client’s perspective  
EI#19 
Dean's Professor of 
Leadership 
USA’s leading university in the 
management field 
Organisational behaviour scholar 
interested in trust and how it may be 
affected by political structures and 
economic conditions  
Academic 
expert 
12th  
May 
Not recorded  
Good link to the organisational 
behaviour theory 
EI#20 
Head of estates division  Estates division at one of UK’s leading universities 
Experience in managing facilities and 
new projects of university buildings 
University 
client 
15th  
June 
Not recorded  
Enthusiastic and supportive drawing 
links to personal experience 
EI#21 Professor of Information 
Systems 
University and world’s leading 
research centre on the management 
practices 
Qualitative studies of how team 
members in building projects use 
information 
Academic 
expert  
5th  
May 
Not recorded  
Informal interview at an academic 
conference 
EI#22 
Managing partner 
A research-based architectural design 
with reputation for innovation in 
regeneration and master planning. 
The challenge of designing to 
different actors across the UK  
 
Architect 
26th  
May 
Not recorded  
Key idea: architecture practice as a 
constant negotiation among actors  
EI#23 Elected member of a local 
council 
A typical council. They represent a 
public client that manages and builds 
social housing 
Public procurement of building – e.g. 
sports facilities and social housing 
Health & Safety 
Advisor 
26th  
May 
Not recorded  
Examples of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in the 
county 
EI – Exploratory Interview 
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Appendix 1.5 (A) Explanatory Interview Guide (Practitioners) 
 
Inter-firm Collaboration, Trust and the Delivery of Environmentally 
Sustainable Construction 
Exploratory interview no. ___ 
 
(To be filled in at the end of interview) 
Interviewee’s identification 
 
  Company’s name __________________________________ 
 
Date   ___ / ___ / ___ 
  Job position ______________________________________ Venue ____________ 
  Name ___________________________________________ Recorded   Y /  N 
  Contact__________________________________________  
  
 
(1 - Make sure I introduce myself and the project to the interviewee; 2 – Ensure that the interviewee has a clear 
idea about the research goals; 3 – Paraphrase the questions always the answers are vague, but follow up on 
emerging themes) 
 
A| Personal experience / sector overview   
1 – For how long have you been in the construction sector? Which job positions have you 
taken in your career?  
2 – If I might, could you please tell me what episodes in your career you remember the best? 
Why? 
3 – If you could describe the inter-firm collaboration practices in the construction sector in a 
paragraph, how would you describe them? 
4 – To what extant do you consider that the legal framework affect the collaboration among 
firms (e.g., incentives)? 
 
B| Inter-firm collaboration practices 
1 – How is inter-firm collaboration important for your business? 
2 - Which type of the companies/organisations do you need to collaborate with? Why? 
4- Which factors might hamper inter-firm collaboration? Which factors might facilitate 
collaboration? 
5 – Could you describe both a successful and unsuccessful collaboration? 
5 – Which type of contracts do you have with other companies? 
 
C| Trust 
1- If I ask you to describe trust, how would you describe it for me?  
2 - What characteristics do you look for in others, in terms of behaviours, attitudes, to assess 
whether you can trust them? 
3 – Does the level of trust influence the contracts? Could you provide with some examples? 
4- Would you have any whereby trust affects the relationship of (name of the company) and 
your suppliers? 
5 – Would you interrupt collaboration with a company and restart collaboration later on? Why?  
 
D| Value of trust  
1. Is trust important for (name of the company)? Why?   
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2 - Can you give an example of when trust was an issue? 
4. How much do you value the existence of trust in inter-firm collaboration? Why? 
4. In which situations/projects do you think that trust is more important? 
 
E| Uncertainty   
(Note: We are moving towards the end of this interview, yet I am wondering about the 
importance of the uncertainty in the construction sector for the phenomenon we have been 
describing) 
 
1. I understand uncertainty is major factor in the sector. Is that correct?  
2. Please tell me more about the sources of uncertainty. Why do these sources affect (name 
of the company)? 
3. Could you please give me an example how uncertainty can affect the level of trust? 
 
F| Sustainability  
(Note: It is my understanding that one of the reasons why (name of the company) engages in 
collaboration arrangements is to create value for the business (e.g. delivery of sustainable 
solutions for the clients.)  
 
1 – How important is collaboration for the delivery of environmental sustainable solutions in 
the buildings? 
2 – How do companies/organisations collaborate to make it possible? 
3 – If I tell you the following statement – there is a link between trust among firms and what 
those companies can delivery in terms of product environmental sustainability – how would 
you comment on it? 
 
Is there any thought you would like to add to this interview?  
(Thank the interviewee for his/her time and precious collaboration and views) 
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Appendix 1.5 (B) Exploratory Interview Guide (Researchers) 
 
Inter-firm Collaboration, Trust and the Delivery of Environmentally 
Sustainable Construction 
Exploratory interview no. ___ 
 
(To be filled in at the end of interview) 
Interviewee’s identification 
 
  Name ___________________________________________ 
 
Date   ___ / ___ / ___ 
  Job position ______________________________________ Venue ____________ 
  Name ___________________________________________ Recorded   Y /  N 
  Contact__________________________________________  
  
 
(1 - Make sure I introduce myself and the project to the interviewee; 2 – Ensure that the interviewee has a clear 
idea about the research goals; 3 – Paraphrase the questions always the answers are vague, but follow up on 
emerging themes) 
 
To introduce myself and my research project (research question; theoretical framework; and research strategy) 
 
 
A| Research question 
This research focuses on small scale projects.  
1 – How would you describe the inter-firm collaboration in the construction sector? 
2 – How would you explain the current situation of lack of trust and adversarial strategies?  
 
 
 
B| Theoretical framework 
An inevitable debate is about the nature of the construction firm (e.g., temporary structures, 
low capacity of knowledge transfer).  
1 – Would you share the view that there is a negative relationship between controls (e.g., rigid 
contracts) and trust-building among firms? 
2 – Would you agree that trust is a resource embedded in the inter-firm collaboration ties? 
Why? 
3 –What is trust in the construction sector? How would you compare it to other sectors? 
4 – How do you see the contractor’s capacity to create high-quality relationships with the 
suppliers, even though the environment is characterised by adversarial strategies and low 
levels of trust?  
 
 
C| Research strategy 
Being a large and heterogeneous sector, I have decided to study projects from a case-study 
perspective.  
1 – One of the elements of this research is the communication networks within projects, how 
do you feel that the communication practices in the sector affect research strategy? (For 
example, there is a preference of the use of the phone over the email; thus to chart the email 
flow may be not enough.) 
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D| Practical advice  
1 - Contrary to other sectors, construction is underrepresented within management research. 
Additionally it is operated by professional mostly trained in the ‘hard-sciences’.  Do you see in 
this a challenge for a management research project? Why? 
2 – From your experience, what are the main issues when doing research in this sector? 
 
 
Is there any thought you would like to add to this interview?  
(Thank the interviewee for his/her time and precious collaboration and views) 
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Appendix 1.6 List of Material 
  
Referencing System  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: I combine the wave number and the total numbers of waves (e.g. W1/12) in the referring system in order to enhance the temporal traceability of material 
within the time span of each project. 
 
 
Reference Type of Document+ Date (Wave) Description Notes (Obs.) 
Dale Lane (Case#1) 
MM01-W1/12-Case#1 Meeting Minutes (MM) Apr-08 (Wave1) Review meeting  Microsoft Word file 
MM02-W2/12-Case#1 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jun-08 (Wave 2) Progress meeting PDF file (scanned).  With handwritten 
amends to the minutes). 
MM03-W3/12-Case#1 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jul-08 (Wave3) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM04-W4/12-Case#1 Meeting Minutes (MM) Sep-08 (Wave4) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM05-W5/12-Case#1 Meeting Minutes (MM) Oct-08 (Wave5) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM06-W6/12-Case#1 Meeting Minutes (MM) Nov-08 (Wave6) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM07-W7/12-Case#1 Meeting Minutes (MM) Dec-08 (Wave7) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM08-W8/12-Case#1 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jan-09 (Wave8) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM09-W9/12-Case#1 Meeting Minutes (MM) Feb-09 (Wave9) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM01 - W1/12 – Case#1 
Type of document 
Document number 
Time-stamp (dynamic configuration inter-organisational relationships) 
Case-study number 
Number of waves (configuration of inter-organisational relationships)  
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MM10-W10/12-Case#1 Meeting Minutes (MM) Mar-09 (Wave10) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM11-W11/12-Case#1 Meeting Minutes (MM) Apr-09 (Wave11) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM12-W12/12-Case#1 Meeting Minutes (MM) May-09 (Wave12) Project Delivery Team Meeting Microsoft Word file 
MA01-W1-Case#1 Meeting Agenda (MA) Jun-08 Meeting agenda PDF file (scanned version) 
MA02-W11-Case#1 Meeting Agenda (MA) Apr-09  Meeting agenda Microsoft Word file 
SM01-W11-Case#1 Site Meeting Notes (SM) Apr-09 Notes from site meeting Microsoft Word file 
CF01-Case#1 Cash Flow Map (CF) Project document Cash Flow Map as issued by the client Microsoft Excel file 
PD01-Case#1 Project Team Directory (PD) Project document 
Directory of Organisations members 
and their contact details.  Microsoft Excel file 
BP01-Case#1 Board Paper (BP) Aug-08 Report to the Financial Planning Committee 
Annex 1 Site Visuals 
Annex 2 Site Valuation 
CC01- Case#1 Construction Contract (CC) Jul-08 Report to the Financial Planning Committee PDF file 
EE01-Case#1 Email Exchange (EE) Dec-10 Email exchange SbD officer with the local police and I. 
Electronic format (Microsoft Outlook 
message). Further information on the SbD 
certification for the building. 
PI01-Case#1 Phone Interview (PI) Dec-10 
Phone ‘interview’ between the officer 
at the local police and I regarding the 
SbD certification. 
Handwritten notes 
Fulmar Road (Case#2) 
MM01-W1/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jun-09 (Wave1) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM02-W2/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jul-09 (Wave2) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM03-W3/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Aug-09 (Wave3) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM04-W4/18Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Nov-09 (Wave4) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM05-W5/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jan-10 (Wave5) Progress meeting PDF file (Held on Jan, 5; it refers to December)*. 
MM06-W6/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Feb-10 (Wave6) Progress meeting PDF file (Held on Feb, 4; it refers to January)*. 
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MM07-W7/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Feb-10 (Wave7) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM08-W8/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Mar-10 (Wave8) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM09-W9/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Apr-10 (Wave9) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM10-W10/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) May-10 (Wave10) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM11-W11/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jul-10 (Wave11) Progress meeting PDF file (Held on Jul, 6; it refers to June)*. 
MM12-W12/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jul-10 (Wave12) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM13-W13/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Aug-10 (Wave13) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM14-W14/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Sep-10 (Wave14) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM15-W15/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Oct-10 (Wave15) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM16-W16/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Nov-10 (Wave16) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM17-W17/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Dec-10 (Wave17) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM18-W18/18-Case#2 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jan-11 (Wave18) Progress meeting PDF file 
MA01-Case#2 Meeting Agenda (MA) Jun-09 Meeting agenda and meeting schedule for the entire project. PDF file 
BP01-Case#2 Board Paper (BP) May-09 Report to the Financial Planning Committee 
PDF file  
Annex 1 Aerial view of site 
Annex 2 Maps indicating existing & 
proposed stock 
Annex 3  Indicative site view 
Annex 4 Development outputs 
CC01-Case#2 Construction Contract (CC) Dec-09 Report to the Financial Planning Committee PDF file 
PD01-Case#2 Project Team Directory (PD) Not available 
Directory of organisations members 
and their contact details.  Microsoft Word document 
CF01-Case#2 Cash Flow Map (CF) Not available Cash Flow Map as issued by the client Microsoft Excel file 
EE01-Case#2 Email Exchange (EE) Dec-10 Email exchange building control with the local council and I  
Electronic format (Microsoft Outlook 
message). Information about the 
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ownership of the plot land (given by the 
local council to the client). 
EE02-Case#2 Email Exchange (EE) Nov-10 
Email exchange between the 
Programme Delivery Manager with the 
client and  I. 
Electronic format (Microsoft Outlook 
message). Information about project 
management. 
EC01-Case#2 Environmental Certificates (EC) Feb-11 
Individual Environmental Certificates 
for the plots from 1-8 (48 pages). PDF file 
North Wingfield (Case#3) 
MM01-W1/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Feb-08 (Wave1) Development meeting PDF file (scanned version). With handwritten notes). 
MM02-W2/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Mar-08 (Wave2) Development meeting PDF file (scanned version) 
MM03-W3/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jun-08 (Wave3) Progress meeting PDF file (scanned version) 
MM04-W4/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Sep-08 (Wave4) Progress meeting PDF file (scanned version) 
MM05-W5/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Nov-08 (Wave5) Progress meeting PDF file. (Held in November, 5; it refers to October)*. 
MM06-W6/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Dec-08 (Wave6) Progress meeting PDF file. (Held in December, 3; it refers to November)*. 
MM07-W7/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jan-09 (Wave7) Progress meeting PDF file. (Held in January, 7; it refers to December, 2009)*. 
MM08-W8/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jan-09 (Wave8) Progress meeting PDF file. (Held in January, 7; it refers to December, 2009)*. 
MM09-W9/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Feb-09 (Wave9) Progress meeting PDF file. (Held in February, 3; it refers to January)*. 
MM10-W10/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jan09 (Wave10) Progress meeting PDF file. (Held in March, 4; it refers to February)*. 
MM11-W11/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Apr-09 (Wave11) Progress meeting PDF file. (Held in April, 1; it refers to March)*. 
MM12-W12/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jun-09 (Wave12) Progress meeting PDF file. (Held in June 3; it refers to May)*. 
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MM13-W13/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jul-09 (Wave13) Progress meeting PDF file. (Held in July, 1; it refers to June)*. 
MM14-W14/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jul-09 (Wave14) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM15-W15/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jul-09 (Wave15) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM16-W16/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Aug-09 (Wave16) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM17-W17/19Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Sept-09 (Wave17) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM18-W18/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Oct-09 (Wave18) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM19-W19/19-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Dec-09 (Wave10) Progress meeting PDF file 
MM20-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jan-08 Pre-start meeting  PDF file 
MM21-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Feb-08  Project Delivery Team Meeting PDF file 
MM22-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jun-08  Project Delivery Team Meeting PDF file 
MM23-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) Nov-08 Project Delivery Team Meeting Microsoft Word file 
MM24-Case#3 Meeting Minutes (MM) May-09  Site meeting PDF file 
MA01-Case#3 Meeting Agenda (MA) Jan-08  Meeting agenda 
PDF file (scanned version); With 
handwritten notes). 
Annex 1 Gantt chart 
PA01-Case#3 Planning Approvals (PA) Nov-08 Discharge of planning conditions document PDF file 
BP01-Case#3 Board Paper (BP) Jan-08  Report to the Financial Planning Committee 
Annex 1 Site layout 
Annex 2 Areal view of the site 
Annex 3 Site Valuation 
CF01-Case#3 Cash Flow Map (CF) Not available Cash Flow Map as issued by the client Microsoft Excel file 
EE01-Case#3 Email Exchange (EE) Dec-10 
Email exchange between a specialist 
supplier of environmental sustainable 
solutions and I. 
Electronic format (Microsoft Outlook 
message). Information about the biomass 
system installed in the building. 
EE02-Case#3 Email Exchange (EE) Dec-10 Email exchange between quantity 
surveyor at the main contractor and I. 
Electronic format (Microsoft Outlook 
message). Additional information on 
delays. 
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EE03-Case#3 Email Exchange (EE) Nov-10 Email exchange the project manager 
with the client and I. 
Electronic format (Microsoft Outlook 
message) 
EE04-Case#3 Email Exchange (EE) Dec-10 
Email exchange between a specialist 
consultant in environmental 
sustainability and I. 
Electronic format (Microsoft Outlook 
message) 
EE05-Case#3 Email Exchange (EE) Nov-10 
Email exchange between the building 
control officer with the local council 
and I. 
Electronic format (Microsoft Outlook 
message). Additional clarification on the 
SbD certification. 
EE06-Case#3 Email Exchange (EE) Dec-10 Email exchange between the staff 
member with the main contractor and I. 
Electronic format (Microsoft Outlook 
message).  
EE07-Case#3 Email Exchange (EE) Dec-10 Email exchange between officer at the building control and I. 
Electronic format (Microsoft Outlook 
message). Information about building 
certification and direct contact details. 
PI01-Case#3 Phone Interview (PI) Jan-11 
Phone interview between the officer at 
the local police and I regarding the 
SbD certification. 
Handwritten notes 
PI02-Case#3 Phone Interview (PI) Mar-11 Phone interview between the client’s project manager and I.  
RD01-Case#3 Related Documentation (RD) Sep-10 
INSITE, Vol.7 Issue2. (partner 
organisation’s journal) PDF file (available on-line) 
RD02-Case#3 Related Documentation (RD) Dec-10 Newsletter by the client PDF file (available on-line) 
EC01-Case#3 Environmental Certificates (EC) Jan-10 
Individual Environmental Certificates 
for the plots 1-23 (118 pages). PDF file 
Rowlett Road (Case#4) 
MM01-W1/8-Case#4 Meeting Minutes (MM) Mar-08 (Wave1) Development meeting PDF file (scanned version) 
MM02-W2/8-Case#4 Meeting Minutes (MM) May-08 (Wave2) Development meeting PDF file (Held in May, 1; it refers to April)*. 
MM03-W3/8-Case#4 Meeting Minutes (MM) May-08 (Wave3) Development meeting PDF file (Held in May, 1; it refers to April)*. 
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MM04-W4/8-Case#4 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jul-09 (Wave4) Progress meeting  PDF file 
MM05-W5/8-Case#4 Meeting Minutes (MM) Nov-09 (Wave5) Progress meeting  PDF file (Held in November13; it refers to October)*. 
MM06-W6/8-Case#4 Meeting Minutes (MM) Dec-08 (Wave6) Progress meeting  PDF file (scanned version); With handwritten notes) 
MM07-W7/8-Case#4 Meeting Minutes (MM) Feb-09 (Wave7) Progress meeting  PDF file 
MM08-W8/8-Case#4 Meeting Minutes (MM) Mar-09 (Wave8) Progress meeting  PDF file 
MM09-Case#4 Meeting Minutes (MM) May-08 Project Delivery Team Meeting Microsoft Word file 
MM10-Case#4 Meeting Minutes (MM) Feb-09 Project Delivery Team Meeting Microsoft Word file 
BP01-Case#4 Board Paper (BP) Feb-08  Report to the Financial Planning Committee 
PDF file 
Annex 1 Land and unit valuation 
Annex 2 Planning layout & elevations 
CC01-Case#4 Construction Contract (CC) Feb-08 Report to the Financial Planning Committee PDF file 
CF01-Case#4 Cash Flow Map (CF) Not available Cash Flow Map as issued by the client Microsoft Excel file 
PD01-Case#4 Project Team Directory (PD) Not available 
Directory of organisations members 
and their contact details.  Microsoft Excel file 
EE01-Case#4 Email Exchange (EE) Nov-10 Email exchange between staff member 
with the client and I. 
Electronic format (Microsoft Outlook 
message). Additional clarification about 
the management of the project. 
PI01-Case#4 Phone Interview (PI) Mar-11 
Phone interview between the project 
manager with the client and I regarding 
the maintenance of common areas. 
Handwritten  notes 
Blyth Court (Case#5) 
MM01-W1/12-Case#5 Meeting Minutes (MM) Apr-09 (Wave1) Site meeting PDF file  
MM02-W2/12-Case#5 Meeting Minutes (MM) May-09 (Wave2) Site meeting PDF file 
MM03-W3/12-Case#5 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jun-09 (Wave3) Site meeting PDF file 
MM04-W4/12-Case#5 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jul-09 (Wave4) Site meeting PDF file 
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MM05-W5/12-Case#5 Meeting Minutes (MM) Aug-09 (Wave5) Site meeting PDF file 
MM06-W6/12-Case#5 Meeting Minutes (MM) Sep-09 (Wave6) Site meeting PDF file 
MM07-W7/12-Case#5 Meeting Minutes (MM) Oct-09 (Wave7) Site meeting PDF file 
MM08-W8/12-Case#5 Meeting Minutes (MM) Nov-09 (Wave8) Site meeting PDF file 
MM09-W9/12-Case#5 Meeting Minutes (MM) Dec-09 (Wave9) Site meeting PDF file 
MM10-W10/12-Case#5 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jan-10 (Wave10) Site meeting PDF file 
MM11-W11/12-Case#5 Meeting Minutes (MM) Feb-10 (Wave11) Site meeting PDF file 
MM12-W12/12-Case#5 Meeting Minutes (MM) Mar-10 (Wave12) Site meeting PDF file 
BP01-Case#5 Board Paper (BP) Mar-09 Report to the Financial Planning Committee 
PDF file 
Annex 1 Site Layout 
Annex 2 Floor layout 
CC01-Case#5 Construction Contract (CC) Feb-09 Report to the Financial Planning Committee PDF file 
EE01-Case#5 Email Exchange (EE) Nov-10 
Email exchange between the building 
control officer with the local council 
and I. 
Electronic format (Microsoft Outlook 
message).  
EE02-Case#5 Email Exchange (EE) Nov-10 
Email exchange between the building 
control officer with the local council 
and I. 
Electronic format (Microsoft Outlook). 
Additional clarification about planning 
permission. 
EE03-Case#5 Email Exchange (EE) Nov-10 Email exchange between the architect 
and I. Electronic format (Microsoft Outlook). 
Oakley Road (Case#6) 
MM01-W1/8-Case#6 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jan-08 (Wave1) Progress meeting PDF file  
MM02-W2/8-Case#6 Meeting Minutes (MM) Feb-08 (Wave2) Progress meeting PDF file  
MM03-W3/8-Case#6 Meeting Minutes (MM) Apr-08 (Wave3) Progress meeting PDF file (Held in April, 2; it refers to March)*. 
MM04-W4/8-Case#6 Meeting Minutes (MM) May-08 (Wave4) Progress meeting PDF file (Held in May, 13; it refers to April)*. 
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MM05-W5/8-Case#6 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jun-08 (Wave5) 
 
Progress meeting PDF file (Held in June, 11; it refers to May)*. 
MM06-W6/8-Case#6 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jul-08 (Wave6) Progress meeting PDF file (Held in July, 9; it refers to June)*.  
MM07-W7/8-Case#6 Meeting Minutes (MM) Aug-08 (Wave7) Progress meeting PDF file (Held in August, 13; it refers to July)*. 
MM08-W8/8-Case#6 Meeting Minutes (MM) Sep-08 (Wave8) Progress meeting PDF file (Held in September, 10; it refers to August)*. 
BP01-Case#6 Board Paper (BP) Dec-09 Report to the Financial Planning Committee 
PDF file 
Annex 1 Grant appraisal 
Annex 2 Arial view of the site 
Annex 3 Project Outputs 
PA01-Case#6 Planning Approvals (PA) Nov-07 Planning Permission Application (Decision letter from the local council) 
PDF file (scanned version). Document 
issued before project could start on site. 
Annex1 H.M. Land Registry. 
PA02-Case#6 Planning Approvals (PA) Feb-08 
Letter from client the local council 
regarding discharging of planning 
conditions. 
PDF file (scanned version)  
 
CR01-Case#6 Contractor’s Report (CR) Dec-07 
Documents sent by the main 
contractor. It includes a letter and an 
email regarding the use of an adjoining 
site by the main contractor during the 
project (to implement a restricted area 
for keeping supplies and machinery). 
PDF file 
Annex 1 Proof of contractor’s Liability 
and Contract Works Insurances 
Annex 2 Gantt Chart of works (scanned 
version) 
Annex 3 Letter (scanned version) between 
the main contractor and adjoining 
landlord. 
Annex 4 Email (scanned version) between 
the main contractor and the local council. 
CR02-Case#6 Contractor’s Report (CR) Apr-08 
Report by the main contractor to the 
client and their agent. (It includes 
information on project progress; health 
and safety; stage of environmental 
assessment; and number of lost hours 
PDF file (scanned version) 
Annex1 Contact details for main 
contractor’s sub-contractors 
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due to inclement weather). 
CR03-Case#6 Contractor’s Report (CR) May-08 
Report by the main contractor to the 
client and their agent. (It includes 
information on project progress; health 
and safety; stage of environmental 
assessment; and number of lost hours 
due to inclement weather). 
PDF file (scanned version) 
Annex 1 Contact details for main 
contractor’s sub-contractors 
PA03-Case#6 Planning Approvals (PA) Mar-08 
Letter from the clients’ agent to the 
local council suggesting the erection of 
a fence to stop trespasses reported as 
‘historic un-authorised entries’. 
PDF file (scanned version)  
Handwritten notes where the local officer 
agrees to the erection of a fence.  
CR04-Case#6 Contractor’s Report (CR) Jun-08 
Report by the main contractor to the 
client and their agent. (It includes 
information on project progress; health 
and safety; stage of environmental 
assessment; and number of lost hours 
due to inclement weather). 
PDF file (scanned version) 
Annex 1 Contact details for main 
contractor’ sub-contractors 
CR05-Case#6 Contractor’s Report (CR) Jul-08 
Report by the main contractor to the 
client and their agent. (It includes 
information on project progress; health 
and safety; stage of environmental 
assessment; and number of lost hours 
due to inclement weather). 
PDF file (scanned version) 
Annex 1 Contact details for main 
contractor’ sub-contractors 
CR06-Case#6 Contractor’s Report (CR) Aug-08 
Report by the main contractor to the 
client and their agent. (It includes 
information on project progress; health 
and safety; stage of environmental 
assessment; and number of lost hours 
due to inclement weather). 
PDF file (scanned version) 
Annex 1 Contact details for main 
contractor’ sub-contractors 
CR07-Case#6 Contractor’s Report (CR) Sep-08 
Report by the main contractor to the 
client and their agent. (It includes 
information on project progress; health 
and safety; stage of environmental 
assessment; and number of lost hours 
PDF file (scanned version) 
Annex 1 Contact details for main 
contractor’ sub-contractors 
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due to inclement weather). 
 
Washbrook Road (Case#7) 
MM01-W1/10-Case#7 Meeting Minutes (MM) Apr-09 (Wave1) Site meeting PDF file (scanned version version) 
MM02-W2/10-Case#7 Meeting Minutes (MM) May-09 (Wave2) Site meeting PDF file (scanned version version) 
MM03-W3/10-Case#7 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jun-09 (Wave3) Site meeting PDF file (scanned version) 
MM04-W4/10-Case#7 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jul-09 (Wave4) Site meeting PDF file (scanned version) 
MM05-W5/10-Case#7 Meeting Minutes (MM) Aug-09 (Wave5) Site meeting PDF file (scanned version) 
MM06-W6/10-Case#7 Meeting Minutes (MM) Sep-09 (Wave6) Site meeting PDF file (scanned version) 
MM07-W7/10-Case#7 Meeting Minutes (MM) Oct-09 (Wave7) Site meeting PDF file (scanned version) 
MM08-W8/10-Case#7 Meeting Minutes (MM) Nov-09 (Wave8) Site meeting PDF file (scanned version) 
MM09-W9/10-Case#7 Meeting Minutes (MM) Dec-09 (Wave9) Site meeting PDF file (scanned version) 
MM10-W10/10-Case#7 Meeting Minutes (MM) Jan-10 (Wave10) Site meeting PDF file (scanned version) 
CR01-Case#7 Contractor’s Report (CR) Apr-09 
Report by the main contractor to the 
client and their agent. (It includes 
information on project progress; 
proposed programme dates; planning 
conditions and health and safety). 
PDF file (scanned version). It includes 
contact details for sub-contractors on-site. 
Annex 1 Planning Conditions Action 
Sheet 
Annex 2 Gantt chart (scanned version with 
handwritten annotations) 
PD01-Case#7 Project Team Directory (PD) Project document 
Directory of organisations and project 
managers’ contact details.  PDF file (scanned version) 
PA01-Case#7 Planning Approvals (PA) Mar-09 
Letter from the architects’ practice to 
the local council as part of the 
submission of ‘information to 
discharge the outstanding planning 
conditions’. 
PDF file (scanned version) 
Annex 1 Construction drawings 
Annex 2 Adjoining landlords’ consent to 
the building works 
Annex 3 Client’s comments on 
construction drawings 
Annex4 Copy of Certificate of Employers 
liability Insurance (for the main 
contractor) 
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CR02-Case#7 Contractor’s Report (CR) May-09 
Report by the main contractor to the 
client and their agent. (It includes 
information on project progress; 
proposed programme dates; planning 
conditions; and, cash flow). 
PDF file (scanned version). With 
handwritten notes regarding design 
changes and cash flow (amends to the 
values). 
 
CR02-Case#7 Contractor’s Report (CR) May-09 
Report by the main contractor to the 
client and their agent. (It includes 
information on project progress; 
proposed programme dates; planning 
conditions; health and safety; and, cash 
flow). 
PDF file (scanned version). With 
handwritten notes regarding design 
changes. 
Annex 1 Gantt chart (scanned version) 
Annex 2 Finishes schedule 
Annex 3 Planning Conditions Action 
Sheet 
Annex 4 Reduced Output Inspection 
(pictures on health and safety issues) 
Annex 5 e-email (scanned version) 
between the local police and the clients’ 
agent 
PA01-Case#7 Planning Approvals (PA) Jun-09 
Letter from the local council to the 
client (and return of client’s cheque as 
the local council was not charging for 
discharging conditions). 
PDF file (scanned version)  
 
CR03-Case#7 Contractor’s Report (CR) Jul-09 
Report by the main contractor to the 
client and their agent. (It includes 
information on project progress; 
proposed programme dates; planning 
conditions; health and safety; and, cash 
flow). 
PDF file (scanned version). With 
handwritten notes regarding design 
changes 
Annex 1 Finishes schedule 
Annex 2 Monitor’s Site Report  
Annex 3 Drawings; handwritten 
comments 
PA02-Case#7 Planning Approvals (PA) Jun-09 Letter from architects’ practice to the local council regarding design changes. 
PDF file (scanned version)  
 
EC01-Case#7 Environmental Certificates (EC) Feb-10 
Individual Environmental Certificates 
for the plots from 1-23 (115 pages). PDF file 
+
 I indicated the meeting as noted in the minutes even through ‘progress meeting’ and ‘site meeting’ were often used interchangeable. 
* The meetings were held at the end of each month. Exceptionally, these were also held in the first week of the following month. To account for this, I made sure I 
allocated the meeting minute to the month that it reported on instead of the month that the meeting was held. 
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Appendix 1.7 Academic Conferences and Trade Fairs 
Event Details Audience Profile Impact on My Research 
Academic Conferences* 
Lecture Series on Innovation, Imperial College 
Business School (in various occasions) 
Leading researchers and practitioners in 
the areas of innovation (e.g. Chairman 
of the Olympic Delivery Authority) 
I learnt about a diversity of topics relating to innovation from 
researchers and practitioners. I highlight the lecture by Sir John Armitt, 
Chairman of the Olympic Delivery Authority, on lessons about building 
the 2012 Olympic site. 
Lecture Series on Strategy and 
Entrepreneurship, London Business School (in 
various occasions) 
Leading researchers in the areas of 
strategy and entrepreneurship 
Discussions on various methodological and theoretical approaches 
within strategy. This was important in the early stages of my research.    
5th Workshop on Trust within and between 
Organisations. EIASM – European Institute for 
Advanced Studies in Management, 2010, Spain. 
Researchers working on trust from 
different methodological and 
theoretical traditions 
One of my early opportunities to present my ideas outside of the LSE as 
I was making sense of my readings of research on inter-organisational 
relationships and trust – my first research interest.   
Sumantra Ghoshal Conference on 
Managerially Relevant Research, London 
Business School, 2010, UK 
Leading researchers on strategy and 
organisational theory 
Opportunity to attend a showcase of research ‘in progress’ within 
strategy. I highlight works using multiple case-study research design 
and social capital theory. 
Student presentations at the EROB and ISIG 
Department of Management, LSE 
Fellow PhD students from different 
methodological and theoretical 
traditions within management 
It was a ‘safe harbour’ to present and develop my research. Fellow 
students and faculty helped me to mature ideas. They also shared 
wisdom about conducting and communicating original research.  
PhD Poster Day at the LSE (2010 and 2011) 
Fellow PhD students across social 
sciences at various stages of their 
research and community outside of the 
LSE 
Showcase of my research outside the LSE community. I recall the 
encouragement given by a strategy consultant about my multimedia 
visualisation (first tried in 2011) of dynamic inter-organisational 
relationships. 
PhD Day at the University of Reading, 2010, 
UK 
Fellow PhD students focusing on the 
various aspects of construction 
management and engineering 
I learnt tips on conducting research within the building industry (often 
an ‘outsider’ setting for management research). For instance, the 
importance of referrals to access potential interviewees.  
Construction Matter – Managing 
complexities, decisions and actions in the 
building process. CBS - Copenhagen Business 
School, Copenhagen, 2010, Denmark. 
Europe-based researchers studying the 
building industry from an 
organisational studies perspective 
One of my early presentations to researchers specialised in the building 
industry – mostly across Europe. 
First oikos Young Scholars Entrepreneurship 
Academy. Urnäsch, 2010, Switzerland 
Fellow PhD students working across 
various areas related to environmental 
sustainability 
I presented some preliminary insights from interviews and meeting 
minutes (at that time, for a couple of cases only) concerning 
environmentally sustainable construction. It was an opportunity to 
discuss environmental sustainability across fields of research.  
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INFORMS 2010 Annual Meeting. Austin, 
Texas, 2010, USA College of Organization Science 
My first presentation on the use of meeting minutes to study dynamic 
inter-organisational relationships.  
Fifth Annual Mid-Atlantic Strategy 
Colloquium (MASC 5), University of Maryland 
Smith School of Business, 2011, USA 
USA-based researchers from different 
areas of strategy and entrepreneurship 
Advice on my research design using multiple case-study research and 
social network analysis - SNA (this currently is a working paper). I also 
received practical advice on doing and publishing my research. 
SUNBELT XXXI Social Networks 
Conference, 2011, USA 
Researchers on social networks from 
various method and theoretical 
traditions. Showcase of research using 
SNA across various disciplines 
One of the most import venues for me to mature my ideas on the 
development of an in-depth approach to social networks. Methodology-
related advice from ‘users’1 of SNA techniques. 
LSE-Dauphine Doctoral Workshop, 2011, 
France 
PhD students and experienced 
researchers in organisational studies 
I had the opportunity to receive feedback on the use of meeting minutes 
as a data source on inter-organisational relationships and it linkages to  
other theoretical traditions within organisational studies 
27th EGOS Doctoral Workshop and 
Colloquium, 2011, Sweden 
Fellow PhD students and experienced  
researchers 
I learnt several tips on qualitative research from the fellow PhD 
students. My participations on the conference track focused on the trust 
allowed me to strengthen my work on trust.  
OMT/MOC Doctoral Consortium, Academy 
of Management (AoM), 2011, USA. 
Fellow PhD students and experienced  
researchers 
I had the opportunity to discuss preliminary analyses of my data (I could 
build on the feedback received at the EGOS Colloquium). I was pointed 
out directions for strengthening my research and theoretical contribution 
on coordination of inter-organisational relationships.  
4th Conference on Management & Social 
Networks, Université de Genève, 2012, 
Switzerland 
Researchers on social networks from 
various method and theoretical 
traditions  
I received feedback on my approach to SNA using meeting minutes 
from a coordination perspective. I received feedback on my novel 
approach to SNA from experienced researchers.  
Trade Events* 
Willmot Dixon Education Sector, Surrey 
Sports Centre, 2010, UK 
Architects’  practice, local councils, 
and education institutions 
Expanded my network of contacts within the building industry. 
Recruitment of interviewees 
SDRN Annual Sustainable Development 
Research Conference,  2010, London 
Various stakeholders engaged in  
environmental sustainable construction 
Understanding of the current debates in the building industry concerning 
challenges of environmental sustainable construction. 
ECOBUILD, years of 2009, 2010, and 2011, 
UK 
A wide range of international 
organisations working across the 
building industry 
Recruitment of interviewees. Talks about the building industry in the 
UK and elsewhere. I had the opportunity to observe the launch of new 
building technologies and techniques over the past few years. 
NLA/CABE breakfast seminar 
‘Simpler and Better - Housing design in 
everyone's interest’, 2011, UK 
Architects’ practices, local councils and 
housing associations   
A practitioner’s perspective on challenges and further directions for 
action concerning England’s housing sector. 
 
* The listing is organised chronologically for better reflecting the impact throughput my research journey leading to the present version of the study. 
1 I say ‘users’ intentionally. This aims to denote ‘tried and true’ SNA techniques as opposed to new ones.  
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Appendix 1.8 Inter-Rater Agreement in Codding Text-Based Social Network 
Data 
 
 
 
*** This content has been removed by the request of the author *** 
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Appendix 1.9 Illustration of Extraction of Social Network Data from Text 
 
 
 
 
 
*** This content has been removed by the request of the author *** 
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 Appendix 1.10 LSE Research Ethics Checklist 
 
RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW CHECKLIST 
 
This checklist must be completed before potential participants are approached to take 
part in any research. 
 
Section I: Applicant Details 
Name of researcher: NUNO OLIVEIRA 
Status(delete as 
appropriate): 
Undergraduate Student/MSc Student/PhD Student/Staff 
 
Email address: N.R.OLIVEIRA@LSE.AC.UK 
Contact address: 
 
HOUGHT STREET 
WC2A 2AE 
 
Telephone number: 07517477721 
 
Section II: Project Details 
Title of the proposal and brief abstract: INTER-FIRM NETWORS: THE 
INTANGIBLE ELEMENT IN BUILDING PROJECTS 
 
 
Section III:  Student Details: 
Details of study:  
Supervisor’s name: DR NATHALIE MITEV 
Email address: N.N.MITEV@LSE.AC.UK 
Contact address:  02079556029 
 
Section IV: Research Checklist 
 
Consent 
 Yes No Not 
certain 
Does the study involve participants who are in any way 
vulnerable or may have any difficulty giving consent? If 
you have answered yes or are not certain about this please 
complete Section 1 of the Research Questionnaire. 
 
As general guidance, the Research Ethics Committee feels 
that research participants under the age of 18 may be 
vulnerable. 
  
 
X 
 
Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study 
without their knowledge and consent at the time? (e.g. 
covert observation of people in public places) If you have 
answered yes or are not certain about this please complete 
Section 1 of the Research Questionnaire. 
  
 
X 
 
 
Research Design/Methodology 
   
Does the research methodology use deception? If you have    
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answered yes or are not certain about this please complete 
Section 2 of the Research Questionnaire. 
X 
Are there any significant concerns regarding the design of 
the research project?  
a) If the proposed research relates to the provision of social 
or human services is it feasible and/or appropriate that 
service users or service user representatives should be in 
some way involved in or consulted upon the development 
of the project? 
 
b) Does the project involve the handling of any sensitive 
information? 
 
If you have answered yes or not certain to these questions 
please complete Section 3 of the Research Questionnaire. 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
  
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
Financial Incentives/Sponsorship 
   
Will the independence of the research be affected by the 
source of the funding? If you have answered yes or not 
certain about this please complete Section 4 of the Research 
Questionnaire. 
  
 
X 
 
Are there payments to researchers/participants that may 
have an impact on the objectivity of the research? If you 
have answered yes or not certain about this please complete 
Section 4 of the Research Questionnaire. 
  
 
X 
 
Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses 
and compensation for time) be offered to participants? If 
you have answered yes or not certain about this please 
complete Section 4 of the Research Questionnaire. 
  
 
X 
 
 
Research Subjects 
   
Is pain or more than mild discomfort likely to result from 
the study? If you have answered yes or not certain about 
this please complete Section 5 of the Research 
Questionnaire. 
  
 
X 
 
Could the study induce unacceptable psychological stress or 
anxiety or cause harm or negative consequences beyond the 
risks encountered in normal life? Will the study involve 
prolonged or repetitive testing? If you have answered yes or 
not certain about this please complete Section 5 of the 
Research Questionnaire. 
  
 
X 
 
Are drugs, placebos or other substances to be administered 
to the study participants or will the study involve invasive, 
intrusive or potentially harmful procedures of any kind? If 
you have answered yes or not certain about this please 
complete Section 5 of the Research Questionnaire. 
  
 
X 
 
 
Risk to Researchers 
   
Do you have any doubts or concerns regarding your (or    
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your colleagues) physical or psychological wellbeing during 
the research period? If you have answered yes or not certain 
about this please complete Section 6 of the Research 
Questionnaire. 
 
X 
 
Confidentiality 
   
Do you or your supervisor have any concerns regarding 
confidentiality, privacy or data protection? If you have 
answered yes or not certain about this please complete 
Section 7 of the Research Questionnaire. 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
Dissemination 
   
 
Are there any particular groups who are likely to be harmed 
by dissemination of the results of this project? If you have 
answered yes or not certain about this please complete 
Section 8 of the Research Questionnaire. 
  
 
X 
 
 
 
Academic Research Staff 
Principal Investigator Signature: 
Date: 
 
Undergraduate/MSc Student/PhD Student 
Student Signature: 
Student Name (Please print): NUNO OLIVEIRA 
Department: DoM Department of Management 
Date: 
Date of Research Ethics Seminar attended: 
 
 
 
 
Summary of any ethical issues identified: 
 
Supervisor Signature*: 
Supervisor Name (Please print): MITEV, NATHALIE 
Department: ISIG - INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND INNOVATION GROUP 
Date: 
* By signing this document the student supervisor attests to the fact that any ethical issues raised have been dealt 
with adequately. 
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APPENDICES 2 Consequences of Coordination (Chapter IV) 
 
Appendix 2.1 Calculation of the Multidimensional Measure of Consequences of 
Coordination  
 
The aim of this appendix is twofold: to explain the calculation procedure; and to 
assuage any bias concerns.  
 
The baseline information is the set of 4 dimensions for the multidimensional 
measure of consequences of coordination in inter-organisational relationships: (1) 
‘on time and under budget’; (2) building certification; (3) environmental 
sustainability standards; and, (4) defaults to the building. These four dimensions had 
been informed by a content analysis of meeting minutes and projects reports. The 
dimension of ‘on time and budget’ was decomposed into two indicators: delays to 
project and over-budget costs. The unit of measure is as following: number of weeks 
and British Sterling Pound (£), respectively. I gathered this information from project-
related documentation. Additionally, I confirmed the information with the project 
manager for each project. The ‘building certification’ was a count of the number of 
certifications issued for each social housing project. ‘Environmental sustainability 
standards’ were operationalised as a level of environmental sustainability as issued 
by the CfSH and BRE Eco-homes certificates. These certificates classify the building 
in various levels. For instance, CfSH ranges from 1 to 6, where 6 is the highest level 
of environmental sustainability. Finally, information for the variable ‘defaults to the 
building’ was gathered from meeting minutes and project reports. This variable was 
operationalised as an inventory of defaults that affected the aesthetics and 
maintenance costs of the building (after hand-over to the client).  
Weighting of the each of the four dimensions was carried out. For each case, I 
weighted the indicators used across the four dimension of the measure for 
consequences of coordination. Consider the indicator delays. First, I computed the 
total number of weeks of delays across the 7 projects. Second, I worked out the 
proportion of the delay in each project in relation to the total of the 7 projects. 
Finally, the proportion was converted into the weighting factor (Table A).  
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Table A Weighting of Factors 
 
Delays Over-Budget Building Certs Env. Sus. Standard* Overall Value  Weight Value  Weight Value  Weight Level  Weight 
Dale Lane  Road 
(Case#1) 3 Weeks 0.30 £0 0.00 3 0.11 3 0.14 -0.05 
Fulmar Road 
(Case#2) 3 Weeks 0.30 £17,000 0.10 5 0.19 3 0.14 -0.08 
North Wingfield 
(Case#3) 2 weeks 0.20 £155,000 0.89 4 0.15 4 0.18 -0.76 
Rowlett Road 
(Case#4) On time 0.00 £0 0.00 3 0.11 3 0.14 0.25 
Blyth Court 
(Case#5) 2 weeks 0.20 £0 0.00 4 0.15 3 0.14 0.08 
Oakley Road 
(Case#6) On time 0.00 £13000 0.01 4 0.15 3 0.14 0.28 
Washbrook Road 
(Case#7) On time 0.00 £0 0.00 4 0.15 3 0.14 0.28 
Total 10 weeks 1 £173300 1 27 1 22 1  
* The CfSH and BRE Eco-homes certification are comparable.  
 
In the following step, correction factors were considered to assuage bias 
concerns. Specifically, I considered two factors. Correction factor 1 corrected for the 
number of weeks of delay in the project in relation to the forecasted completion time. 
Correction factor 2 adjusted the over-budget costs (measured in £) to forecasted 
building costs (as at the start of project). I computed a proportion of the over-budget 
costs in relation to the total building costs. Altogether, these two correction factors 
reduced skewedness influenced by project’s total building costs (correction factor 1) 
and length of the completion time (correction factor 2). Having weighted these two 
factors, an overall score was reached, as shown in Table B. 
 
Table B Measure of Inter-Organisational Relationships 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Overall Z-scores Score 
Dale Lane  Road 
(Case#1) 
0.21 0 0.46 0.12 < 0.15 Z-Score Low 
Fulmar Road 
(Case#2) 
0.11 0.01 0.44 0.38 >  0.15 Z-Score Medium 
North Wingfield 
(Case#3) 
0.08 0.05 0.46 0.10 < 0.15 Z-Score Low 
Rowlett Road 
(Case#4) 
0 0 0.25 2.31 > 1 Z-Score High 
Blyth Court 
(Case#5) 
0.17 0 0.45 0.23 > 0.15 Z-Score Medium 
Oakley Road 
(Case#6) 
0 0.01 0.29 1.92 > 1 Z-Score High 
Washbrook Road 
(Case#7) 
0 0 0.28 1.93 > 1 Z-Score High 
 
For clarity’ sake in conveying the findings, I computed an overall score of the 
multidimensional indicator of consequences of coordination that entailed three 
levels: high; medium; and low. I defined these three levels in the following way. 
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First, I compute the z-scores on this multidimensional indicator for all 7 cases. Z-
scores assess the variation of a given variable (e.g. number of weeks of delay) in 
relation to its average measure in units of standard deviations (SD). The higher it is 
the z-score the greater the consequences of coordination. A score of high denotes 
cases where the consequences of coordination among organisations lead to fully 
achieve the purpose. For instance, it refers to whether the project was delivered on 
time and at no extra costs to the client. In contrast, a score of low refers to cases 
where coordination was marginally achieved resulting in over-budget costs 
transferred to the client and delays in the project hand-over. 
The highest z-score was found in Rowlett Road (Case#4) while the lowest z-score 
was registered in Dale Lane (Case#1). Finally, I defined a threshold of three levels: 
low if z-score < 0.15; medium if z-score > 0.15; and high if z-score > 1. I think these 
are fairly reasonable thresholds. More so, if one considers that the function of those 
is to simplify data presentation only and not producing any actual. 
Overall assessment of the measure was satisfactory in terms of reliability and it 
captured the industry context. As far as biases are concerned, I consider that the 
measure was robust. Additionally, I gathered qualitative assessments about the 
attainment of inter-organisational relationships coordination. The combination of 
discrete measures with qualitative assessments was advantageous because it provided 
additional information that could not have been measured.  
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APPENDICES 3 Mechanisms of Coordination (Chapter V) 
 
Appendix 3.1 Measures of Density and Hierarchy in Inter-Organisational 
Relationships 
 
 
 
 
*** This content has been removed by the request of the author *** 
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Appendix 3.2 Calculation and Interpretation of the Measure of Variation: Z-
scores 
 
In this appendix, I explain the calculation and the interpretation of z-scores which 
I used to study variation. Given the longitudinal nature of this study, I felt the need 
to follow a standard procedure of representing the variation of variables. Moreover, 
there was requirement to standardise the values in order to prevent bias in the 
interpretation. Bias could have occurred if I had studied variation in terms of 
proportions wherein the total fluctuates over time (and therefore affects 
proportionality). I addressed this problem by using z-scores. 
Z-scores are used to measure variation of a given variable away from the average 
(µ: mean); the unit used is standard deviation (σ: SD). A z-score is given by,  
 
 
 
Where x is the value for a given variable, µ  the average and σ the standard 
deviation for x variable. Z-scores proved adequate to study variation as opposed to 
comparing absolute measures which are sensitive to two elements: (1) size of the 
configuration of inter-organisational relationships – i.e. the number of organisations; 
and (2) number of ties within the configuration of inter-organisational relationships. 
As for interpretation, consider a Z-Score of .02 for network density in January 
2010 (Wave 1). This figure shows that the network density for January 2010 is .02 
standard deviations higher than the average density for the entire configuration of 
inter-organizational relationships.  
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Appendix 3.3 Graphic Representation of the Structure of Dynamic Inter-Organisational Networks 
Case#1 Dale Lane 
Entire Configuration Wave #1 (Apr08) Wave #2 (May08) 
  
Wave #3 (Jul08) Wave #4 (Sep08) Wave #5 (Oct08) 
 
 
Wave #6 (Nov08) Wave #7 (Dec08 Wave #8 (Jan09) 
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Wave #9 (Feb09) Wave #10 (Mar09) Wave #11 (Apr09) 
 
 
 
Wave #12 (May09) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
324
 
Case#2 Fulmar Road 
Entire Configuration Wave #1 (Jun09) Wave #2 (Jul09) 
 
 
 
Wave #3 (Aug09) Wave #4 (Nov09) Wave #5 (Dec09) 
 
 
 
Wave #6 (Jan10) Wave #7 (Feb10) Wave #8 (Mar10) 
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Wave #9 (Apr10) Wave #10 (May10) Wave #11 (Jun10) 
 
 
 
Wave #12 (Jul10) Wave #13 (Aug10) Wave #14 (Sep10) 
 
 
 
Wave #15 (Oct10) Wave #16 (Nov10) Wave #17 (Dec10) 
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Wave #18 (Jan11)  
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Case#3 Northwingfield Road  
Entire Configuration Wave #1 (Jan08) Wave #2 (Feb08) 
 
 
 
Wave #3 (Mar08) Wave #4 (Jun08) Wave #5 (Aug08) 
 
 
 
Wave #6 (Sep08) Wave #7 (Nov08) Wave #8 (Dec08) 
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Wave #9 (Jan09) Wave #10 (Feb09) Wave #11 (Mar09) 
 
 
 
Wave #12 (Apr09) Wave #13 (May09) Wave #14 (Jun09) 
 
 
 
Wave #15 (Jul09) Wave #16 (Aug09) Wave #17 (Sep09) 
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Wave #18 (Oct09) Wave #19 (Dec09)  
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Case#4 - Rowlett Road 
Entire Configuration Wave #1 (Mar08) Wave #2 (May08) 
  
 
Wave #3 (Jul08) Wave #4 (Oct08) Wave #5 (Jan09) 
  
 
Wave #6 (Feb09) Wave #7 (Mar09) Wave #8 (Apr09) 
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Case#5 - Blyth Court 
Entire Configuration Wave #1 (Apr09) Wave #2 (May09) 
 
 
 
Wave #3 (Jun09) Wave #4 (Jul09) Wave #5 (Aug09) 
 
 
 
Wave #6 (Sep09) Wave 7 (Oct09) Wave #8 (Nov09) 
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Wave #9 (Dec09) Wave #10 (Jan10) Wave #11 (Feb10) 
 
 
 
Wave #12 (Mar10)   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
333
 
Case#6 - Oakley Road 
Entire Configuration Wave #1 (Jan08) Wave #2 (Feb08) 
 
 
 
Wave #3 (Mar08) Wave #4 (Apr08) Wave #5 (May08 
 
 
 
Wave #6 (Jun08) Wave #7(Jul08) Wave #8 (Aug08 
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Case#7 - Washbrook Road 
Entire Configuration Wave #1 (Apr09) Wave #2 (May09) 
  
 
Wave #3 (Jun09) Wave #4 (Jul09) Wave #5 (Aug09) 
 
 
 
Wave #6 (Sep09) Wave #7 (Oct09) Wave #8 (Nov09) 
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Wave #9 (Dec09) Wave #10 (Jan10)  
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Appendix 3.4 Coordination Mechanisms of Dynamic Inter-Organisational Relationships (Standardised values; z-scores) 
  W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 W13 W14 W15 W16 W17 W18 W19 
Dale Lane 
(Case#1) 
Contracting 0.475 -0.312 -0.706 -1.572 -0.225 0.475 -0.706 2.387 -0.225 0.377 -0.706 0.738        
Monit. Org.  0.637 -0.366 -0.616 -1.168 -0.923 -0.366 0.762 -1.010 0.762 0.762 -0.616 2.141        
Density -0.222 0.227 -0.415 -0.114 -0.137 -0.672 0.469 -1.501 -0.415 -0.267 0.321 2.725        
Hierarchy 0.848 -0.334 -0.334 -0.994 0.138 0.769 -0.334 1.447 1.447 -0.334 -0.334 -1.985        
Fulmar 
Road 
(Case#2) 
Contracting -1.644 -1.690 0.304 2.009 0.759 0.045 -0.432 0.521 1.116 -1.265 0.270 0.918 0.155 0.521 -0.395 -0.159 0.351 -1.384  
Monit. Org.  -0.256 0.278 1.241 2.925 0.043 0.043 -1.055 0.409 0.867 -0.506 -1.517 -0.506 -0.717 0.043 -0.717 -0.898 0.278 0.043  
Density -1.236 -0.576 -0.187 0.564 -0.150 0.013 -0.546 2.401 -0.485 -0.298 -0.708 -0.990 0.871 -0.616 -0.071 -0.071 -0.294 2.380  
Hierarchy 1.337 0.112 0.024 1.203 -0.016 -0.669 1.272 -0.986 -0.780 -2.015 -0.299 -0.353 -1.501 0.996 1.028 1.143 -0.028 -0.470  
North 
Wingfield 
(Case#3) 
Contracting 0.072 0.934 -0.667 0.811 2.288 1.80 -0.790 0.072 0.072 0.072 -1.159 -0.962 0.072 -1.652 -1.121 -0.398 -0.326 0.417 0.470 
Monit. Org.  0.840 0.363 1.453 -0.182 2.270 0.36 -0.590 1.126 0.840 -1.543 -1.271 -1.162 -0.590 0.363 -0.810 -0.330 0.070 -0.399 -0.810 
Density 0.558 -0.771 1.148 -1.060 -1.060 1.94 0.520 -0.720 0.810 -0.738 -0.540 -0.337 0.089 -0.341 1.213 -0.405 -0.423 -0.877 0.032 
Hierarchy 0.200 0.323 -0.046 0.361 0.179 -2.45 -0.547 1.122 -0.679 0.008 0.354 -0.174 0.135 0.595 0.112 1.213 0.562 -0.866 0.640 
Rowlett 
Road 
(Case#4) 
Contracting 0.065 -0.699 0.524 -1.810 0.524 1.048 1.048 -0.699            
Monit. Org.  -0.806 -1.151 -0.806 -0.523 0.230 1.414 1.414 0.230            
Density 0.258 -0.764 -0.571 -1.035 1.848 -0.239 -0.571 1.074            
Hierarchy -0.950 0.885 -0.163 0.885 -1.213 0.885 0.885 -1.213            
Blyth 
Court 
(Case#5) 
Contracting -0.915 -1.709 -0.563 0.184 0.335 -0.915 0.184 0.848 2.258 0.243 -0.093 0.143        
Monit. Org.  -0.655 -0.995 -0.882 -1.095 -0.223 -0.655 0.503 1.382 1.835 1.188 -0.429 0.024        
Density -0.578 -0.636 -0.552 -0.356 -0.415 -0.802 -0.688 -0.106 2.455 1.309 -0.415 0.785        
Hierarchy 0.340 -0.142 -0.205 0.120 1.168 1.225 0.378 0.468 -1.547 -2.170 0.635 -0.270        
Oakley 
Road 
(Case#6) 
 
Contracting -1.102 1.068 0.854 -1.102 -0.642 0.213 1.353 -0.642            
Monit. Org.  -0.223 0.820 0.142 -1.683 0.142 -0.536 -0.385 1.723            
Density -0.502 0.017 1.152 -0.850 -0.326 -1.043 -0.296 1.848            
Hierarchy 0.775 0.260 -1.212 0.641 1.248 -0.042 0.030 -1.700            
Washbroo
k Road 
(Case#7) 
 
Contracting -0.330 -0.428 1.580 0.943 1.307 -0.472 -0.214 0.094 -1.603 -0.876          
Monit. Org.  -0.779 -0.303 -0.779 -0.779 -0.484 -1.008 0.158 0.823 1.281 1.870          
Density -1.202 1.732 -0.343 -1.327 -0.349 -0.592 -0.339 1.070 0.806 0.543          
Hierarchy -0.124 0.303 0.332 1.268 1.098 -0.599 0.986 -0.574 -1.932 -0.759          
W – Wave (observation point in time) 
 
Contracting – Use of contracting 
Monit. Org. – Monitoring organisations  
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Appendix 3.5 Graphic Visualisation of the Variation of the Variables Underlying Organising and Relating 
Use of Contracting and Hierarchy* Monitoring Organisations and Density* Case Story (Summary) 
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Dale Lane (Case#1) provides a clear 
example of the interplay between 
administrative coordination mechanisms 
and the structure of the inter-organisational 
relationships. For instance, there are 
concomitant variations of contracting and 
hierarchy within inter-organisational 
relationships up to Wave 9 (out of 12 
waves). A similar trajectory is observable 
for the positive relation between variations 
of the proportion of monitoring 
organisations and density of inter-
organisational relationships. 
Overall Coordination+: Low 
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Fulmar Road (Case#2) is one of the 
longest projects studied (18 waves in 
total). Nonetheless, a positive variation 
between administrative coordination 
mechanisms and structure of inter-
organisational relationships is observable 
throughout the design and build life-cycle. 
Clearly, contracting has an important role 
in developing goal-congruence among 
organisations. Contracting is associated 
with hierarchy within inter-organisational 
relationships. This is observed for Wave7, 
Wave15 and Wave16. 
Overall Coordination+: Medium 
(Figure continues in the next page) 
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North Wingfield road (Case#3) has the 
longest observation period (19 waves) 
among all 7 case-studies. The conversion 
of this former colliery village into a new 
social housing development for the 
community in Derbyshire entailed a 
configuration of inter-organisational 
relationships in which density was 
constantly shaped by the use of managing 
organisations. Such a positive relationship 
was noted for the entire design and build 
life-cycle. This extended from January 
2008 to December 2009. The highest 
register of hierarchy within inter-
organisational relationships occurred early 
in Wave8 and Wave16. 
Overall Coordination+: Low 
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Rowlett Road (Case#4) experienced high 
coordination whereas the proportion of 
monitoring organisations steadily 
increased over time. Both hierarchy and 
density denoted rather unstable patterns 
over time. A unique feature to this 
configuration was, perhaps, the use in 
turns of the variation of contracting and 
monitoring organisations (i.e. 
administrative forms of coordination).  
Overall Coordination+: High 
(Figure continues in the next page) 
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Blyth Court (Case#5) was a project 
delivered by a configuration of inter-
organisational relationships characterised 
by an increasing hierarchy over time (up to 
Wave 8, out of 12 Waves) alongside a 
steady increase of contracting (for the 
same period). The hiring of monitoring 
organisations occurred mainly toward the 
end of the project (from Wave 8 onwards). 
The Blyth Court case experienced the 
longest period of negative variations on the 
proportion of monitoring organisations (8 
waves). 
Overall Coordination+: Medium 
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Oakley Road (Case#6) aimed at 
delivering a new Women’s refuge 
following the closure of the local refugee 
in 2000. Administrative coordination 
mechanisms and structural attributes of 
inter-organisational relationships over time 
evidently varied in parallel. Like Case#4, 
the newly-built social housing project in 
Oakley Road that alternated between the 
two administrative coordination 
mechanisms. A decrease of contracting 
(and therefore hierarchy) towards the end 
of the project contrasted with an increase 
of monitoring organisations (and therefore 
density). 
Overall Coordination+: High 
(Figure continues in the next page) 
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Washbrook Road (Case#7) displayed a 
pronounced closeness between the 
variations of the use of contracting and 
hierarchy over time. One important aspect 
was the steady increase of the density of 
inter-organisational relationships after 
completion of the structure of the building 
(Wave 6). The last stages of the project 
were marked by a smooth progress of 
work across a wide range organisational 
expertise, from finishings in the building 
to pruning of trees in the public way.  
Overall Coordination+: High 
 *Graphic representation of the configuration of inter-organisational relationships at every point in time is made available in Appendix 3.3. For clarity’ sake, the z-scores values 
are not displayed in the graph; however, these are reported in Appendix 3.4. 
+
 Based on the overall score of coordination consequences (Chapter IV). 
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APPENDICES 4 Coordination Problems (Chapter VI) 
 
Appendix 4.1 Contractual Bottlenecks: Contractual homophily and contractual 
centrality 
 
 
 
 
*** This content has been removed by the request of the author *** 
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Appendix 4.2 Measure of Organisational Expertise-Driven Homophily  
 
 
 
 
*** This content has been removed by the request of the author *** 
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Appendix 4.3 Graphic Representation of Dynamic Inter-Organisational Networks According to Contractual Relationship 
Case#1 Dale Lane 
Entire Configuration Wave #1 (Apr08) Wave #2 (May08) 
 
 
 
Wave #3 (Jul08) Wave #4 (Sep08) Wave #5 (Oct08) 
 
 
 
Wave #6 (Nov08) Wave #7 (Dec08 Wave #8 (Jan09) 
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Wave #9 (Feb09) Wave #10 (Mar09) Wave #11 (Apr09) 
 
 
 
Wave #12 (May09) 
  
 
  
Black-coloured nodes represent organisations on a contractual relationship 
Red-coloured nodes represent organisations on a non-contractual relationship 
  
 
 
 
 
345
 
Case#2 Fulmar Road 
Entire Configuration Wave #1 (Jun09) Wave #2 (Jul09) 
  
 
Wave #3 (Aug09) Wave #4 (Nov09) Wave #5 (Dec09) 
   
Wave #6 (Jan10) Wave #7 (Feb10) Wave #8 (Mar10) 
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Wave #9 (Apr10) Wave #10 (May10) Wave #11 (Jun10) 
  
 
Wave #12 (Jul10) Wave #13 (Aug10) Wave #14 (Sep10) 
 
 
 
Wave #15 (Oct10) Wave #16 (Nov10) Wave #17 (Dec10) 
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Wave #18 (Jan11)   
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Case#3 North Wingfield Road  
Entire Configuration Wave #1 (Jan08) Wave #2 (Feb08) 
  
 
Wave #3 (Mar08) Wave #4 (Jun08) Wave #5 (Aug08) 
 
 
 
Wave #6 (Sep08) Wave #7 (Nov08) Wave #8 (Dec08) 
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Wave #9 (Jan09) Wave #10 (Feb09) Wave #11 (Mar09) 
 
 
 
Wave #12 (Apr09) Wave #13 (May09) Wave #14 (Jun09) 
   
Wave #15 (Jul09) Wave #16 (Aug09) Wave #17 (Sep09) 
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Wave #18 (Oct09) Wave #19 (Dec09)  
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Case#4 - Rowlett Road 
Entire Configuration Wave #1 (Mar08) Wave #2 (May08) 
 
 
 
Wave #3 (Jul08) Wave #4 (Oct08) Wave #5 (Jan09) 
  
 
Wave #6 (Feb09) Wave #7 (Mar09) Wave #8 (Apr09) 
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Case#5 - Blyth Court 
Entire Configuration Wave #1 (Apr09) Wave #2 (May09) 
 
 
 
Wave #3 (Jun09) Wave #4 (Jul09) Wave #5 (Aug09) 
  
 
Wave #6 (Sep09) Wave 7 (Oct09) Wave #8 (Nov09) 
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Wave #9 (Dec09) Wave #10 (Jan10) Wave #11 (Feb10) 
 
 
 
Wave #12 (Mar10)   
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Case#6 - Oakley Road 
Entire Configuration Wave #1 (Jan08) Wave #2 (Feb08) 
 
 
 
Wave #3 (Mar08) Wave #4 (Apr08) Wave #5 (May08 
  
 
Wave #6 (Jun08) Wave #7(Jul08) Wave #8 (Aug08 
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Case#7 - Washbrook Road 
Entire Configuration Wave #1 (Apr09) Wave #2 (May09) 
   
Wave #3 (Jun09) Wave #4 (Jul09) Wave #5 (Aug09) 
 
  
Wave #6 (Sep09) Wave #7 (Oct09) Wave #8 (Nov09) 
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Wave #9 (Dec09) Wave #10 (Jan10)  
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APPENDICES 5 A Theory of Coordination Voids (Chapter VII) 
 
Appendix 5.1 Research Outputs and Further Research  
 
Working in progress 
Coordination Strategy (research stream 1) 
‘Influence of Reinforcing Cycles on Effectiveness in Interorganizational Relationships’ 
(Working paper; with Fabrice Lumineau). 
 ‘On the Nature of Coordination in Dynamic Interorganizational Relationships’ 
(Working paper). 
 
Micro-Foundations of Dynamic Inter-Organisational Relationships (research 
stream 2) 
 ‘A Theory of Coordination Voids (ToCV) in Dynamic Interorganizational 
Relationships’ 
‘Trust and Risk in Dynamic Interorganizational Networks’ (Working paper) 
 
Research Methodology (research stream 3) 
‘The Boundary (Mis)Specification Problem: A study on theory-building combining 
multiple-case study and social network analysis’ (Working paper). 
 ‘An In-Depth Approach to Social Network Analysis: Relevance, methods and 
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Conferences Papers 
Oliveira, N. (2013). Boundary (Mis)Specification in Multiple Case-Study and Social 
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Oliveira, N., Houij Gueddana, W., and Mitev, N. (2012). Two (Quite Different) 
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APPENDICES 6 A Multimedia Files 
 
Appendix 6.1 Multimedia Support for Visualisation of Dynamic Inter-
Organisational Relationships 
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